|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 324 Records
-
2025 (3) TMI 244
Violation of principles of natural justice - failure on the part of the respondent to provide an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner prior to the passing of impugned order - HELD THAT:- Initially, the notice in Form GST DRC-01 was issued on 26.12.2023, wherein the time limit was fixed for filing the reply on or before 25.01.2024. Accordingly, the reply was filed on 25.01.2024. Further, in the said notice, the date of personal hearing was fixed on 03.01.2024, which is 3 weeks prior to the expiry of time limit, provided by the respondent, for filing the reply.
Though a detailed reply dated 25.01.2024 was already filed by the petitioner, without considering the same, a reminder notice dated 07.03.2024 has been issued by the respondent, whereby once again the time limit for filing the reply was fixed as on or before 14.03.2024 and the date of personal hearing was fixed on 11.03.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner had filed his 2nd reply dated 14.03.2024 along with a copy of the 1st reply dated 25.01.2024. Thereafter, without providing any opportunity of personal hearing, the respondent had passed the impugned order dated 22.04.2024, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 75(4) of the GST Act, 2017.
Conclusion - The impugned order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice without providing any proper opportunity to the petitioner. In such view of the matter, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 22.04.2024 passed by the respondent.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
-
2025 (3) TMI 243
Challenge to impugned cancellation of GST Registration Order - HELD THAT:- The issue stands covered by a series of judgments, commencing with the decision in Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center Vs. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST) (GST) and others [2022 (2) TMI 933 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], wherein, under identical circumstances, this Court has directed the revocation of registration subject to conditions.
The benefit extended by this Court vide its earlier order in Suguna Cutpiece Centre's case, may be extended to the petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
-
2025 (3) TMI 242
Direction for compliance of the Order Passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Haryana and Punjab - refund the amount deposited by the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- There are no justification to entertain this instant writ petition which shall stand disposed of with liberty reserved to the writ petitioner to initiate such proceedings as may be permissible in law, if it be its case that the judgment of that High Court has not been complied with.
-
2025 (3) TMI 241
Cancellation of GST registration of the petitioner - non filing of the GST return for a continuous period of six months - petitioner is ready to make the payment towards GST return for a period of six months as well as the penalty, if any, imposed by the respondent-department - HELD THAT:- In view of the consensus between the parties, the matter is covered by the order passed in SUNIL SAH VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2024 (9) TMI 904 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT], the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order. The petitioner shall be at liberty to move an application for revocation or cancellation of the order under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, within two weeks.
Petition disposed off.
-
2025 (3) TMI 240
Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance.
PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts).
Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.
-
2025 (3) TMI 239
Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance.
PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts).
Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.
-
2025 (3) TMI 238
Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance.
PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts).
Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.
-
2025 (3) TMI 237
Supply of goods/services - sale of assets by the Liquidator - whether the Liquidator must obtain GST registration? - HELD THAT:- Notification nos. 11/2020-Central Tax dated 21.03.2020 & 39/2020-Central Tax dated 05.05.2020 were issued, which seeks to provide special procedure for corporate debtors undergoing the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
As per the said Notification, the Government, has notified those registered persons, who are corporate debtors under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), undergoing the corporate insolvency resolution process and the management of whose affairs are being undertaken by interim resolution professionals (IRP) or resolution professionals (RP), as the class of persons who shall follow special procedure as prescribed therein, from the date of the appointment of the IRP/RP till the period they undergo the corporate insolvency resolution process.
The West Bengal Authority for Advance Ruling has given a ruling vide in the case of Mansi Oils and Grains Pvt. Ltd. [2020 (7) TMI 141 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING, WEST BENGAL] that the sale of the assets of the applicant by NCLT appointed liquidator is a supply of goods by the liquidator, who is required to take registration under section 24 of the GST Act.
Conclusion - i) Any sale of assets of the company Maheshwary Ispat Limited which is in liquidation, done by the Liquidator of the company results in a supply of goods and/or services or both within the meaning of “supply” as defined under section 7 of the CGST Act 2017. ii) The Liquidator who is an insolvency professional being appointed by the Hon’ble NCLT Kolkata Bench as a liquidator, is required to obtain GST registration in terms of Section 24 of the CGST Act, 2017 and WBGST Act 2017 read together with the Notification no. 11/2020-Central Tax dated 21-March-2020 and Notification no. 439-F.Tdated 03-April 2020, issued under the WBGST Act, 2017.
-
2025 (3) TMI 236
Maintainability of appeal before Supreme court on low tax effect - TP Adjustment - MAM for Royalty payment - TNMM or CUP - as decided by HC [2023 (8) TMI 458 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein as concur with Appellant that having accepted the TNMM method as the most appropriate, it was not open to the TPO to subject only one element, i.e, payment of royalty, to an entirely different CUP method.
HELD THAT:- It is stated that the tax effect is less than ₹5 crores; hence, the Revenue would not press the present special leave petition.
In view of the statement made, the special leave petition is dismissed as not pressed, leaving the question(s) of law open.
In view of the aforesaid order, we are not examining the application for condonation of the delay.
-
2025 (3) TMI 235
Refusal to condone the delay in filing income tax returns - no reply to notice of defective return promptly - as submitted financial position of the Petitioner company is not quite strong, and the business activities suffered considerably due to the Covid pandemic and submitted that the Petitioner had candidly disclosed that a part-time accountant received the intimation of the notice of defective return, but the same was not brought to the notice of the directors for a considerable time
HELD THAT:- The records show that this is a case where the Petitioner had filed the returns within the prescribed period. However, the returns were found to be defective, and the Petitioner was informed of the defective return. However, for reasons the Petitioner attributes to the part-time account, such intimation was not addressed, resulting in the delay. The explanation offered does not smack of any mala fides. Mr Jose Pulikkoden pointed out that earlier there used to be delays in granting refunds. Therefore, the Petitioner bona fide believed that the refund issue was pending with the department. Only at the later stage, when enquiries were made, it was realised that the matter was pending due to non-clearance of the defects in the returns as may have been pointed out to the Petitioner.
Considering the explanation and the statement that no interest would be claimed if a refund is allowed, the delay deserves to be condoned. Mr Jose Pulikoden pointed out that, according to the Petitioner, the refunds would be in the range of Rs. 5,65,000/-. He submitted that this refund means much to the Petitioner company, which is presently in reduced financial circumstances.
Accordingly, we are inclined to allow condonation. As submited that the Petitioners do not have a copy of the defect notice. Accordingly, we direct the Respondents to furnish a copy of the defect notice to the Petitioner within two weeks of uploading this order. The return so filed after clearing the defects pointed out should be scrutinised by issuing notice u/s 143 (2) and making an assessment u/s 143 of the Income Tax.
-
2025 (3) TMI 234
Final assessment order u/s 143 (3) r.w.s. 144C (3) along with consequential notices of demand - Petitioner lodged objections to the draft order but failed to inform the assessing officer about the objections being filed before the DRP. Consequently, the final assessment order was made - HELD THAT:- We are inclined to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the DRP. The facts, in this case, are comparable in Sulzer Pumps India Private Limited [2021 (12) TMI 891 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] where, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, after recording that the assessing officer was not at fault still, granted the assessee in the same matter an additional opportunity since factually, objections had been filed with DRP, and such objections were pending. The relief in Sulzer Pumps (supra) was granted based on facts like those in the present case. Therefore, it is not as if the Sulzer Pumps (supra) or this order is a precedent for exercising discretion in every matter of this nature, irrespective of the factual position.
At the same time, we also agree that the assessing officer who made the impugned assessment order in this case was not at fault because there was no intimation by the Petitioner about the pendency of objections before the DRP. Though, in the peculiar facts of the present case, which are quite similar to those in Sulzer Pumps (supra) we are indulging the Petitioner, it is only appropriate that the Petitioner, for her lapse, she pays costs of Rs. 10,000/- favouring the High Court employees medical welfare fund at Mumbai.
-
2025 (3) TMI 233
Rejection of refund application - department’s website indicates that some of the Petitioner’s applications seeking refund have been rejected based on the remarks indicated in the last column - as argued such rejection is arbitrary since there was no compliance with natural justice and the Petitioner was denied the opportunity to show how the Petitioner was entitled to a refund - HELD THAT:- Respondent should have heard the Petitioner before rejecting the refund applications. The rejection of refund applications involves civil consequences, and typically, the principles of natural justice must be complied with. At the hearing, the Petitioner could possibly have been able to explain why the refunds were due, and such refund applications could not have been rejected based upon objections like alleged non-submission of Form-26B etc.
On the above grounds, we set aside the rejection of the Petitioner’s applications seeking a refund.
The matters are remitted to the Respondents for fresh consideration. We also direct the Respondents to decide the Petitioner’s applications for refund after giving the Petitioner and their representative an opportunity to be heard.
-
2025 (3) TMI 232
Adjustment of the refund for the assessment year 2024-2025 against the outstanding demand for the assessment year 2011-2012 - alternative submission made by the Petitioner to pay an additional 5 percent of the demand - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the opinion that the alternative submission made by Mr Jain is required to be accepted. The alternative submission being that the Petitioner is ready to pay additional 5 percent of demand for assessment year 2011-2012 so that the total payment would be 20 percent of the demand and since same would be in accordance with the instructions of the CBDT dated 31 July 2017, the balance demand would be stayed.
In our view, this submission is fair, and the same is required to be accepted.
-
2025 (3) TMI 231
Right to prefer cross-objections in an appeal referable to Section 260A - Appeals to the High Court on substantial questions of law - HELD THAT:- The various judgments that were cited and noticed above, have principally focused on the provisions of the Code and had interpreted the phrase “as far as may be” as being sufficient to hold that a cross-objection would lie even in an appeal from an appellate decree. However, here we are not only faced with the restrictive stipulation enshrined in Section 260A (6) of the Act but also by the prominent absence of a right to prefer cross-objections having been incorporated in Section 260A despite that avenue having been accorded statutory recognition in Section 253 (4) of the Act.
In our considered opinion and bearing in mind the language of Section 260A (6)(b), the right of a respondent can at best stretch to advancing a contention in relation to any finding returned by the Tribunal adverse to that party and which has an indelible connect with the question of law on which the appeal may be admitted.
We thus find ourselves unable to countenance sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 260A as conferring an independent right in a respondent to maintain or continue an apparent challenge in respect of a finding rendered by the Tribunal de hors or disconnected with the substantial question of law on which such an appeal may be entertained.
In summation, we would hold that absent a specific adoption of a right to prefer cross-objections and the same being statutorily acknowledged to be part of the appeal procedure laid out in Section 260A of the Act, a cross-objection would not be maintainable.
Section 260A (6) is merely an enabling provision and which empowers a respondent to agitate an issue that may have been decided against it by the Tribunal subject to the condition that the same is indelibly connected with the decision which gives rise to the question of law on which we admit an appeal. The said provision cannot be construed as conferring an independent right upon a respondent to raise a challenge divorced or isolated from the question on which the appeal comes to be admitted.
This would also be in line with the decisions rendered in the context of the Code and the maintainability of cross-objections in a second appeal and where it was held that in case the objection be indelibly coupled to the main question, there would be no legal requirement of preferring cross-objections separately. This since the same would merely entail the respondent seeking to press an issue though decided against it, in support of the ultimate decision rendered.
Considering indisputable fact that the present applicants had preferred cross-objections before the Tribunal which came to be partly allowed. For instance, while Ground Nos. 1 and 2 thereof came to be rejected, Ground No. 3 came to be partly allowed alongside Ground No. 6 of the Revenue. The cross-objections thus came to be partly allowed. It was the stand of the respondent itself that a cross-objection is akin to an appeal. If that were so, the applicant could have possibly taken appropriate steps to assail the order of the Tribunal to the extent that it was so aggrieved. However, and for reasons assigned above, the remedy was clearly not that of a cross-objection.
-
2025 (3) TMI 230
Bogus purchases - estimation of income - CIT (A) findings that only 12.5% of the bogus purchases should be added - HELD THAT:- As in the instant case, the respondent-assessee has offered no explanation of the source of the expenditure incurred on account of purchases and, therefore, AO was justified in making an addition of the said amount and the Appellate Authorities were not justified in estimating the profit rate and thereby impliedly grant deduction of such unexplained expenditure which is contrary to the express provision of Section 69C.
In the instant case before us, assessee has not appeared in the re-assessment proceedings to discharge its onus on proving purchase transactions under consideration.
Before the CIT (A) for the first time, scanty details of sundry debtors, creditors and stocks were given. CIT(A) gave a finding of the respondent-assessee’s involvement in bogus transaction. Therefore, the finding of the AO on the genuineness of the purchases was confirmed by the CIT (A).
Before the Tribunal, assessee has not canvassed any submission on the genuineness of the purchases but only pleaded for an estimation of a certain percentage of such bogus purchases to be added.
Therefore, assessee has not proved the genuineness of the purchases, which inter alia include the source of making the payment for such purchases. Today before this Court assessee’s submissions that they have discharged the onus cast upon them to prove the genuineness of the purchases, including the source cannot be accepted.
Appeal of the appellant-revenue is allowed by answering the question in favour of the appellant-revenue and against the respondent-assessee.
-
2025 (3) TMI 229
Penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) - non specification of clear charge - defective notice - HELD THAT:- In this case, the notice issued to the Assessee did not clarify whether the penalty was proposed to be imposed on the grounds of concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The necessary box containing the two options was not ticked. Thus, the Assessee had no clear notice about the case it was required to meet.
Thus, we are satisfied that the questions now proposed, stand answered against the Revenue, inter alia by Mohd. Farhan [2021 (3) TMI 608 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (LB)] - Revenue Appeal is dismissed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 228
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - time limit for notice - computation of the “relevant assessment year” - HELD THAT:- The record would reflect that pursuant to a search and seizure operation conducted in respect of a third person on 02 March 2022, the petitioner was served a notice under Section 148 on 06 October 2023. Undisputedly and for the purposes of reopening, bearing in mind the proviso to Section 149 (1), action could have been initiated only up to AY 2015-16.
It is ex facie evident that AY 2014-15 falls beyond the ten-year block period as set out u/s 153C r.w.s. 153A of the Act. Consequently, the impugned notice is rendered unsustainable. Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2025 (3) TMI 227
Penalty u/s 271 (1) (c) - denial of benefit of Section 11 as they did not have a registration certificate u/s 12A - HELD THAT:- Trust has came into existence on 17 October 2007 and the first accounting year of the Trust is from 25 October 2007 to 31 March 2008. Assessee also undertook to file the audited accounts before 30 September 2008, which was duly done. However, the application dated 5 September 2008 came to be disposed of by the CIT (E) only on 31 March 2009. The delay in disposing of the application and making it applicable from AY 2009-2010 only cannot be attributed to the Appellant-Assessee. There is no reason given as to why the registration could not have been granted with effect from the date when the firm came into existence.
In any case, the Appellant-Assessee is a Charitable Trust and was under a bona fide belief that the registration certificate would be granted from the date of its existence and it was on the basis of that bona fide belief that the claim was made. It was first year of the Appellant-Assessee.
In our view, no case is made out for concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income since the application for registration u/s 12A was filed with the Respondent-Revenue and the same was on record at the time of filing the return of income while making the claim.
No justification for imposing the penalty of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income u/s 271 (1) (c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2025 (3) TMI 226
Disallowance of bad debts - Borrowers defaulted in the repayment obligations to the Lender - It is the Assessee’s case that CIPL had become financially sick on account of heavy losses and therefore, it was not feasible to recover any further amount from the said company
ITAT set aside the deletion of bad debts as it found that the Assessee was engaged in the business of lending and advancing money and therefore, furnishing a guarantee to the Lender fell within the scope of its business and accepted the Assessee’s explanation that it was unable to recover the guarantee commission as CIPL was not in the financial condition to pay the same - HELD THAT:- In terms of the Commitment Agreement the income by way of commission would accrue after the expiry of three years of the agreement. Thus, the Assessee could not account for the income by way of commission prior to the expiry of three years from the date of the Commitment Agreement. However, by that time, the Borrowers had defaulted in payment of the amounts due to the Lender and therefore, it is clearly doubtful whether the commission could be recovered.
In the given circumstances, non-recording of income by way of commission on bank guarantees could not be a ground for rejecting the expense of bad debts suffered if the same was during the course of its business. We find no infirmity with the decision of the learned ITAT in not accepting the AO’s decision that the bad debts were not allowable as expense as the Assessee had not recognized the commission receivable in respect of guarantees as income in the given facts.
The first question projected by the Revenue is not a substantial question of law in the given facts of this case.
Whether the amount of bad debts as claimed by the Assessee is allowable as an expense under Section 36 (1) (vii) read with Section 36 (2) (i) of the Act and whether the Assessee’s claim for this allowance is a colorable device to reduce the tax liability - ITAT has misdirected itself. The issue flagged by the AO and learned CIT(A) was that the Assessee had deliberately refrained from taking any steps for recovering the dues from CIPL as it was a group company. Further, the facts indicated that CIPL had the wherewithal to pay at least part of the funds. This was established by the fact that it had made a donation of Rs. 10 crores during the said financial year. The AO and the learned CIT(A) had found that the Assessee had arranged the affairs in a manner whereby it had reflected a loss on account of bad debts, which could be set off against its income. On the other hand, CIPL, which had suffered losses, would in any event not be liable to pay tax on account of writing off its liability. Thus, the arrangement in effect transfers the loss within the same group from a loss-making entity to a profit making entity and conversely profits resulting from remission of liability to a loss making entity.
The allowance in respect of bad debts [Under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act] is allowable only if:
(a) the debt was taken into account for computing the income of the assessee in the previous year in which the amount is written of or prior previous years; or
(b) represents money lent in the ordinary course of business of banking or money lending.
In the present case, we concur with the decision of the learned CIT (A) that none of the two conditions are satisfied.
Substantial questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee.
-
2025 (3) TMI 225
Appeal pending adjudication for more than 2 years before the CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- This court is cognizant of the large number of statutory appeals pending for disposal before the NFAC and express concern over the delay in disposal of such appeals, for which the NFAC was envisaged. We expect that the NFAC would endeavour to implement the said remedial measures in all earnest.
So far as the present petition is concerned, we note with some concern that the appeal filed on 14.10.2022, is still pending adjudication for more than 2 years before the CIT(A).
We, therefore direct the said appeal filed on 14.10.2022 under e-filing acknowledgment be taken up for consideration and disposed of with expedition not beyond a period of eight weeks from date.
........
|
9911796707
