Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1961 1961 (8) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 61 to 64 of 64 Records

• 1961 (8) TMI 4
  

  Whether bamboo, thatch, fuel, etc., grown by the assessee company and utilised for its own benefits in its tea business, agricultural income within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act ?

  Whether such income be computed under rule 4 of the rules framed under the Act ?

  Held that:- The words in section 2(1)(b)(i) are, in our opinion, wide, plain and unambiguous and they cannot be construed to exclude agricultural produce used by the appellant for its business. In this connection we may incidentally refer to the provisions of sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 7(1) of the Act which provide for the computation of tax and allowances under the head " agricultural income from agriculture. " These three sub-clauses in terms correspond to the three sub-clauses of section 2(1)(b) and lend some support to the conclusion that clause (i) in section 2(1)(b) does not require that the agricultural produce should be sold and profit or gain received from such sale before it is included in the said clause. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Mitra is justified in contending that the answer made by the High Court in the affirmative and against the appellant in reference to question No. 1 is wrong.

  Rrule 4(2) deals with cases where agricultural produce has been sold outside the market as well as cases where agricultural produce has not been sold at all. The effect of reading the two sub-rules together is that the cases of market sales are covered by rule 4(1) and all other cases are covered by rule 4(2). Rule 4(2) is a residuary rule which applies to all cases not falling under rule 4(1). Therefore, we must hold that the answer given by the High Court to question No. 2 in the affirmative and against the appellant is also right. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1961 (8) TMI 3
  

  Whether the assessee is entitled to earned income relief on the share income of the two minor sons for 1949-50 assessment year and on the share income of one minor son for 1950-51 assessment year included in the computation of the total income of the assessee under the provisions of section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act ?

  Held that:- The section can only be read as enacting that for purposes of earned income relief, " such income " will be included which, though it is the income of another person, has been earned by the assessee, or, in the case of a firm, where the assessee is a partner, by his being actively engaged as partner in the conduct of the business. The words " where the assessee is a partner " must be given effect to, ever when the income of the minor or the wife is considered under the latter part, and they also point to the same conclusion. In reading the definition in this way, no violence is done to the language of it. The condition that the assessee must have worked actively as a partner is thus applicable also to the latter part of the definition. In our opinion, the High Court was right in the answer which it gave. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1961 (8) TMI 2
  
  Issues:
  - Burden of proof in confiscation of goods under the Sea Customs Act
  - Evidence required to establish contravention of import restrictions
  - Applicability of legal principles in customs proceedings
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The petitioner, a businessman, challenged the confiscation of certain goods seized from his shop under the Sea Customs Act. The Deputy Superintendent conducted a search in the absence of the petitioner, leading to the seizure of various items. The petitioner contended that the burden of proof was wrongly placed on him by the department, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to establish the contravention of import restrictions. The authorities rejected the petitioner's claim of purchasing the goods legitimately, assuming illicit importation due to lack of evidence supporting lawful acquisition.
  
  2. Specifically, regarding the 7 O'clock blades, the department alleged that they were manufactured post the imposition of restrictions, yet failed to provide conclusive evidence supporting this claim. The absence of such evidence raised doubts about the department's ability to prove the goods were imported against the imposed restrictions. The petitioner argued that the department's conclusions lacked substantial evidence to link the seized goods to contravention of import regulations.
  
  3. The Sea Customs Act empowers authorities to confiscate goods imported in violation of restrictions, with penalties imposed accordingly. The petitioner highlighted that the burden of proof rested on the department to establish the illicit importation of goods under the relevant Acts. The appellate authority's summary disposal of the case raised concerns about the lack of detailed examination of each item seized, indicating a procedural lapse in assessing the legality of the goods' importation.
  
  4. Citing the case of "Amba Lal v. Union of India," the court emphasized the importance of the burden of proof in customs proceedings. The court stressed the application of fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and natural justice in such cases, indicating that the burden lies on customs authorities to prove guilt satisfactorily. The court further discussed the inapplicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to customs proceedings, reiterating the prosecution's responsibility to establish charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
  
  5. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, quashing the confiscation order and directing the release of the seized properties. The court found that the department failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish the illicit importation of goods, leading to the decision to refund any penalties paid by the petitioner. The judgment highlighted the significance of upholding legal principles and ensuring due process in customs proceedings to safeguard the rights of individuals involved.

  ---

• 1961 (8) TMI 1
  
  Issues:
  Challenge to validity of order confiscating gold under Sea Customs Act, Land Customs Act, and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Denial of opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. Violation of principles of natural justice.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The judgment deals with a petition challenging the validity of an order confiscating gold under various Acts. The order imposed a personal penalty and confiscated the gold based on statements of witnesses, without allowing cross-examination of certain witnesses. The petition challenged the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses, alleging a violation of principles of natural justice.
  
  2. The primary ground of challenge was the denial of the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were relied upon by the 1st Respondent in passing the order. The Respondent contended that customs inquiries did not require cross-examination and that the Enquiry Officer had discretion in allowing it. However, a Division Bench decision held that failure to provide the right to cross-examination in customs inquiries violated natural justice principles.
  
  3. The judgment noted that the Respondent's reliance on witness statements without allowing cross-examination was a violation of natural justice. Following the Division Bench decision, the court concluded that the impugned order must be set aside due to the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses, as it violated principles of natural justice.
  
  4. The court did not delve into other grounds raised in the petition, as the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses was sufficient to set aside the impugned order. Consequently, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, setting aside the order and making the rule absolute in their favor.
  
  5. The judgment directed the 1st respondent to conduct fresh inquiries within a specified time frame. If fresh proceedings were not initiated within the stipulated period, a writ of mandamus would be issued to restore possession of the confiscated gold to the petitioners. The respondents were also ordered to bear the costs of the petitioners.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment highlighted the importance of the right to cross-examine witnesses in quasi-judicial inquiries, emphasizing the principles of natural justice and setting aside the impugned order due to the denial of this right.

  ---

1234