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Showing 61 to 80 of 1396 Records
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2021 (4) TMI 1337
Recovery of Tax - Attachment and auction of property - Right of buyer of property in Auction - Validity of action on the part of respondent no.1/ District Industries Centre in refusing to transfer the property - priority of dues - mortgage of property - HELD THAT:- Issue notice, returnable in four weeks.
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2021 (4) TMI 1336
Seeking exemption from payment of property tax - Charitable Hospital - seeking allotment of lands, for the purpose of setting up of hospital offering free / concessional medical services - HELD THAT:- The General meaning for the word “Charity” is generosity and helpfulness, especially towards the needy or suffering. An institution engaged in relief of the poor, charitable organization is dedicated to the General Public purpose, more specifically, for the benefit of needy people, who cannot pay for benefits received. The charitable institution does not distribute earnings for the benefit of private individuals. Thus, the character of a Charitable institution must be considered with reference to the facts and circumstances as well as the manner, in which, such institutions are being run by such trust or person.
In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a submission that a holistic approach is required. Equally such a holistic approach is imminent for Revenue also. Thus, the holistic approach towards the institution alone would result in neutralizing the provisions of the Act more specifically, regarding property tax. The exemptions are exceptions and to be granted discreetly, if the applicant is capable of establishing that they are providing medical services dominantly to the poor, needy and deserving people of the society.
This Court is of the strong opinion that it is for the charitable institution to establish the facts and circumstances. In the present case, the petitioners have provided some data, showing that they are providing medical services to the poor, needy and deserving people.
On perusal of the official website of the petitioner/Sundaram Medical Foundation, the same would reveal that “Sundaram Medical Foundation was established in 1990 by Dr.S.Rangarajan with the help of M/s.Sundaram Finance Group of Companies as a Community Centred Hospital, following the best tradition of medical service. Dr.Rangarajan's vision was to provide Quality Health Care which is cost-effective and community centred - Based on the inspection, the Corporation Officials formed an opinion that the petitioner/Sundaram Medical Foundation is not doing charitable services so as to grant exemption from payment of property tax. Thus, irrespective of the fact whether the petitioner is accepting the rates for hospital wards at Sundaram Medical Foundation published by www.medifee.com is correct or incorrect, the very facts regarding the inspection conducted by the Corporation Officials and their findings would show that there is no free access to the poor, needy and deserving patients in the petitioner/Hospital and the charges collected are also competitive and on higher side - it cannot be construed as if the petitioner is providing medical treatment at free of cost to the large number of poor, needy and deserving patients.
There is a clear indication that the medical services is to be provided largely and predominantly to poor, needy and deserving people alone. When such a character is missing, then the writ petitioner Foundation is not entitled to get exemption. During the inspection, it is found that the petitioner is providing treatment to rich and affluent, but certainly not at concessional rate - the petitioner is not entitled to avail the benefit of property tax exemption under Section 101(e) of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1335
Validity of assessment order - retesting report was never supplied - HELD THAT:- Mr. Sourabh Goel, Advocate has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent and states that as a matter of fact the report must have been supplied to the petitioner but to avoid un-necessary delay the department would not have any objection in again handing over a copy of the retesting report to the petitioner and passing a fresh order of assessment after permitting the petitioner to cross-examine the expert if required.
The impugned order is set aside and the respondent is directed to transmit a copy of the retesting report to the petitioner and thereafter the matter would be decided in accordance with law - Petition disposed off.
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2021 (4) TMI 1334
Additional depreciation on the machinery which was installed during the year but purchased before 1.4.2005 - HELD THAT:- We notice that similar issue was considered by the coordinate bench in the case of Euro Pratik Ispat Private Limited [2014 (4) TMI 397 - ITAT MUMBAI] Assessee had claimed AD @10%,as the P &M had worked for a period less than one year. It is a common phenomenon that in big projects, installation of machinery takes very long time because of the sheer volume of the work to be carried out. If an assessee is not successful in installing P&M in one year and carries forward the installation work in subsequent year/years it cannot be denied any benefit on the ground that it had acquired the P &M in earlier year. The intent of the legislature was to attract investment, so in our opinion the section can be termed as benevolent provision. In the case under consideration production started from 01.01.2006. Before that fabrication and completion of P&M was going on. Treatment given by the assessee in the books of accounts to the P&M was in accordance with the Accounting Standards (AS)and the AO/FAA has not denied the fact that the assessee was following AS. Therefore, in our opinion, assessee was entitled to claim AD @of 10%. Reversing the order of the FAA, we decide the effective ground of appeal in favour of the assessee.
Similar view was also expressed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of IDMC Ltd [2017 (2) TMI 644 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT].Therefore, respectively following the above decisions which are applicable mutatis mutandis to the present case, we are inclined to accept the submission of Ld. AR. Accordingly grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1333
Maintainability of appeal - low tax effect - HELD THAT:- As noted that the tax effect in this appeal is of Rs.35,25,971/- which is less than the monetary limit of the Rs.50 lacs as fixed by CBDT Circular No.17/2019 dated 08.08.2019 for filing appeal before the Tribunal. Hence, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. However, the Revenue is given liberty to get the appeal revive if at later stage it is discovered that grounds raised by the Revenue is covered by any exception clause of circular of CBDT dated 20.08.2018. Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1332
Estimation of income - Bogus purchases - CIT(A) has restricted the addition on the basis of the decision of the earlier year for the A.Y.2009-10 in which the addition was restricted to the extent of 5% of the bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the assessee has already declared 4.38% profit on the purchase. The total addition comes to the extent of 9.38% which seems high. Since the addition has been restricted to the extent of 3% of the bogus purchase, therefore, the earlier profit to the extent of 4.38% is liable to be set off. Accordingly, we set aside the finding of the CIT(A) on the issue and restrict the addition to the extent of 5% of the bogus purchase only which includes 4.38% profit upon the bogus purchase declared by the assessee. Accordingly, we restricted the addition to the extent of 5% of the total bogus purchase and decide these issues in favour of the assessee against the revenue.
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2021 (4) TMI 1331
Attachment of Bank Accounts - the operation of impugned order shall remain stayed on a condition that the appellant shall offer bank guarantee - HELD THAT:- Depositing the amount is a condition precedent for grant of interim relief including lifting of attachment of bank account - The attachment of bank account(s) of the appellant shall be lifted only after compliance of the condition imposed.
List the matter for hearing in the third week of July, 2021.
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2021 (4) TMI 1330
Depreciation claim u/s 32 - amount paid to DOT for purchase of 3G spectrum - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee's own case [2019 (8) TMI 1831 - ITAT MUMBAI] AO was of the opinion that said capital expenditure on account of acquisition of 3G Spectrum fees is covered under Section 35AAB of the Act and is required to be amortized as per provisions of Section 35ABB of the Act over the period of 20 years for which 3G Spectrum has been allocated and accordingly disallowed the depreciation claim on said 3G Spectrum fees. We noted that this issue is squarely covered by the co-ordinate bench decision of Idea Cellular Limited [2017 (12) TMI 660 - ITAT MUMBAI] Following the co-ordinate Bench decision, we allow this issue of assessee's appeal.
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2021 (4) TMI 1329
Over entitlement of the Appellants to receive interest on delayed payment on the subject-heads, which were to be paid by the employer in local currency as per the stipulations in the said agreement - HELD THAT:- The High Court in the appeal concurred with the Arbitration Court and concluded that omission to include the rate of interest in the bid document, the "appendix to bid" to be specific, had resulted in creation of contractual term that there would not be any claim for interest on delayed payment (as per Clause 60.8) so far as payment in local currency component contained in the agreement is concerned.
The underlying principle guiding award of interest is that interest payment is essentially compensatory in nature. But as it is already observed, interest on delayed payment formed part of the contract itself. The agreement did not contain any express exclusion Clause on payment of interest on delayed payment whether on component of payment in foreign currency or local currency - The Appellate Court's rationale that such blank interest column might have had resulted in acceptance of the bid of the Appellants as their bid could have been more competitive on the assumption that the other bidders might have had pressed for interest in that column is not acceptable. There are no material from which such a conclusion could be reached. No material has been shown from which it can be inferred that omission to fill in the blank space gave the Appellants some kind of competitive edge in the bid process.
The simple interest at the rate of 8% would be just and equitable on the sum left unpaid - appeal allowed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1328
Maintainability of appeal - the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant is that the appeal before the NCLAT against an interlocutory order of the NCLT would interminably delay the final disposal of the proceedings before the NCLT. It has been submitted during the course of the hearing that one of the appellants is ninety-eight years old - HELD THAT:- All that needs to be observed is that the NCLAT should dispose of the appeal against the interlocutory proceedings before the date which has been fixed for the hearing of the main proceedings before the NCLT.
Appeal disposed off.
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2021 (4) TMI 1327
Decree for specific performance - seeking direction to the Respondents to deliver vacant possession of the schedule property - decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit property - decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit property and a decree of mandatory injunction to deposit the title deeds with the Court - contention of the Appellants is that the agreements and the MOUs have to be read together - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute about the agreements dated 20.03.1991 and the MOUs between the parties. It is also a fact that Income Tax Department wanted to compulsorily acquire the property, due to which Writ Petitions were filed which were disposed of on 11.09.1998. Writ Appeals filed by the Department were pending on the date of filing of the suit. The relevant clause in the MOU is that the Appellants shall pay the balance sale consideration at the time of registration of sale deeds immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition. The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment held that the Appellants were not ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement by not depositing the balance sale consideration immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition. The High Court lost sight of the words “at the time of registration of sale” in clause 3 of MOUs - there are force in the submission made on behalf of the Appellants that payment of balance consideration has to be done only at the time of the registration of the sale deeds. Admittedly, no steps were taken for the registration of the sale deeds. The finding of the Division Bench of the High Court that the Appellants were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract by not paying the balance consideration immediately after disposal of the Writ Petition is erroneous.
The High Court highlighted the conduct of the Appellants to deny relief. The failure of the Appellants in not pleading and proving how they were put in possession of a part of the property, the frivolous complaint about vacant possession not being given by the Respondents and the attempt made by the Appellants to take forcible possession of a part of the property were commented upon to hold that the Appellants were disentitled to equitable relief. There is not dispute that the Appellants were in possession of the first floor of the property. Details about the manner in which possession was given to the Appellants not being pleaded cannot be a ground to deny relief - The contention of the Appellants is that the Indian Bank was not a tenant in the ground floor but only a creditor of the Respondents. Admittedly, the Indian Bank sued the Respondents for recovery of the loan by the sale of the hypothecated goods stored in the ground floor. It was also contended on behalf of the Appellants that a police complaint was preferred by them against the Respondents for causing disturbance to their possession. The Appellants cannot be said to be disentitled for a relief of specific performance on the ground that their conduct on this count is blameworthy.
A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of delay or laches. However, an exception to this rule is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take place within the stipulated time. Once a suit for specific performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court process cannot be put against the plaintiff as a matter of law in decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the discretion of the Court, regard being had to the facts of each case, as to whether some additional amount ought or ought not to be paid by the plaintiff once a decree of specific performance is passed in its favour even at the appellate stage - the Respondents are not entitled for any additional amount as 90 per cent of the sale consideration was paid by the Appellants before 1994.
Appeal allowed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1326
Tender Call Notice inviting tender from eligible registered diet preparation and catering firms/suppliers etc. having a valid labour licence and a food licence with a minimum of three years of relevant experience - field of preparation and distribution of therapeutic and non-therapeutic diet to government or private health institutions having a minimum of 200 beds for the year 2019-2020 - HELD THAT:- What is clear is that the authority concerned read its own TCN to refer to the licence to be submitted by bidders as the labour licence under the Contract Labour Act - Sub-clauses (20) and (21) of Tender document in particular, make it clear that the staff employed would be employed by the agency as contract labour, the agency being responsible to make alternative arrangements in cases where their staff goes on strike.
This Court has repeatedly held that judicial review in these matters is equivalent to judicial restraint in these matters. What is reviewed is not the decision itself but the manner in which it was made. The writ court does not have the expertise to correct such decisions by substituting its own decision for the decision of the authority - The High Court has not adverted to any of the decisions, and in second-guessing the authority’s requirement of a licence under the Contract Labour Act, has clearly overstepped the bounds of judicial review in such matters. In any case, a registration certificate under Section 4 of the Orissa Act cannot possibly be the equivalent of a valid labour licence issued by the labour department.
The requirement of the Section 1(4) of Contract Labour Act, that its applicability be extended only to establishments in which there are 20 or more workmen can be done away with by the appropriate government under the proviso, making it clear that this is not an inflexible requirement. In any case, the acceptance of such argument would amount to second-guessing the authority’s interpretation of its own TCN which, as has been stated hereinabove, cannot be so second-guessed unless it is arbitrary, perverse or mala fide.
Thus, except for an incantation of the expression mala fide, no mala fide has in fact been made out on the facts of this case - appeal allowed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1325
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions - contention of the petitioner as sought to apply the provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 as amended in 2016 to transactions which took place much prior there to in 2013, and such action in giving retrospective affect to provisions which have penal consequences (such as Section 24 introduced by 2016 amendment) is contrary to Article 20(1) of the Constitution of lndia.
He also contends that there has been a violation of principles of natural justice since the order was passed without providing the documents and the statements relied upon by the 1"t respondent and without giving opportunity to the petitioner to rebut them, apart from without giving the opportunity to cross-examine persons whose statements were sought to be used against the petitioner and also the impugned order travels way beyond the allegations contained in the show-cause notice
HELD THAT:- We find considerable force in the said submissions.
Therefore, there shall be interim stay as prayed for, subject to the condition that the petitioner does not transfer 4,50,000 shares of the petitioner allotted in the financial year 2011-12 on'14.12.2011 in the name of the 3'd respondent.
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2021 (4) TMI 1324
Seeking interim protection pending arbitration to restrain the 1st Respondent, IL & FS Financial Services Ltd. (IFIN) from acting on its Event of Default (EoD) notice of 23rd July 2019 - seeking temporary injunction restraining IFIN from acting in furtherance of a pledge invocation notice - Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act 1956 - HELD THAT:- The NCLAT has absolutely no jurisdiction over this Court, even on its Original Side, given that this is a Chartered High Court. The High Court is in no way subject to the NCLAT's jurisdiction or superintendence. I do not see how the words 'court of law' can be 'read down', because other than the NCLT, there is no other judicial authority over which the NCLAT exercises such superintending power. But if we leave that aside and focus on the words 'arbitration panel and arbitration authority', and even assuming for a moment that the NCLAT has the power to stay arbitrations, it certainly does not have the authority to stay the hands of this Court in hearing a petition under Section 9 or any other petition that properly comes before this Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Indeed, I do not even see how the NCLAT has such control over arbitral tribunals. The NCLAT can make no order under Section 9, Section 11, Section 34, Section 37 or any of the other provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Notably, Section 9 of the Arbitration Act--and indeed no provision of that Act--is made subject to the provisions of the Companies Act 2013. This in itself is a telling circumstance.
It is enough for the present order to hold that the NCLAT order cannot and does not come in the way of this Court making an appropriate order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. When and how that arbitration is to be commenced is another matter, one with which I am not presently concerned.
Everything in the Arbitration Act is founded on a contract; and this necessarily means that to claim an equitable and discretionary relief, a Section 9 petition is not to be handled like a regular civil suit invoking a non-contractual civil remedy. The Respondent must be shown to be in wrongful conduct. Its actions must be shown to ones in violation of the contract. A respondent seeking to enforce its contractual rights will suffer no injunction unless it is shown that the Respondent itself is in breach or has acted contrary to the contract. Once a breach by the Petitioner is not only demonstrated but is accepted, equity will not operate in its favour. Conversely, where there is a demonstration of a breach by the Respondent, the Petitioner may be entitled to seek an equitable relief in the court's discretion.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1323
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - As argued writ petitioner the impugned notice u/s 148 issued by the first respondent, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 23(2), Mumbai is without any jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- In the case of the petitioner, the Assessing Officer is at Chennai. Thus, the order initially issued by the first respondent, though improper, need not be set aside in view of the fact that the said proceedings were subsequently transferred to the Income Tax Authorities at Chennai. The first respondent has not adjudicated the issues, nor conducted any enquiry.
First respondent conducted certain investigation and identified the immovable properties belong to the petitioner situate at Mumbai. All the files are now transferred to the authority at Chennai, who in turn issued notices on 14.12.2018 directing the petitioner to file the return of income for the assessment year 2011-12, in response to the notice issued under Section 148 of the IT Act, dated 28.03.2018. Though the second respondent has commenced the proceedings by issuing letters dated 14.12.2018, the petitioner is no way prejudiced and she has to avail an opportunity by submitting her objections and by following the procedures contemplated under the IT Act.
The entire proceedings initiated by the first respondent has already been transferred to the authority at Chennai, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner and she is at liberty to defend her case in the manner known to law and by filing objections and an opportunity be provided to the petitioner as prescribed. WP dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1322
Validity of arbitration proceedings - seeking permanent injunction to restrain ADM from initiating, proceeding with, or continuing with arbitration proceedings - whether a case is made out to grant an anti-arbitration injunction? - HELD THAT:- The principles relating to the grant of anti-suit injunctions were examined and formulated in paragraph 24 of Modi Entertainment [2003 (1) TMI 734 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that an anti-suit injunction would not be granted to forbear the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum chosen by the parties - there are no contemporaneous document complaining of the non-receipt of FOSFA Form 54. On the contrary, the executed contracts contain a clause stating that the parties admit knowledge and notice of contract Form 54 of FOSFA. In this context, it is noteworthy that reciprocal obligations were fulfilled by the buyer and seller as regards some of the executed contracts, all of which used the same template, and the allegation that contract Form 54 was not received did not surface then. Therefore, the material on record does not prima facie support the contention that the respective Plaintiff did not have a copy of the contract Form 54 of FOSFA. However, in order to not prejudice the contesting parties in proceedings before the appropriate forum, I do not propose to enter conclusive findings.
As regards the contention that the contract is unconscionable because it permits termination by the seller but not by the buyer; prima facie, such contention appears to be untenable in view of the incorporation of contract Form 54 in the executed contracts with the consequential recourse to the termination clause contained therein - The distinction between an arbitration clause and the other provisions of the contract becomes material in this context, and both severance and the Kompetenz-kompetenz principle are firmly entrenched in Indian jurisprudence, as is evident from Sasan and MSM.
The respective Plaintiff also contended that the arbitral institution is not neutral inasmuch as it is controlled by oil seed producers. In effect, the respective Plaintiff appeared to contend that any arbitral institution which is set up by a trade organisation is not neutral - The material on record does not support a conclusion that the FOSFA arbitral institution is ex facie not neutral and I see no reason to draw such conclusion merely because FOSFA is an organisation representing the interest of traders in oil seeds and fats.
The next contention that should be dealt with relates to the alleged lack of neutrality on the part of the arbitrators. Although such allegation is levelled by the respective Plaintiff, no actionable material has been placed before this Court to substantiate the contention that all the panel arbitrators of FOSFA or the specific arbitrators in the present case are not neutral. Indeed, the facts on record disclose that the respective Plaintiff proceeded to nominate its arbitrator upon receiving a notice of arbitration from ADM. The decision to abandon the arbitral process and institute proceedings before this Court was taken subsequently. In any event, any grievance on this score should be canvassed before the arbitral tribunal and/or the courts in the UK in accordance with applicable law.
The respective Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In light of the above discussion and analysis, there are no reason to continue the anti-arbitration injunction. Consequently, the order of injunction granted originally on 05.07.2019 and extended periodically stands vacated.
Plaintiff has failed to make out a case for an anti-arbitration injunction and that this Court does not have jurisdiction - the arbitral process need not be interfered with - application disposed off.
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2021 (4) TMI 1321
TP Adjustment - International transaction - ALP of corporate guarantee commission - A.O./TPO’s action in holding that there was international transaction insofar as bank guarantee is concerned and assuming the said value at 2% of guarantee value - HELD THAT:- AR has not disputed the fact that corporate guarantee commission is an international transaction. The AR only disputes 2% attributed for imputing ALP of corporate guarantee commission. On identical facts in the case of Manipal Global Education Services Pvt. Ltd[2019 (5) TMI 1942 - ITAT BANGALORE] had imputed 0.50% as cost, instead of 2% arrived by the TPO. The TPO in the cited case also arrived at 2% by taking the credit rating of the tax payer just like this case.
Thus we direct the AO/TPO to make TP adjustment in respect of corporate guarantee at 0.50% for the assessment years under consideration. It is ordered accordingly.
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2021 (4) TMI 1320
Validity of seniority list of Inspectors - promotion of Inspectors to the post of Superintendents - the petitioners who had joined the department after the joining of the private respondents cannot be placed above them in the seniority list - HELD THAT:- It is a matter of fact that the seniority position in the present case was not finally settled when the judgment in the case of K. MEGHACHANDRA SINGH AND ORS. VERSUS NINGAM SIRO AND ORS. [2019 (11) TMI 1733 - SUPREME COURT] was delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 13th November, 2019. The impugned seniority list was issued on 15th March, 2018 and immediately thereafter, various representations were filed on behalf of the private respondents against the said seniority list. When no response was received on the said representations, the private respondents filed the OA before the CAT, challenging the said seniority list, from which the present petition arises.
The CAT has correctly applied the dicta in K. Meghachandra Singh case in the present case and has proceeded to quash the seniority list to the extent it placed the petitioners above the private respondents. The fact that the CAT decision would impact the inter se seniority between the promotees and direct recruits (petitioners), is not the subject matter of the present petition, and therefore, need not be examined. It is also an admitted position that in the present case requisitions for the appointment of the petitioners were sent to SSC the recruiting authority on 11th February, 2015, after the private respondents had already joined the Delhi Commissionerate. Therefore, even in terms of OM dated 4th March, 2014, the petitioners cannot be placed above the private respondents.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1319
Disallowance of Social Forestry and depreciation on at use for social forestry - HELD THAT:- Considering the consistent decisions of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case [2020 (12) TMI 215 - ITAT SURAT] and following the principal of consistency and more over the Ld. CIT(A) granting relief to the assessee by following the order of Tribunal, therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). Hence, we affirm the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). In the result this ground of appeal is dismissed.
Disallowance of Unexplained Creditors - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld.CIT(A) while passing the order followed the order of Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2005-06 [2011 (2) TMI 1460 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] - Thus following the principal of consistency and more over the Ld. CIT(A) granting relief to the assessee by following the order of Tribunal, therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). Hence, we affirm the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). In the result this ground of appeal is dismissed.
Disallowance on excess process stock declared to bank - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld. CIT(A) while passing the order followed the order of Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2002-03 dated 09.04.2009.[2009 (9) TMI 999 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] - Tribunal in assessee’s own case and following the principles of consistency and more over the Ld. CIT(A) granting relief to the assessee by following the order of Tribunal, therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). Hence, we affirm the order passed by Ld. CIT(A). In the result this ground of appeal is dismissed.
Addition made on account of commission paid on sale - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld. CIT(A) while passing the order held that that ad-hock disallowance by A.O. is not justified. We have further on similar ground of appeal in assessee’s own case similar relief was granted to assessee in appeal for A.Y. 2010-11 to 2012-13 [2020 (12) TMI 215 - ITAT SURAT]
Addition made on account of Other Expenses - CIT-A deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld. CIT(A) while passing the order followed the order of Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2002-03 [2009 (9) TMI 999 - ITAT AHMEDABAD]
Addition made on account of Employee Welfare Expenses - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld.CIT(A) while granting relief to the assessee by taking view that ad-hoc disallowance by A.O. is not justified. We have further noted similar ground of appeal that raised by the revenue was dismissed by Tribunal in appeal for A.Y. 2010- 11 to 2012-13 [2020 (12) TMI 215 - ITAT SURAT]
Addition made on account of Book Profit computation u/s.14A - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case as relying on Special Bench of Delhi Tribunal in Vireet investment [2017 (6) TMI 1124 - ITAT DELHI] held that computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2), is to be made without resorting to computation as contemplated under section 14A. Considering the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any merit in this ground of appeal.
Addition made on account of Non deduction of tax on foreign remittance - CIT-A allowed relief to assessee - HELD THAT:- We have noted that ld.CIT(A) while passing the order followed the order of his predecessor for AY 2012-13 [2020 (12) TMI 215 - ITAT SURAT] wherein its was held that commission paid to non-resident for services rendered outside India cannot be deemed to be income accrued or arisen in India. And followed the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT Vs Toshoku Ltd [1980 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] We have further noted that in appeal for AY 2010-11 to 20112- 13, similar relief was granted by Tribunal to assessee by dismissing the similar ground of appeal raised by revenue
Revenue appeal dismissed.
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2021 (4) TMI 1318
Seeking grant of Bail - allegation against the persons named in the FIR is that they were operatives/functionaries of a terrorist gang TPC and they were extorting levy from coal traders, transporters and contractors - Sections 414, 384, 386, 387, 120B Indian Penal Code, Sections 25(1B)(a)/ 26/35 of the Arms Act and Section 17(1)(2) of the CLA Act - HELD THAT:- While considering the grant of bail Under Section 43D(5), it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire material on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the Accused or not.
A close scrutiny of the material placed before the Court would clearly shows that the main accusation against the Appellant is that he paid levy/extortion amount to the terrorist organization. Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. It is clear from the supplementary charge-sheet and the other material on record that other Accused who are members of the terrorist organization have been systematically collecting extortion amounts from businessmen in Amrapali and Magadh areas. The Appellant is carrying on transport business in the area of operation of the organization. It is alleged in the second supplementary charge-sheet that the Appellant paid money to the members of the TPC for smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the Appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organization.
It is not satisfying that a prima facie case has been made out against the Appellant relating to the offences alleged against him - these findings are restricted only for the purpose of grant of bail to the Appellant and the trial court shall not be influenced by these observations during trial.
Appeal allowed.
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9911796707
