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1979 (4) TMI 178
The Supreme Court of India acquitted the appellant of charges under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code due to lack of evidence showing his knowledge or reason to believe that the recovered bags were stolen property. The prosecution failed to prove that the appellant possessed the stolen property, as there was no evidence linking him directly to the theft or payment for the bags. The mere presence of the appellant at the shop where the goods were delivered was deemed insufficient to establish guilt under Section 411 IPC. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted, and any paid fine was ordered to be refunded.
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1979 (4) TMI 177
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the estate acquired by Nataraja Pillai under the Will.
2. Applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3. Construction of Clause 5 of the Will.
4. Determination of heirs and their shares.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of the Estate Acquired by Nataraja Pillai:
The trial court found that Nataraja Pillai acquired only a life estate in the properties mentioned in Schedule I of the Plaint. Upon his death without male issue, the properties were to revert to the heirs of the testator, Palaniandi Pillai, as if on intestacy.
2. Applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff, Krishnammal, could not invoke Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The High Court, however, held that the ascertainment of the heirs of the testator should be done according to the Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928, and not according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3. Construction of Clause 5 of the Will:
The High Court interpreted Clause 5 of the Will to mean that the testator created an "artificial" class of ultimate residuary legatees, referred to as "my heirs." This class of legatees would only acquire a vested interest if Nataraja Pillai died without male issue. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the term "my heirs" should be construed in its legal sense, meaning the testator's legal heirs under the law of inheritance. The Court clarified that the testator did not intend to deviate from the Hindu Law of intestate succession.
4. Determination of Heirs and Their Shares:
The Supreme Court held that the heirs of the testator, on whom the estate was to devolve in the event of Nataraja dying sonless, were to be ascertained according to the Hindu Law of intestate succession in force at the time of Nataraja's death (January 31, 1957). This meant applying the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, the plaintiff, as the widow of a predeceased son, and the defendants were all heirs falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in Section 8 of the Act. The distribution of the property would follow the rules in Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, giving the plaintiff a 1/3rd share and the remaining 2/3rd share to be equally distributed among the branches of Ramaswami and Vadivelu.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and decreed a partition for the plaintiff's 1/3rd share in the suit property, while the remaining 2/3rd share was to be distributed equally among the branches of the defendants. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
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1979 (4) TMI 176
Issues:
Appeal against quashing of charges under Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC based on inadmissible evidence. Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere in second revision. Exercise of discretionary powers by the Supreme Court.
Analysis:
The appeal before the Supreme Court was against the High Court's decision to quash charges framed by a Special Judge under various Sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC. The High Court had directed the Special Judge to reconsider the matter excluding inadmissible evidence. The appellant contended that the second revision filed by the respondent was not maintainable as it amounted to a review of the previous judgment, citing the precedent set in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwala. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the High Court's adherence to a recent decision regarding the admissibility of certain statements, even if the order may have been wrong or without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court exercised discretionary powers and upheld the High Court's judgment, considering it just and in line with promoting the ends of justice. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of, and the High Court's decision was upheld.
The primary issue in the case was the admissibility of evidence in framing charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC. The respondent had raised concerns that the charges were based on statements obtained under duress or inducement, which were inadmissible. The High Court, in its order, directed the exclusion of such statements and instructed the Special Judge to decide the matter afresh after excluding vitiated evidence. This decision was based on the recent ruling of the Supreme Court regarding the admissibility of statements obtained under certain conditions. The High Court's order aimed to ensure a fair trial by excluding tainted evidence and allowing for a fresh consideration of the case.
Another issue raised in the appeal was the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere in a second revision filed by the respondent. The appellant argued that the second revision amounted to a review of the previous judgment, which was impermissible. Citing the precedent in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwala, the appellant contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to alter its previous judgment once signed. However, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the technicality of the issue, exercised discretionary powers and refrained from interfering with the High Court's order. The Supreme Court considered the High Court's decision as aligned with the recent legal position and conducive to the ends of justice, leading to the upholding of the High Court's judgment.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the charges and remand the case for reconsideration excluding inadmissible evidence. Despite the technical argument regarding the maintainability of the second revision, the Supreme Court exercised discretionary powers and declined to set aside the High Court's order. The decision was based on promoting fairness and justice in the trial process, ultimately leading to the disposal of the appeal in favor of upholding the High Court's judgment.
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1979 (4) TMI 175
Issues Involved: Jurisdiction of the Court, Validity of Charge-Sheet, Enquiry Report, Show Cause Notice, Principles of Natural Justice, Authority of Disciplinary Actions, Compliance with Railway Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1968, Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court:
The primary issue was whether the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The petitioner contended that since the General Manager of Eastern Railway, whose office is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, was a superior authority to those who passed the impugned orders, the Court had jurisdiction. The Court, however, held that no part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction as the impugned orders were passed by authorities outside its territorial jurisdiction. The Court referenced Article 226 of the Constitution of India and relevant case law, concluding that the location of the General Manager's office did not confer jurisdiction since no order was passed by him.
2. Validity of Charge-Sheet:
The petitioner challenged the charge-sheet (Annexure 'B') on grounds that it was issued by an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority, violating the Railway Board's Circulars and the principles of natural justice. The petitioner argued that the Assistant Operating Superintendent, who issued the charge-sheet, was not his appointing authority and lacked the authority to issue a charge-sheet for a major penalty.
3. Enquiry Report:
The enquiry report (Annexure 'G') concluded that the petitioner was responsible for the incident. The petitioner claimed the enquiry was conducted improperly and in violation of natural justice. Specific allegations included not being allowed to be present during witness examinations, the enquiry officer failing to have witnesses sign their evidence, and the enquiry officer being biased as he was involved in the fact-finding process.
4. Show Cause Notice:
The show cause notice (Annexure 'H') was issued based on the findings of the enquiry report, asking the petitioner to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner argued that the entire proceeding was vitiated by bias and procedural irregularities.
5. Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioner contended that the entire proceedings violated principles of natural justice. Allegations included not being allowed to be present during the enquiry, not being provided with the private number sheet, and the enquiry officer's bias. The petitioner also argued that the enquiry and findings were vitiated as neither he nor his defence helper or the Enquiry Officer signed the evidence duly.
6. Authority of Disciplinary Actions:
The petitioner argued that the Assistant Operating Superintendent, who issued the charge-sheet, was not his appointing authority and lacked the authority to issue a charge-sheet for a major penalty. This was claimed to be in contravention of the Railway Board's Circulars.
7. Compliance with Railway Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1968:
The petitioner contended that the charge-sheet, enquiry report, and show cause notice were in violation of the Railway Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1968. The petitioner argued that the Assistant Operating Superintendent did not have the authority to issue the charge-sheet, and the enquiry was not conducted as per the rules.
8. Article 311 of the Constitution of India:
The petitioner argued that the proceedings violated Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which provides protection to civil servants. The petitioner claimed that the charge-sheet and subsequent proceedings were not conducted by the appropriate authority and were thus unconstitutional.
Conclusion:
The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition as no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. The Court discharged the Rule on the preliminary point of jurisdiction without going into the merits of the case. The petitioner was advised that this would not prejudice him from approaching the appropriate forum for redressal of his grievances. The stay of operation of the order was refused.
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1979 (4) TMI 174
Issues involved: Interpretation of the term "son" and "daughter" in Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act.
Summary:
The judgment involved a case where two sisters, with a common father but different mothers, were in dispute over inheritance rights. The appellant claimed a share in the estate of her deceased father and step-mother based on Section 15(1)(a) of the Act. The High Court denied her claim, citing conflicting interpretations by different High Courts. The Supreme Court deliberated on whether the terms "son" and "daughter" in the Act included step-children or only biological children. The court highlighted the need for legislative clarity to resolve such conflicts and prevent further litigation.
The judgment emphasized the importance of promoting reconciliation and resolving disputes amicably, especially between close relatives. The parties reached a compromise where the respondent agreed to pay a sum of money and transfer certain properties to the appellant. The court directed the terms of the compromise to be implemented, ensuring a fair distribution of assets. It was noted that the remaining properties would belong solely to the respondent, settling all claims from the appellant regarding the estate.
In conclusion, the appeal was allowed in part based on the compromise reached by the parties, which was deemed reasonable and just. The judgment highlighted the significance of finding common ground and fostering unity in legal proceedings, setting a positive example for future cases involving family disputes. The decree was made without costs, and a call was made for Parliament to clarify its intention regarding Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act.
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1979 (4) TMI 173
Issues Involved:
1. Scope and Ambit of Section 4 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Determination of Assessable Value for Excise Duty.
3. Inclusion of Post-Manufacturing Costs and Expenses.
4. Definition and Treatment of Related Persons.
5. Inclusion of Packing Costs in Assessable Value.
6. Treatment of Trade Discounts.
7. Claims for Refund of Excess Excise Duty.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Scope and Ambit of Section 4 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944
The judgment primarily revolves around the interpretation of Section 4 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, as amended by the Central Excises and Salt (Amendment) Act, 1973. This section determines the value of excisable goods for the purpose of charging excise duty. The court examined whether the amended Section 4(a) could include post-manufacturing costs and profits in the assessable value.
2. Determination of Assessable Value for Excise Duty
The court reiterated that excise duty is a tax on the manufacture or production of goods, not on their sale. The assessable value should only include manufacturing costs and manufacturing profits. The court emphasized that post-manufacturing costs and profits should be excluded from the assessable value, adhering to the principles laid down in the Voltas case and Atic Industries case.
3. Inclusion of Post-Manufacturing Costs and Expenses
The court clarified that post-manufacturing costs such as selling, distribution, administrative expenses, and profits arising from post-manufacturing operations should not be included in the assessable value. The judgment cited various cases, including the Voltas case and Atic Industries case, to support this interpretation. The court further provided a non-exhaustive list of post-manufacturing costs that should be excluded, such as advertising expenses, storage costs, insurance charges, selling profits, marketing and distribution expenses, freight charges, and interest on credit sales.
4. Definition and Treatment of Related Persons
The court addressed the issue of sales to related persons, as defined under Section 4(a) of the Act. It was held that mere relationship between the manufacturer and the wholesale dealer does not automatically make the dealer a related person unless extra commercial advantages are conferred, making them favored buyers. The court emphasized that the price charged to an independent buyer should be considered for determining the normal price, even if the sales to related persons form a significant part of the total sales.
5. Inclusion of Packing Costs in Assessable Value
The court discussed the inclusion of packing costs in the assessable value. It was held that the cost of initial or first packing, if it is of a durable nature and returnable by the buyer to the assessee, should be excluded from the assessable value. The court also noted that secondary packing costs should not be included in the assessable value unless the goods cannot be consumed or utilized without such packing.
6. Treatment of Trade Discounts
The court held that trade discounts allowed in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade at the time of removal should be excluded from the assessable value. It was emphasized that the trade discount should not be refundable on any account whatsoever.
7. Claims for Refund of Excess Excise Duty
The court addressed various claims for refund of excess excise duty paid by the petitioners. It was held that the petitioners are entitled to refunds where excise duty was collected on post-manufacturing costs, expenses, and profits. The court directed the excise authorities to refund the excess amounts collected, provided the claims were not barred by limitation.
Judgment Summary:
1. W.P. No. 5948 of 1975: The court directed the respondent to fix the normal price under Section 4(a) as the price charged by the petitioner to its wholesale dealers, excluding post-manufacturing costs, expenses, and profits. The cost of Display boxes and cartons should also be excluded.
2. W.P. Nos. 819, 2194, and 1115 of 1976: The court issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to assess and collect excise duty after excluding post-manufacturing costs, expenses, and profits. It also directed refunds for excess duty collected before 1-10-1975, if not barred by limitation.
3. W.P. No. 1532 of 1976: The court directed the respondents to refund the excise duty collected on the cost of jute bags and quashed the demand for excise duty on jute bags for the specified period.
4. W.P. Nos. 2601 and 2602 of 1976: The court quashed the orders of the appellate authority and directed the respondents to exclude the cost of transport and secondary packing from the assessable value.
5. W.P. Nos. 217 and 218 of 1978: The court quashed the order of the Assistant Collector and directed the respondents to exclude post-manufacturing costs, expenses, and profits from the assessable value. The trade discount should be allowed irrespective of credit sales.
The court also granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and stayed the refund orders in certain writ petitions until the end of July 1979. The court directed the return of bank guarantees furnished by the petitioners during the pendency of the writ petitions.
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1979 (4) TMI 172
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of taxation of cash credits of Rs. 90,000 for the assessment year 1962-63.
2. Validity of taxation of cash credits of Rs. 91,000 for the assessment year 1963-64.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of taxation of cash credits of Rs. 90,000 for the assessment year 1962-63:
The primary issue was whether the cash credits of Rs. 90,000 shown in the books of the assessee for the assessment year 1962-63 could be validly taxed as profits from other sources. The court examined the materials and explanations provided by the assessee for each creditor.
Gajanand Agarwal:
- The assessee claimed that Gajanand Agarwal advanced a sum of Rs. 30,000 (Rs. 20,000 in 1962-63 and Rs. 10,000 in 1963-64).
- The ITO found the credits to be non-genuine based on several factors: Gajanand's claim of starting with a capital of Rs. 5,000 and showing a 100% return in the first year was deemed unrealistic; returns for five years were filed on a single date, close to the date of the credits; the registers produced were similar in size and color to those of other creditors, suggesting they were prepared by the assessee; and the personal expenses claimed were too low to be credible.
- The AAC and Tribunal supported the ITO's findings, noting inconsistencies in Gajanand's business activities.
- The court found no error or perversity in the authorities' conclusion that Gajanand was not in a position to advance the sums claimed.
Pushker Lal Agarwal:
- Pushker Lal Agarwal was claimed to have advanced Rs. 20,000.
- The ITO rejected this claim, noting that Pushker Lal's family expenses were understated and that his capital was likely locked up in his business.
- The AAC and Tribunal upheld the ITO's findings.
- The court agreed with the authorities, finding no error in their conclusion that Pushker Lal could not have advanced the sums claimed.
Sita Devi and Jamuni Devi:
- Both ladies were claimed to have advanced Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 25,000 respectively.
- They did not appear before the ITO but filed affidavits.
- The ITO rejected the affidavits due to lack of evidence of savings, simultaneous filing of income-tax returns, and similarity in registers.
- The AAC and Tribunal supported the ITO's findings.
- The court found the authorities' conclusions reasonable and not perverse.
2. Validity of taxation of cash credits of Rs. 91,000 for the assessment year 1963-64:
The issue was whether the cash credits of Rs. 91,000 shown in the books of the assessee for the assessment year 1963-64 could be validly taxed as profits from other sources. The court examined the explanations provided for each creditor.
Rukmani Devi and Sarda Devi:
- Rukmani Devi (wife of the assessee) and Sarda Devi (wife of the son of the assessee) were claimed to have advanced Rs. 31,000 and Rs. 30,000 respectively.
- The ITO rejected these claims, noting the lack of evidence of business activities and simultaneous filing of returns.
- The AAC and Tribunal upheld the ITO's findings.
- However, the court found that the authorities had made a wrong assumption about the lack of evidence for Rukmani Devi's business activities, as the assessment order for 1958-59 confirmed her involvement in pawn brokering.
- The court directed the authorities to re-examine the cases of Rukmani Devi and Sarda Devi.
Conclusion:
- For the assessment year 1962-63, the court upheld the taxation of cash credits of Rs. 90,000 in favor of the Revenue.
- For the assessment year 1963-64, the court partially upheld the taxation of cash credits of Rs. 91,000, directing the Tribunal to re-examine the cases of Rukmani Devi and Sarda Devi.
Final Judgment:
- The reference for the assessment year 1962-63 was answered in the affirmative and in favor of the Revenue.
- The reference for the assessment year 1963-64 was answered partly in favor of the Department and partly in favor of the assessee, with a directive for re-examination of specific cases.
- No order as to costs in either of the two cases.
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1979 (4) TMI 171
Issues:
1. Petition for writ of habeas corpus due to alleged illegal detention.
2. Delay in trials and investigations leading to prolonged detention.
3. Compliance with provisions of Criminal Procedure Code.
4. Release of under-trial prisoners and expeditious disposal of cases.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard a petition for a writ of habeas corpus concerning the alleged illegal detention of individuals under the guise of the judicial process. The Court noted that petitioners 3 and 4 should be released on their own bonds, subject to certain conditions, as directed by the trial court. Regarding petitioner 1, the State affirmed in an affidavit that no such person was in custody, and the State was directed to ensure that no one was detained except through due process of law.
The Court highlighted the issue of prolonged detention without trials commencing, emphasizing the breakdown of criminal justice when expeditious trials are not pursued. Sections 167, 209, and 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code stress the importance of prompt case disposal, including investigations and trials. The Court expressed strong disapproval of the significant delays in investigations, stating that such actions violated human rights guaranteed under the Constitution, particularly under Article 21. Despite refraining from immediate orders, the Court directed the State to release individuals detained for over six months without trials or charge sheets, except in cases involving specific offenses.
Furthermore, the Court instructed the State to complete investigations within two months for cases without charge sheets and mandated the Sessions Court to dispose of cases with charge sheets within six months. The State was required to report back to the Court after six months. The Court criticized the State for lengthy investigations, highlighting cases where individuals had been in custody for up to five years, urging the government to take action to prevent the silent suffering of indigent accused persons. The Court emphasized compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the mass release of individuals in line with the provisions of the Constitution and the Code.
In conclusion, the Court disposed of the petition with the aforementioned observations and directions, emphasizing the need for the government to uphold the rule of law and ensure the timely release and fair treatment of accused persons in custody.
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1979 (4) TMI 170
Issues Involved:
1. Definition of "Premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
2. Applicability of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 to lands initially leased as agricultural but later used for non-agricultural purposes.
3. Interpretation of conflicting judgments from the Supreme Court regarding the relevant date for determining the nature of the property.
4. Harmonization of statutory interpretation with the objectives of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Definition of "Premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:
The central question referred to the Full Bench was whether a property that was agricultural land at the time of letting but had ceased to be agricultural land by the date of the eviction petition qualifies as "premises" under Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The court noted that Section 3(n) defines "premises" to include "any land not used for agricultural purposes."
2. Applicability of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:
The eviction proceedings were initiated under Section 21(1) of the Act, which pertains to the eviction of tenants. The court had to determine if the property, initially agricultural but later used for industrial purposes, could be considered "premises" under the Act. The court emphasized that the nature of the property should be assessed at the time the right conferred by the statute is sought to be enforced, not at the initial date of letting.
3. Interpretation of Conflicting Judgments from the Supreme Court:
The Division Bench had conflicting views based on two Supreme Court judgments: Subhadra v. Narsaji Chenaji Marwadi and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman. The former emphasized the date of letting as the relevant date, while the latter focused on the date when the statutory right is sought to be enforced. The Full Bench clarified that the High Court should follow the decision of the larger bench when there is a conflict. However, it found that the two Supreme Court decisions were not irreconcilable, as they addressed different contexts under the Bombay Act, which has a similar definition of "premises."
4. Harmonization of Statutory Interpretation with the Objectives of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961:
The court underscored the need to interpret the Act in a manner that advances its remedial objectives. The Act aims to provide protection to tenants and regulate landlord-tenant relationships. Therefore, the interpretation should not be rigidly tied to the initial date of letting but should consider the current use of the property at the time the statutory right is invoked.
The court referred to the case of Davies v. Gilbert, where the Court of Appeal in England held that the relevant time for determining the nature of the property is when the landlord seeks to enforce his rights. This principle was applied to the present case, concluding that the relevant date for determining whether the land is "premises" is when the eviction petition is filed, not the initial date of letting.
Conclusion:
The Full Bench overruled the decision in Rudrayya's case, which had followed the earlier Supreme Court judgment in Subhadra's case. It held that a property which was agricultural land at the time of letting but ceased to be agricultural land by the date of the eviction petition is "premises" within the meaning of Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. This interpretation aligns with the remedial objectives of the Act, ensuring that the statutory protections are effectively applied based on the current use of the property.
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1979 (4) TMI 169
Issues Involved
1. Legality of the Magistrate's order issuing Letters Rogatory.
2. Jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Relevance and admissibility of evidence obtained through Letters Rogatory.
4. Locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the collection of evidence.
Detailed Analysis
1. Legality of the Magistrate's Order Issuing Letters Rogatory
The petitioner challenged the order dated April 24, 1978, issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directing a letter of request to be sent to the U.S. District Court to obtain documents from the Washington Mutual Savings Bank. The petitioner argued that the order was illegal as the Magistrate himself acknowledged that he could not invoke Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that the documents had already been received in India and were in the possession of the C.B.I. The Court held that even if the order was illegal, the documents' possession by the C.B.I. rendered the issue academic.
2. Jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
The petitioner contended that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure that allowed the Magistrate to issue Letters Rogatory to a foreign court. The Court assumed the order was not supported by any provisions of the new Criminal Procedure Code but declined to interfere, emphasizing that the documents were already in possession of the C.B.I. and could be used as evidence if relevant and admissible.
3. Relevance and Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through Letters Rogatory
The Court referenced the Privy Council's decision in *Kuruma v. The Queen* and the Supreme Court's decision in *Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection*, stating that the manner in which evidence is obtained does not affect its admissibility if it is relevant. The Court concluded that the documents could be used as evidence by the prosecution, regardless of how they were acquired.
4. Locus Standi of the Petitioner to Challenge the Collection of Evidence
The Court emphasized that the petitioner, being an accused, had no locus standi at the investigation stage to challenge the manner of evidence collection. The law does not grant the accused the right to interfere with evidence collection; the accused can only challenge the evidence's admissibility when it is tendered in court. The Court held that the petition was devoid of merit as the petitioner could not claim relief at this stage.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed the petition, stating that the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the collection of evidence during the investigation stage. The Court also noted that the documents' possession by the C.B.I. rendered any interference with the Magistrate's order academic. The evidence's admissibility would be determined based on its relevance and not the manner of its acquisition.
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1979 (4) TMI 168
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 297 to 301 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 under Article 14 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the group of sections 297 to 301 constitutes an alternative mode of acquisition or an exception to Section 296.
3. Validity of the classification between land falling within the regular line of the street and land outside it.
4. Alleged procedural discrimination in the absence of personal service of notice and personal hearing.
5. Adequacy and determination of compensation under Section 301 compared to the Land Acquisition Act.
6. Challenge under Article 31(2) of the Constitution regarding the adequacy of compensation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 297 to 301 under Article 14:
The court examined whether Sections 297 to 301 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, constitute an alternative mode of acquisition to Section 296 or an exception to it. The court held that Sections 297 to 301 are particular provisions that cut down or limit the general operation of Section 296, thus constituting an exception to it. The classification between land within the regular line of the street and land outside it was deemed reasonable and based on an intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.
2. Alternative Mode of Acquisition or Exception:
The court ruled that Sections 297 to 301 constitute an exception to the general provisions of Section 296. The Municipal Commissioner must proceed under Sections 298 or 299 to acquire land within the regular line of the street, which is not built upon or becomes open, and cannot use Section 296 for such acquisitions. This interpretation follows the rule that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way or not at all.
3. Validity of Classification:
The classification between land falling within the regular line of the street and land outside it was upheld as valid. The court found that the object of Sections 297 to 301 is to prescribe a building line for regularity and orderly development, which is different from the object of Section 296, which is to widen or improve public streets. The classification was held to be rational and not arbitrary, as it was based on the type and quality of the land and the purpose for which it could be used.
4. Procedural Discrimination:
The court rejected the argument of procedural discrimination due to the absence of personal service of notice and personal hearing. It was noted that adequate publicity was given to the proposal to prescribe a fresh regular line of the street through public notices in newspapers and the Official Gazette, as well as special notices put up in the street. The court found that the nature of objections to the proposed prescription of a fresh regular line is limited and does not require a personal hearing. Additionally, the court held that the Municipal Commissioner is included in the definition of "person" under Section 504, allowing for a judicial determination of compensation by the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court.
5. Adequacy and Determination of Compensation:
The court held that compensation under Section 301 provides full indemnification in accordance with judicial norms, similar to the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act. The court dismissed the argument that the compensation would be less under Section 301, noting that the owner is fully indemnified for all losses sustained. The absence of a provision for interest in Section 301 was also addressed, with the court stating that interest is awarded by courts from the date of taking possession of the property.
6. Challenge under Article 31(2):
The court rejected the challenge under Article 31(2) of the Constitution, stating that the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is an "existing law" and thus not affected by Clause (2) of Article 31. The court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. The State of Gujarat, which upheld similar provisions.
Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed, the judgment and order appealed against were set aside, and the writ petition filed by the first respondent was dismissed with costs. The court also rejected the application for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
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1979 (4) TMI 167
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit.
2. Validity of tenancy created in contravention of the Rent Control Act.
3. Applicability of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
4. Public policy considerations in the context of the Rent Control Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit:
The primary issue was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for recovery of possession and damages. The trial court had decreed the suit, affirming its jurisdiction. The appeal questioned this jurisdiction, arguing that the eviction should be governed by the Rent Control Act, not by a Civil Court. The court concluded that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction as the tenancy was governed by the Rent Control Act, which mandates that eviction matters be handled by the Rent Controller.
2. Validity of tenancy created in contravention of the Rent Control Act:
The court examined if a tenancy created without notifying the vacancy to the Accommodation Controller, as required by the Rent Control Act, was valid. The appellant argued that such tenancies were void, citing previous judgments. However, the court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Muralidhar v. State of U.P., which held that tenancies created in contravention of the Act are valid inter se between the parties but void against the State. The court agreed with this view, stating that the tenancy, though created in violation of the Act, remains valid between the landlord and tenant but not against the Controller.
3. Applicability of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act:
The court considered whether the tenancy agreement was void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, which renders agreements unlawful if they are forbidden by law or opposed to public policy. The appellant argued that the tenancy was void as it contravened the Rent Control Act. The court, however, concluded that the agreement was not forbidden by law inter se between the parties, although it was void against the Controller. The court emphasized that the Act does not explicitly render such tenancies void but imposes penalties for non-compliance.
4. Public policy considerations in the context of the Rent Control Act:
The court analyzed whether the tenancy agreement was opposed to public policy. The appellant contended that the agreement violated public policy as it contravened the Rent Control Act's provisions designed to prevent unreasonable eviction and ensure proper control of housing. The court, however, concluded that the public policy underlying the Act was to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction and regulate leasing, not to render such agreements void. The court held that the agreement, while void against the Controller, was valid inter se between the landlord and tenant, aligning with the Act's purpose of tenant protection.
Conclusion:
The court held that the tenancy agreement, though created in contravention of the Rent Control Act, was valid between the landlord and tenant but void against the Controller. The Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction, which should be handled by the Rent Controller. The decision in G. Eswaraiah v. Mahendrappa Khani was overruled, affirming the Supreme Court's view in Muralidhar v. State of U.P. The reference was answered accordingly, and the case was remitted to the Division Bench for a decision on merits according to law.
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1979 (4) TMI 166
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a gift of land made in favor of the daughter towards "Pasupu Kumkuma" as marriage provision requires a registered document.
2. Whether such lands, when possession is given to the daughter without a registered deed, should be excluded from the donor's holding for the purpose of Section 8 of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Requirement of Registration for "Pasupu Kumkuma" Gifts
Facts and Contentions:
- In the cases under review, the petitioners gifted lands to their daughters as marriage provisions through unregistered documents or orally.
- The petitioners argued that under Hindu Law, the father's obligation to maintain an unmarried daughter includes marriage expenses, and thus, property given as "Pasupu Kumkuma" is not a gift under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property (T.P.) Act and does not require registration.
- The Government Pleader contended that such gifts fall under Section 122 of the T.P. Act and require registration under Section 123 of the T.P. Act and Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act.
Legal Analysis:
- Section 3(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act defines "maintenance" to include reasonable marriage expenses.
- Historical references from Manu and Katyayana indicate that daughters had a share in the father's property, evolving to the right of maintenance and marriage expenses.
- Case law, including Serandayya Pillai v. Shankaralingam Pillai and C.G.T. v. Chandrasekhara Reddy, supports that property given for marriage expenses is not a gift requiring registration.
- The court concluded that gifts for "Pasupu Kumkuma" are not gifts within the meaning of Section 122 of the T.P. Act, as they are obligations of the father and involve consideration. Therefore, such transactions do not require registration under Section 123 of the T.P. Act or Section 17 of the Registration Act.
Conclusion:
- The court held that gifts of land made towards "Pasupu Kumkuma" do not require registration as they are not considered gifts under Section 122 of the T.P. Act.
Issue 2: Exclusion of Lands from Donor's Holding
Facts and Contentions:
- The petitioners argued that lands given as "Pasupu Kumkuma" should be excluded from their holdings under Section 8 of the A.P. Land Reforms Act.
- They relied on the decision in Authorised Officer v. K.C.V. Narasayya, which emphasized that land must be included in the holding of the person in actual possession.
Legal Analysis:
- The court reaffirmed that the act of giving lands as "Pasupu Kumkuma" is legal and valid.
- It held that the lands should be excluded from the donor's holding since they are in the lawful possession of the daughters.
- Section 3(1)(v) of the Land Reforms Act includes lands in the holding of the person in actual possession, whether through mortgage, part performance of a contract, or otherwise.
Conclusion:
- The court concluded that the lands given as "Pasupu Kumkuma" should be excluded from the donor's holding as they are in the lawful possession of the daughters.
Final Judgment:
- The Civil Revision Petitions were allowed, setting aside the orders of the lower Tribunals.
- The court held that the gifts of land made towards "Pasupu Kumkuma" do not require registration and should be excluded from the donor's holding for the purposes of the A.P. Land Reforms Act.
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1979 (4) TMI 165
Issues involved: Appeal against acquittal u/s 302 IPC for murder of newly married wife.
Summary:
1. The appeal was against the acquittal of the respondent for the murder of his newly married wife. The prosecution case was based on circumstantial evidence, with motive playing a crucial role. However, both the trial Court and the High Court found insufficient motive for the murder. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that the prosecution failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis of guilt and the circumstances were not wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, as held by the High Court.
2. The respondent claimed that the deceased died of epilepsy, while prosecution witnesses argued against it. The defense presented medical experts supporting the epilepsy theory. The High Court, after thorough examination of the evidence and medical opinions, held that the possibility of epilepsy could not be ruled out. As the evidence on both sides was balanced, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, leading to the acquittal upheld by the Supreme Court.
3. The defense argued that the theory of epilepsy was a myth, citing the respondent's statement about seeing the deceased trembling before her death. However, the Court reasoned that this observation might have been incorrect, and the attempts to revive the deceased could have been futile. The prosecution's reliance on weak motives and lack of conclusive evidence led the Court to uphold the acquittal, as there was no strong reason for the respondent to murder his wife.
4. After thorough consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, stating that while suspicion existed against the respondent, it could not replace concrete proof. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was discharged of his bail bonds.
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1979 (4) TMI 164
Issues Involved:
1. Whether there was an express or implied undertaking given by the appellant to hand over possession to the receiver.
2. Whether the appeal before the Division Bench was competent and whether the order passed by the High Court was a nullity.
Summary:
Issue 1: Undertaking to Hand Over Possession
The appellant was convicted u/s 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, by the Delhi High Court for allegedly breaching an undertaking to hand over possession to a receiver. The Supreme Court examined whether there was an express or implied undertaking given by the appellant. The Court noted that the High Court's order did not contain an explicit direction for the appellant to hand over possession, only that he should not interfere with the receiver and should cooperate. The Supreme Court emphasized that an undertaking must be clear and express, either in writing or orally incorporated in the court's order. The Court found no such undertaking by the appellant and held that the High Court erred in construing the consent order as an implied undertaking. The Court concluded that the appellant's failure to comply with the consent order did not amount to contempt of court, as there was no express undertaking given.
Issue 2: Competence of the Appeal and Validity of the High Court's Order
The appellant argued that the appeal before the Division Bench was incompetent, rendering the High Court's order a nullity and disobedience of such an order would not attract the provisions of the Act. The respondent contended that the appellant, having filed the appeal and agreed to the consent order, could not later claim the order was void. The Supreme Court found merit in the respondent's argument but chose not to decide on this point, as the first issue was sufficient to resolve the appeal.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and quashed the order directing the appellant's detention in civil prison for four months. The appellant was acquitted of the offence u/s 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
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1979 (4) TMI 163
Issues:
1. Whether the contract for the supply of examination papers, envelopes, and other printed material constitutes a works contract or a job work?
2. Whether the turnover of paper and envelopes is liable to tax?
Analysis:
1. The case involved a printing press owner who entered into an agreement for the supply of examination papers, envelopes, and other printed material. The assessee contended that the work done was a job work and not liable to tax, claiming exemption on the turnover of various items. The Sales Tax Officer taxed the turnover of envelopes and printed material. The assessee argued that the agreement constituted a works contract, citing relevant case law. The court considered previous judgments where composite contracts were treated as works contracts, emphasizing that the contract in question could not be split into separate parts for taxation purposes. The court agreed with the assessee's contention, ruling that the entire contract was a works contract and not subject to tax.
2. The Standing Counsel referred to various cases to argue that the turnover of paper and envelopes should be taxed. However, the court distinguished those cases from the present situation. In one case, it was held that the supply of packing material was incidental to a works contract, similar to the situation in the current case. The court found that the contract in question was composite in nature, involving the supply of printed examination papers along with the necessary packaging and delivery services. As a result, the court ruled that the turnover of paper and envelopes was not liable to tax. The revision was allowed, setting aside the previous decision and directing the authorities to treat the turnover as a works contract, granting costs to the assessee.
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1979 (4) TMI 162
Issues involved: Interpretation of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, specifically regarding the legality of customary bonus u/s the amending Act 23 of 1976.
Summary:
The Supreme Court examined the appellant-management's challenge to the award of the Industrial Tribunal regarding the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, as amended by Act 23 of 1976, focusing on the issue of whether the amendment annulled customary and contractual bonuses. The dispute centered around the denial of customary bonus claimed by the workmen, with the Tribunal's decision and subsequent appeal revolving solely around customary bonus. The Court emphasized that the Bonus Act primarily dealt with profit-oriented bonuses and did not govern customary, traditional, or contractual bonuses. The Court concurred with the view that the Act left customary bonus untouched. The appellant's argument that the 1976 amendment nullified all bonus claims except profit or productivity-based bonuses was refuted based on the legislative intent and the specific provisions of the Act.
The Court analyzed the amendments brought about by Act 23 of 1976, noting that the new long title of the Bonus Act specified payment of bonus based on profits, production, or productivity, excluding customary or contractual bonuses. The Court highlighted that Section 17 of the Act distinguished between bonus payable under the Act and customary bonuses, indicating that customary bonuses were not covered by the amended Act. The appellant's reliance on Section 31A was dismissed, as it pertained to productivity bonuses and did not affect other types of bonuses like customary bonuses. The Court concluded that statutory and customary bonuses operated in separate spheres and did not conflict with each other.
Ultimately, the Court held that the appeal challenging the legality of customary bonus under the 1976 amendment Act must fail, as the claim was rooted in custom but quantified by contract, and the Act did not impede customary bonuses. While costs could have been awarded to the respondent workmen, the Court, noting the respondent's attitude during the proceedings, dismissed the appeal, directing each party to bear their respective costs.
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1979 (4) TMI 161
Issues:
1. Validity of partition and formation of partnership business.
2. Setting aside of arbitration award and subsequent trial proceedings.
3. Reopening of partition based on fairness and prejudice to minor's interest.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Validity of partition and formation of partnership business
The case involved a dispute over the partition and formation of a partnership business between two brothers, Mannulal and Rajaram. The plaintiff, a minor son of Rajaram, filed a suit seeking a share in the business and assets. The Trial Court found that the business was not ancestral but a joint business, with a partition occurring in 1948. The Trial Court also noted that while the partition was voluntary, it appeared to be unequal and unfair. The High Court, however, determined that the business was ancestral and the partition was unfair to the minor sons of Rajaram. The High Court granted a decree in favor of the plaintiff for an account of his share in the business. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the findings of the High Court.
Issue 2: Setting aside of arbitration award and subsequent trial proceedings
During the suit, an arbitration award was made to equalize the shares of the two branches, which was later set aside by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. The plaintiff appealed the decision, leading to the continuation of the suit. The Trial Court found no fraud or misrepresentation in the partition, but noted the inequality in the division of the business. The High Court affirmed the Trial Court's findings and granted a decree in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's findings were incorrect.
Issue 3: Reopening of partition based on fairness and prejudice to minor's interest
The key question before the Supreme Court was whether the partition could be reopened solely based on unfairness and prejudice to the minor's interest, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. The appellants contended that the earlier finding by the High Court in the arbitration award proceedings should bind the subsequent stages of the suit. However, the respondent argued that a minor coparcener could seek to reopen a partition if it was unfair or prejudicial to their interest, even without fraud or misrepresentation. The Supreme Court referred to legal principles and precedents, ultimately upholding the High Court's decision that the partition was unfair and prejudicial to the minor sons of Rajaram. The Court dismissed the appeal, citing the precedent set in Ratnam Chettiar v. S. M. Kuppuswami Chettiar.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that a partition could be reopened if found unfair or prejudicial to the minor's interest, even without fraud or misrepresentation. The judgment highlighted the importance of fairness in family partitions and upheld the rights of minor coparceners to challenge unequal divisions.
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1979 (4) TMI 160
Issues:
- Appeal against acquittal under Section 302 I.P.C.
- Circumstantial evidence and motive in murder case.
- Medical evidence regarding cause of death.
- Evaluation of evidence and acquittal by High Court.
Analysis:
1. The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the acquittal of the respondent from the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. for the murder of his wife. The deceased was found dead at the respondent's house shortly after their marriage. The prosecution's case relied on circumstantial evidence, and the motive for the murder was deemed insufficient by both the trial Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, motive plays a crucial role in establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in this instance, the prosecution failed to prove a strong motive for the murder, leading to the acquittal by the High Court.
2. The defense argued that the deceased died of epilepsy, while prosecution witnesses contested this claim. Various doctors provided conflicting opinions on the cause of death, with some suggesting epilepsy as a possibility. The High Court extensively examined the medical evidence and concluded that the possibility of epilepsy could not be ruled out. Given the balanced nature of the medical evidence, the benefit of the doubt was held in favor of the accused, further supporting the acquittal.
3. The defense also highlighted the respondent's statement regarding the deceased's condition before her death, suggesting that she was trembling. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that this observation alone was not conclusive evidence of guilt. The absence of a strong motive, coupled with the weak argument of illicit relations as a motive for murder, further weakened the prosecution's case. The Court emphasized that suspicion, no matter how serious, cannot substitute for concrete proof beyond reasonable doubt.
4. After a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence and legal arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to acquit the respondent. While acknowledging the suspicion surrounding the case, the Court emphasized the lack of conclusive proof against the respondent. The appeal was deemed meritless, and the respondent was discharged from his bail bonds, upholding the acquittal verdict.
This detailed analysis of the judgment highlights the key legal issues surrounding the appeal against acquittal, the significance of circumstantial evidence and motive in murder cases, the role of medical evidence in determining cause of death, and the standard of proof required for conviction in criminal cases.
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1979 (4) TMI 159
Issues Involved:
1. Illegal detention of undertrial prisoners.
2. Detention of lunatics or persons of unsound mind.
3. Compliance with section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4. Investigation delays in the State of Bihar.
5. Provision of legal aid to undertrial prisoners.
6. Protective custody of women and children.
7. Compliance with section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. Pendency of cases in courts.
Summary:
1. Illegal Detention of Undertrial Prisoners:
The writ petition highlighted the issue of undertrial prisoners detained for periods longer than the maximum term they could be sentenced if convicted. The court directed the release of 70 such prisoners and identified 59 more for immediate release, stating their continued detention violated their fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
2. Detention of Lunatics or Persons of Unsound Mind:
The court questioned the detention of lunatics or persons of unsound mind in ordinary jails and sought an affidavit from the State Government explaining the circumstances and proposed actions for these individuals.
3. Compliance with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
Affidavits and charts were filed showing compliance with the proviso to section 167(2) regarding the production of undertrial prisoners before Magistrates. The court expressed doubt about the Magistrates' application of mind in remanding prisoners and emphasized the need to inform prisoners of their right to bail after 90 or 60 days of detention.
4. Investigation Delays in the State of Bihar:
The court noted the large number of cases pending investigation for more than six months, particularly minor offences, and criticized the State Government's lethargic approach. It urged the State to take prompt action to expedite investigations and improve the investigative machinery.
5. Provision of Legal Aid to Undertrial Prisoners:
The court reiterated the constitutional right of accused persons to free legal services if they cannot afford a lawyer. It directed the State Government to provide lawyers at its own cost for undertrial prisoners charged with bailable offences and to ensure compliance with this mandate.
6. Protective Custody of Women and Children:
The court sought an affidavit confirming the transfer of women under "protective custody" in jails to welfare homes and instructed the State Government to issue necessary instructions to avoid such detentions in the future.
7. Compliance with Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The court directed the State Government to release undertrial prisoners in summons cases where investigations exceeded six months without Magistrate approval. It also requested the High Court to ensure Magistrates comply with this provision.
8. Pendency of Cases in Courts:
The court expressed concern over the staggering number of pending cases, some extending beyond five years. It requested additional information from the High Court of Patna on disposal norms for Magistrates and Sessions Judges to consider necessary directions for ensuring speedy trials.
The court scheduled the next hearing for 24th April, 1979, to continue addressing these issues.
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