1999 (4) TMI 199 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
Classification under exemption Notification No. 1/93 - Brand name dispute - Allegations of similarity - Allegations of misuse of brand name - Limitation period for demand of duty.

Classification under Exemption Notification:
The case involved the appellants manufacturing electric switches and parts availing the benefit of exemption under Notification No. 1/93. After crossing the exemption limit, a show cause notice was issued alleging that the appellants were not entitled to the exemption due to using a brand name, "AGI Switches," similar to another entity, Ahuja General Industries' "AGI." The adjudicating authority held the brand names to be identical, attracting the Notification's provisions. However, the advocate argued significant differences in color scheme and design, emphasizing the absence of an agreement or marketing collaboration between the parties. The Tribunal noted the differences and ruled in favor of the appellants, granting them the benefit of the Notification.

Brand Name Dispute:
The central issue revolved around the alleged similarity in brand names, "AGI" and "AGI Switches," leading to a dispute over entitlement to the exemption under Notification No. 1/93. The advocate highlighted distinctions in color scheme and design elements, asserting that the differences were substantial and not minor as claimed by the adjudicating authority. Citing precedents, the advocate argued that even identical brand names do not necessarily indicate ownership by another party. The Tribunal agreed with the advocate, emphasizing the marked differences in the brand names and the lack of evidence suggesting Ahuja was not entitled to the Notification's benefits, ultimately ruling in favor of the appellants.

Limitation Period for Demand of Duty:
Regarding the limitation period for demanding duty, the advocate contended that the classification list had been approved with full disclosure of brand name usage, and as Ahuja operated in the same Central Excise Division, there was no suppression of facts. The advocate argued that the demand was time-barred as the show cause notice was issued beyond the statutory six-month period. The opposing view reiterated the findings of the lower authorities on the brand name similarity and the alleged non-disclosure of brand name usage. However, the Tribunal, having ruled in favor of the appellants on the brand name dispute, did not delve into the limitation issue, ultimately setting aside the impugned order and allowing the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.