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1982 (1) TMI 215
Issues:
- Application to produce affidavit of a witness at a late stage of trial
- Whether evidence can be brought on record after the defense is closed
- Interpretation of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Analysis:
1. The petitioner was facing trial under the Opium Act for possession of opium. The prosecution requested to introduce an affidavit of a witness, Harpal Singh, from the office of the Chemical Examiner. This request was believed to be influenced by previous court decisions highlighting the importance of such link evidence for the prosecution. However, doubts were raised on the correctness of these decisions by another judge, leading to a larger bench referral that did not materialize due to implied overruling by a Division Bench in a subsequent case.
2. The trial magistrate allowed the prosecution's application to introduce the affidavit, stating it was crucial for a just decision. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that new evidence should not be allowed after the defense is closed. Previous court decisions were cited to support this argument, emphasizing that the powers under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be exercised to the disadvantage of the accused once the defense has concluded.
3. The petitioner relied on past judgments to assert that introducing evidence after the defense is closed would be prejudicial. However, the judge expressed reluctance to follow this precedent, citing the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 311 and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, which grant wide powers to the court to ensure justice is served.
4. The judge referred to a Supreme Court case, emphasizing the court's power to call witnesses at any stage for a just decision. While acknowledging limitations on introducing new evidence after the defense concludes, the judge highlighted the importance of upholding the interests of justice above all else.
5. Ultimately, the judge held that the court's power to examine witnesses for a just decision, as provided by Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should not be restricted based on the stage of the trial. The impugned order allowing the introduction of the affidavit was deemed valid, and the petitioner's challenge was dismissed. The judgment emphasized the paramount importance of ensuring justice and following the Supreme Court's guidance on interpreting relevant legal provisions.
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1982 (1) TMI 214
Issues Involved:
1. Territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition.
2. Effectiveness of the order of removal.
3. Part of the cause of action arising in Calcutta.
4. Maintainability of the writ petition after the appellant's superannuation.
5. Applicability of writ jurisdiction against a Government company.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Territorial Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court:
The primary issue was whether the Calcutta High Court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appellant argued that a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta as the impugned order of removal was served on him at his residence in Calcutta. The Court held that in view of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ petition is maintainable if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the State of West Bengal. The Court concluded that the order of removal became effective when it was received by the appellant in Calcutta, thereby giving rise to a part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
2. Effectiveness of the Order of Removal:
The Court examined when the order of removal became effective. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, which held that an order of dismissal becomes effective only when it is communicated to the concerned officer. The Court also distinguished between the communication of an order of suspension and an order of dismissal, noting that the latter requires actual knowledge by the officer. The Court concluded that the impugned order of removal became effective when it was received by the appellant in Calcutta.
3. Part of the Cause of Action Arising in Calcutta:
The Court discussed whether the receipt of the order of removal in Calcutta constituted a part of the cause of action. It was held that the service of the order of removal was the immediate occasion giving rise to a cause of action for the appellant to move against the same before a Court or Tribunal. The Court also noted that the incidents constituting the charges against the appellant, except one, had happened in Calcutta, thereby contributing to a part of the cause of action arising in Calcutta.
4. Maintainability of the Writ Petition After the Appellant's Superannuation:
The Corporation contended that the writ petition had become infructuous as the appellant had crossed the age of superannuation during the pendency of the appeal. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan, which suggested that the High Court should ordinarily quash the order of dismissal if found illegal but should not necessarily direct payment of full back wages. The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable for the purpose of quashing the order of removal, and the issue of back wages would depend on the facts of each case.
5. Applicability of Writ Jurisdiction Against a Government Company:
The Corporation argued that no writ lies against it as it is a Government company. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decisions in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Som Prakash v. Union of India, which held that a Government company is an "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution and is subject to the same constitutional limitations as the Government. The Court concluded that the Corporation, being a Government company under the control of the Government of India, is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 and is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court.
Conclusion:
The judgment of the learned single Judge was set aside, and the case was sent back to the appropriate Bench for disposal on merits. The appeal was allowed, but there was no order for costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 213
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the court to examine the validity of the Government of India's actions.
2. Applicability and enforceability of international treaties and obligations within Indian municipal law.
3. Obligations under the Gleneagles Accord and United Nations membership.
4. Legislative action required to enforce international obligations in India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court to Examine the Validity of Government Actions:
The appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition by a single judge, who held that the Government of India's action of allowing two English cricket players, who had links with South Africa, to visit India was an act of State. Consequently, the court had no jurisdiction to examine its validity or grant the relief sought. The appellant, Civil Rights Vigilance Committee, contested this decision, arguing that the Government of India's actions violated its obligations under international treaties.
2. Applicability and Enforceability of International Treaties and Obligations within Indian Municipal Law:
The appellant argued that the obligations under the Gleneagles Accord and the United Nations should be enforceable by Indian courts. However, the court examined the constitutional provisions and found that treaties entered into by the Government of India do not automatically become part of Indian municipal law unless incorporated through legislation. Articles 245(1), Entry 14 in List-I of Schedule VII, and Article 253 of the Constitution empower Parliament to make laws for implementing treaties. Article 51 of the Constitution, though directive, is not enforceable by courts as per Article 37.
3. Obligations under the Gleneagles Accord and United Nations Membership:
The appellant contended that the Government of India's obligations under the Gleneagles Accord and its United Nations membership should prevent Boycott and Cook from entering India. However, the court held that these obligations, being part of international treaties, do not form part of municipal law unless explicitly made so by legislative action. The court cited authoritative texts and previous judgments, including the Supreme Court's decision in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, to support this view.
4. Legislative Action Required to Enforce International Obligations in India:
The court emphasized that international treaties and obligations require enabling legislation to be enforceable within Indian municipal law. The court referred to decisions from the Rajasthan High Court and Kerala High Court, which held that treaties do not form part of the law of the land unless incorporated by legislation. The Supreme Court in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin also affirmed that international covenants do not automatically become enforceable parts of Indian law without legislative action.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Government of India's obligations under the Gleneagles Accord and United Nations membership cannot be enforced by Indian courts at the instance of citizens or associations unless incorporated into Indian law through appropriate legislation. The court also declined to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, as the decision followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin and did not raise any substantial question of law of general importance.
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1982 (1) TMI 212
Issues Involved:
1. Statutory Corporation's Obligations and Powers
2. Alleged Misleading Information and Non-Disbursement of Loan
3. Principle of Promissory Estoppel
4. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Statutory Corporation's Obligations and Powers:
The appellant is a statutory Corporation established under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The Act empowers the Corporation to provide medium and long-term credit to industrial concerns, including those in the hotel industry. The Corporation operates under a Board of Directors with powers delineated in Chapter III of the Act, including granting loans or advances to industrial concerns, provided they are sufficiently secured. The Corporation also has the authority to impose conditions to protect its interests and ensure the loan is used appropriately. In case of default, the Corporation can take over management or possession of the industrial concern and transfer or realize the mortgaged property. The Act also allows the Corporation to demand immediate repayment under certain conditions, such as false information or the need to protect its interests.
2. Alleged Misleading Information and Non-Disbursement of Loan:
The respondent, a company engaged in the hotel industry, applied for a loan of Rs. 30 lakhs, which was sanctioned by the appellant-Corporation. However, after receiving pseudonymous letters alleging that the promoter-director of the respondent was involved in illegal activities, the Corporation decided not to disburse the loan. The Corporation argued that the refusal to refinance by the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and the misleading information provided by the respondent justified their decision. The Court found this argument untenable, as the Corporation had already considered the possibility of IDBI refusing to refinance and had provided for higher interest rates in such a scenario. Moreover, the Corporation was aware of the allegations against the promoter-director before finalizing the contract and creating an equitable mortgage.
3. Principle of Promissory Estoppel:
The Court invoked the principle of promissory estoppel, stating that the appellant-Corporation, after promising to advance a loan, led the respondent to alter its position to its detriment. The respondent had incurred expenses and started construction based on the promise of the loan. The Court held that the Corporation could not arbitrarily refuse to disburse the loan without rescinding the contract or releasing the mortgaged property. The Corporation's actions were not in line with sound business principles and were likely to ruin the respondent's business.
4. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226:
The appellant-Corporation argued that the dispute was purely contractual and should be resolved through a suit for breach of contract, not a writ petition under Article 226. The Court disagreed, stating that the Corporation was performing a statutory duty under Section 25 of the Act when it agreed to advance the loan. The relationship between the parties was not purely contractual but also statutory, as evidenced by the Corporation's powers to nominate directors and take over management under Sections 27 and 29 of the Act. The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable as the Corporation's refusal to disburse the loan was arbitrary and unfair, warranting judicial intervention under Article 226.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the single judge's order directing the appellant-Corporation to disburse the loan amount to the respondent in accordance with the agreement. The judgment emphasized the statutory obligations of the Corporation, the applicability of promissory estoppel, and the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226.
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1982 (1) TMI 211
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of a Single Judge vs. Division Bench in hearing applications for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Interpretation of Rule 1(q)(ii), Chapter I, Part I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules.
3. Procedural requirements for State appeals under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
4. Legislative intent behind Section 378(3) and its comparison with Section 378(4).
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of a Single Judge vs. Division Bench:
The primary question was whether an application for 'leave' to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, should be heard by a Single Judge or a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. The State Government of Madhya Pradesh contended that such an application should be treated as part of the appeal under Section 378(1) and therefore should be placed before a Division Bench. The practice in the Madhya Pradesh High Court was to list such applications before a Single Judge. The Supreme Court held that the Single Judge had no competence to entertain, hear, or dispose of the application for leave under Section 378(3) as it virtually entailed dismissal of the appeal under Section 378(1). The matter should have been dealt with by a Bench of two Judges as per Rule 1(q)(ii), Chapter I, Part I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules.
2. Interpretation of Rule 1(q)(ii), Chapter I, Part I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules:
Rule 1(q)(ii) specifies that appeals by the Provincial Government under Section 417 of the old Code (now Section 378 of the new Code) from an order of acquittal should be heard by a Bench of two Judges. The Supreme Court interpreted this rule to mean that the application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) should also be heard by a Division Bench. The Court rejected the High Court's practice of treating the application for leave as a separate entity to be heard by a Single Judge, stating that such a practice was not supported by the statutory provisions.
3. Procedural Requirements for State Appeals under Section 378:
The Court examined the procedural requirements under Section 378 of the Code. It noted that the making of an application for leave under Section 378(3) is not a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal under Section 378(1) or (2). The prayer for leave can be contained in the petition of appeal itself. The Supreme Court emphasized that the language of Section 378(3) does not support the view that there are two distinct stages-first, the application for leave and then the appeal. Instead, the appeal and the application for leave can be combined in one petition.
4. Legislative Intent behind Section 378(3) and its Comparison with Section 378(4):
The Court analyzed the legislative intent behind Section 378(3), noting that it was introduced to create a statutory restriction against the unrestricted right of appeal by the State or Central Government against orders of acquittal. The Court compared the language of Section 378(3) with Section 378(4), which deals with appeals by private complainants and requires a separate application for 'special leave.' The Court found that the legislature intended to treat State appeals differently from private complainant appeals by prescribing different procedures. The State can incorporate a prayer for leave in the memorandum of appeal, whereas a private complainant must first obtain special leave.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order that dismissed the application for leave under Section 378(3) of the Code. It directed that the application should be dealt with by a Bench of two Judges as required by Rule 1(q)(ii), Chapter I, Part I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. The Court's decision clarified the procedural requirements and jurisdictional rules for State appeals against acquittals under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
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1982 (1) TMI 210
The judgment by Sultan Singh, J. in the case stated that affidavits must be properly verified to be admissible in evidence. Affidavits lacking proper verification are considered worthless. The court held that two affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff were of no use due to improper verification. (Case citation: 1982 (1) TMI 210 - DELHI HIGH COURT)
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1982 (1) TMI 209
Issues:
Assessment of sales tax on hotels and restaurants for supply of food and drinks.
Analysis:
The judgment involves six writ petitions filed by hotel and restaurant owners challenging notices for sales tax assessment. The petitioners argue that serving food and drinks to customers does not constitute a sale, thus they are not liable for sales tax. On the contrary, the Department contends that the transactions may amount to sale under Section 2(o) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, emphasizing that the petitioners make sales across the counter and supply items outside the establishments at the same rate, warranting an inquiry by the assessing authority.
The Supreme Court's decisions in State of H.P. v. Associated Hotels of India and Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi are cited. In the former, the Court held that supplying meals to hotel guests is a contract of service, not sale, as food is an amenity incidental to the service provided. The latter case extended this principle to restaurants serving customers, stating that if the essence of the transaction is service with food supply being incidental, it does not constitute a sale.
A review petition in Northern India Caterers clarified that a transaction is eligible for sales tax if the dominant object is the sale of food, with services being incidental. The judgment emphasizes that the assessing authority must determine the intention of the transaction in each case, considering factors like separate service charges, the right to take away food, and the dominant object of the transaction.
Ultimately, the Court holds that the assessing authority must establish facts in each case to determine if the transaction constitutes a sale of food or drinks. Since only show cause notices have been issued and a detailed inquiry is pending to ascertain the nature of transactions, the Court dismisses the writ petitions without prejudice, allowing the assessing authority to make a determination based on the Supreme Court's decisions.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the need for a case-by-case analysis to ascertain whether the dominant intention of a transaction is the sale of food or drinks. It highlights the importance of considering various factors to determine if the transaction qualifies as a sale for the purpose of sales tax assessment.
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1982 (1) TMI 208
Issues:
1. Challenge to summoning and charging under Section 500, Indian Penal Code, based on limitation period.
2. Failure of the Magistrate to settle the question of limitation at the pre-cognizance stage.
3. Application of Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code, for extending the period of limitation.
4. Quashing of summoning and charging orders due to lack of jurisdiction.
5. Consideration of whether the complaint should be dismissed as being beyond limitation.
Analysis:
1. The petition challenged the summoning and charging of the petitioner under Section 500, Indian Penal Code, due to the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence beyond the limitation period. The offence was committed on May 20, 1975, with the trial ending in acquittal on February 11, 1980. The complaint should have been filed within three years of the offence, making it beyond the limitation period.
2. The petitioner's counsel argued that the Magistrate failed to address the limitation issue at the pre-cognizance stage, as the complaint was beyond limitation from the date of the defamatory material in the First Information Report. The respondent's counsel relied on Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code, for extending the period of limitation in the interest of justice, but no formal application was made for such extension.
3. The Magistrate's failure to consider the limitation issue at the pre-cognizance stage rendered the proceedings without jurisdiction. The summoning and charging orders were quashed on this basis. The petitioner's counsel contended that the complaint itself should be dismissed as being beyond limitation, citing a precedent where the Supreme Court quashed a similar order due to the complainant not seeking the benefit of Section 473.
4. It was argued that keeping the complaint pending, considering the significant time elapsed since the offence, would be futile. The complainant's failure to explain the delay from the correct starting point of limitation and the lack of justification for reviving the old matter for private vendetta were highlighted. The petition was allowed, with the proceedings quashed and the complaint dismissed.
5. The judgment emphasized the need to end litigation at a certain point, especially when the delay in filing the complaint was not adequately explained and there was no justification for reviving the matter after a significant period had passed. The dismissal of the complaint was deemed appropriate in the interest of justice and to prevent the misuse of legal proceedings for personal vendettas.
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1982 (1) TMI 207
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, which is an instrumentality or agency of the State, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Whether the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited (Respondent No. 3) is an instrumentality or agency of the State.
3. Whether a writ of certiorari can be issued against the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited.
4. Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued against the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Amenability of a Society Registered Under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act to Writ Jurisdiction:
The court examined whether a society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, which functions as an instrumentality or agency of the State, is subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The court referenced the Full Bench judgment in Ajmer Singh v. Registrar Co-operative Societies Punjab, which had concluded that a society merely registered under the Act is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. However, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, such as Som Parkash Rakhi v. Union of India and Ajoy Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, necessitated a reassessment. It was held that if a body is an instrumentality or agency of the State, it would be an 'authority' under Article 12 and thus subject to writ jurisdiction.
2. Instrumentality or Agency of the State:
The court applied the tests laid out in Ajay Hasia's case to determine whether the Mortgage Bank is an instrumentality or agency of the State. These tests include factors such as the extent of State control, financial assistance, monopoly status, and the nature of functions performed. The court found that none of these tests were conclusively satisfied in the case of the Mortgage Bank. The Mortgage Bank was not created by statute but was merely registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. It was concluded that the Mortgage Bank is not an instrumentality or agency of the State.
3. Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari:
The court examined whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against the Mortgage Bank. It was emphasized that the writ of certiorari traditionally applies to bodies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The court referenced authoritative precedents, including the Electricity Commissioners' case and Ridge v. Baldwin, to assert that certiorari is intended for bodies acting in a public capacity and under a duty to act judicially. The court concluded that the Mortgage Bank, being a private entity registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and not performing public duties, is not amenable to a writ of certiorari.
4. Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus:
The court also considered whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the Mortgage Bank. It was noted that mandamus is available against private persons only if they are under a public duty imposed by statute. The court referenced Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual, which held that mandamus does not lie against a company registered under the Companies Act unless it has public duties imposed by statute. The court found that the Mortgage Bank does not have such public duties and thus, a writ of mandamus is not maintainable against it.
Conclusion:
1. A society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, if it is an instrumentality or agency of the State, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited is not an instrumentality or agency of the State.
3. A writ of certiorari cannot be issued against the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited.
4. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued against the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited.
The petition was dismissed, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs due to the complex nature of the issues involved.
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1982 (1) TMI 206
Issues Involved:
1. Executability of the decree without a specific relief for possession.
2. Requirement of permission under the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
3. Inclusion of vendors as parties in the execution application.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Executability of the Decree Without a Specific Relief for Possession:
The petitioner contended that the decree was inexecutable as the decree-holders did not claim a relief for possession in the suit itself, thus there was no decree for possession. The petitioner argued that the High Court acted in violation of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act by granting relief of possession at the execution stage without an amendment of the plaint.
The Court noted that Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to claim possession in a suit for specific performance. The proviso to Section 22(2) allows amendment at any stage of the proceedings, including execution. The Court emphasized that the relief of possession is inherent in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale, and the amendment of the plaint could be allowed even during execution proceedings.
The Court referred to various precedents, including the Allahabad High Court's decision in *Hakim Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan* and the Calcutta High Court's decision in *Kartik Chandra Pal v. Dibakar Bhattacharjee*, which supported the view that a decree for specific performance includes the relief of possession. The Court also cited Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, which mandates the seller to deliver possession upon execution of the sale deed.
The Court concluded that the High Court's omission to allow an amendment in the plaint was not fatal, and the execution court had jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The petitioner's objection was deemed hyper-technical, and the Court upheld the High Court's order granting possession.
2. Requirement of Permission Under the Urban Land Ceiling Act:
The petitioner argued that the execution application was not maintainable without obtaining permission under Sections 26 and 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The execution court overruled this objection, and the High Court affirmed the decision.
The Court did not find merit in this objection, as the primary issue was the enforceability of the decree for specific performance and possession, which was not contingent upon the Urban Land Ceiling Act's permissions at the execution stage.
3. Inclusion of Vendors as Parties in the Execution Application:
The petitioner contended that the vendors were not originally impleaded as parties in the execution application, making it non-maintainable. The execution court directed the execution of the sale deed but refused the relief of possession, suggesting a separate suit for possession. The High Court modified the order, granting possession to the decree-holders.
The Court held that the High Court's decree included the petitioner and the vendors, making them judgment debtors. The relief of possession was inherent in the decree for specific performance, and the execution court had jurisdiction to grant possession. The Court emphasized that procedural technicalities should not impede the substantive rights of the decree-holders.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's order granting possession to the decree-holders. The Court emphasized the purpose of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and ensure complete relief to the decree-holders. The procedural objections raised by the petitioner were deemed hyper-technical, and the Court affirmed the High Court's just and equitable order.
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1982 (1) TMI 205
Issues Involved:
1. Acquittal of the accused under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
2. Interpretation of Section 2(ia)(f) and clauses (l) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
3. Applicability of the Supreme Court judgments in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mai and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia.
4. Definition and treatment of "primary food" under the Act.
5. Powers and limitations of Food Inspectors under the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Acquittal of the Accused:
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon, acquitted the accused-respondent of the charge under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The acquittal was based on the Supreme Court judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mai, which emphasized that proof of the unfitness of the article for human consumption is necessary to bring the case within its purview. The Public Analyst's report did not specify whether the 'Sabat Haldi' was unfit for human consumption or injurious to health.
2. Interpretation of Section 2(ia)(f) and Clauses (l) and (m):
Section 2(ia)(f) of the Act deems an article of food to be adulterated if it is insect-infested or otherwise unfit for human consumption. The Supreme Court in Kacheroo Mai's case held that these terms should be read conjunctively. However, amendments brought by Parliament Act No. 34 of 1976 introduced clauses (l) and (m), which distinguish between food that is injurious to health and food that is sub-standard due to natural causes. The court noted that these amendments were intended to ensure that innocent people are not unnecessarily harassed and that primary food, which is non-injurious to health, is exempted from being deemed adulterated if sub-standard due to natural causes.
3. Applicability of Supreme Court Judgments:
The State of Haryana appealed, relying on the Supreme Court judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia, which held that even slight insect infestation makes the article adulterated. However, the court noted that the amendments to the Act and the introduction of the concept of "primary food" rendered the overlapping of clauses (l) and (m) with clause (f) inapplicable. The court based its decision on its reasoning rather than solely on the Supreme Court judgments.
4. Definition and Treatment of "Primary Food":
The court emphasized that 'Sabat Haldi' is a primary food, being a produce of agriculture in its natural form. The amendments to the Act placed primary food at a different level, exempting it from being deemed adulterated if sub-standard due to natural causes and beyond human control. The court highlighted that primary food, if non-injurious to health, should not attract penal consequences even if sub-standard.
5. Powers and Limitations of Food Inspectors:
Parliament Act No. 34 of 1976 introduced a proviso to Section 10(2), restricting Food Inspectors from taking samples of primary food unless it is intended for sale as such food. This curb aims to protect producers and keepers of primary food from harassment and allows them to declare the food not for sale if suspected of adulteration. The court noted that the turmeric fingers in question could have been naturally infested by insects, and the Public Analyst's report was deficient in specifying whether the article was injurious to health or adulterated by human agency.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the amendments to the Act and the concept of primary food rendered the application of clause (f) inapplicable in this case. The deficient report of the Public Analyst and the possibility of natural insect infestation warranted the maintenance of the acquittal. The appeal by the State of Haryana was dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 204
Issues:
- Appeal against judgment and decree dated 25th Nov., 1969 of the High Court of Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 2226 of 1969.
- Challenge of dismissal order on the grounds of illegal inquiry and lack of reasonable opportunity to defend.
- Denial of arrears of salary and recovery of emoluments.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal brought by the State of U.P. against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Allahabad. The case involved the dismissal of the plaintiff, a Head Constable, following a charge-sheet and disciplinary inquiry. The plaintiff challenged his dismissal, alleging that no proper inquiry was conducted, and he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The trial Court initially dismissed the suit, but the Second Additional Civil Judge reversed this decision, holding that the charge-sheet was vague, and the plaintiff was prejudiced in his defense. The appeal Court declared the dismissal as illegal and void, remanding the matter for salary-related relief. The High Court upheld the decree, leading to the State's appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, after hearing the State's counsel, affirmed the findings of the lower courts. It was established that the plaintiff was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and was prejudiced in his defense. The charge-sheet lacked essential particulars regarding the alleged misconduct, such as the date, time, and location, which hindered the plaintiff's defense during the inquiry. Additionally, statements of witnesses from a preliminary inquiry were not disclosed to the plaintiff, further impeding his defense. The Court concluded that the dismissal order was illegal, void, and inoperative due to the denial of a fair opportunity to defend. As the plaintiff had passed away during the proceedings, the only relief available to the legal heirs was the payment of arrears of salary and other emoluments due to the deceased.
In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs, upholding the decisions of the lower courts regarding the illegality of the dismissal order and the entitlement of the deceased plaintiff's legal heirs to receive arrears of salary and other emoluments.
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1982 (1) TMI 203
Issues Involved:
1. Abuse of Process of Law
2. Jurisdiction of Rent Control Officer as a Civil Court
3. Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), Cr. P.C.
4. Validity of Criminal Complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 201 IPC
Summary:
1. Abuse of Process of Law:
The Supreme Court noted that the landlord, after losing in civil courts, initiated a frivolous criminal prosecution against the tenant, which appeared to be an abuse of the process of law. The complaint was filed by Maharaj Singh, an advocate, alleging that the appellants committed offenses u/s 193, 199, and 201 IPC.
2. Jurisdiction of Rent Control Officer as a Civil Court:
The Court examined whether the Rent Control Officer could be deemed a civil court. Section 34(1) of the Rent Act states that the District Magistrate or any authorized officer, while holding an inquiry, shall be deemed a civil court within the meaning of Sections 480 and 482 of the CrPC, 1898, and Sections 193 and 228 IPC. The Court concluded that the Rent Control Officer, being authorized by the District Magistrate, is deemed a civil court for the purposes of Section 193 IPC.
3. Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), Cr. P.C.:
Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr. P.C. prohibits any court from taking cognizance of offenses u/s 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211, and 228 IPC unless there is a complaint in writing from the court where the offense was committed. The Court held that since the Rent Control Officer is deemed a civil court, any false evidence given before it would attract Section 195(1)(b)(i), requiring a complaint from the Rent Control Officer for cognizance.
4. Validity of Criminal Complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 201 IPC:
The Court found that the complaint lacked specific allegations to constitute offenses u/s 199 and 201 IPC. There was no evidence of the appellants destroying any evidence or making false statements with the intention of screening an offender. The Court emphasized that mere rejection of evidence does not constitute falsity u/s 199 IPC. The invocation of criminal jurisdiction by the complainant, who had lost in civil proceedings, was deemed an abuse of the process of law.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and quashed the proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Secunderabad, citing abuse of the process of law and lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offenses without a complaint from the Rent Control Officer.
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1982 (1) TMI 202
Title: Central Government GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Citation: 1982 (1) TMI 202 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Summary: The Government reviewed a case where steel ingot manufacturers cleared runners and risers without duty payment, claiming exemption under Notification No. 237 of 75. The demand for duty was confirmed but later overturned. The Government held that steel melting scrap, including runners and risers, should be exempted under Notification No. 237 of 75. They concluded that Notification No. 16 of 79 did not levy duty on goods already exempted under Notification No. 237 of 75. The impugned order was set aside, and the revision application was allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 201
Issues: Interpretation of Notification No. 65 of 1972; Applicability of Rule 11 of Central Excise Rules, 1944 on refund claim.
In this judgment, the petitioners cleared yarn falling under item 18E of the Central Excise Tariff and later filed a refund claim, contending that the yarn had been used in another composite mill, making it eligible for exemption under Notification No. 65 of 1972. The Assistant Collector rejected the claim as time-barred under Rule 11, which was upheld in appeal. The petitioners argued that the time of weaving by a composite mill, not the clearance time, should determine duty liability for refund eligibility. They claimed the refund was not covered by Rule 11 but by the Limitation Act.
The government rejected the petitioners' argument, stating that even if they had a case on merits, the excess duty was paid due to error, triggering the refund claim under Rule 11. Rule 11 mandates refund claims for duties paid in error to be made within three months, extendable to one year. As the claim was filed beyond one year, it was rightly rejected as time-barred. The government emphasized that claims for excess duties due to error must be filed within one year.
Furthermore, the government found no merit in the petitioners' case regarding the interpretation of Notification No. 65 of 1972. The exemption under the notification applied only if the yarn was used in the same composite mill where it was manufactured, not in another mill. Extending the exemption to yarn used in other mills would render the condition of the exemption redundant. Therefore, the government concluded that the petitioners did not pay the duty under a mistake of law and upheld the rejection of the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 200
Issues: Classification of blended polypropylene yarn for duty exemption under Notification No. 332 of 1977, violation of natural justice in review proceedings, initiation of review proceedings within the statutory time limit.
Classification of blended polypropylene yarn:
The case involved the classification of blended polypropylene yarn for duty exemption under Notification No. 332 of 1977. The petitioners had cleared the yarn based on a clarification from the Assistant Collector, but a subsequent show-cause notice demanded duty, contending that the yarn did not qualify for the exemption. The Assistant Collector initially withdrew the notice, classifying the yarn as polypropylene yarn eligible for the benefit. However, the Collector revised this decision, stating that blended yarn was not entitled to the exemption, leading to a duty demand. The Government observed that the predominance of non-cellulosic fiber was relevant only for classification under the Central Excise Tariff, and since the Notification referred to "polypropylene yarn" specifically, it meant 100% polypropylene yarn, not blended yarn. The Government further noted that blended yarn was known and sold in the market as such, distinct from pure polypropylene yarn, supported by separate exemption notifications for polypropylene yarn and blended polypropylene yarn.
Violation of natural justice in review proceedings:
The petitioners contended that the Collector violated natural justice by not granting them a hearing during the review proceedings, despite their request. The petitioners' advocate argued that principles of natural justice were breached, and the review proceedings were beyond jurisdiction as they were not initiated within one year of the Assistant Collector's clarification. However, the Government found that the Collector had provided an opportunity for a hearing, which the petitioners failed to avail. The Government held that the Collector was not obligated to grant another hearing, concluding that the Collector had complied with the principles of natural justice.
Initiation of review proceedings within statutory time limit:
Regarding the initiation of review proceedings within the statutory time limit, the petitioners claimed that the proceedings should have been initiated within one year of the Assistant Collector's clarification. The Government clarified that the review was not of the clarification but of the original order, and since the revision by the Collector pertained to the original order, it was initiated within the prescribed one-year period as per Section 35A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Consequently, the Government rejected the petitioners' argument on the timing of the review proceedings.
In conclusion, the Government upheld the Collector's order, stating it was legally sound and declined to interfere with it. The judgment emphasized the distinction between polypropylene yarn and blended polypropylene yarn for duty exemption purposes, affirmed compliance with natural justice principles in the review process, and clarified the initiation of review proceedings within the statutory timeframe.
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1982 (1) TMI 199
The Central Government of India reviewed a case involving seven refund claims for goods supplied as ship's stores, which were rejected by the Assistant Collector. The petitioners argued that there was no delay in four cases, they were not asked for required indents, and the ship masters had signed the certificates. The Government set aside the previous order, directing the Assistant Collector to reevaluate the refund claims with a personal hearing and in compliance with natural justice principles. The revision application was disposed of accordingly.
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1982 (1) TMI 198
The Assistant Collector confirmed a duty demand on polypropylene tow. The Appellate Collector rejected the appeal, stating tow was not exempt under Notification No. 64/77. The Government upheld the decision, noting tow and staple fibre are different. Notification No. 280/79 could not apply retrospectively. The revision application was rejected.
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1982 (1) TMI 197
The Government of India rejected the revision application filed by the consignee, stating that they are liable for penal action as they did not ensure the duty paid tobacco was received from known persons. The consignee's plea of bona fides was not accepted as they failed to take necessary precautions. The order in appeal was deemed correct in law.
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1982 (1) TMI 196
The judgment by the Central Government of India allowed deductions for agency commission on Bajaj brand fans but disallowed it for Kassels brand fans sold through distributors. The discount given to distributors on Kassels fans was deemed eligible for deduction. The revision application was disposed of accordingly.
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