|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 383 Records
-
2012 (1) TMI 350
Insider trading - Selling the shares during the unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) period - Violation of the PIT Regulations 1992 - according to the Board, the appellant was deemed to be a connected person with the company and its directors who had access to US PI and hence an insider. The appellant is alleged to have traded in the scrip of the company based on the (UP SI) relating to financial results. Hence, it was alleged that the appellant had violated regulation 3(i), (ii) and 4 of the regulations. After considering the reply of the appellant and granting personal hearing, the adjudicating officer found the appellant guilty and, by the impugned order, imposed penalty as stated above. Hence, this appeal.
HELD THAT:- the appellant in the present case has placed sufficient material on record to show that she has not traded on the basis of US PI. It is also a matter of record that the appellant used to trade regularly in the shares of the company and her trades were genuine transactions carried out by her in the normal course of business. the appellant that where an entity is privy to USPI, it will tend to purchase shares and not sell the shares prior to the US PI becoming public if the information is positive. In this case declaration of financial results, dividend and bonus were positive information but the appellant not only bought but also sold the shares not only during the period when the price sensitive information was unpublished but also prior to and after the information becoming public. A person who is in possession of US PI which, on becoming public is likely to cause a positive impact on the price of the scrip, would only buy shares and would not sell the shares before the US PI becomes public and would immediately offload the shares post the information becoming public. This is not so in the case under consideration. The trading pattern of the appellant, as shown in the chart above, does not lead to the conclusion that the appellant’s trades were induced by the US PI. Further, appellants in that appeal only purchased the shares while in possession of US PI and there was no trading by them prior to or after the information becoming public. In the case in hand the charge of trading on the basis of US PI has not only been denied by the appellant, it has also been able to demonstrate through her trading pattern that the trading was not based on the US PI.
the appeal is allowed and impugned order set aside with no order as to costs.
-
2012 (1) TMI 349
Issues involved: Determination of assessable value of motor vehicles and limitation period for demand.
For the issue of assessable value, the judgment focused on whether the cost of the chassis in the manufacturing process should be considered as 100% or 110%, as per the practice of M/s Eicher Motors Ltd. The decision was influenced by a previous Larger Bench ruling in the case of M/s Eicher Motors Ltd. The appellant's plea on limitation was not addressed in the impugned order, leading to the demand being contested for the period from 1.11.04 to 31.03.07. The advocate requested setting aside the order and remanding the matter for a decision on the plea of limitation, a course of action agreed upon by the Revenue's representative. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner for a determination on the issue of limitation and any associated penalties. The appellant was assured the opportunity to present their defense and adhere to principles of natural justice. Ultimately, all appeals were allowed through remand.
-
2012 (1) TMI 348
Issues involved: Appeal against reopening of assessment u/s 143(3) and exclusion of gross processing charges from export profit.
Cross objection against reopening of assessment: The assessee challenged the reopening of assessment u/s 143(3) based on the exclusion of 90% of gross processing charges from export profit. The assessing officer reopened the assessment after four years from the end of the year, citing the need for the exclusion. The assessee contended that there was no failure on their part to disclose material facts necessary for assessment, as all details were provided. The Tribunal referred to a similar case and found no negligence on the part of the assessee in disclosing material facts, rendering the reopening of assessment invalid u/s 147. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were deemed baseless, and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax(A) was upheld.
Decision: The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, as the reopening of assessment was found to be invalid due to lack of negligence on the part of the assessee in disclosing relevant material facts. The cross objection of the assessee was allowed, leading to the rejection of the revenue's appeal.
-
2012 (1) TMI 347
Issues involved: Application for waiver of pre-deposit of duty, interest, and penalty under the Hot Air Independent Textile Processors Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1998.
Summary:
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT MUMBAI heard an application for waiver of pre-deposit of duty amounting to &8377; 28,58,839/-, interest, and penalty under the Hot Air Independent Textile Processors Annual Capacity Determination Rules, 1998. The demand was for the period from 16.12.98 to 28.2.99 and March 99 to February 2000. The Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Beauty Dyers vs Union of India held Rule 3 of the said Rules to be ultra vires Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, rendering the demand unsustainable. The Revenue contended that the assessees are liable to pay duty of excise under Section 3 of the Act or any other relevant provisions. In light of the Madras High Court's decision, the impugned order was set aside, the pre-deposit condition was waived, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, with the appellant being granted a personal hearing opportunity. The appeal was allowed by way of remand.
-
2012 (1) TMI 346
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the issue of penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Levy of Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act
The appellant contested the penalty amount imposed by the Assessing Officer u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case revolved around the declaration of income from the sale of a plot of land, claiming exemption u/s 54F for investment in a residential house. The Assessing Officer found discrepancies in the claimed deduction under section 54F, leading to the initiation of penalty proceedings. The appellant argued that the mistake was due to reliance on counsel's advice, and the penalty was unjustified. The CIT (Appeals) upheld the penalty, but the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's mistake was bonafide, as it acted on counsel's advice in good faith. Therefore, the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was deemed unwarranted, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the penalty.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, setting aside the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.
-
2012 (1) TMI 345
Issues involved:
1. Questioning the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding re-assessment proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. Computation of book profits under Section 115JB and deduction/exemption under Section 10A and 10B.
Issue 1: Re-assessment proceedings under Section 147/148
The High Court upheld the tribunal's decision to strike down the re-assessment proceedings under Section 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, citing that the jurisdictional pre-conditions were not satisfied. The court found the tribunal's findings on merits to be correct, aligning with the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT versus Bhari Information Tech Systems Private Limited. The court dismissed the appeal by the Revenue with no order as to costs.
Issue 2: Computation of book profits under Section 115JB
The court examined the discrepancy in the computation of book profits under Section 115JB, specifically related to the deduction/exemption under Section 10A and 10B. The difference arose due to the assessee providing depreciation on a straight-line method in the books of accounts but calculating depreciation as per the written down value method for taxable income purposes, as mandated by Section 32. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Bhari Information Tech Systems Private Limited, emphasizing that deductions claimed must be based on adjusted book profit under Section 115JA. The court also discussed the relevant provisions of Explanation 1 to Section 115JB and highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the eligibility and deductibility of profits for computing book profits under Section 115JB.
Separate Judgement:
The court referred to the case of Ajanta Farma Limited versus Commissioner of Income Tax, where the Supreme Court clarified the computation of deductions under different sections of the Income Tax Act. The court emphasized that Section 115JB operates as a self-contained code for taxing deemed income and outlined the specific adjustments required for computing book profits. The court rejected the Department's argument regarding the eligibility and deductibility of profits under Section 80HHC, stating that such distinctions are crucial to maintain the self-contained nature of Section 115JB.
In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the tribunal's decision on both issues and finding no substantial question of law for consideration.
-
2012 (1) TMI 344
Issues involved: Stay of recovery of arrears of service tax, future liability towards service tax.
Stay of recovery of arrears of service tax:
The Supreme Court granted leave in SLP (C) No. 34002/2011 and directed that the appellants clear all arrears of service tax due as on 31st December, 2011 in three equated instalments by specified dates - 29th February, 2012; 30th April, 2012; and 30th June, 2012. It was specified that no coercive steps shall be taken against the appellants for recovery of arrears if the instalments are paid on time. However, in case of default in depositing any instalment by the due date, the respondents are permitted to recover the entire amount in arrears immediately.
Future liability towards service tax:
The Supreme Court clarified that there is no stay of imposition of service tax u/s sub-clause (zzzz) of clause (105) of Section 65 read with Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) for the future liability towards service tax from 1st January, 2012 onwards. This means that the appellants are still liable to pay service tax for future transactions from the specified date.
Civil Appeal No. 8390 of 2011:
The judgment was tagged with Civil Appeal No. 8390 of 2011 for reference and further proceedings related to the case.
-
2012 (1) TMI 343
Denied benefit of the provisions of the proviso to section 92C(2) - Held that:- This is not in accordance with the pronounced decisions of various Benches including that of Pune. In effect, the demand relatable to this issue becomes clearly irrecoverable demand. We have also considered assessee's readiness to pay some tax and on considering assessee's capacity to pay and the requirements of Government of India, we are of the opinion that the assessee must pay 50% of the clear disputed demand (after excluding the demand related to the 5% plus or minus and also excluding the statutory interest segment thereof) which may be somewhere around ₹ 2 crores.
Thus, the assessee is required to pay sum of ₹ 1 crore now for becoming entitled to the stay of demand conditionally. Considering the difficulties narrated by the learned counsel to pay the said demand in one go, we direct the assessee to pay the same in five equal monthly instalments. The first instalment should be paid at the end of this month i.e. January, 2012. We also consider the assessee's request for early hearing and the same is acceded to. Thus the case is posted for hearing on 23rd February, 2012 as pronounced in the open Court.
-
2012 (1) TMI 342
Issues Involved:
1. Amendment of pleadings u/s Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.
3. Due diligence in filing amendments post-trial commencement.
Summary:
1. Amendment of Pleadings u/s Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court was correct in allowing an application for amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the trial had concluded and the matter was reserved for orders. The High Court had permitted the amendment sought by the Respondents to incorporate specific pleadings that were allegedly missed due to a typographical error. The Supreme Court noted that the application for amendment was filed on 24.09.2010, after the arguments were completed on 22.09.2010 and the matter was posted for judgment on 04.10.2010. The Court emphasized that the proviso to Rule 17 restricts amendments post-trial commencement unless due diligence is demonstrated.
2. Compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act:
The Court reiterated that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates a specific averment in the plaint that the plaintiff has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. The absence of such an averment renders the suit for specific performance liable to dismissal. The Respondents' omission to include this averment was not considered a mere typographical error but a significant oversight.
3. Due Diligence in Filing Amendments Post-Trial Commencement:
The Supreme Court scrutinized the concept of due diligence, highlighting that it requires reasonable investigation before requesting certain kinds of relief. The Court found that the Respondents failed to exercise due diligence, as the omission of mandatory requirements running into several sentences could not be classified as a typographical error. The Court concluded that the trial court had rightly dismissed the amendment application, and the High Court erred in accepting the explanation of a typographical error.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order dated 08.02.2011, agreeing with the trial court's decision to dismiss the amendment application. The civil appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
-
2012 (1) TMI 341
Issues involved:
The appeal challenges the rejection of registration under sec.12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Director of Income-tax (Exemptions), Chennai.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Eligibility for Registration under sec.12AA
The appellant, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, aims to promote growth and development of industries, facilitate technology transfer, create awareness about laws and policies, and update knowledge in various industries for its members. The Director (Exemptions) contended that the society's main objects primarily benefit its members and are not charitable under sec.2(15). However, the appellant argued that its activities are of public utility, without any profit motive, and are not meant for individual or group benefits. The appellant cited relevant judicial pronouncements to support its case. The Tribunal considered the issue and referred to previous court decisions where similar organizations were deemed to be of public utility and charitable in nature. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant-society is entitled to registration under sec.12AA, as its activities align with the principles of public utility and charity.
Issue 2: Future Compliance with Income-tax Act
The Tribunal noted that any potential contravention of Income-tax Act provisions related to charities by the appellant-society would be assessed in subsequent years during the assessment process. The Revenue has the authority to examine the appellant's operations annually to ensure compliance with relevant laws. The Tribunal emphasized that any future violations could be addressed during assessment proceedings.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal directed the Director (Exemptions) to grant registration to the appellant-society under sec.12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed, and the stay petition was deemed infructuous and rejected. The judgment was pronounced on January 11, 2012, in Chennai.
-
2012 (1) TMI 340
Issues Involved:
1. Preliminary Objection
2. Jurisdiction of Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur
3. Binding Precedent of Previous Judgments
4. Validity of Clarificatory Memo
5. Compliance with Article 166 of the Constitution
6. Retrospective Application of Clarificatory Memo
7. Validity of Government's Direction to the Director
8. Independence of Director's Order
9. Other Contentions
Summary:
A. Preliminary Objection:
The petitioner argued that similar matters were pending before a Division Bench and requested these writ petitions be listed before the Division Bench. However, the court noted that the Chief Justice had directed these petitions to be listed before the single judge, and thus, the request was denied.
B. Jurisdiction of Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur:
The court examined whether the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had jurisdiction u/s 9-N to permit the use of additional ramps located in Krishna District. It was concluded that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur lacked jurisdiction to grant such permission, as the concerned Assistant Director is the one having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps, i.e., the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Nandigama, Krishna District.
C. Binding Precedent of Previous Judgments:
The court analyzed whether the previous judgments in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 and WVMP. No.2639 of 2010 constituted binding precedents. It was determined that the judgment in W.P. No.12239 of 2010 did not constitute a binding precedent as it was rendered per incuriam and sub-silentio, lacking detailed reasoning and consideration of the relevant statutory provisions.
D. Validity of Clarificatory Memo:
The court held that the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 issued by the Government, stating that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology having territorial jurisdiction over the ramps is the competent authority, was not ultra vires Rule 9-K(3). The memo was deemed a valid clarification to implement the Rules.
E. Compliance with Article 166 of the Constitution:
The petitioner argued that the impugned memo did not comply with Article 166 of the Constitution and the A.P. Government Business Rules. The court found that the memo was issued after obtaining approval from the Minister for Mines & Geology and did not involve questions of policy or administrative importance requiring the Chief Minister's approval. Thus, the memo was in substantial compliance with Article 166.
F. Retrospective Application of Clarificatory Memo:
The court concluded that the clarificatory memo dated 20.06.2011 was not retrospective in operation. It did not nullify any vested rights of the Society as the permission granted by the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur was declared null and void.
G. Validity of Government's Direction to the Director:
The court held that the Government's memo dated 20.06.2011, requesting the Director of Mines and Geology to consider exercising his powers u/s 11(2)(c) to regulate quarrying operations, was valid. The Director's power to regulate quarrying operations includes the authority to prevent the use of unauthorized ramps for transportation of sand.
H. Independence of Director's Order:
The court found that the Director of Mines and Geology had exercised his independent judgment and was not influenced by the Government's memo. The Director's order was detailed and reasoned, addressing the representations and issues raised.
I. Other Contentions:
The court dismissed the contention regarding the violation of the A.P. Advocate General (Duties, Leave and Remuneration) order 1961, as it lacked statutory force and could not be enforced in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion:
The court allowed W.P. No.25583 of 2010, declaring the permission granted to the Society to use the additional ramps as null and void. The other writ petitions filed by the Society were dismissed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 338
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are the permissibility of amending a complaint filed under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and the jurisdiction of the court where the alleged defamation took place.
Amendment of Complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C.:
The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under Sections 120B, 499, and 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for defamation. The complaint was later amended to include allegations related to a poem written by the petitioner. The Magistrate allowed the amendment before taking cognizance of the case. The petitioner argued that there is no provision in the Cr.P.C. for amending a complaint under Section 200 and that the Magistrate's actions were not justified. However, the court held that since the amendment was allowed before taking cognizance and no prejudice was caused to the petitioner, the Magistrate was justified in permitting the amendment. The court cited previous cases to support this decision, emphasizing that disallowing the amendment would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, the petition to quash the proceedings based on the amendment was dismissed.
Jurisdiction of the Court:
The petitioner also argued that the alleged defamation took place in Mysore, so the complaint filed in Bangalore was not maintainable. However, the court referred to a previous case where it was held that if the act and consequence of harming reputation occur in a particular jurisdiction, that court has the jurisdiction to try the offense of defamation. Therefore, the court rejected the petitioner's argument regarding jurisdiction and upheld the proceedings in PCR No. 8409/2007 registered as C.C. No. 15851/2007 before the VII Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore.
-
2012 (1) TMI 337
Issues involved: Appeal against order related to assessment year 2001-02, delay in filing appeal, justification of AO's assessment of agricultural income.
Delay in Appeal: The appeal was filed 4 days beyond the limitation period, but the delay was condoned upon department's request.
Assessment of Agricultural Income: The AO assessed the agricultural income declared by the assessee as excessive, leading to an addition of &8377; 79,93,628 under "Income from other sources." The Ld CIT(A) deleted this addition, prompting the revenue's appeal.
Defects in AO's Findings: The Ld CIT(A) highlighted several defects in the AO's assessment:
- Incorrect land extent assumption
- Misunderstanding of the product sold (Kismiss, not grapes)
- Lack of cross-examination opportunity for employees
- Past acceptance of declared agricultural incomes
- Lack of corroborative evidence for selling rates
Additional Considerations: The Ld CIT(A) did not address certain crucial points:
- Discrepancies in selling rates
- Competency of Farm Gate Inspector
- Details of sales bills and grape varieties sold
Judgment: The tribunal found defects in the assessee's agricultural income accounts and reduced the declared income by &8377; 8.00 lakhs. This revised assessment was deemed to meet the ends of justice, and the AO was directed to treat this amount as "Income from other sources." The appeal of the revenue was partly allowed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 336
Issues involved: Appeal against the order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding the applicability of section 10(26AAA) u/s. 143(3)/147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 2004-05.
Summary:
Issue 1: Reopening of Assessment and Applicability of Section 10(26AAA)
The assessee, a contractor, filed an appeal against the assessment order for the year 2004-05. The case was reopened, and the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3)/147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 10(26AAA) for income accrued in Sikkim, citing the Finance Act, 2008. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) denied the claim, stating that the assessee should have raised the issue before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal held that the assessee fulfilled the conditions of section 10(26AAA) and was eligible for exemption, even though the issue arose during the appeal process. The Tribunal emphasized that appellate proceedings are part of assessment proceedings, and the cause of substantial justice should prevail. The order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was set aside, and the assessee's appeal was allowed.
Issue 2: Grounds of Appeal
The assessee raised multiple grounds of appeal, including denial of section 10(26AAA) benefit, rejection of additional ground to treat income as Nil, and confirmation of alleged concealment of contract receipt. The Tribunal found that since the entire income earned by the assessee was exempt from tax, the other grounds raised by the assessee did not require adjudication. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.
This judgment highlights the importance of considering legal claims in appellate proceedings, especially when substantial justice is at stake, and the authority has co-terminous powers with the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal's decision favored the assessee's eligibility for exemption u/s. 10(26AAA) despite the issue arising during the appeal process.
-
2012 (1) TMI 335
The Delhi High Court proceeded ex-parte as the defendant did not appear despite being served. The plaintiffs are required to file an affidavit as evidence within eight weeks. The case is listed for plaintiffs' evidence before the Joint Registrar on 29th March 2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 334
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 32(5A) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976.
2. Excessive delegation of legislative power.
3. Whether the charges levied amount to a tax and are ultra vires Article 265 of the Constitution.
4. Proportionality of charges collected by the BDA.
Summary:
Issue 1: Constitutionality of Section 32(5A) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976
The High Court declared Section 32(5A) of the 1976 Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, void, and inoperative. It quashed the conditions requiring respondents to pay various charges and directed a refund. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the High Court erred in finding the provision discriminatory without a strong factual foundation. The Court emphasized that the BDA needed to augment resources for civic amenities due to increased population and development, and this did not violate Article 14.
Issue 2: Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power
The High Court found Section 32(5A) to be a piece of excessive delegation, lacking guidelines for the BDA's power to demand additional sums. The Supreme Court reversed this, noting that the legislative policy and guidelines are evident in the Preamble and objects of the 1961 and 1976 Acts. The Court held that the BDA's power under Section 32(5A) is guided by the need to meet expenditure for augmenting water supply, electricity, roads, and other amenities, and is subject to State Government directions under Section 65.
Issue 3: Whether Charges Levied Amount to a Tax and are Ultra Vires Article 265 of the Constitution
The High Court did not explicitly address this issue, but the Supreme Court found that the charges for augmenting water supply, electricity, transport, etc., do not amount to a tax. The Court highlighted that the BDA and other agencies incurred substantial expenses for these amenities, benefiting all residents, including those in private layouts. Thus, the charges are not a tax and do not violate Article 265.
Issue 4: Proportionality of Charges Collected by the BDA
The High Court did not provide reasons for declaring the levy of supervision charges, improvement charges, examination charges, slum clearance development charges, and MRTS cess illegal. The Supreme Court noted that the BDA collected Rs. 34.55 crores for the Cauvery Scheme and Rs. 15.15 crores for the Ring Road surcharge, and the State Government had directed stopping these collections. The Court directed the State Government to decide on the pending demands and the appropriateness of these charges within three months.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and dismissed the writ petitions. It directed the State Government to take appropriate decisions regarding the charges within three months and communicate these to the respondents. If aggrieved, respondents may seek legal remedies.
-
2012 (1) TMI 333
Issues involved: Violation of regulations 4(1) and 4(2) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.
Summary:
The appeal challenged an order holding the appellant guilty of violating regulations 4(1) and 4(2) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Regulations. The appellant was accused of executing synchronized trades with brokers and clients, leading to non-genuine transactions in a company's scrip on the Bombay Stock Exchange, resulting in market manipulation. The appellant did not respond to the show cause notice and was fined Rs. 25 lacs. The appellant argued lack of evidence connecting it to the group entities and market manipulation. The adjudicating officer found sufficient evidence of interconnected trades among related entities, supporting market manipulation charges.
The adjudicating officer established relationships between the entities involved, indicating coordinated trading activities. Despite the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of market manipulation, circumstantial evidence pointed to collusion among the entities. The appellant's counsel cited previous cases with reduced penalties for similar transactions involving group entities. The Tribunal upheld the findings but reduced the penalty to Rs. 7 lacs, aligning with previous decisions on comparable cases.
In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the adjudicating officer's findings of market manipulation violations but reduced the penalty to Rs. 7 lacs, in line with precedents.
-
2012 (1) TMI 332
Arbitration agreement - Jurisdiction of District Forums on Quality of seeds - commercial production of the seeds - farmers/growers 'consumer' u/s 2(d) of the Consumer Act - awarded compensation - Appellant - M/s. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. (NSCL) is a Government of India company. Its main functions are to arrange for production of quality seeds of different varieties in the farms of registered growers and supply the same to the farmers. The Respondents own lands in different districts and are engaged in agriculture/seed production. They filed complaints with the allegation that they had suffered loss due to failure of the crops/less yield because the seeds sold/supplied by the Appellant were defective.
HELD THAT:- the farmers/growers purchased seeds by paying a price to the Appellant, they would certainly fall within the ambit of Section 2(d)(i) of the Consumer Act and there is no reason to deny them the remedies which are available to other consumers of goods and services. there is nothing in the Seeds Act and the Rules which may give an indication that the provisions of the Consumer Act are not available to the farmers who are covered under 'consumer'. As a matter of fact, any attempt to exclude the farmers from the ambit of the Consumer Act by implication will make that Act vulnerable to an attack of unconstitutionality on the ground of discrimination.
The seeds sown under the supervision of the expert deputed by the Appellant. The entire crop was to be purchased by the Appellant. The agreements entered into between the Appellant and the growers clearly postulated supply of the foundation seeds by the Appellant with an assurance that the crop will be purchased by it. It is neither the pleaded case of the Appellant nor any evidence was produced before any of the Consumer Forums that the growers had the freedom to sell the seeds in the open market or to any person other than the Appellant. Therefore, it is not possible to take the view that the growers had purchased the seeds for resale or for any commercial purpose and they are excluded from the definition of the term 'consumer'. As a matter of fact, the evidence brought on record shows that the growers had agreed to produce seeds on behalf of the Appellant for the purpose of earning their livelihood by using their skills and labour.
After examining the reports the District Forums felt satisfied that the seeds were defective and this is the reason why the complainants were not called upon to provide samples of the seeds for getting the same analysed/tested in an appropriate laboratory. the procedure adopted by the District Forum was in no way contrary to Section 13 of the Consumer Act and the Appellant cannot seek annulment of well-reasoned orders passed by three Consumer Forums on the specious ground that the procedure prescribed under Section 13 of the Consumer Act had not been followed.
In the result, the appeals are dismissed. The Appellant shall pay cost of ₹ 25,000/- to each of the Respondents. The amount of cost shall be paid within a period of 60 days from today.
-
2012 (1) TMI 331
Issues involved: Assessment of disallowance of expenditure u/s 43B(f) for payment made to LIC as premium, eligibility of payment for leave encashment benefit under mercantile system of accounting.
Assessment of disallowance u/s 43B(f): The assessee, a banking company, paid &8377; 30 lakh to LIC as premium, leading to a disallowance issue under sec. 43B(f). The Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure citing a pending appeal, but the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-II, Dehradun, deleted the disallowance following the Tribunal's decision for Assessment Year 2006-07. The revenue appealed, contending that the liability to pay leave encashment benefit was not incurred during the relevant year. The Tribunal noted that the issue was covered by previous decisions and held in favor of the assessee based on the nature of the payment and the insurance policy taken to discharge the liability, allowing the deduction of &8377; 30 lakh.
Eligibility of payment for leave encashment benefit: The revenue argued that the liability for leave encashment benefit was not incurred during the relevant year, thus not eligible for deduction under the mercantile system of accounting. The Tribunal considered the facts and previous decisions, emphasizing the nature of the payment and the insurance policy taken by the assessee. Referring to relevant case laws, the Tribunal concluded that the premium paid for the insurance policy was eligible for deduction, as the liability was discharged through the policy. Consequently, the disallowance of &8377; 30 lakh was deleted, and the appeal was dismissed on 11th January, 2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 330
Issues Involved: Appeal against the order of the ld.CIT(A) allowing deduction u/s 80IB(4) for the Assessment Year 2007-08.
Summary:
1. The appeals by the Revenue were directed against separate orders dated 19.3.2010 passed by the ld.CIT(A) for the Assessment Year 2007-08, involving a common issue.
2. The assessee, an individual deriving income from trading and manufacturing, claimed deduction u/s 80IB(4) of &8377; 35,77,971/-. The AO disallowed the claim citing failure to substantiate commencement of production before 31.3.2004 and lack of comprehensive manufacturing process. The ld. CIT(A) allowed the claim, leading to the Revenue's appeal before the Tribunal.
3. The ld. CIT(A) upheld the claim of the assessee, similar to the appellate order for the assessment year 2006-07.
4. The Revenue contended that the ld. CIT(A) erred in allowing the appeal without considering the failure to substantiate production commencement by the specified date and the nature of manufacturing activity.
5. Both parties agreed to set aside the issue to the AO's file due to similar cases in the assessee's group.
6. The Tribunal, considering the facts and anomalies, directed the AO to decide the issue afresh, following the order for the assessment year 2006-07. The matter was sent back to the AO for fresh consideration.
7. In another appeal, the parties agreed that the facts and grounds were similar to a related case, leading to a similar direction to the AO for fresh consideration.
8. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeals for statistical purposes, directing the AO to follow the findings and orders given in the respective cases.
9. Both appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, with the orders pronounced on 25th Jan., 2012.
........
|
9911796707
