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2008 (2) TMI 916
Issues involved: The judgment involves the following substantial questions of law: A. Whether poultry shed constitutes plant for depreciation allowance. B. Whether charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C was justified. C. Whether miscellaneous income can be included for calculating rebate under section 80JJ of the Income Tax Act.
Issue A - Poultry Shed Depreciation: The Court held that the issue of poultry shed depreciation is covered by a previous decision and the assessee is entitled to depreciation at 25 per cent.
Issue B - Charging of Interest: The controversy regarding charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C was resolved in favor of the assessee based on a previous decision where the interest charged by the Assessing Officer was deemed not tenable.
Issue C - Miscellaneous Income for Rebate Calculation: The Court determined that a miscellaneous income of Rs. 3,26,811 cannot be included for calculating rebate under section 80JJ of the Act, citing a decision by the apex Court which concluded that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit on this score.
The appeal was allowed in part, with no order as to costs.
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2008 (2) TMI 915
The High Court of Allahabad heard a case related to a dispute covered by a previous decision dated 20.12.1996. The writ petition was disposed of with directions to handle the petitioners' case according to the earlier decision and not enforce the order dated 30/31.3.1990.
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2008 (2) TMI 914
Issues involved: Challenge to order passed by Single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissing Revision Petition filed u/s 397 read with 401 of CrPC.
Background: Appellant, former Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, faced obstruction and abuse during construction of village road leading to filing of complaint under IPC sections. Accused persons sought dropping of charges citing time bar, which was partly accepted by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.
Appellant's Argument: Magistrate should not have discharged accused after summons issuance. High Court's summary dismissal without reason is unjust as there were arguable points and the Magistrate's order was legally flawed.
Respondents' Argument: High Court rightly dismissed revision petition as it lacked merit.
High Court Order: Dismissed the revision petition summarily without providing any reasons, which is deemed unsustainable as reasons are essential for clarity and justice in judicial decisions.
Legal Precedents: Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are crucial for transparency and allow for judicial review. Right to reason is fundamental for a fair judicial system.
Judgment: Supreme Court set aside High Court's order and remitted the matter for fresh consideration with a requirement for a reasoned order. Emphasized the importance of providing reasons in judicial decisions for clarity and fairness.
Outcome: Appeal allowed in favor of the appellant.
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2008 (2) TMI 913
The Supreme Court granted leave in a case regarding pre-deposit of duty under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962. The impugned judgment was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in light of a previous court decision. Parties can raise all contentions, and the appeal was disposed of with this direction.
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2008 (2) TMI 912
Issues involved: The issues involved in the legal judgment are the validity of the order of sanction passed by the Collector of Customs and the consideration of evidence related to the grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Validity of Order of Sanction: The judgment revolves around the validity of the order of sanction passed by the Collector of Customs for prosecution under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. The provision under Section 137 of the Act mandates that no court can take cognizance of certain offenses without the previous sanction of the Commissioner of Customs. The order of sanction in this case was found to be lacking as it did not demonstrate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind on the documents presented before him. The absence of examination of the sanctioning authority as a witness led to a lack of clarity on how the decision to grant sanction was made based on the evidence. The High Court's judgment did not address the crucial aspect of a valid order of sanction, which was a significant flaw in the legal process. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, emphasizing the necessity of a valid order of sanction for prosecution under the Customs Act.
Consideration of Evidence for Sanction: The legal proceedings also involved a detailed consideration of the evidence related to the grant of sanction for prosecution under the Customs Act. The Trial Court had convicted all accused individuals, but the Sessions Judge later acquitted them due to issues with the sanctioning process. The High Court, in its subsequent judgment, reversed the acquittal and convicted accused Nos. 1 & 2 without affording them the opportunity to present their case through their counsel. This lack of due process raised concerns about the fairness of the trial. The Supreme Court intervened, highlighting the importance of a thorough examination of evidence and proper legal procedures in criminal cases. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for a fresh hearing, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and adherence to legal standards in criminal proceedings.
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2008 (2) TMI 911
Import - Bill of entry - Period for filing of - Declaration - Baggage - the decision in the case of CHANDRA I. KRIPLANI Versus COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ACC, MUMBAI [2001 (10) TMI 229 - CEGAT, MUMBAI] contested - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2008 (2) TMI 910
Issues involved: The issues involved in this case are related to the adjustment of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) credit against tax payable, the interpretation of section 115JAA of the Income-tax Act, and the order of priority of adjustment between Tax Deducted at Source (TDS), advance tax, and MAT credit.
Adjustment of MAT Credit Against Tax Payable: The appellant, engaged in the business of printing and publishing, filed a return of income for the assessment year 2001-2002 claiming a refund of tax. The Assessing Officer initially calculated the refund without setting off the MAT credit from the tax payable, resulting in a lower refund amount. The appellant's application under section 154 of the Act to rectify this error was rejected by the Assessing Officer. The CIT (Appeals) directed the Assessing Officer to accept the appellant's claim and calculate the refund considering the MAT credit. The Tribunal upheld the CIT (Appeals) decision, emphasizing that MAT credit should be adjusted against the tax payable before TDS is deducted. The Tribunal referred to previous decisions supporting this interpretation and concluded that the MAT credit must be set off first against the tax payable, with TDS deducted only from the remaining tax payable amount.
Interpretation of Section 115JAA: Section 115JAA of the Income-tax Act provides for tax credit in respect of tax paid on deemed income for certain companies. The Tribunal highlighted the provisions of this section, particularly sub-section (4), which specifies that the tax credit shall be allowed set off in a year when tax becomes payable on the total income computed in accordance with the normal provisions of the Act. The Tribunal clarified that the MAT credit should be adjusted before TDS deduction, as per the legislative intent and previous Tribunal decisions. The Tribunal affirmed that the MAT credit must be set off against the tax payable before any TDS deduction, in line with the statutory provisions of section 115JAA.
Order of Priority of Adjustment: The Tribunal also addressed the issue of the order of priority of adjustment between TDS, advance tax, and MAT credit. Referring to previous Tribunal decisions, the Tribunal emphasized that MAT credit should be given priority in set off against the tax payable before considering TDS deduction. The Tribunal rejected the order of priority prescribed in the return form, emphasizing that the MAT credit adjustment should precede any TDS deduction. The Tribunal's decision aligned with previous Tribunal rulings, emphasizing the correct order of adjustment between MAT credit and TDS, as mandated by the statutory provisions of section 115JAA.
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2008 (2) TMI 909
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 142A of the Income Tax Act in the context of assessment made under Section 143.
Summary:
The High Court of Rajasthan considered the appeal regarding the assessment made by the Assessing Officer under Section 143 of the Income Tax Act. The court noted that Section 142A allows for reference to the Valuation Officer in specific cases where the value of certain investments or assets needs to be estimated. These cases are outlined in Sections 69, 69A, and 69B, which deal with unexplained investments or undisclosed amounts in the books of accounts. The court emphasized that Section 142A does not empower the Assessing Officer to routinely refer every assessment to the Valuation Officer, but only in cases falling under Sections 69, 69A, and 69B. Since the appellant's case did not involve issues covered by these sections and the books of accounts were found to be regularly maintained, the court upheld the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal.
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2008 (2) TMI 908
Issues Involved: 1. Allowance of depreciation not claimed by the assessee. 2. Exclusion of DEPB/Special Import Licence receipts from business profits under clause (baa) of Explanation to section 80HHC of the Act.
Summary:
1. Allowance of Depreciation Not Claimed by the Assessee: The primary issue was whether the Assessing Officer (AO) was justified in allowing depreciation that the assessee did not claim for the assessment years 1994-95 to 1997-98. The AO recomputed the Written Down Value (WDV) and depreciation for assessment years 1998-99 to 2004-05 during reassessment u/s 153A and assessment u/s 143(3). The CIT(A) upheld the assessee's right not to claim depreciation for the years 1998-99 to 2001-02, citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v/s Mahendra Mills, 243 ITR 56, which stated that depreciation must be calculated on the WDV of assets determined by deducting depreciation actually allowed, not notionally allowed. However, the CIT(A) allowed depreciation for the years 2002-03 to 2004-05 based on initial cost, adjusted for additions or deletions in the block of assets.
The Revenue argued that Explanation 5 to Section 32(1) was retrospective and applicable for all assessment years, citing the decision of ITAT Mumbai Bench in Mandhana Exports P. Ltd. v/s ACIT, 82 ITD 306. The CIT-DR also referenced the Bombay High Court's decision in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd v/s CIT, 261 ITR 98, which held that depreciation must be allowed for computing deductions under Chapter VI-A, regardless of whether it was claimed by the assessee.
The Tribunal concluded that for computing gross profits for deductions under Chapter VI-A, depreciation must be allowed as per sections 29 to 43D, including section 32. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the AO's order, which computed depreciation notionally for assessment years 1994-95 to 1997-98 to determine the WDV for 1998-99 and subsequent years.
2. Exclusion of DEPB/Special Import Licence Receipts: The issue of excluding DEPB/Special Import Licence receipts from business profits under clause (baa) of Explanation to section 80HHC was not decided in this appeal. The CIT(A) had amended his order u/s 154, and the Revenue's appeals on this issue were pending in ITA No. 4313 to 4319/Del/2006.
Conclusion: The appeals filed by the Revenue were allowed, and the order pronounced in the open court on 08.2.2008.
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2008 (2) TMI 907
Issues Involved: 1. Investigation of membership u/s 247/250 of the Companies Act, 1956. 2. Alleged concerted acquisition of shares violating SEBI regulations. 3. Maintainability of the petition under Section 247/250 for listed companies. 4. Interim relief for restraining transfer of shares.
Summary:
1. Investigation of Membership u/s 247/250: The petitioner, M/s. Rasoi Limited, filed a petition u/s 247/250 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking an investigation into the membership of respondent Nos. 1 to 27 to determine the true persons financially interested in the company. The petitioner also sought interim relief to restrain the respondents from transferring their shares or exercising voting rights. The petitioner had previously filed a petition u/s 111A for rectification of the register of members, alleging concerted acquisition of shares by respondents in violation of SEBI regulations. During the pendency of the 111A petition, some respondents transferred their shares to others, leading to the current petition.
2. Alleged Concerted Acquisition of Shares: The petitioner argued that the respondents acted in concert to acquire 21% of the company's shares, significantly increasing the share price. The petitioner highlighted the interconnections among the respondents, such as common shareholding, loans, registered offices, directors, bank accounts, and auditors. The petitioner contended that the investigation was necessary to uncover the true persons financially interested in the company and to aid the pending 111A petition.
3. Maintainability of the Petition: The respondents challenged the maintainability of the petition, arguing that Section 247 was not applicable to listed companies post-SEBI regulations. They contended that the petitioner should approach SEBI for investigation under Regulation 38(a) of the Takeover Regulations. The respondents also argued that the petition lacked specific allegations and was filed with an oblique purpose. The Board examined whether a petition u/s 250 could be independently filed and concluded that it could, provided there were circumstances warranting an investigation u/s 247(1A).
4. Interim Relief for Restraining Transfer of Shares: The petitioner sought to restrain the respondents from transferring their shares, arguing that the investigation would reveal interconnections among the respondents. The Board noted that an investigation u/s 247(1A) was not an end in itself but a means for further action. The Board also observed that the petitioner had not impleaded respondents 17 to 27 in the 111A petition, limiting the effectiveness of any investigation. The Board found that the petitioner sought the restraint order to circumvent the lack of such power under Section 111A.
Conclusion: The Board dismissed the petition, vacating all interim orders, and granted liberty to the petitioner to implead respondents 17 to 27 in the 111A petition. The Board emphasized that SEBI should handle investigations related to violations of Takeover Regulations for listed companies. The Board also directed the 1st respondent to respond to an application alleging violation of the status quo order.
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2008 (2) TMI 906
Issues involved: Interpretation of provisions u/s 142A and 131(1)(d) in relation to assessment proceedings.
Summary: The appeals arose from a Tribunal judgment regarding assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96, questioning the application of s. 142A despite the assessment order being passed before 30th Sept., 2004. The assessee's returns were filed in July 1995, and after no action under s. 143(1)(a), the AO issued a notice under s. 148 in Oct. 1996 based on a valuation report indicating income escapement.
The CIT(A) set aside the assessment, citing relevant case laws, which the Tribunal upheld. The Revenue argued that s. 131(1)(d) allows obtaining valuation reports even if no assessment proceedings are pending. However, the Tribunal found that the assessment was completed under s. 143(1)(a) due to the expiry of time for issuing s. 143(2) notice, leading to the initiation of proceedings under s. 147 post-assessment.
The AO's reason to believe income escapement was solely based on the valuation report obtained under s. 131(1)(d). Referring to a Supreme Court case, the Court held that s. 131(1)(d) does not empower the AO to refer matters to the Valuation Officer. Despite the introduction of s. 142A in 2004, it has limitations and cannot be applied retrospectively to finalized assessments before Sept. 30, 2004.
The Court ruled in favor of the assessee, dismissing the appeals as the provisions of s. 142A could not be invoked in this case based on the existing legal framework and the specific circumstances of the assessment proceedings.
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2008 (2) TMI 905
Issues involved: 1. Disallowance of interest received from banks for securing export credit facilities u/s 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. Validity of retrospective amendment act of amending sec. 80HHC and levy of interest u/s 234B based on retrospective amendment.
Issue 1: Disallowance of interest received from banks for securing export credit facilities u/s 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961: The Assessee appealed against the order disallowing 90% of the gross interest received from banks on deposits for securing export credit facilities from the purview of 'profits of business' for computing deduction u/s 80HHC. The Tribunal referred to a decision by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in Dollar Apparels v ITO, where it was held that income earned from bank deposits without a nexus to export earnings is assessable under 'income from other sources' and not 'income from business.' Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the Assessee's ground based on this precedent.
Issue 2: Validity of retrospective amendment act of amending sec. 80HHC and levy of interest u/s 234B based on retrospective amendment: The Assessee challenged the retrospective amendment act of amending sec. 80HHC and the validity of levying interest u/s 234B based on this retrospective amendment. The Tribunal cited a previous order in the case of M/s. Well Knit Industries where it was held that the Assessee could not have anticipated the tax implications of the retrospective amendment, invoking the maxim "LEX NON COGIT AD IMPOSSIBILIA," which means the law cannot compel one to do the impossible. The Tribunal concluded that in such a situation, the Assessee cannot be held liable to pay advance tax, and therefore, interest u/s 234B is not applicable. Following this precedent, the Tribunal decided this issue in favor of the Assessee and against the Revenue.
In conclusion, the appeal of the Assessee was partly allowed based on the above considerations.
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2008 (2) TMI 904
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay as well as on merits. (Citation: 2008 (2) TMI 904 - SC)
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2008 (2) TMI 903
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as the revenue did not challenge previous decisions, making them final. The appeals were similar to cases involving Blue Star Ltd. and Nutherm Packaging Group.
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2008 (2) TMI 902
Whether the exemption provided in the notification covers cannulae for distant parts of veins and blood vessels as well or it is limited to cannulae for aorta and vena cavae and similar veins and blood vessels, and whether term ‘blood vessels’ has to be read separately?
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2008 (2) TMI 901
Issues involved: Appeal filed by the department against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding adjustment of brought forward losses, unabsorbed depreciation under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Summary:
Issue 1: Adjustment of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation under section 10A
The department objected to the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding the adjustment of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation against the income under section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment for the year under appeal did not show any adjustment for set off of brought forward losses or unabsorbed depreciation. Section 10A of the Act allows for the carry forward and set off of losses and unabsorbed depreciation from earlier assessment years. The Supreme Court in Rajapalayam Mills Ltd., v. CIT clarified that once losses and unabsorbed depreciation from earlier years have been adjusted against profits of other businesses, they cannot be claimed as adjustable in the current year. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), stating that the department's claim for adjustment was unjustified and not in accordance with the law.
Decision: The appeal by the revenue department is dismissed.
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2008 (2) TMI 900
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act, 1961. 2. Limitation period for imposing penalty under Section 275 of the IT Act, 1961. 3. Requirement of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer (AO) for initiating penalty proceedings. 4. Merits of the penalty imposed.
Issue-wise Analysis:
1. Validity of Penalty under Section 271(1)(c): The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was levied by the AO for an amount of Rs. 3,20,60,021 on the basis that the assessee had filed inaccurate particulars of income leading to an addition of Rs. 9,16,00,061. The CIT(A) partly confirmed and partly canceled the penalty. The Tribunal found that the AO failed to establish that the assessee had concealed income or filed inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal emphasized that mere disallowances or additions do not automatically justify the imposition of penalty. The AO must show positive material evidence indicating the assessee's contumacious conduct.
2. Limitation Period for Imposing Penalty: The Tribunal analyzed the relevant dates and concluded that the penalty order dated 30th March 2005 was barred by limitation. According to Section 275(1)(a), the penalty order should have been passed within six months from the end of the month in which the Tribunal's order was received, which was 14th March 2002. Hence, the penalty should have been imposed by 30th September 2002. The Tribunal rejected the argument that the AO had two years from the end of the financial year 2002-03, noting that the assessment order dated 31st March 2003 was not a fresh order but merely an appeal effect order.
3. Requirement of Satisfaction by the AO: The Tribunal stressed that the AO must be satisfied during the assessment proceedings that the assessee had concealed income or filed inaccurate particulars. This satisfaction must be evident from the assessment order. In this case, the AO's satisfaction was not discernible from the assessment orders dated 21st December 1987 and 31st March 2003. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Dilip N. Shroff vs. Jt. CIT, which mandates that the AO's satisfaction must be clear and specific.
4. Merits of the Penalty Imposed: The Tribunal held that the AO did not provide sufficient grounds for imposing the penalty. The AO's primary basis for the penalty was the difference between the returned loss and the assessed income, which the Tribunal found insufficient. The Tribunal noted that the additions were made due to the assessee's inability to produce supporting evidence, not due to deliberate concealment or filing of inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal referred to various judgments, including those of the Rajasthan High Court and the Supreme Court, to support its conclusion that mere disallowances or additions do not justify penalty under Section 271(1)(c).
Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and canceled the penalty, while dismissing the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of the AO's satisfaction and the limitation period for imposing penalties, and found that the AO failed to meet these requirements in this case.
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2008 (2) TMI 899
Issues Involved: 1. Depreciation on units not claimed by the assessee. 2. Deduction of 90% of certain receipts from business profits under section 80HHC. 3. Restriction of deduction under sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA. 4. Deduction under sections 80HHC and 80-IA while computing income under section 115JA. 5. Disallowance of corporate dividend tax under section 115JA. 6. Addition of provision for depreciation for earlier years under section 115JA. 7. Exclusion of excise duty and sales tax from total turnover for section 80HHC. 8. Disallowance of payments made to employees under VRS. 9. Addition of notional interest on interest-free advances.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Depreciation on Units Not Claimed by the Assessee: The assessee objected to the CIT(A)'s allowance of depreciation on three units (Pondicherry I, Pondicherry II, and Calcutta) despite not claiming it. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision based on the jurisdictional High Court's ruling in Scoop Industries (Pvt). Ltd. vs. ITO, which mandates granting depreciation before special deductions, irrespective of the claim by the assessee. The appeal on this ground was dismissed.
2. Deduction of 90% of Certain Receipts from Business Profits under Section 80HHC: The assessee challenged the deduction of 90% of various receipts from business profits. The Tribunal referred to the Bombay High Court's judgment in CIT vs. Bangalore Clothing Co., clarifying that only operational business income from export turnover is included in business profits, excluding non-operational income. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the issue considering specific principles, including the exclusion of net income not assessable under section 28, treating independent income as non-operational, and excluding sales tax and excise duty from total turnover. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
3. Restriction of Deduction under Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA: The assessee contested the restriction of deductions to Rs. 2,61,43,688/- against the claimed Rs. 8,61,99,493/-. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision based on the Special Bench ruling in Vahid Paper Converters vs. ITO, which mandates considering depreciation for accurate profit determination. The appeal was dismissed.
4. Deduction under Sections 80HHC and 80-IA while Computing Income under Section 115JA: The assessee argued for deductions under sections 80HHC and 80-IA in computing income under section 115JA. The Tribunal, referencing the Special Bench decision in DCIT vs. Syncome Formulations (I) Ltd., ruled that deductions should be based on adjusted book profits, not regular business profits. The appeal was allowed.
5. Disallowance of Corporate Dividend Tax under Section 115JA: The assessee claimed a deduction for corporate dividend tax while computing income under section 115JA. The Tribunal, aligning with the decision in ACIT vs. Balarampur Chini Mills Ltd., allowed the deduction, rejecting the revenue's argument that corporate dividend tax is part of income tax. The appeal was allowed.
6. Addition of Provision for Depreciation for Earlier Years under Section 115JA: The AO added back provision for depreciation for earlier years to the book profit. The Tribunal, following the Supreme Court's decision in Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT, ruled that such provisions should be disregarded for computing taxable income under section 115JA. The appeal was allowed.
7. Exclusion of Excise Duty and Sales Tax from Total Turnover for Section 80HHC: The revenue objected to the exclusion of excise duty and sales tax from total turnover. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in CIT vs. Lakshmi Machine Works, which excludes such duties from total turnover for section 80HHC computation. The appeal was dismissed.
8. Disallowance of Payments Made to Employees under VRS: The revenue challenged the allowance of VRS payments as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, supported by the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Bhor Industries Ltd., and Supreme Court rulings, recognizing VRS payments as allowable business expenditure. The appeal was dismissed.
9. Addition of Notional Interest on Interest-Free Advances: The revenue contested the deletion of notional interest on interest-free advances. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, consistent with prior Tribunal rulings in the assessee's case for earlier years, recognizing the advances as necessary for statutory and administrative expenses. The appeal was dismissed.
Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals on issues related to section 115JA deductions and provision for depreciation, while dismissing appeals on depreciation claims, restriction of deductions under sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA, and VRS payments. The revenue's appeals on excise duty, sales tax exclusion, and notional interest were dismissed. The AO was directed to re-examine certain issues under section 80HHC.
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2008 (2) TMI 898
Issues involved: The issues involved in the judgment are the termination of a Peon's services due to a criminal conviction, the application of disciplinary action, the legality of the punishment imposed, and the judicial review based on the doctrine of proportionality.
Termination of Services due to Criminal Conviction: The Respondent, a Peon in a Middle School, was terminated from service after being convicted for assaulting an individual. Despite the conviction, the Respondent's services were terminated, leading to a series of appeals and revisions challenging the termination.
Application of Disciplinary Action: The Respondent filed various appeals and revisions challenging the termination of services. The Tribunal held that the punishment of removal from service was excessive considering the nature of the offense, which did not involve moral turpitude. The Tribunal emphasized the need for fair and reasonable exercise of power by the disciplinary authority.
Legality of Punishment Imposed: The High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the Tribunal's decision, upholding the reduction of the Respondent's sentence to a fine. The Court emphasized that the disciplinary authority must consider all circumstances before imposing a punishment, especially when the offense does not involve moral turpitude.
Judicial Review based on Proportionality: The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, highlighted the shift in legal parameters towards the doctrine of proportionality in judicial review. Citing previous cases, the Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach in assessing decisions, especially concerning human rights and the weight accorded to various interests.
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2008 (2) TMI 897
Land in question was a "granted land" or "land purchased for a price at a public auction" - Application for Cancellation of the sale deed and restoration of the land under the provisions of The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ("the Act"), in the year 1981 - rejected - alienation after the expiry period of ten years of non-alienation clause and hence the sale transaction is not in violation of the condition governing grant and, therefore, it does not attract the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act - Jurisdiction of the High Court for interference in a factual decision - HELD THAT:- We have to see terms and conditions and recitals in the document and not the title alone. Though the document, according to the appellant, "Certificate of Grant", perusal of the clauses therein, clearly shows that the land was sold on 04.03.1948 in a public auction and Motappa purchased the same for a price of ₹ 408.12. In addition to the recitals, the "darkhast register extract" produced as Annexure "C" before the High Court also shows that the land in question was sold for a "price". Form I also indicates that the land in question was purchased and what was paid by the purchaser under the said document was the purchase price. In the light of the principles mentioned above and the terms and conditions in the recital clearly show that the land was purchased by Motappa in a public auction for a price.
Merely because the document has been styled or titled as "Certificate of Grant", it cannot be construed that the land was a "granted land" attracting the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Assistant and the Deputy Commissioner, the authorized authorities under the Act and Rules, on verification of the contents of the document coupled with Revenue extract rightly concluded that the land was purchased by Motappa in a public auction for a price even in the year 1948.
We have referred to the recitals in the document produced before the High Court which though titled as certificate of grant/Saguvali chit, various terms and conditions make it clear that the land was purchased by Motappa in a public auction on payment of a price for ₹ 408.12. In addition, the two authorities as well as the High Court adverted to the revenue extract and concluded that it was not a "granted land" and it was purchased in a public auction on payment of a price. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court has rightly refused to quash the orders of the said authorities and dismissed the writ petition. If the factual finding that the subject-matter of the land was a "granted land" undoubtedly it attracts bar under Section 4 of the Act and follow the conditions as stated in Rule 43 (1) (5) and (8).
In the result, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.
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