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• 2012 (1) TMI 432
  
  The High Court of Bombay allowed the application seeking reliefs related to issuance of No Dues Certificate and withdrawal of claims by the respondent, subject to conditions including withdrawal of proceedings before Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and keeping open the right to proceed against sureties. The respondent was directed to issue the No Dues Certificate within six weeks. The application was disposed of accordingly. (Case citation: 2012 (1) TMI 432 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT)

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• 2012 (1) TMI 431
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the Madhya Pradesh Madhyasthan Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (M.P. Act) continues to operate in view of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A.C. Act 1996).
  2. Whether the High Court's appointment of an arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996 was valid.
  3. The applicability of the principle of per incuriam to the decision in Va Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. MPSE Board and Anr.
  4. The scope and definition of "works contract" under the M.P. Act.
  5. The jurisdiction of the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal versus an independent arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996 in cases of contract termination.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Continuance of M.P. Act in View of A.C. Act 1996:
  The primary question was whether the M.P. Act, which mandates the referral of disputes to the Arbitration Tribunal, remains operative after the enactment of the A.C. Act 1996. The court analyzed Section 2(4) of the A.C. Act 1996, which states that Part-I of the A.C. Act 1996 applies to every arbitration under any other enactment unless inconsistent with that enactment. The court found that the provisions of the M.P. Act are inconsistent with the A.C. Act 1996, particularly because the M.P. Act provides for statutory arbitration even in the absence of an arbitration agreement, unlike the A.C. Act 1996.
  
  2. Validity of High Court's Appointment of Arbitrator:
  The High Court had appointed an arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996, relying on the Va Tech decision, which held that the M.P. Act is impliedly repealed by the A.C. Act 1996 where there is an arbitration clause. The Supreme Court found that this decision was rendered per incuriam (in ignorance of relevant statutory provisions and precedent) and thus could not be sustained. Consequently, the High Court's appointment of an arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996 was invalid.
  
  3. Principle of Per Incuriam:
  The court applied the principle of per incuriam, which allows a court to disregard a previous decision if it was given in ignorance of a relevant statutory provision or binding authority. The court noted that the Va Tech decision did not consider the provisions of Section 2(4) of the A.C. Act 1996 or the earlier decision in Anshuman Shukla, which highlighted the distinct features of the M.P. Act. Thus, the Va Tech decision was rendered per incuriam and could not be used as a precedent.
  
  4. Scope and Definition of "Works Contract":
  The court examined the definition of "works contract" under Section 2(i) of the M.P. Act, which includes agreements for the execution of works such as construction, repair, or maintenance of various structures. The court clarified that disputes arising out of the execution of these works must be referred to the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal as per Section 7 of the M.P. Act. However, the definition does not include disputes related to the termination or cancellation of the contract.
  
  5. Jurisdiction in Cases of Contract Termination:
  Justice Gyan Sudha Misra, while concurring with the main judgment, provided additional reasoning on the jurisdiction issue. She emphasized that disputes related to the termination or cancellation of a works contract do not fall within the definition of "works contract" under the M.P. Act. Therefore, such disputes should be referred to an independent arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996, not the M.P. State Arbitration Tribunal. This distinction was crucial in determining the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment based on the Va Tech decision was set aside. The court held that arbitration proceedings should proceed under the M.P. Act of 1983 and not under the A.C. Act 1996. However, in cases where the works contract itself has been terminated, the dispute should be referred to an independent arbitrator under the A.C. Act 1996. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench to resolve the divergence in views.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 430
  

  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal questions presented in this judgment are:

  • Whether a person who has not been served with a statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be subsequently arraigned as an accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Whether the absence of a statutory notice affects the maintainability of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • Whether the powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to join a person as an accused in a complaint that is otherwise not maintainable.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Arraignment of an Accused Without Statutory Notice

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act requires that a statutory notice be served to the drawer of the cheque. Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for the arraignment of additional accused during the trial.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court emphasized that the statutory notice under Section 138 is a fundamental requirement for the maintainability of a complaint. Without such notice, the cause of action does not arise, and thus, the complaint is not maintainable.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: It was found that no statutory notice was served upon the petitioner, who was sought to be arraigned as an accused.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the legal requirement of statutory notice to the facts, concluding that the absence of notice precluded the maintainability of the complaint against the petitioner.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court rejected the argument that the powers under Section 319 could be used to rectify the absence of a statutory notice, asserting that such powers cannot make an otherwise non-maintainable complaint valid.
  • Conclusions: The court concluded that the petitioner could not be arraigned as an accused under Section 319 in the absence of a statutory notice under Section 138.

  Issue 2: Maintainability of Complaint Without Statutory Notice

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act outlines the conditions under which a complaint is maintainable, including the issuance and service of a statutory notice.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court reiterated that the statutory notice is a prerequisite for a valid complaint under Section 138, and its absence renders the complaint non-maintainable.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The evidence showed that no notice was served on the petitioner, and the complaint was filed against an individual who was not the drawer of the cheque.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the statutory requirements to the facts, determining that the complaint was not maintainable due to the absence of notice.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The argument that the statutory notice requirement could be bypassed was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the necessity of adhering to procedural requirements.
  • Conclusions: The court concluded that the complaint was not maintainable without the statutory notice, and thus, the petitioner could not be prosecuted under Section 138.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  • Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "A person who is not issued and/or served with the notice as required under Clause(b) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no complaint can be filed against him for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act."
  • Core Principles Established: The necessity of serving a statutory notice under Section 138 for a complaint to be maintainable. The limitations of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in rectifying procedural deficiencies in complaints.
  • Final Determinations on Each Issue: The court quashed the order of the revisional court and restored the decision of the Judicial Magistrate, dismissing the application to arraign the petitioner as an accused.

  The judgment underscores the critical importance of procedural compliance in legal proceedings, particularly in cases involving the Negotiable Instruments Act. The decision highlights that statutory requirements, such as the issuance and service of notice, are indispensable for the maintainability of complaints and cannot be circumvented through the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 429
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in this case are the maintainability of a suit challenging a compromise decree passed by a revenue court under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and the applicability of Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases.
  
  Issue 1: Maintainability of the suit before a civil court
  
  The Appellant filed a suit seeking to declare a decree passed by the Assistant Collector as fraudulent and not binding. The Defendants contended that the suit was beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Munsif initially held the suit was not maintainable, but the Additional District Judge allowed an appeal stating that the suit was based on fraudulent grounds, making it suitable for a civil court. However, the Defendants later raised a new objection under Order XXIII Rule 3-A, which was dismissed by the Munsif but upheld by the High Court.
  
  Issue 2: Applicability of Order XXIII Rule 3-A
  
  Order XXIII Rule 3-A prohibits the institution of a separate suit to set aside a decree based on a compromise that was not lawful. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, which clarified the purpose of the rule and emphasized the need to question compromises before the court that recorded them. While the High Court relied on this rule to declare the suit not maintainable, the Supreme Court highlighted that revenue courts lack the expertise to handle fraud allegations with criminal implications. The Court held that the civil court has inherent jurisdiction to try civil disputes unless expressly barred, and Order XXIII Rule 3-A does not prevent suits challenging decrees from limited jurisdiction authorities.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decision on the suit's maintainability. The case was directed to be restored before the Munsif for expedited resolution, emphasizing the need to address the issue promptly after being stuck for 31 years. No costs were awarded in the appeal.
  

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• 2012 (1) TMI 428
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of filing a single complaint for multiple dishonoured cheques.
  2. Applicability of Section 219 of the Criminal Procedural Code, 1860.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Legality of filing a single complaint for multiple dishonoured cheques.

  The petitioner challenged the order dated 15.4.2011 by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, which issued summons against the petitioner for dishonoured cheques. The petitioner argued that respondent No. 2 filed one complaint for 14 dishonoured cheques, which is against the legal precedent that allows a maximum of three dishonoured cheques per complaint. The petitioner relied on the case of Kershi Pirozsha Bhagvagar v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 2007 Cri.L.J. 3858, which supports the filing of separate complaints for multiple dishonoured cheques.

  Respondent No. 2 countered that all the cheques were part of the same transaction, and thus a single complaint was justified. They cited Lalit Fabrics Private Limited v. Linkers Associates Limited 1995 Law Suit (Del) 874, where it was held that a single complaint for multiple dishonoured cheques does not lose its validity. Additionally, cases from Andhra Pradesh High Court (B. Venkat Narendra Prasad and Anr v. State of A.P. III (2003) BC 319) and Karnataka High Court (Tiruchandoor Muruhan Spinning Mills (Private) Limited v. Madanlal Ramkumar Cotton and General Merchants 2000 Law Suit (Kar) 486) supported the filing of a single complaint for multiple cheques if they are part of a single transaction.

  Issue 2: Applicability of Section 219 of the Criminal Procedural Code, 1860.

  The petitioner argued that Section 219 of the Criminal Procedural Code, 1860, limits the number of offences of the same kind that can be tried together to three within a twelve-month period. The petitioner contended that each dishonoured cheque represents a separate transaction and offence, thus requiring separate complaints.

  Respondent No. 2 argued that Section 219 does not apply as all cheques were part of a single transaction. They cited the case of Alpha Graphics v. Arjun Kohli 148 (2008) DLT 373, which held that the stage for determining the number of charges and trials is when charges are framed, not at the complaint filing stage. The Bombay High Court in Rajasthani Trading Co. and Anr. v. Chemos International Limited and Anr. II (2001) BC 426 also supported the view that multiple cheques from a single transaction can be tried together.

  The court concluded that the filing of a single complaint for multiple dishonoured cheques from the same transaction is permissible and does not violate Section 219 of the Criminal Procedural Code, 1860. The order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dated 15th April 2011 was upheld, and the interim order was vacated. The petition (Crl. M. C. No. 2351/2011) was dismissed with no order as to costs.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 427
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the order passed u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Enquiry regarding agricultural income.
  3. Enquiry regarding unsecured loan.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity of the order passed u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
  The appeals were preferred by the assessee against the orders of the CIT passed u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, setting aside the assessment orders for the assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The CIT issued a show cause letter u/s 263(1) of the Act to the assessee based on a proposal from the Additional CIT. The Tribunal found that the CIT acted on the proposal of the Additional CIT and did not form his own opinion. The Tribunal held that for exercising jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, the CIT must be satisfied that the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Since the assessment order was not erroneous, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order passed u/s 263 of the Act.
  
  2. Enquiry regarding agricultural income:
  The main objection raised by the CIT was regarding the agricultural income shown by the assessee. The CIT observed that the Assessing Officer (AO) did not make any enquiry regarding the agricultural land obtained on lease and the agricultural operations conducted thereon. The assessee contended that detailed enquiries were made by the AO, including verification by the Inspector, who submitted a report confirming the agricultural activities. The Tribunal noted that the AO issued a questionnaire, received replies, and deputed Inspectors for physical verification and spot enquiries. The Inspectors' report confirmed the assessee's agricultural activities. The Tribunal concluded that the AO made proper enquiries and the assessment order could not be called erroneous.
  
  3. Enquiry regarding unsecured loan:
  The CIT also raised an issue regarding an unsecured loan of Rs. 1.25 lakhs. The assessee explained that the loan was taken from Smt. Sunita Rohati through an account payee cheque in an earlier assessment year and repaid in the assessment year 2007-08. Relevant evidence was placed before the AO, who accepted the claim after verification. The Tribunal found that the AO made proper verification and enquiry regarding the unsecured loan, and thus, the assessment order was not erroneous on this ground.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal held that the CIT did not properly exercise jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act as the assessment orders were not erroneous, though they might be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT's order passed u/s 263 of the Act and allowed the appeals of the assessee.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 426
  
  Issues involved: Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC, maintainability of present petition, legality of procedures u/s 82 Cr.P.C., cognizance u/s 174-A IPC, abuse of process of the Court.
  
  Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC: The Petitioner sought quashing of FIR No. 14/2011 registered u/s 174-A IPC at PS Farsh Bazar, contending that the process was illegal as summons were not served, warrants were issued without proper notice, and the Petitioner was not an absconder. The Petitioner argued that cognizance for an offence u/s 174-A IPC can only be taken on a complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. The Respondent, however, argued that affixation alone satisfies the requirements u/s 82 Cr.P.C. and publication in a newspaper is not mandatory. The Court noted that the Police officer can register FIR u/s 174-A IPC based on a complaint and found no merit in the Petitioner's contentions.
  
  Maintainability of present petition: The Court referred to a previous petition filed by the Petitioner seeking similar relief, which was withdrawn after the Court was not inclined to grant relief. The Petitioner argued that the earlier withdrawal should not bar the present petition, citing legal precedent. The Court acknowledged that the earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn but proceeded to hear arguments on merits. The Court emphasized that repeated petitions for the same relief are an abuse of process.
  
  Legality of procedures u/s 82 Cr.P.C.: The Petitioner challenged the legality of procedures u/s 82 Cr.P.C., stating that the proclamation was not published in the specified newspaper. The Court explained that while certain aspects of publication are mandatory, others are not, and non-compliance with non-mandatory requirements does not invalidate the process. The Court clarified that the FIR u/s 174-A IPC is an independent cause of action and should not be quashed solely because another case was settled.
  
  Cognizance u/s 174-A IPC: The Court analyzed the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and noted that while most offences under Chapter X are non-cognizable, the offence u/s 174-A IPC is cognizable. Therefore, the Police officer can register FIR and file a charge-sheet for this offence without a complaint u/s 195 Cr.P.C. The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that cognizance could only be taken on a complaint.
  
  Abuse of process of the Court: The Court concluded that the present petition and application were an abuse of the Court's process by the Petitioner. As a result, the petition was dismissed with a cost imposed on the Petitioner for abusing the legal process.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 425
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the retraction made by Vikram, the Approver.
  2. Delay in filing applications for further evidence.
  3. Application of Section 311 and Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity of the Retraction Made by Vikram, the Approver:
  The case revolves around the attempt on the life of the Chief Justice of India in 1975, where two live hand grenades were lobbed inside the car of the Chief Justice, which did not explode. The investigation led to the arrest of several individuals, including Santoshanand Avadhoot, Ranjan Dwivedi, and Sudevanand Avadhoot. Vikram, one of the accused, made a confessional statement u/s 164 CrPC and requested pardon u/s 306 CrPC. However, in 1978, Vikram retracted his statement, claiming it was obtained under coercion by the CBI. The retraction was recorded in Danapur jail and later supported by officials in Bihar. Vikram later testified that his retraction was made under threats from Bihar officials. The Supreme Court noted that one of Vikram's statements must be false but could not determine which one without further examination.
  
  2. Delay in Filing Applications for Further Evidence:
  The appellants filed applications in 1997-1998, seeking to introduce Vikram's retraction and other related documents into the appeal record, summon Vikram for further cross-examination, and consider his evidence from the L.N. Mishra murder case. The Delhi High Court dismissed these applications due to the delay of over 20 years. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the delay should not have been the sole ground for rejection, especially since the appeals had been pending since 1976. The court emphasized that further cross-examination of Vikram would not have significantly delayed the appeal's disposal.
  
  3. Application of Section 311 and Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC):
  The Supreme Court examined whether summoning Vikram for further cross-examination was permissible under the law. The CBI opposed the appellants' request, arguing that Vikram's confessional statements were voluntary and that his retraction had no legal sanctity. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from previous cases like Mishrilal v. State of M.P. and Hanuman Ram v. State of Rajasthan, where witnesses' later statements were found to be for extraneous reasons. The court noted that Section 391 CrPC allows the appellate court to take additional evidence if necessary to arrive at a just decision. The court held that the High Court should have summoned Vikram for further examination to determine the truth.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's order refusing to summon Vikram for further examination. It directed the High Court to summon Vikram for additional evidence, limiting the examination to four days. The court also expressed distress over the prolonged delay in the case and urged the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to ensure the appeals are disposed of within six months. The appeals were allowed.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 424
  
  Title: Supreme Court of India Judgment 2012 (1) TMI 424 - SC Order
  
  Judges: Chief Justice A.K. Patnaik and Justice Swatanter Kumar
  
  Appellant's representatives: Mr. R.P. Bhatt, Mr. Sukumar Pattjoshi, Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, Ms. Anil Katiyar, Mr. B.V. Balaram Das
  
  Respondent: None
  
  Order: Special leave petition adjourned for eight weeks. Directing Settlement Commission to resolve pending proceedings under Application No.563/KNK-III/15/2000-IT.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 423
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of CIT(A) directing AO to allow deduction u/s. 80IB for Assessment Year 2003-04 due to submission of audit report in Form No. 10CCB during reassessment proceedings.
  
  Issue 1: Condonation of Delay
  
  The appeal by revenue was delayed by 25 days, and the revenue provided reasons for the delay in filing. The Ld. Counsel for assessee conceded the delay, leading to the admission of the appeal by the tribunal.
  
  Issue 2: Allowance of Deduction u/s. 80IB
  
  The AO framed assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act for the relevant assessment year, disallowing deduction u/s. 80IB due to non-submission of audit report in Form No. 10CCB. Subsequently, during reassessment proceedings, the audit report was filed, and the assessee claimed that this technical default should not hinder the allowance of deduction u/s. 80IB. The CIT(A) allowed the claim, considering the submission of the audit report during reassessment as sufficient compliance.
  
  Key Points:
  - The AO initially accepted the deduction u/s. 80IB without the audit report but later reopened the assessment due to the absence of the report.
  - The CIT(A) held that submission of the audit report in Form No. 10CCB is directory, not mandatory, and allowed the deduction based on the submission during reassessment.
  - The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the assessee's submission during reassessment proceedings was to substantiate the original claim, not a fresh claim.
  
  Conclusion:
  The tribunal dismissed the appeal of the revenue, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to allow the deduction u/s. 80IB based on the submission of the audit report during reassessment proceedings.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 422
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding the deletion of an addition made on account of disallowance of provision of warranty debited to profit and loss account u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  Summary:
  The Revenue appealed against the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition related to the provision of warranty. The Revenue argued that the CIT(A) did not consider the increase in the provision made during the relevant year compared to previous years. The Revenue contended that the provision for warranty should meet specific conditions as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rotork Controls (I) Pvt. Ltd case. The Revenue urged for a reconsideration of the issue based on the legal principles established by the Supreme Court.
  
  The assessee, on the other hand, relied on the CIT(A)'s order and previous Tribunal decisions in their favor for other assessment years. After hearing both parties, the Tribunal noted that the issue had been settled by the Supreme Court in the Rotork Controls (I) Pvt. Ltd case. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the case in light of the Supreme Court's observations and conditions laid down in the judgment.
  
  Regarding the cross-objection filed by the assessee against the Assessing Officer's findings, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to adjudicate on it as the main appeal had been remitted back to the AO for reconsideration. Therefore, the cross-objection was dismissed as infructuous.
  
  Ultimately, the appeal by the Revenue was allowed for statistical purposes, and the cross-objection by the assessee was dismissed. The order was pronounced in the open court on 30th Jan, 2012.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 421
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the FIR No. 21/2005 should be quashed.
  2. Allegations of mala fide intent by the complainant.
  3. Applicability of double jeopardy.
  4. Nature of the dispute being civil or criminal.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Quashing of FIR No. 21/2005:
  The petitions filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C. sought to quash FIR No. 21/2005 registered u/s 120B/420/467/468/471/477A IPC. The FIR was based on allegations that the petitioners entered into a criminal conspiracy, used forged documents to claim themselves as Directors of the Company, and committed falsification of accounts. The court observed that a plain reading of the FIR makes out a prima facie case against the petitioners for cheating, forgery, using forged documents, and falsification of accounts. The court referred to the principles laid down in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 and concluded that the FIR cannot be quashed as it discloses a cognizable offence.
  
  2. Allegations of Mala Fide Intent:
  The petitioners alleged that the FIR was lodged with mala fide intent by the complainant, Ms. Mausumi Bhattacharjee. However, the court noted that allegations of mala fides are easy to make but difficult to establish prima facie. The court held that the allegations against the complainant essentially constitute the petitioners' defense, which needs to be proved during the trial. The court found no merit in this contention and dismissed it.
  
  3. Applicability of Double Jeopardy:
  The petitioners contended that the FIR is liable to be quashed due to double jeopardy, citing T.T. Anthony Vs. State 2001 (2) JCC 282: AIR 2001 SC 2637. The court compared the FIRs registered in New Delhi and Dehradun and found that they disclose different offences. The court held that the principle of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 Cr.P.C. is not applicable as there is no acquittal or conviction in respect of the case registered at Dehradun, and the offences in the two FIRs are distinct and separate.
  
  4. Nature of the Dispute:
  The petitioners argued that the dispute is essentially civil in nature and has been converted into a criminal dispute. The court referred to the judgments in M/s Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 2780 and Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors. Appeal (Crl.) 1392 of 2007. The court held that the dispute between the parties is not purely civil and involves allegations of forgery and cheating, which warrant criminal proceedings. The court dismissed the contention that the FIR should be quashed on this ground.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court dismissed the petitions, holding that the FIR discloses a prima facie case for cognizable offences, and the contentions of mala fide intent, double jeopardy, and the dispute being civil in nature were without merit. The court also imposed a cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- each on the petitioners for abusing the process of law.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 420
  
  Issues involved:
  The petitioners sought a direction for the refund of tax deducted at source on land acquisition compensation exempted under Section 194LA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with interest.
  
  Summary:
  The petitioners approached the High Court seeking a refund of tax deducted at source on land acquisition compensation exempted under Section 194LA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with interest. The land owned by the petitioners' father was acquired for public purpose, and compensation was assessed. The petitioners challenged the award and filed execution proceedings due to tax deduction at source under Section 194A of the Act. The Court noted that the payment released to the petitioners was on account of interest paid by the department. The petitioners acknowledged that tax was deducted at source as per Section 194A of the Act. Referring to a previous judgment, the Court stated that interest on enhanced compensation was taxable in the year of receipt, and the petitioners could file income tax returns to seek refund of excess tax deducted at source. The writ petition was disposed of, granting the petitioners liberty to file income tax returns and claim refunds in accordance with the law.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 419
  
  Issues involved: Appeal by Revenue against CIT(Appeals) order, depreciation rate on software, disallowance of lease equalization charges under Section 115JB.
  
  Depreciation on software: Revenue appealed CIT(Appeals) order directing 60% depreciation on software, citing previous year's 25% allowance. AR argued for 60% depreciation as per rules and Income-tax Act. Tribunal found software fell under 60% depreciation in Income-tax Rules, rejecting Revenue's argument based on previous year's decision. Ground No.2 dismissed.
  
  Disallowance of lease equalization charges: Revenue challenged deletion of disallowance of lease equalization charges under Section 115JB. AR cited High Court decision that such charges were not a reserve and should not be added back to profits. DR admitted issue favored assessee based on High Court decision. Tribunal upheld CIT(Appeals) decision, finding no error. Ground No.3 dismissed.
  
  Conclusion: Revenue's appeal dismissed, upholding CIT(Appeals) orders on depreciation rate for software and lease equalization charges under Section 115JB.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 418
  
  Issues involved: Cross appeals by assessee and department against the order of ld. CIT (A) for assessment year 2007-08.
  
  Ground No. 4 - Unexplained Gift:
  The AO added Rs. 55,00,000/- as unexplained gift received by the assessee from his NRI brother. The AO found discrepancies in the certificate provided by the brother, leading to the gift being treated as non-genuine under section 68. The ld. CIT (A) upheld the AO's decision.
  
  The assessee presented evidence including a statement from the brother, bank statements, and drafts to prove the genuineness of the gift. The Tribunal found that the gift was received through proper banking channels, and the details provided were sufficient to establish the genuineness of the transaction. Relying on various case laws, the Tribunal held that the gift was genuine and deleted the addition of Rs. 55,00,000/-.
  
  Remaining Grounds in Assessee's Appeal:
  - Addition of Rs. 2,00,000/- on account of difference in sale consideration: The AO added Rs. 9,94,149/- due to variations in sale values determined by the Sub Registrar. The ld. CIT (A) found that provisions of section 50C did not apply as the assessee sold a business asset, not a capital asset. The Tribunal agreed, deleting the addition of Rs. 2,00,000/-.
  - Interest charge: The AO was directed to provide consequential relief to the assessee.
  
  Grounds in Department's Appeal:
  - Addition of Rs. 41,948/- for diesel shortage: The AO restricted the wastage of diesel based on previous year's claim. The ld. CIT (A) deleted the addition, citing a similar decision in the earlier year.
  - Addition of Rs. 58,725/- for commission/brokerage income: The AO estimated income higher than declared, but the ld. CIT (A) deleted the addition following a previous decision. The Tribunal confirmed the ld. CIT (A)'s order.
  - Disallowance of Rs. 42,882/- out of construction expenses: The AO disallowed 50% of expenses, which the ld. CIT (A) reduced to 20%. The Tribunal found the reduction reasonable and confirmed the ld. CIT (A)'s decision.
  - Addition of Rs. 61,490/- for low household expenses: The ld. CIT (A) upheld the decision of the previous year, and the Tribunal confirmed this decision.
  
  In conclusion, the appeal of the assessee was allowed in part, while the appeal of the department was dismissed. The Tribunal's order was pronounced on 19.01.2012.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 417
  
  Issues involved:
  The controversy arises from the Appellant's appointment as a Teacher for primary and upper primary schools based on the educational qualifications required for the post.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Provisional selection and cancellation of appointment
  The Appellant was provisionally selected for the post of Teacher but later received a letter cancelling the selection due to not passing the Higher Secondary/Senior Secondary Examination after passing the Secondary Examination.
  
  Issue 2: Qualification and eligibility
  The Appellant completed her graduation and obtained a B. Ed. Degree and M.A. degree from recognized universities. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's case stating that not passing the Senior Secondary Examination, which is the basic qualification, makes the candidature ineligible.
  
  Issue 3: Interpretation of equivalent qualification
  The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's view that higher qualifications are not equivalent to passing Senior Secondary examination. The Court emphasized that the term 'equivalent' allows for flexibility without lowering the basic requirement, especially for a provisionally selected candidate.
  
  Decision:
  The Supreme Court held that the Appellant should be considered for the appointment, and the provisional selection should not be cancelled. The Court ordered the Respondent Rajasthan Public Service Commission to make a suitable recommendation within four weeks, and the State to make the appointment accordingly within the subsequent four weeks. The appeal was disposed of with no costs.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 416
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to High Court order under Article 227 of the Constitution regarding investigation into a murder case.
  
  Summary:
  The Supreme Court heard the appeal challenging a High Court order disposing of a petition under Article 227 without addressing the key issues involved. The case revolved around the murder of Imran and the subsequent investigation. The Appellant, dissatisfied with the investigation, approached the Magistrate under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking further investigation by a different agency due to concerns about the initial police investigation. The Magistrate, acknowledging the need for further investigation, directed a police officer to conduct it, which the Appellant contested as the same police authorities were involved. The High Court's brief order did not delve into the crucial aspects of the case, prompting the Supreme Court to intervene.
  
  The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a fair and thorough investigation in upholding the rule of law and ensuring equal access to justice for all citizens. Citing the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under Article 14, the Court highlighted the need for proper scrutiny of serious offenses like murder. In light of these principles, the Court directed the Additional Director General of Police, State CID, Pune Division, to assign a senior officer to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the case within three months. The Court stressed the significance of impartiality in the investigation process to uphold justice and maintain law and order in a democratic society.
  
  Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, instructing for an independent and thorough investigation to be carried out by a designated senior officer from the State CID, Pune Division, to ensure a fair examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the murder case.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 415
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2008-09. Grounds raised include rejection of books of account u/s 145(3) and application of net profit rate of 12% on net contract receipts.
  
  Rejection of Books of Account u/s 145(3): Assessee, a civil contractor, failed to appear before Assessing Officer and provide necessary information. Original vouchers, muster roll, and stock register were not produced. Books of account were incomplete and not properly vouched. AO rejected books u/s 145(3) and applied 12% net profit rate based on Punjab & Haryana High Court precedent.
  
  Application of Net Profit Rate: Assessee claimed to be a road contractor, declared 5.23% NP rate on gross receipts. Despite explanations, incomplete documentation led to rejection of books u/s 145(3). Authorities applied 12% NP rate citing a High Court decision. Tribunal directed AO to apply 7% NP rate due to lack of complete vouchers. Decision based on similar cases and lack of verifiable expenses.
  
  Conclusion: Appeal partly allowed, directing AO to determine income using 7% NP rate. Ground challenging 12% NP rate dismissed, while another ground partly allowed. The decision was pronounced on January 27, 2012, by Ms. Sushma Chowla, Judicial Member, and Shri Mehar Singh, Accountant Member of ITAT Chandigarh.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 414
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment involves issues related to penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act for excess depreciation claimed, deduction claimed under u/s 80-IA for a new power plant, and excess claim for deduction u/s 80-IB.
  
  Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for excess depreciation claimed:
  The assessee's appeal challenged the penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) for excess depreciation claimed. The Tribunal noted that the assessment had been set aside for a de novo assessment, leading to the cancellation of the penalty. The department was granted the option to re-initiate the penalty during the assessment if required by law.
  
  Validity of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for deduction claimed under u/s 80-IA:
  The cross objection by the assessee contested the penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) for deduction claimed under u/s 80-IA. The Tribunal dismissed the cross objection as the penalty had been cancelled in a previous assessment year for similar reasons, following the decision of the Tribunal.
  
  Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for excess claim of deduction u/s 80-IB:
  The revenue's appeal challenged the deletion of the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for an excess claim of deduction u/s 80-IB. The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the penalty, considering the debatable nature of the deduction claim and the existence of favorable decisions for the assessee at the time of filing the return.
  
  In summary, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal while allowing the assessee's appeal and dismissing the cross objection. The penalties imposed u/s 271(1)(c) were cancelled based on the specific circumstances and legal precedents cited in each case.

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• 2012 (1) TMI 413
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) being dismissed as not maintainable.
  
  The appeal was filed by the assessee against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) at Bangalore dated 03.09.2010, arising from the assessment completed u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee, a Government of Karnataka undertaking, was incorporated to canalize the sale of Indian Made Liquor and Beer in the state. The CIT(A) revised the assessment u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, and during the pendency of the appeal, the Assessing Officer passed a consequential order u/s 143(3) read with sec. 263. The CIT(A) held the assessment order u/s 143(3) to be non-est and dismissed the appeal, leading to the current appeal before the Tribunal.
  
  The learned counsel for the assessee argued that the revision order u/s 263 did not address the privilege fee disallowed by the Assessing Officer, making the appeal maintainable. On the other hand, the learned DR supported the CIT(A)'s order. After considering the contentions and evidence, the Tribunal found that the order u/s 143(3) was set aside by the revision order u/s 263, necessitating a denovo consideration of the assessment by the AO. As the assessment order u/s 143(3) dated 30.10.2006 was rendered non-est, the appeal against it was deemed not maintainable. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision and dismissed the assessee's appeal.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal pronounced the order on 18th Jan, 2012, dismissing the appeal of the assessee.

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