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1999 (5) TMI 639
Issues: Appeal against penalty imposed for contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, condonation of delay, proper service of impugned order, jurisdiction of the Board to condone delay.
Analysis:
1. The judgment pertains to appeals against penalties imposed for contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellants, Sajjan Singh and Shambu Singh, were penalized for sale and purchase of foreign currency in violation of the Act. The penalties were imposed under sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Act.
2. The appeals were accompanied by applications for condonation of delay, stay of the impugned order, and waiver from pre-deposit of penalty amounts. The delay in filing the appeals was 138 days, exceeding the 90-day limit prescribed by the Act. The Board issued a notice to the appellants to explain why their appeals should not be dismissed as time-barred.
3. The appellant in Appeal No. 16 claimed that the impugned order was delivered at his residence, making the appeal not time-barred. However, due to limitations on the Board's power to condone delays beyond 90 days, the appellant was advised to seek recourse elsewhere.
4. Regarding Appeal No. 15, the appellant argued that the impugned order was not properly served as it was delivered at Shambu Singh's residence, not his own. The appellant filed the appeal within the prescribed period upon learning about the order. The respondent contended that the appellant resided with Shambu Singh and had received notices at the same address where the impugned order was sent.
5. The Board found the appellant's argument unconvincing, noting that he had previously stated residing with Shambu Singh at the address where the order was delivered. Despite attempts to provide a different address later, the Board's notice sent to the new address was returned undelivered. The appellant's evidence to prove different addresses was deemed unreliable, and his plea for condonation of delay was similar to the other appellant's case.
6. Ultimately, both appeals were dismissed as time-barred due to the Board's lack of jurisdiction to condone delays exceeding the statutory limit. The decision was based on the appellants' failure to demonstrate proper service of the impugned order and establish valid grounds for condonation of delay.
This detailed analysis covers the issues raised in the judgment, addressing the legal arguments presented by the parties and the Board's reasoning for dismissing the appeals.
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1999 (5) TMI 638
Issues:
1. Imposition of penalties under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
2. Failure to initiate legal action against a defaulting foreign buyer.
3. Consideration of extension of time for realizing outstanding export proceeds.
4. Competence of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in decision-making for export-related matters.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment involves penalties imposed on an appellant-company and its directors for contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The appellant-company was penalized for non-realization of export proceeds, while its directors faced penalties under a different section of the Act.
2. The issue of failure to initiate legal action against a defaulting foreign buyer was raised by the Adjudicating Officer. The appellants argued that not filing a suit in foreign courts did not equate to a lack of effective steps to recover outstanding export proceeds. Previous decisions of the Board were cited to support this argument.
3. The case also delved into the consideration of extension of time for realizing outstanding export amounts. The RBI was involved in this process, and the appellant had applied for both extension of time and permission to write off the outstanding amount. The judgment highlighted the importance of RBI's decision-making authority in such matters.
4. The competence of the RBI in decision-making for export-related issues was a crucial aspect of the judgment. It was emphasized that the RBI should independently assess each application for extension of time or write-off without being influenced by ongoing legal proceedings or investigations.
5. The judgment ultimately set aside the penalties imposed on the appellants, citing reasons such as the premature nature of the proceedings, pending RBI decisions on extension of time, and the need for independent RBI decision-making. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was overturned for all appellants involved.
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1999 (5) TMI 637
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this legal judgment are whether the appellant should be treated as a permanent employee of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board or if he was on deputation from Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit University.
Issue 1: Appellant's Employment Status
The appellant, who was initially deputed from the University to the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board as Controller of Examinations, sought confirmation in this role. The University and the Board both approved his permanent absorption in the Board. Despite this, the Board terminated his services based on a High Court judgment. The High Court held that the appellant could not claim permanent employment with the Board. The appellant challenged this decision through two cases.
Key Details:
- The Board sought permission from the University to depute the appellant as Controller of Examinations.
- The State Government authorized the appellant to discharge duties as Controller of Examinations.
- The Board recommended the appellant's confirmation to the State Government.
- The University consented to the permanent absorption of the appellant in the Board.
- The State Government appointed the appellant as Controller of Examinations.
- The High Court, in a previous judgment, directed the State Government to decide on the mode of appointment for the Controller of Examinations post.
Issue 2: Legality of Termination
The Board terminated the appellant's services in anticipation of government approval, following the High Court judgment. The State Government approved this decision. The appellant challenged these termination orders in a writ petition, seeking reinstatement and payment of arrears. The Court ordered his reinstatement and payment of arrears. The appellant continued in his role until retirement in 1996.
Key Details:
- The Board terminated the appellant's services based on the High Court judgment.
- The State Government approved the termination.
- The Court ordered the appellant's reinstatement and payment of arrears.
- The appellant continued in his role until retirement.
Issue 3: Deputation and Employment Consensus
Deputation involves the assignment of an employee from one department to another in public interest. In this case, the University, the Board, and the appellant all consented to the deputation and his permanent absorption by the Board. The Court found no evidence of impropriety or lack of public interest in the deputation. The Division Bench erred in dismissing the appellant's writ petition, and the appellant's retirement benefits were to be calculated based on his permanent employment status with the Board.
Key Details:
- Deputation involves the voluntary assignment of an employee to another department.
- The University, the Board, and the appellant consented to the deputation.
- No evidence of impropriety in the deputation was found.
- The Division Bench erred in dismissing the appellant's writ petition.
- The appellant's retirement benefits were to be calculated based on his permanent employment status with the Board.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court judgment and quashing the termination orders. The appellant was deemed a permanent employee of the Board at the time of his retirement, with his retirement benefits to be calculated accordingly.
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1999 (5) TMI 636
Issues:
1. Whether the subsequent notification under Section 9 of the Indian Stamp Act can impose stamp duty.
2. Who is liable to pay the stamp duty on the contract.
3. Whether the subsequent notification removes the exemption on stamp duty.
4. Whether the limit of five thousand rupees applies to specific instruments or all instruments mentioned in the notification.
Analysis:
1st Issue - Imposition of Stamp Duty by Notification (Section 9):
The subsequent notification dated 14.1.1982 did not impose fresh stamp duty but merely amended the existing exemption. The power to issue notifications includes the authority to add, amend, or rescind provisions. The State Government's action in issuing the subsequent notification was within its jurisdiction, and the stamp duty was not newly imposed. The question of whether the stamp duty exemption was lifted is a separate matter to be addressed.
2nd Issue - Liability to Pay Stamp Duty:
In the case of conveyance contracts like the one in question, the grantee is responsible for paying the stamp duty as per Section 29 of the Act. The petitioner, being the grantee, is liable to bear the stamp duty expenses. The terms of the contract also specify that the buyer, in this case, the petitioner, is obligated to pay the stamp duty and registration fees. Thus, the petitioner is legally bound to pay the stamp duty.
3rd Issue - Removal of Stamp Duty Exemption:
The exemption under the notifications pertains to conveyance of forest produce in Government forests. The contract for resin purchase falls under the first part of item No. 11, which covers general conveyance of forest produce. While the subsequent notification introduced a value limit of five thousand rupees for exemption, there is ambiguity regarding whether this limit applies to specific instruments or all instruments mentioned. The Court noted that the semi-colon in the notification's wording could be misleading, and suggested the State clarify the ambiguity. However, the Court did not find sufficient grounds to rule against the State on this issue, rendering the fourth point irrelevant.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the State's authority to charge stamp duty on resin contracts and affirming the petitioner's liability to pay the duty as the grantee. The judgment emphasized the need for clarity in legal notifications to avoid ambiguity and recommended the State address such issues for future reference.
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1999 (5) TMI 635
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of three orders (Nos. 22 dated 2-5-95, 24, and 25 dated 8-5-95) passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
2. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
3. Request for stay of the Debt Recovery proceeding till the disposal of the criminal case.
4. Maintainability of applications under Article 227 of the Constitution despite the existence of an alternative remedy by way of appeal.
5. Allegations of fraud and their impact on the jurisdiction and proceedings of the Tribunal.
6. Refusal to grant adjournment by the Tribunal.
7. Review of the Tribunal's order dated 20-2-95.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Three Orders by the Tribunal:
The petitioner challenged the legality of three orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The Tribunal had rejected the petitioner's applications for stay of proceedings and for review of an earlier order. The Tribunal also refused to grant adjournments requested by the petitioner.
2. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal:
The Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act was questioned by the petitioner on the grounds that the alleged claim arose out of fraudulent actions and did not constitute a "debt" as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. The Court held that the application filed by the bank was indeed for the recovery of a debt and fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is not bound by the Civil Procedure Code but is guided by the principles of natural justice as per Section 22 of the Act.
3. Request for Stay of Debt Recovery Proceedings:
The petitioner sought a stay of the Debt Recovery proceedings until the disposal of a criminal case initiated against him. The Tribunal rejected this request, and the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the pendency of the criminal case did not affect the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, which emphasized that criminal matters should be given precedence but did not find it applicable to stay the Tribunal's proceedings in this case.
4. Maintainability of Applications under Article 227:
The bank's counsel argued that the applications under Article 227 were not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 20 of the Act. The Court overruled this preliminary objection, stating that even if an alternative remedy exists, an application under Article 227 is maintainable if the Tribunal's order is without jurisdiction, arbitrary, or violates principles of natural justice.
5. Allegations of Fraud:
The bank alleged that the petitioner had committed fraud by presenting forged documents to obtain a loan. The Court held that the allegations of fraud did not oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 19. The Tribunal was competent to adjudicate the matter based on the demand promissory note, which was not alleged to be forged.
6. Refusal to Grant Adjournment:
The petitioner requested adjournments on multiple grounds, including the intention to move the High Court against an order and the physical unfitness of his senior advocate. The Tribunal rejected these requests, and the Court found no fault in the Tribunal's decision, noting that the petitioner had not demonstrated a valid reason for the adjournments.
7. Review of Tribunal's Order Dated 20-2-95:
The petitioner sought a review of the Tribunal's order dated 20-2-95, alleging errors and the discovery of new evidence. The Court found the review application to be frivolous and motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings. The petitioner failed to specify the new and important matters that warranted a review.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the applications under Article 227, finding no justification to interfere with the Tribunal's orders. The petitioner was directed to proceed with the application under Section 19 of the Act, and the Tribunal was instructed to expedite the proceedings. The applications were dismissed with costs assessed at 200 Gms.
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1999 (5) TMI 634
Issues Involved:
1. Conflict between General Rules and Special Rules.
2. Interpretation of Rule 5 and Note (3) of the General Rules.
3. Applicability of amended rules to ongoing selection processes.
4. Rights of candidates selected by the Public Service Commission.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Conflict between General Rules and Special Rules:
The core issue was whether the amendment to the General Rules by the Notification dated 5th December 1992 was in conflict with the Special Rules governing the recruitment of Sales Tax Officers in Kerala. The Division Bench of the High Court had held that the amendment to the General Rules would take away the rights of the petitioners for appointment against 20% of the successive substantive vacancies arising in the cadre of Sales Tax Officers, and that the amendment was in conflict with the Special Rules. However, the Supreme Court observed that Rule 2 of the General Rules provides that in case of repugnancy between the General Rules and Special Rules, the Special Rules would prevail. The Court further clarified that if the language of the general rule is clear and unqualified, it would prevail despite repugnancy, establishing a rule of universal application.
2. Interpretation of Rule 5 and Note (3) of the General Rules:
Rule 5 and Note (3) of the General Rules were central to the dispute. Rule 5 specifies the method of recruitment where it is both by direct recruitment and by transfer, and Note (3) clarifies that the number of vacancies to be filled by each method should be calculated based on the cadre strength and not on the existing vacancies. The Supreme Court emphasized that the language of Note (3) is clear and unqualified, and it applies to all special rules whenever a ratio or percentage is prescribed. The Court stated that the intention of the legislature in adding Note (3) was to establish a uniform pattern for computing the ratio or percentage of direct recruits and transferees, thereby filling any lacuna in the Special Rules.
3. Applicability of amended rules to ongoing selection processes:
The respondents contended that the recruitment process that began in 1987 should be governed by the rules existing at that time, and that the amended rules should not apply retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that there was no question of giving retrospective effect to the amended rules. The amendment, which came into effect in 1992, was applicable after its enactment, and since the selection process was not completed until 1995, the amended rules were applicable. The Court also noted that the amendment did not alter the selection process but clarified the computation method for the ratio or percentage of appointments.
4. Rights of candidates selected by the Public Service Commission:
The candidates selected by the Public Service Commission argued that their appointments should be governed by the rules existing at the time of the advertisement in 1987. The Supreme Court reiterated that a candidate on a select list does not acquire an absolute right to appointment. The Government has the discretion to decide the number of selected candidates to be appointed based on the prescribed ratio or percentage in the service rules. The Court also referred to a Government Order (G.O.M.S. No. 233/85/GAD) which clarified that changes in qualifications, method of appointment, age, or other recruitment conditions introduced after the issue of a notification for selection would apply to future selections only, except in cases where the changes amount to concessions or exemptions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench, and restored the order of the learned Single Judge. The Court held that the amendment to the General Rules was not repugnant to the Special Rules and did not take away the rights of the candidates selected by the Public Service Commission. The amended rules were applicable to the selection process that culminated in 1995, and the computation of vacancies should be based on the cadre strength as clarified by Note (3) to Rule 5.
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1999 (5) TMI 633
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of convictions under TADA Act.
2. Admissibility and evidentiary value of confessions under Section 15 of TADA Act.
3. Determination of criminal conspiracy and individual involvement.
4. Appropriateness of death sentences awarded.
Summary:
1. Legality of Convictions under TADA Act:
The Court found that the conviction of the accused under Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the TADA Act could not be sustained. The charges under these sections were dismissed for all the accused. The Court noted that the intention to overawe the Government or to strike terror, essential for TADA charges, was not explicitly mentioned in the charges framed against the accused.
2. Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Confessions under Section 15 of TADA Act:
The Court held that confessions recorded under Section 15 of TADA Act are admissible in trials for offences under the TADA Act and other connected offences tried together. The Court clarified that such confessions are substantive evidence against the maker and co-accused, abettor, or conspirator if they are charged and tried in the same case. The Court rejected the argument that such confessions could only be used for corroboration, affirming that they are substantive evidence.
3. Determination of Criminal Conspiracy and Individual Involvement:
The Court examined the confessions and other evidence against each accused. It confirmed the conviction of A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan), A-3 (Murugan), A-9 (Robert Payas), A-10 (Jayakumar), A-16 (Ravichandran), and A-18 (Arivu) under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC. The Court acquitted other accused of the conspiracy charges under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC due to lack of sufficient evidence proving their involvement in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi.
4. Appropriateness of Death Sentences Awarded:
The Court considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances for each accused. It confirmed the death sentences for A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan), A-3 (Murugan), and A-18 (Arivu), finding their cases to fall within the "rarest of the rare" category. The death sentences of A-9 (Robert Payas), A-10 (Jayakumar), and A-16 (Ravichandran) were commuted to life imprisonment. The Court emphasized the gravity of the crime, the planning involved, and the impact on the nation while determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.
Conclusion:
The Court set aside the convictions under TADA Act for all accused. It confirmed the convictions under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC for A-1, A-2, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-16, and A-18. The death sentences for A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-18 were confirmed, while the death sentences for A-9, A-10, and A-16 were commuted to life imprisonment. All other accused were acquitted of the conspiracy charges and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.
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1999 (5) TMI 632
Issues:
1. Application under Order 19 Rule 2 C.P.C. rejected by the lower court.
2. Dispute regarding the necessity of cross-examination of the deponent.
3. Scope of revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C.
4. Conditions for exercising judicial discretion under Order 19 Rule 2 C.P.C.
5. Jurisdictional error in entertaining revision petition.
Analysis:
1. The revision petition challenged the rejection of an application under Order 19 Rule 2 C.P.C. by the lower court. The petitioner argued that the plaintiff did not provide documentary evidence for the alleged tenancy, relying mainly on his own affidavit. The petitioner sought an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff to establish the veracity of the claims made in the affidavit.
2. The non-petitioners contended that circumstantial evidence supported the alleged tenancy claim and opposed the revision petition. They argued that the petitioner's application lacked sufficient reasons for cross-examination under Rule 2 of Order 19 C.P.C. The non-petitioners emphasized the limited scope of a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. and the necessity for justifying the request for cross-examination.
3. The judgment referenced various legal precedents to establish the scope of Section 115 C.P.C. and the restrictions on the High Court's revisionary powers. It highlighted that the High Court could not vary or reverse an order unless it would lead to a failure of justice or irreparable injury. The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to the conditions specified in the proviso to Section 115(1) of the Code.
4. The judgment delved into the conditions required for exercising judicial discretion under Order 19 Rule 2 C.P.C. It cited cases where courts allowed cross-examination based on the potential failure of justice if the order under revision stood. The court emphasized the need for a bonafide application supported by cogent reasons and the necessity for cross-examination in the interest of justice.
5. The analysis concluded that the lower court had the jurisdiction to decide on granting permission for cross-examination under Order 19 Rule 2 C.P.C. There was no evidence of material irregularity in the lower court's decision, and the conditions for granting permission were not met in this case. The judgment dismissed the revision petition based on the legal principles established by the Supreme Court and previous court decisions, emphasizing the lack of irreparable injury at that stage.
This detailed analysis of the judgment provides a comprehensive understanding of the legal issues involved and the court's reasoning behind dismissing the revision petition.
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1999 (5) TMI 631
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of whether Aryapuram Thattimal Padugai is a minor inam under The Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 30 of 1963) or falls under the Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1963 (Act 26 of 1963).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of the Applicable Act:
The central question is whether Aryapuram Thattimal Padugai, consisting of Mela Thattimal Padugai and Kizha Thattimal Padugai, is a minor inam under Act 30 of 1963 or falls under Act 26 of 1963. The State Government initially issued a notification treating it under Act 26 of 1963, later withdrew, and notified it under Act 30 of 1963. The appellants contended that the State Government correctly issued the notification under Act 30 of 1963, which was upheld by the Settlement Officer.
2. Petition by Respondents:
The respondents filed a petition under Section 5 of the Madras Inams (Supplementary) Act (Act 31 of 1963) for a declaration that the two distinct areas in Aryapuram Thattimal Padugai form a new inam estate falling under Act 26 of 1963. The Settlement Officer dismissed the petition, holding that the land was a minor inam under Act 30 of 1963.
3. Tribunal's Decision:
The respondents appealed to the Minor Inam Estates Abolition Tribunal, which allowed the appeal. The Tribunal held that the two portions granted in inam could be identified without their extents and boundaries being given, construing it as a 'part village inam estate'. The Tribunal also referred to the Madras High Court's decision in Karumbavira Vanniar, which dealt with the same estate, concluding that the grant was of two separate bits of land lying in two different taraf villages and was amalgamated in 1919 to form Aryapuram Thattimal Padugai village.
4. High Court's Decision:
The High Court rejected the appellants' submission that the grant was expressed only in terms of acreages or cawnies. It held that the references to paimash accounts and subsequent surveys were compiled after the grant, and thus, it could not be concluded that it was described in the grant itself. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, setting aside the notification under Act 30 of 1963.
5. Supreme Court's Analysis:
The Supreme Court analyzed the historical context of inam lands and the relevant legislative provisions. It referred to various definitions and judicial interpretations, emphasizing the need to interpret Sub-clause (b), Explanation 1 to Section 2(11) of Act 26 of 1963. The Court noted that the grant's original documents were not on record, and the parties relied on collateral evidence from the Karumbavira Vanniar case.
6. Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the area of Mela and Kizha formed part of the respective villages and thus constituted a 'part village inam estate'. It could not be held that the grant was expressed only in terms of acreages or cawnies. The Court found merit in the respondents' alternative submission that even if the grant referred to acreage, it was not expressed "only in terms of acreages or cawnies". The Court upheld the Tribunal and High Court's findings and dismissed the appeals, affirming the notification under Act 30 of 1963 was illegal.
Judgment:
The appeals were dismissed, and the notification under Act 30 of 1963 was held to be illegal. The findings of the Tribunal and High Court were upheld, confirming that Aryapuram Thattimal Padugai is a 'part village inam estate' under Act 26 of 1963.
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1999 (5) TMI 630
Issues:
- Challenge to judgment and order directing payment of residue money from sale of factory
- Interpretation of Section 29(4) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951
Issue 1: Challenge to judgment and order directing payment of residue money from sale of factory
The Gujarat State Financial Corporation challenged the judgment directing it to pay the residue of the money received from the sale of a factory, "R.K. Textiles," to the petitioner. The factory was sold for Rs. 7,50,000, with an initial deposit of Rs. 2,50,000, and the remaining amount was to be paid within two years. The Corporation was directed to pay the residue to the petitioner after adjusting dues and costs. The appellant argued that as the full sale price was not received, there was no residue amount available for payment to the petitioner. However, the Court held that once the property is sold, the money received is held in trust by the Corporation and must be applied as per Section 29(4) of the Act. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the direction to pay the residue amount to the petitioner.
Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 29(4) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951
Section 29 of the Act provides the Financial Corporation with rights in case of default by an industrial concern. Sub-section (4) states that money received by the Corporation shall be held in trust to pay costs, charges, and debts due, with the residue to be paid to the entitled person. The Court interpreted the term "money received," stating that when property is sold, the amount realized is considered received by the Corporation. Even if part of the amount is treated as a loan to the purchaser, the entire consideration should be treated as money received. Therefore, the Court held that the Corporation must pay the residue amount to the petitioner after adjusting costs and charges. The Court dismissed the appeal and rejected the request for continuing interim relief due to the prolonged litigation.
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1999 (5) TMI 629
The Supreme Court allowed the appellant, who is facing criminal prosecution in India, to return to England by directing the court in Rajasthan to return his passport upon executing a bond of Rs. 3,00,000 with sureties. The appellant can appear through counsel in court except on essential days, ensuring his presence when required.
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1999 (5) TMI 628
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to impose exemplary costs in criminal cases.
2. Interpretation of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) regarding inherent powers.
3. Applicability of specific provisions of the CrPC for awarding costs.
4. Examination of previous case laws and principles of statutory interpretation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Impose Exemplary Costs in Criminal Cases:
The primary issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to impose exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000 on each appellant while rejecting a frivolous or vexatious petition under Section 482 of the CrPC. The appellants argued that the High Court lacked such jurisdiction except as provided under Sections 148(3), 342, and 359 of the CrPC. The respondents contended that the High Court had inherent jurisdiction to impose costs to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice.
2. Interpretation of Section 482 of the CrPC Regarding Inherent Powers:
Section 482 of the CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make necessary orders to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice. The Court held that this section stands independently and is not limited or affected by other provisions of the CrPC. The inherent powers include the authority to impose costs, which can be exemplary, to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.
3. Applicability of Specific Provisions of the CrPC for Awarding Costs:
The Court examined Sections 148(3), 342, 357, and 359 of the CrPC, which provide specific instances where costs can be awarded. It was argued that these provisions do not preclude the High Court from exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 to award costs in appropriate cases. The Court noted that while these sections provide for costs in certain cases, they do not explicitly prohibit the High Court from awarding costs in other cases under its inherent powers.
4. Examination of Previous Case Laws and Principles of Statutory Interpretation:
The Court referred to several previous decisions to support its interpretation of Section 482. In "State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal," it was held that inherent powers could not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with specific provisions of the CrPC. However, the Court distinguished this case by emphasizing that Section 482 allows for the exercise of inherent powers where no specific provision exists or where such exercise is necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.
In "Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. The State of Bihar," the Court recognized the inherent powers of the High Court to expunge remarks made against a medical practitioner, highlighting that such powers are necessary for securing the ends of justice. Similarly, in "Pampathy v. State of Mysore," the Court acknowledged that inherent powers are essential for the proper discharge of judicial duties, especially in cases not covered by specific statutory provisions.
The Court also addressed the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), noting that its application should be limited and should not lead to inconsistency or injustice. The Court emphasized that inherent powers should be exercised judiciously and only in extraordinary circumstances to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court has the inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC to impose costs, including exemplary costs, in appropriate cases to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. This power is independent of other provisions of the CrPC and should be exercised judiciously in exceptional circumstances. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's order imposing costs on the appellants.
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1999 (5) TMI 627
Issues:
Challenge to legality of order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal confirming Sub-Divisional Officer's order under Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1947.
Analysis:
The appellant, a tenant, appealed against the Bombay High Court's dismissal of his Writ Petition questioning the legality of the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which confirmed the Sub-Divisional Officer's order in TNC Appeal No. 192/79. The appellant's right to purchase the land under Section 32F of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1947 was governed by the fact that the landlady was a widow. The landlady passed away, and the tenant failed to comply with the requirement of Section 32F within the stipulated period. The heirs of the landlady contended that the purchase had become ineffective due to the tenant's failure to exercise his right under Section 32F within the prescribed time. The Tribunal accepted this contention, and the High Court confirmed the Tribunal's decision in the Writ Petition filed by the appellant.
The appellant argued that despite the High Court's earlier decision, he still had the right to purchase the land under Section 32F. However, the Court found it difficult to accept this argument. Section 32F provides that in cases where the landlord is a widow, the tenant must exercise the right to purchase the land within one year from the expiry of the period during which the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. The tenant failed to comply with this requirement, as the intimation was given long after the deadline had passed. The Court emphasized that the language of Sections 32F and 31 is clear, and the period of one year must be counted in accordance with these provisions, not from the date of the tenant's knowledge. The Court rejected the argument that the period should be counted from the date of the tenant's knowledge, stating that equity cannot override the clear provisions of the law.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the Writ Petition, ruling that the appellant must hand over possession of the land as directed by the Tehsildar within one month from the date of the judgment. The appeal was deemed to have failed and was consequently dismissed.
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1999 (5) TMI 626
Issues Involved:
1. Landlord-tenant relationship post Rent Act era.
2. Validity of an unregistered lease deed.
3. Effect of the Delhi Rent Control Act amendment.
4. Impact of dismissal of an ejectment suit for default.
5. Fresh notice to quit and subsequent suit for ejectment.
6. Legal status of tenant post-dismissal of ejectment suit.
7. Cause of action in a suit for ejectment.
8. Interpretation of Order 9, Rule 9, CPC.
9. Tenant's rights and landlord's reversionary rights post-dismissal of ejectment suit.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Landlord-tenant relationship post Rent Act era:
The judgment discusses the transformation in landlord-tenant relationships following the amendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act, which ceased to protect tenancies with rents exceeding Rs. 3,500/- per month. Consequently, the relationship between the parties is governed solely by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
2. Validity of an unregistered lease deed:
The lease deed dated 1.4.1982 was not registered. According to settled law, in the absence of a registered instrument, the tenancy is considered month-to-month. The court cited several Supreme Court decisions affirming this principle, including Bhawanji Lakhamshi v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Burmah Shell v. Khaja Midhat Noor.
3. Effect of the Delhi Rent Control Act amendment:
With the amendment to Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the premises in question, where the rent exceeds Rs. 3,500/-, are no longer covered by the Rent Act. The judgment emphasizes that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 now apply.
4. Impact of dismissal of an ejectment suit for default:
The previous suit for ejectment was dismissed for default. The court examined whether such dismissal bars a fresh suit for ejectment under Rule 9 of Order 9, CPC. It concluded that the dismissal for default does not extinguish the landlord's reversionary rights or convert the tenant's status to that of an absolute owner.
5. Fresh notice to quit and subsequent suit for ejectment:
The landlord served a fresh notice to quit dated 15.10.1996 and filed a new suit for ejectment. The court held that the dismissal of the earlier suit does not preclude the landlord from serving a fresh notice and filing a subsequent suit for ejectment.
6. Legal status of tenant post-dismissal of ejectment suit:
Upon dismissal of the ejectment suit, the tenant's status is restored to that of a month-to-month tenant rather than a tenant at sufferance. The court clarified that the tenant does not become an owner in freehold or a tenant in perpetuity.
7. Cause of action in a suit for ejectment:
The court identified the cause of action in a suit for ejectment as the termination of the tenancy by a valid notice to quit. Each notice to quit and the subsequent expiry of the tenancy month constitutes a fresh cause of action.
8. Interpretation of Order 9, Rule 9, CPC:
Order 9, Rule 9, CPC precludes a fresh suit on the same cause of action if the previous suit was dismissed for default. However, the court interpreted that a fresh notice to quit creates a new cause of action, allowing the landlord to file a new suit for ejectment.
9. Tenant's rights and landlord's reversionary rights post-dismissal of ejectment suit:
The court emphasized that the dismissal of an ejectment suit does not affect the landlord's reversionary rights. The tenant remains liable for rent and continues as a tenant from month-to-month, subject to termination by a fresh notice to quit.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the order of the learned ADJ, dismissing the tenant's application under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC, and affirmed that the second suit for ejectment is not barred under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC. The civil revision was dismissed, with no orders as to costs. The observations made in the judgment do not affect the tenant's right to appeal against the decree for ejectment passed on 11.3.1999.
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1999 (5) TMI 625
Issues:
1. Allegation of collusion between two divisions of the same company for wrongful Modvat credit availed by the chemical division.
2. Dispute regarding the payment of duty and Modvat credit availed by the pharmaceutical division.
3. Legal interpretation of exemption notifications and Modvat credit eligibility.
4. Validity of invoking a larger period of limitation and the applicability of Section 11AC retrospectively.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The Commissioner held that collusion existed between the chemical and pharmaceutical divisions of the company to defraud the Government by availing wrong Modvat credit. The chemical division transferred inputs to the pharmaceutical division, leading to the accumulation of Modvat credit. The Commissioner imposed penalties on both divisions for intentional collusion.
Issue 2:
The dispute arose from the payment of duty and Modvat credit availed by the pharmaceutical division based on inputs received from the chemical division. The Department objected to the Modvat credit taken at a higher rate, alleging that the chemical division paid duty as a deposit, not actual duty. Show cause notices were issued, and the adjudicating authority confirmed the duty demand and penalties.
Issue 3:
The appellant argued that they had the option to forego exemption benefits and pay duty, allowing them to avail Modvat credit. They cited previous Tribunal decisions supporting their claim that once duty payment is not challenged, Modvat credit cannot be denied. The appellant contended that the Department's invocation of Section 11AC was incorrect as it was introduced after the period in question.
Issue 4:
The Tribunal found that the adjudicating authority wrongly invoked a larger period of limitation and Section 11AC retrospectively. They emphasized the appellant's right to choose exemption benefits and pay duty, as established in previous Tribunal decisions. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders, ruling them devoid of merit and substance, and allowed the appeals with consequential relief.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed allegations of collusion, disputed duty payments and Modvat credit availed, legal interpretations of exemption notifications and Modvat credit eligibility, and the validity of invoking a larger period of limitation and Section 11AC retrospectively. The Tribunal's decision provided detailed analysis and legal reasoning, ultimately setting aside the impugned orders and allowing the appeals.
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1999 (5) TMI 624
The appeal was about whether the benefit of Notification No. 53/88 applied to waste from HDPE tape manufacturing. The Revenue argued duty was not paid on the waste, but the respondents disagreed. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondents, stating the waste arose from duty-paid material, so the notification applied. The appeal by the Revenue was rejected.
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1999 (5) TMI 623
The plaintiff applied to place on record an application moved by Shri K.K. Bhargava, but the defendant opposed, claiming the document was forged. The court found the application belated and lacking authenticity, thus dismissing it.
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1999 (5) TMI 622
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the agreement to sell the property.
2. Compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease.
3. Breach of Clause II (13) of the lease deed.
4. Sanction of building plans by NDMC and L&DO.
5. Impact of Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act (ULCRA) on the agreement.
6. Possession of the property.
7. Entitlement to specific performance of the contract.
8. Award of compensation in lieu of specific performance.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Agreement to Sell the Property:
The agreement dated 25th July 1972 involved the appellant agreeing to sell, transfer, and assign his rights, title, and interest in the property at 6, Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi, to the respondents for Rs. 8,97,740/-. The agreement included terms for payment, possession, and construction of a multi-storeyed building. A supplementary agreement modified the terms, including payment in the form of flats instead of cash.
2. Compliance with the Terms and Conditions of the Lease:
The lease deed contained specific covenants restricting alterations, constructions, and usage of the property without prior written consent from the lessor. The appellant was required to obtain approval from the lessor before any assignment or transfer of the property.
3. Breach of Clause II (13) of the Lease Deed:
The Government of India issued a notice on 31st October 1972, highlighting a breach of Clause II (13) due to the appellant's agreement to sell the property without prior approval. The respondents argued that there was no sale, only an agreement to sell, and they had removed objectionable structures.
4. Sanction of Building Plans by NDMC and L&DO:
The respondents submitted building plans for an 8-storeyed and two 5-storeyed buildings, which were rejected by NDMC due to zoning issues and plot size requirements. Despite repeated efforts, the plans were not sanctioned until a decree by the Trial Court in 1990 influenced NDMC to grant conditional approval in 1991.
5. Impact of Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act (ULCRA) on the Agreement:
The property included excess land as per ULCRA, making it ineligible for sale without exemption. Applications for exemption were repeatedly denied. An exemption granted in 1985 imposed stringent conditions, making the agreement impractical to honor.
6. Possession of the Property:
The agreement recited delivery of possession to the respondents, which was disputed. The Trial Court found that only a small area was handed over for storage, while the Division Bench held that legal possession was given. The appellant retained major possession.
7. Entitlement to Specific Performance of the Contract:
The Court held that the agreement was to be performed within a reasonable time, inferred from the terms and circumstances. The respondents failed to secure necessary sanctions and clearances within a reasonable period, and the contract's performance became impractical due to ULCRA and zoning restrictions. The Court found that the performance would cause undue hardship to the appellant and denied specific performance.
8. Award of Compensation in Lieu of Specific Performance:
The Court awarded compensation to the respondents instead of specific performance. The appellant was directed to return the consideration amount with interest and pay additional compensation of Rs. 3,25,000/- with interest from the date of the decree.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the suit for specific performance filed by the respondents, directed the appellant to return the consideration amount with interest, awarded additional compensation to the respondents, and ordered the respondents to vacate the portion of the property they occupied. The costs were to be borne by the parties as incurred.
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1999 (5) TMI 621
Issues: Scope of dispute limited to possession, additional evidence admitted beyond scope of suit, maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal, appellant's title to property
Analysis:
1. The dispute between the parties was limited to possession of a property in Bombay. The respondent sought a permanent injunction based on his exclusive possession for several decades. The trial court decreed the suit in part, and the matter was remanded for fresh disposal. The Appellate Judge restricted the scope of remand, allowing the filing of additional written statements and appointing an architect-Commissioner to draw a sketch map. The trial court passed a decree based on possession, leaving the question of title open.
2. The High Court, in an unusual procedure, allowed additional evidence and recorded findings on the appellant's title to the property. The Single Judge concluded that the respondent failed to prove possession and dismissed the suit, alleging the respondent of forgery and perjury. The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's judgment, considering the limited scope of the suit and absence of title issues, and restored the trial court's decree based on possession.
3. The appellant contended that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and the suit based on possession without title was not maintainable against the owner. However, the Supreme Court clarified the maintainability of the appeal under the Letters Patent and refuted the appellant's claim of title based on trial court findings and a notice issued by respondent's advocates.
4. The Single Judge's admission of additional evidence on title without a plea or issue on the matter was deemed beyond jurisdiction. The Supreme Court highlighted the principles of possessory title, the protection of long continuous possession through injunction, and the requirement for the owner to regain possession through due process of law.
5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it with costs, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the scope of the suit and legal principles governing possession and title disputes.
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1999 (5) TMI 620
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction for assessment year 1988-89
2. Jurisdiction for assessment year 1989-90
3. Merits of additions for both assessment years
4. Charging of interest under section 215/234B
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction for assessment year 1988-89:
The original assessment for 1988-89 was framed before the search operation, and no disclosure of renovation expenditure was made in the return. The Assessing Officer found evidence of unaccounted renovation expenses during the search. It was deemed that income had escaped assessment, justifying the reopening.
2. Jurisdiction for assessment year 1989-90:
The original assessment for 1989-90 was completed after the search operation. Subsequently, it was discovered that unaccounted marriage expenses related to this year were not disclosed. The undisclosed expenses warranted the reopening of the assessment for 1989-90.
3. Merits of additions for both assessment years:
The undisclosed income of Rs. 21,30,000 was disclosed during the search. The entire amount was considered for the assessment year 1990-91. The department could not tax the same income in previous years after taxing it in 1990-91. The additions for renovation expenses and marriage expenses were already included in the disclosed amount for 1990-91, hence not justifiable for the earlier years.
4. Charging of interest under section 215/234B:
Interest under section 215/234B was deemed not chargeable during reassessment, following the Supreme Court decision in Modi Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1995] 216 ITR 759/82 Taxman 377.
In conclusion, the appeals were partly allowed, considering the jurisdictional aspects, merits of additions, and the charging of interest under the mentioned sections. The judgment clarified the treatment of undisclosed income and expenses across different assessment years, ensuring fairness and adherence to legal provisions.
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