Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 654 Records
-
2007 (11) TMI 672
Issues involved: Challenge to the Constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1998 regarding the increase in tax rates for contract carriages.
Summary:
Challenge to Constitutional Validity: The main issue in this case was the challenge to the Constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1998, which increased the tax rates for contract carriages. The challenge was based on the argument that the tax imposition was uneven and placed an unfair burden on the owners of contract carriages compared to stage carriages. The petitioners contended that there was no rational basis for the levy, and it was imposed indiscriminately to cross-subsidize stage carriages. However, the Court found that the initial burden of proof on the petitioners was not met as the petition lacked precise formulation and statistical data to support the disproportionality of the tax rate. The Court emphasized the importance of providing detailed grounds for challenge before shifting the burden to the State to justify the tax rate with quantifiable data.
Compensatory Tax Argument: Another aspect raised in the case was the argument that the tax in question was a compensatory tax. The petitioners relied on certain judgments of the Court to support this argument. The Court acknowledged the repeated increase in the tax rate, especially affecting contract carriages more than stage carriages, as raising questions of public importance. It was noted that the State could rely on available data to demonstrate cross-subsidization for public interest. Despite the significance of the issues involved, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's judgment due to the insufficient pleadings at the initial stage. The petitioners were granted permission to withdraw the civil appeals and special leave petitions with liberty to file a proper writ petition with necessary details and data.
Conclusion: In conclusion, the Court permitted the petitioners to withdraw the appeals and petitions with the opportunity to file a comprehensive writ petition in the High Court. The Court upheld the High Court's judgment and dismissed the civil appeals and special leave petitions with no order as to costs. It was clarified that if a proper writ petition with requisite data was filed, any observations in the impugned judgment would not hinder the petitioners. All contentions from both sides were expressly kept open for further proceedings.
-
2007 (11) TMI 671
... ... ... ... ..... it necessary to deal with Mr. Dwarkadas's submission that while determining which law is to be applied to determine a question as to whether a contract was ever entered into, the Private International law of India and not of the United Kingdom or the other Courts would have to be applied as whatever be the governing law of the contract, admittedly entered into, conflict of law is not a part of governing law. The submission is no doubt of considerable importance but considering the view that I have taken, I do not find it necessary to deal with it or with the judgments cited by him this regard. 104. In the circumstances, Notice of Motion No. 3472 of 2006 is dismissed and prayer (b) of Notice of Motion No. 1343 of 2007 is rejected. Prayer (a) of this Notice of Motion does not survive in view of the dismissal of Notice of Motion No. 3472 of 2006. There shall be no order as to costs. 105. The ad interim order dated 18th October, 2006 shall continue up to 21st January, 2008.
-
2007 (11) TMI 670
Issues Involved: 1. Correctness of the Arbitrator's Award. 2. Basis for computing rates for repairs and maintenance for the eleventh to the sixteenth year of operation. 3. Scope of reference to arbitration and whether the Arbitrator exceeded his mandate.
Summary:
1. Correctness of the Arbitrator's Award: The appeal challenges the judgment of the Bombay High Court, which upheld the Arbitrator's award. The Arbitrator concluded that the computation of repairs and maintenance expenses should consider the years of operation rather than calendar years. This decision was contested by the appellant, who argued that the Arbitrator's conclusion was irrational and beyond the reference made.
2. Basis for Computing Rates for Repairs and Maintenance: The dispute centered on the cost of repairs and maintenance of the respondent's Offshore Vessels (OSVs) for the eleventh to the sixteenth year of their operation. The Arbitrator held that the 12th year of operation of SCI's OSVs should be equated with the 12th year of operation of the respondent's OSVs. The High Court supported this view, stating that the Arbitrator's interpretation was logical, just, and fair.
3. Scope of Reference to Arbitration: The appellant argued that the Arbitrator's award was beyond the reference made, as the reference did not include the 12th to the 16th year. The High Court, however, noted that the prayers in the writ petition indicated that the issue for that period was raised. The Division Bench held that even if the mode of calculation by the Arbitrator was inappropriate, it could not be a ground for exercising power u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court found that the Arbitrator's award was beyond the reference made and that the basis of the Arbitrator's award was wrong. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the norms prescribed by the Arbitrator as upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, with no order as to costs.
-
2007 (11) TMI 669
Issues Involved: 1. Legality of the Tribunal's direction to settle the case under RBI guidelines. 2. Statutory nature of RBI guidelines for One Time Settlement (OTS). 3. Authority of the Tribunal to issue directions to banks for settlement under RBI guidelines.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Tribunal's direction to settle the case under RBI guidelines: The petitioner bank challenged the Tribunal's order dated 13.4.2007, which directed the bank to settle the case of private respondents under RBI guidelines applicable at the time of declaring the account as Non-Performing Assets (NPA). The bank sought to recover the amount as per the judgment and Recovery Certificate dated 23.11.2006 issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh.
2. Statutory nature of RBI guidelines for One Time Settlement (OTS): The court examined whether RBI guidelines for OTS could be regarded as statutory in character, conferring a legal right enforceable by courts. It was noted that the guidelines issued by the Chief General Manager of RBI do not have statutory authority under Sections 21 and 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The guidelines lack statutory flavour and do not create enforceable rights and duties.
3. Authority of the Tribunal to issue directions to banks for settlement under RBI guidelines: The court held that the Tribunal's directions to the bank to settle the outstanding amounts as per RBI guidelines were not legally enforceable. The guidelines issued by RBI do not bind the banks in a statutory sense, and thus, the Tribunal's order directing settlement under these guidelines was set aside.
Conclusion: The court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Tribunal's order dated 13.4.2007, and restored the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, dated 23.11.2006. The RBI guidelines for OTS do not have statutory force, and the Tribunal's directions based on these guidelines were deemed unenforceable.
-
2007 (11) TMI 668
Issues Involved: The appeal against a judgment of the High Court setting aside the order of the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of High Court to set aside findings of fact by Special Court
The main issue in this appeal was whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, could overturn the findings of fact made by the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. The appellant, the State of Andhra Pradesh, had filed an application against the respondents alleging illegal encroachment on specific land. The Special Court found the respondents to be land grabbers and directed them to pay compensation for the grabbed land. However, the High Court, in a Writ Petition, set aside the Special Court's order.
Issue 2: Consideration of Evidence by Special Court
The Special Court, after analyzing oral and documentary evidence, found that the respondents were land grabbers and had not proven title through adverse possession or ownership by Gandhi Hill Society. The Special Court directed the respondents to pay compensation for the grabbed land to perfect their title. The Special Court's findings were based on detailed examination of evidence, including extracts of Town Survey Land Register, Adangal extracts, and survey plans. The Special Court also noted the lack of proof of long-term possession by the respondents and drew adverse inferences due to non-production of title deeds.
Issue 3: High Court's Interference with Special Court's Findings
The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court can only interfere with the Special Court's findings if they are based on no evidence or conjectures. In this case, the Special Court's findings were deemed to be well-founded on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in setting aside the Special Court's findings, as the Special Court's conclusions were based on a thorough consideration of the evidence and could not be considered as lacking in evidence or reasoning. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Special Court's decision.
This summary provides a detailed breakdown of the issues involved in the legal judgment, highlighting the key aspects of the case and the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision.
-
2007 (11) TMI 667
Issues involved: The appeal challenges the order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court regarding the liability of the insurance company in a compensation claim arising from a fatal accident involving a bus owned by a transport company.
Judgment Details:
1. Factual Background: The accident involved the death of a bus conductor and multiple injuries to passengers due to a collision with another vehicle. The claimants sought compensation, leading to a tribunal awarding an amount exceeding the insurer's liability limit.
2. High Court Decision: The High Court increased the compensation amount but maintained the insurer's liability limit. It directed the insurer to pay the full compensation and recover the excess from the vehicle owner and driver.
3. Legal Precedent: Referring to a previous case, the Supreme Court clarified that the insurer's liability is limited to the policy amount. The Court highlighted the need to analyze each case's specific facts before directing payment and recovery.
4. Liability Limitation: The Court emphasized that the insurer's liability is restricted to the policy terms, and any excess amount should be recovered from the insured party.
5. Interest Rate: The Court set the interest rate at 9% per annum, starting from the accident date, and instructed prompt payment of the balance amount to the claimants within three months.
6. Precedent Interpretation: The judgment underscored the importance of considering the unique circumstances of each case before applying legal precedents. It cautioned against blindly relying on past decisions without proper analysis.
7. Final Decision: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the insurer was liable for a specific amount, with the remaining balance to be paid by the insured. No costs were awarded in the case.
-
2007 (11) TMI 666
... ... ... ... ..... e BPO would fully co-operate and sort out all the issues with the person taking control of the company by the order of this Board. Now that the second respondent will be in control of the company by virtue of this order, M/s. Core should honour the statement made before this Board by its counsel. The second respondent will withdraw all the cases against the petitioner as well as against M/s. Core at the earliest and till then she shall not take any further steps to proceed with the same. Should for any reason, the second respondent does not pay the full amount due as per this order to the petitioner within the stipulated time, the right to purchase the interests of the second respondent in respect of her shares and the loans given by her in the company will automatically vest in the petitioner and he will be bound by the same terms and conditions as above. 21. The petition is disposed of in the above terms, vacating all the interim reorders and without any order as to costs.
-
2007 (11) TMI 665
Issues involved: Determination of disgorgement amount u/s SEBI Act, 1992 without establishing guilt or illegal gains, violation of principles of natural justice.
Summary:
Issue 1: Determination of disgorgement amount without establishing guilt or illegal gains
The judgment by the Securities Appellate Tribunal dealt with a series of appeals against an order by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) directing the appellants to jointly and severally disgorge an amount of Rs. 115.82 crores within six months. The SEBI order was based on preliminary findings related to certain entities cornering IPO shares and making windfall gains. The Tribunal noted that the SEBI order determined the disgorgement amount without establishing the guilt of the appellants or confirming any illegal gains made by them. The Tribunal found this approach to be in violation of the principles of natural justice. It emphasized that determining disgorgement should only occur after establishing guilt and illegal gains, and that not every entity is automatically liable for disgorgement without such determinations.
Issue 2: Violation of principles of natural justice
The Tribunal highlighted that the appellants were directed to disgorge the amount without being given an opportunity to present their case or show cause as to why they should be required to disgorge the amount. This lack of procedural fairness was deemed a violation of natural justice. The Tribunal emphasized that the appellants should have been afforded a fair hearing before any determination of disgorgement amount was made. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the SEBI order against the appellants, allowing SEBI to initiate proper disgorgement proceedings in accordance with the law against entities found liable for disgorgement based on established guilt and illegal gains. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.
-
2007 (11) TMI 664
... ... ... ... ..... afted from a lawyer based at Chennai. The lawyer at Chennai did not take steps to draft the rejoinder to the counter-statement for long time and thus the rejoinder could not be filed in time. We have heard both learned Counsel and gone through the correspondences exchanged between the Lawmarks Naveen & Saturn, New Delhi and the lawyer at Chennai. No negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is found to be imputable to the applicant. We are, therefore, satisfied that the cause shown by the applicant constitute sufficient cause for not filing the rejoinder within time. We condone the delay and allow the rejoinder and the document to take on record. 25. In view of the above, the application is allowed and the Registrar is directed to expunge the trade mark No. 1109280 from the Register of Trade Marks. The Miscellaneous petition No. 112/2007 is ordered in the above terms. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Registrar of Trade Marks. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (11) TMI 663
Validity Of Initiation of Proceedings u/s 147/148 - Escaped assessment - belief that (HUF) has not filed the return of income - assumption of justification u/s 148 - Status of HUF - Notice u/s 148 was sent to the HUF and assessment made in the hands of individual - HELD THAT:- In our view, the IT Act recognizes the status of the HUF different from individual status of Karta of the HUF. Two are treated as different legal entities. Therefore, it is necessary that notice u/s 148 of the Act should be sent in the correct status because jurisdiction to make assessment is assumed by issuing valid notice. Admittedly, in this case, the notice u/s 148 was sent to the HUF and assessment has been made in the hands of individual. In our view after having issued notice u/s 148 of the Act to HUF, the AO has no jurisdiction to make the assessment in the case of individual.
In the case of CIT vs. K. Adinarayana Murty [1967 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] held that; ‘individual’ and the ‘HUF’ are treated as separate units of assessment and if a notice u/s 34 of the Act is wrongly issued to the assessee in the status of an individual and not in the correct status of an HUF, the notice is illegal and all proceedings taken under that notice are ultra vires and without jurisdiction."
Thus, it is clear from the above that the Department cannot be permitted to change the status from the HUF to individual. Thus, assessment framed u/s 148/144 is not legally sustainable.
Reasons recorded by the AO - We are of the view that the reopening has been done on the basis of the reason recorded on incorrect facts. That being so, the reasons are, in fact, no reasons at all. This view find support from the decision in the case of CIT vs. Atlas Cycle Industries [1989 (4) TMI 48 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT]. Further, it is seen from the reason recorded that the purpose of reopening was to make verification of the investment made by the assessee. In the case of Manish Ajmera vs. Asstt. CIT [2005 (3) TMI 388 - ITAT CHANDIGARH-A] it has been held that the assessment made u/s 143(1) without issue of notice u/s 143(2) could not be reopened in the absence of any fresh material to show that income has escaped assessment and reopening for making fishing inquiry was not valid.
Therefore, we hold that the initiation of the proceedings u/s 148 of the Act is not legally sustainable and as such assessment framed in pursuance of the said notice is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. Since we have quashed the assessment made in the matter on the legal ground as aforesaid, the other grounds taken by the assessee will not survive.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
-
2007 (11) TMI 662
... ... ... ... ..... are not covered under the ‘business auxiliary service’. The respondents are having only weigh bridge and only weighing the goods. The contention of the Revenue is that weighment of goods is also a ‘business auxiliary service’. In these circumstances, we find no merit in this application, the same is rejected. (Dictated & pronounced in open Court)
-
2007 (11) TMI 661
Issues involved: Challenge to assessment order for the assessment year 1989-90 based on the limitation period u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act.
Summary: The appellant challenged the assessment order for the assessment year 1989-90, questioning the validity of the order based on the limitation period u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act. The key issue raised was whether the assessing Officer's failure to pass an order within two years from the date of issuing the notice under Section 148 of the Act rendered the assessment barred by limitation.
The High Court noted that a notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued on 10.6.1991 and served on the assessee on 11.6.1991. Despite subsequent notices and summons, the assessment order was completed on 29.3.1996, exceeding the two-year limitation period. The Court emphasized that the subsequent notice issued on 22.3.1993 did not extend the limitation period, as there is no provision under the Act for issuing notices after Section 148 notices. The Court held that the assessment should have been completed within two years of the initial notice, and the additional notice did not save the limitation. As this legal issue was not considered by the lower authorities, the Court allowed the appeal in favor of the assessee, setting aside the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), and the Assessing Officer.
-
2007 (11) TMI 660
Issues involved: Initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without explicit satisfaction recorded in the assessment order and validity of penalty imposition based on deduction claimed for expenditure on borrowed funds for investment in shares.
Initiation of Penalty Proceedings u/s 271(1)(c): The Assessing Officer initiated penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) based on the assessment order, where he observed the need for penalty proceedings but did not explicitly record his satisfaction. Subsequently, a penalty was levied on the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the penalty citing lack of bona fide explanation for the deduction claimed. However, the Tribunal reversed the decision, emphasizing the necessity of the Assessing Officer's explicit satisfaction in the assessment order for initiating penalty proceedings, citing relevant court precedents.
Validity of Penalty Imposition on Deduction Claim: The Tribunal also allowed the appeal on merits, stating that the deduction claimed by the assessee for interest on borrowed funds used for share investment was based on a bona fide belief, and no contumacious conduct was evident. Upon independent examination, the Court found no fault in the Tribunal's decision on the merits. Ultimately, no substantial question of law was found to arise in the case.
Separate Judgement: A separate judgment was not delivered by the judges in this case.
-
2007 (11) TMI 659
Issues involved: Reopening of assessment u/s 147/148 of the IT Act, 1961 based on statement alleging accommodation entries from a front company.
Summary:
Reopening of Assessment: The Revenue challenged an order passed by the Tribunal for reopening the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1997-98 u/s 147/148 of the IT Act, 1961. The assessee requested the reasons for the reopening, which were provided, citing a statement by Mr. Sanjay Rastogi alleging accommodation entries from M/s Hallmark Healthcare Ltd. The Tribunal noted that the statement did not explicitly mention the front company or the assessee, and the assessee was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Sanjay Rastogi.
Judgment Analysis: The High Court examined the information provided to the assessee, agreeing with the Tribunal that the statement did not conclusively prove the alleged accommodation entry. The Court distinguished a previous case where a similar statement explicitly mentioned the front company and details of transactions, unlike in the present case. Therefore, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the appeal.
This judgment highlights the importance of providing clear and specific evidence when reopening assessments based on allegations of accommodation entries, emphasizing the need for transparency and opportunity for cross-examination to ensure fair proceedings.
-
2007 (11) TMI 658
Issues involved: Determination of duty liability u/s Notification No. 64/95-C.E., availability of exemption, applicability of limitation period, imposition of penalties.
Summary: The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT AHMEDABAD disposed of a group of cases involving manufacturers of excisable goods supplying to shipbuilders without duty payment under Notification No. 64/95-C.E. The Revenue contended that the goods were not for consumption on board a vessel, challenging the exemption claimed. The issue of exemption availability was settled against the appellants based on precedent. The demand was challenged on the ground of limitation, citing previous Tribunal decisions where demands were held time-barred. The Tribunal referred to cases where demands were considered time-barred due to bona fide belief or certificate from Naval authorities. The demands were held to be barred by limitation, and penalties were set aside. The duty liability for a specific period was quantified by adjusting the amount already paid by the appellants. Penalties imposed were also set aside due to the demands being time-barred.
-
2007 (11) TMI 657
Issues involved: Validity of reopening assessment u/s 147 for asst. yr. 1998-99 based on directions by CIT(A) and subsequent cancellation of reopened assessment.
Validity of Reopening Assessment u/s 147: The assessee filed the return of income for the assessment year 1998-99, and the assessment was completed under section 143(1). Assessments for the preceding years were reopened under section 147, and the CIT(A) directed the AO to reopen the assessment for 1998-99 to investigate the source of investment in property. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) could not give directions to reopen assessments for other years. Subsequently, the AO reopened and completed the assessment. The CIT(A cancelled the reopened assessment for 1998-99, deeming the reopening as wrong and bad in law. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, leading to the Revenue filing an appeal. The Revenue contended that previous judgments in similar cases supported their position, but the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, citing that the CIT(A) had the authority to give directions under section 246 of the Act. The Tribunal found no irregularity in its order and dismissed the appeal based on precedent, emphasizing that the appellate authority cannot exceed its power under the statute.
Cancellation of Reopened Assessment: The Tribunal's decision to cancel the reopened assessment for the assessment year 1998-99 was based on the finding that the reopening under section 147 was incorrect and against the law. The Tribunal referenced a previous judgment involving similar factual aspects and held that the CIT(A) had the power to direct the reopening of assessments, and the AO was obligated to comply with such directions. The Tribunal emphasized that the AO must adhere to the orders of the appellate authority within the bounds of the law. The Tribunal concluded that there was no defect in its order and dismissed the appeal, aligning with the principles established in the cited case.
In conclusion, the High Court of Madras upheld the Tribunal's decision to cancel the reopened assessment for the assessment year 1998-99, emphasizing the authority of the CIT(A) to issue directions for reopening assessments and the AO's obligation to comply within legal boundaries.
-
2007 (11) TMI 656
Issues involved: The issue involves seeking waiver of pre-deposit of penalty amount under Section 76 and 77 of the Act, discretionary powers for imposition of penalty, conflicting views of High Court judgments, and the authority's power to exercise discretion in dropping the penalty.
Summary:
Issue 1 - Waiver of pre-deposit of penalty amount: The appellant sought waiver of pre-deposit of penalty amount of &8377; 75,000/- and &8377; 1,29,000. The Assistant Commissioner initially dropped the penalty proceedings, but the Commissioner later imposed the penalty. The appellant's counsel referred to previous cases where waiver was granted in similar circumstances. The learned Counsel highlighted that the levy of penalty under the mentioned Sections is discretionary and not for minor breaches, citing a High Court judgment. The appellant argued for waiver, while the JDR contended that the penalty imposition was justified based on a different High Court judgment.
Issue 2 - Consideration of submissions: After considering the arguments from both sides, the Bench noted that in a similar case, waiver of pre-deposit was granted by the Bench. The High Court had previously acknowledged the discretionary power of imposing penalties and the authority's ability to drop penalties. Despite a conflicting judgment setting aside the Bench's decision, the matter was to be further examined during the final hearing. The Bench allowed the stay applications by granting waiver of pre-deposit and staying the recovery until the appeals' disposal. All similar cases related to penalty levy were scheduled for a final hearing on December 5, 2007, and these appeals were to be included in the same hearing.
This judgment highlights the legal complexities surrounding the imposition and waiver of penalties, emphasizing the discretionary nature of such decisions and the need for thorough consideration during final hearings.
-
2007 (11) TMI 655
Issues Involved: 1. Application of Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938. 2. Non-disclosure and mis-statement in the insurance proposal form. 3. Materiality of the suppressed facts and their impact on the insurance contract.
Summary:
1. Application of Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938: The appeal questions the application of Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938, arising from a judgment by the High Court of Kerala, which set aside the trial court's decision favoring the plaintiffs. Section 45 stipulates that a life insurance policy cannot be called into question after two years from its commencement unless it is shown that a statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and that it was fraudulently made by the policy-holder.
2. Non-disclosure and mis-statement in the insurance proposal form: The insured, who took a policy on 21st February 1987 and died on 6th July 1987, had undergone an operation for Adenoma Thyroid but did not disclose this in the proposal form. The insurance company repudiated the policy on 10th February 1989, citing non-disclosure and mis-statement. The trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Division Bench of the High Court reversed this, emphasizing the warranty clause and the materiality of the non-disclosed facts.
3. Materiality of the suppressed facts and their impact on the insurance contract: The insured's answers in the proposal form were incorrect, which was not disputed. The Division Bench held that the non-disclosure was material and justified the repudiation of the policy. The Supreme Court noted that the insured's brother, an agent of the Life Insurance Corporation, presumably knew the effect of misstatement of facts. The Court emphasized that a deliberate wrong answer affecting the insurance contract could lead to the policy being vitiated in law.
The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench's decision, stating that the insured's suppression of material facts, despite being aware of the consequences, justified the repudiation of the policy. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the insurance contract was vitiated by the insured's fraudulent act.
-
2007 (11) TMI 654
... ... ... ... ..... he assessment year 198889? (B) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in treating electrical installations in the building of the assessee used as hotel as a part of plant for the purposes of depreciation, without taking note of the words “fittings used in hotels” under the heading “Furniture and fittings” in the Depreciation Schedule specifically providing for deprecation at the rate of 15 thereon?” Issue notice to the other side. Paper book be filed within 3 months. List the appeal for final hearing after 3 months.
-
2007 (11) TMI 653
Issues involved: Appeal against order u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act regarding allowance of depreciation on Non-compete Fee.
Summary: 1. The assessee, a company dealing in yeast products, appealed against the order u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, where the Commissioner found the allowance of depreciation on Non-compete Fee to be erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue's interest. 2. The Commissioner directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the acquisition of Biofoods, the payment of Non-compete Fee, its valuation, and the actual benefit to the assessee, following the decision in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd v CIT (2000) 243 ITR 83 (SC).
3. The assessee argued that all details were submitted to the Assessing Officer, who allowed the claim based on the information provided. However, the Departmental Representative contended that the assessment order lacked discussion on the Non-compete Fee issue, citing relevant legal precedents.
4. The Tribunal noted that the assessment order did not address the capitalization of Non-compete Fee and the allowance of depreciation, which was crucial for correcting errors prejudicial to Revenue's interest. The Commissioner's decision u/s 263 was upheld as justified, and the appeal by the assessee was dismissed.
........
|