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1995 (12) TMI 439
Issues: - Appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the setting aside of election due to corrupt practices. - Allegation of corrupt practices under Sections 123(3) and 123(3A) of the Act based on speeches made by political leaders. - Failure to comply with Section 99 of the Act in naming individuals responsible for corrupt practices. - Interpretation of consent in relation to speeches made by leaders of political parties. - Decision on the effect of defects in the judgment and whether a remand is necessary.
Analysis: The judgment involves an appeal against the setting aside of an election due to alleged corrupt practices under Sections 123(3) and 123(3A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant, a candidate of a political party, was accused of appealing to voters on the grounds of Hindu religion through speeches made by leaders of the party. The High Court initially set aside the election based on speeches made by leaders of the alliance supporting the appellant, without giving notice under Section 99 of the Act to the leaders responsible for the speeches. The Court emphasized the importance of complying with Section 99 before naming individuals responsible for corrupt practices.
The judgment highlighted the necessity of proving consent in cases where corrupt practices are attributed to individuals other than the candidate or their agent. It was emphasized that consent must be explicitly pleaded and proved, even in the case of leaders of political parties, to declare an election void under Section 100(1)(b) for corrupt practices committed by such leaders. The Court noted that consent could be implied from circumstances such as the candidate's conduct, but it should not be presumed solely based on the position of being a party leader.
Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment and dismissing the election petition. It was concluded that a remand was unnecessary in this case, as the allegations against the appellant were not substantiated, and the defects in the judgment regarding compliance with Section 99 were deemed significant. The appellant was awarded costs throughout from the respondent.
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1995 (12) TMI 438
Issues: 1. Allegations of contravention of section 9(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 in Appeal No. 273/95. 2. Allegations of contravention of section 9(1)(a) in Appeal No. 285/95 and Appeal No. 286/95. 3. Plea for dispensation from the requirement of pre-deposit based on a prima facie case in favor of the appellants.
Analysis:
Issue 1: In Appeal No. 273/95, the appellant was penalized for contravention of section 9(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The allegations involved payments made by an Indian resident in U.S.S.R. to the minor son of the appellant, followed by a payment by the appellant to a non-resident Indian. The appellant contested the charges, arguing that the evidence presented did not specifically link the payments to them and that the gifts were made under the provisions of a scheme framed by the RBI. The Tribunal found that the appellants were denied the opportunity to cross-examine a key witness and ordered a fresh adjudication, setting aside the impugned order.
Issue 2: In Appeal No. 285/95 and Appeal No. 286/95, similar allegations of contravention of section 9(1)(a) were made against the appellant regarding payments received from another individual. The appellant argued that the evidence did not conclusively prove the alleged payments and raised concerns about the lack of opportunity for cross-examination. The Tribunal noted that the department had relied on a retracted statement without corroboration and ordered a re-adjudication, emphasizing the need for the appellants to have a fair opportunity to defend themselves.
Issue 3: The appellants sought dispensation from the pre-deposit requirement based on a prima facie case in their favor. The Tribunal agreed that there was merit in their plea and granted dispensation, directing a fresh adjudication of all three appeals. It emphasized the importance of considering all evidence, providing copies to the appellants, and allowing them to raise relevant pleas regarding applicable laws and schemes. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings.
In conclusion, the Tribunal found in favor of the appellants, ordering a re-adjudication of the cases to ensure a fair and thorough examination of the evidence and the opportunity for the appellants to present their defense effectively.
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1995 (12) TMI 437
The appeal was against a penalty imposed for contravention of section 9(1)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The Adjudication Order was set aside as the charge was not sustainable in law. The penalty of Rs. 75,000 was ordered to be refunded if already deposited by the appellant.
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1995 (12) TMI 436
Issues: 1. Penalty imposed for contravention of sections 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. Requirement of pre-deposit of penalty amount. 3. Discrepancies in the amounts and dates mentioned in the show cause notices (SCNs). 4. Interpretation of section 9(1)(b) regarding receipt of payments by a person resident outside India. 5. Knowledge requirement for contravention of section 9(1)(b). 6. Evidence of corresponding remittance for payments received. 7. Allegation of payment made by one party on behalf of another. 8. Misconception in applying provisions of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. Contravention of section 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) on the first appellant. 10. Misconceived charge of contravention of section 9(1)(b) against the second appellant.
Analysis: The judgment pertains to an appeal against an Adjudication Order imposing penalties for contravention of sections 9(1)(b) and 9(1)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellants argued against the requirement of pre-deposit, claiming full disclosure of transaction details and lack of contravention. The Chairman decided to waive the pre-deposit, citing undue hardship. The discrepancies in amounts and dates in the SCNs were noted, with the Chairman deeming the duration discrepancy irrelevant. The interpretation of section 9(1)(b) was extensively analyzed, emphasizing the knowledge requirement for contravention and the significance of corresponding inward remittances.
The judgment delved into the appellant's knowledge regarding payments received and the evidence of corresponding remittances. It highlighted that the appellant's meticulous record-keeping and the circumstances indicated legal receipt of funds. The Chairman concluded that the contravention of section 9(1)(b) was not established, especially in the absence of evidence from the party alleged to have made the payments. Regarding the allegation of payment made on behalf of another party, it was reasoned that the payments were covered by general permission, thus not constituting a contravention of section 9(1)(d).
Furthermore, the judgment addressed the misconceived application of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and ultimately set aside the impugned order against both appellants. The refund of deposited penalty amounts was ordered within a specified timeframe. The detailed analysis provided clarity on the legal interpretation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the specific circumstances of the case, leading to the favorable outcome for the appellants.
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1995 (12) TMI 435
Issues: Alleged contravention of sections 9(1)(b), 9(1)(d), and 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973; Confiscation of seized amount of Rs. 3,50,000.
Analysis:
1. The appeal challenged the Adjudication Order holding the appellant guilty of contravening specific sections of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, with penalties totaling Rs. 32,000 and confiscation of Rs. 3,50,000. The dispensation application for pre-deposit was waived, and the appeal proceeded on merits, culminating in this final order.
2. The appellant's counsel argued against the evidence presented, emphasizing the lack of substantial proof beyond the appellant's statement under section 40 of the Act. The timing and circumstances of the appellant's statement raised doubts about its reliability, especially concerning the alleged receipt and utilization of the seized amount of Rs. 3,50,000.
3. The respondent reiterated the Adjudicating Officer's reasoning, emphasizing corroborative evidence supporting the findings. However, upon review, the Chairman found merit in the appellant's submissions regarding the lack of substantial evidence to uphold the charge of contravention of section 9(1)(b) and subsequent confiscation of the amount.
4. Regarding the contravention of section 9(1)(d), the Chairman analyzed the evidence related to the chits seized from the appellant's premises. While discrepancies existed, the lack of a convincing explanation from the appellant regarding the presence of certain documents led to upholding the charge for a specific amount but dismissing others due to insufficient evidence.
5. Concerning the seized foreign currency, the appellant failed to provide satisfactory evidence to justify its lawful possession, leading to the Chairman's decision not to interfere with the finding of contravention of section 8(1) and the subsequent penalties and confiscation.
6. The final decision partially allowed the appeal, setting aside certain findings and penalties while upholding others. The contravention of section 9(1)(b) and the associated penalty were overturned, along with the confiscation of the Rs. 3,50,000. However, the contravention of section 9(1)(d) was upheld for a specific amount, and the penalty for section 8(1) was sustained. The appellant was directed to pay the sustained penalty from the confiscated amount, with the balance to be refunded within a specified timeframe.
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1995 (12) TMI 434
Issues: Violation of section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, imposition of penalties, confiscation of foreign exchange, dispensing with pre-deposit requirement, sufficiency of evidence, validity of confiscation order, applicability of seized documents as evidence, reduction of penalty amount.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant challenged an adjudication order imposing penalties for contravention of section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The penalties were imposed for unauthorized foreign currency transactions and contraventions. The appellant sought dispensation with the pre-deposit requirement, which was granted based on financial evidence provided.
2. The appellant contested the order on various grounds, but the Chairman found that even if some grounds had merit, the findings in the impugned order were supported by evidence and did not warrant a fresh adjudication. The appellant's counsel agreed to proceed with the case without remand to avoid undue harassment.
3. The appellant did not dispute the recovery of foreign exchange by customs officials, which was later confiscated under section 63 of the Act. The appellant failed to prove lawful acquisition and possession of the foreign exchange, leading to a contravention of section 8(1) based on the evidence presented.
4. Regarding a separate charge, the appellant's counsel argued that the findings were based on a retracted statement and insufficient evidence. However, the Chairman held that the evidence, including incriminating documents seized by customs authorities, supported the charge of contravention of section 8(1) related to unauthorized foreign exchange transactions.
5. The Chairman dismissed the charge under section 8(2) due to lack of conclusive evidence but upheld the contravention of section 8(1) based on the material on record. The penalty imposed was reduced from Rs. 70,000 to Rs. 50,000 considering the circumstances and lack of appeal for penalty enhancement by the department.
6. The final decision partially allowed the appeal, upholding penalties and confiscation for contravention of section 8(1) under one charge while reducing the penalty amount for another charge. The appellant was directed to pay the revised penalty amount within 30 days, failing which the respondent could recover the sum as per the law.
This judgment by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board addressed multiple issues related to unauthorized foreign exchange transactions, sufficiency of evidence, penalty imposition, and confiscation under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The Chairman's detailed analysis considered the arguments presented, the evidence on record, and legal provisions to arrive at a final decision partially in favor of the appellant.
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1995 (12) TMI 433
Issues: 1. Imposition of penalties for contravention of sections 8(1), 8(2), 9(1)(a), and 9(1)(c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. Allegations based on retracted confessional statements. 3. Lack of investigation by enforcement authorities. 4. Appellant's plea for dispensation of penalty deposit. 5. Consideration of evidence and findings by the adjudicating authority. 6. Prima facie case of hardship and waiver of pre-deposit requirement. 7. Need for re-adjudication with the supply of evidence to the appellant. 8. Evaluation of charges independently and determination of penalty quantum. 9. Remand for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
Analysis: 1. The judgment involves an appeal against penalties imposed for contravention of sections 8(1), 8(2), 9(1)(a), and 9(1)(c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant had not deposited the penalty amount and sought dispensation. The allegations were primarily based on retracted confessional statements, raising concerns about the lack of investigation by enforcement authorities.
2. The appellant's representative argued that the enforcement authorities did not conduct a proper investigation, and the findings were solely based on retracted statements. It was contended that the appellant was not provided with all the evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The appellant denied the acquisition of foreign exchange as alleged, challenging the basis of the contravention of sections 8(1) and 8(2).
3. The respondent, however, highlighted that substantial evidence beyond the confessional statements was considered by the adjudicating authority. The respondent emphasized the appellant's serious violations and contraventions of customs and other laws. The issue of evidence disclosure to the appellant was raised, indicating that the appellant had access to the evidence through customs authorities.
4. The Chairman acknowledged the need for the appellant to have an opportunity to address the evidence considered in the impugned order. A prima facie case of hardship was recognized, leading to the waiver of the pre-deposit requirement. The decision was made to re-adjudicate the case after providing the appellant with the evidence discussed in the order.
5. The Chairman directed a fresh adjudication with a specific focus on evaluating the charges independently of the confessional statements. The adjudicating officer was instructed to consider all relevant evidence, allowing the appellant to defend against the charges. The determination of penalty quantum was left to the discretion of the adjudicating authority based on the degree of culpability and other circumstances.
6. Regarding the contravention of section 9(1)(c), it was noted that mere admissions before customs authorities might not suffice. The adjudicating officer was tasked with reevaluating this charge based on other evidence on record. Ultimately, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded for fresh adjudication in compliance with the law, with a specified appearance date for the appellant.
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1995 (12) TMI 432
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the appellant's statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act. 2. Charges under Section 9(1)(b) and Section 9(1)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 3. Quantum of penalty imposed on the appellant.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the appellant's statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act:
The appellant challenged the impugned order on the grounds that the enforcement authorities did not investigate the case and that the order was based solely on an involuntary confessional statement made before the customs authorities under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The appellant argued that the statement was made while he was in custody and under duress, as evidenced by a medical report and a complaint made to the Magistrate. The adjudicating authority was criticized for ignoring these facts, which suggested the statement was involuntary. The judgment emphasized that the appellant's statement under Section 108 could not form the basis of any finding of contravention as it was not voluntary and lacked corroboration by other evidence.
2. Charges under Section 9(1)(b) and Section 9(1)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:
Regarding Section 9(1)(d), the judgment found no evidence to sustain the finding of contravention except the appellant's involuntary statement, which was deemed inadmissible. Therefore, the charge under Section 9(1)(d) was not upheld.
For Section 9(1)(b), the judgment noted the recovery of Rs. 4 lakhs from the appellant's premises. The appellant did not deny that the amount was received on instructions from Abdul Majeed of Karachi. Hence, the finding of contravention of Section 9(1)(b) to the extent of Rs. 4 lakhs was sustained. The adjudicating officer was advised to have sought further explanation from the appellant regarding the seized amount independently of the involuntary statement.
3. Quantum of penalty imposed on the appellant:
The appellant's counsel argued for a reduction in the penalty, citing that the appellant was merely a conduit and not the main operator, had no means to pay the penalty, and that the confiscation of Rs. 4 lakhs already penalized him. The judgment acknowledged these points and found merit in reducing the penalty. It was decided that reducing the penalty from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 10,000, which the appellant had already paid as a pre-deposit, would meet the ends of justice. The appeal was partly allowed, and the pre-deposit was treated as the full payment of the penalty.
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1995 (12) TMI 431
Issues: - Penalty imposed for contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - Failure to realize proceeds of exports - Allegations against the appellant - Misconception of facts by the adjudicating authority - Lack of evidence refutation by the Senior Manager of the bank
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an appeal against a penalty imposed on the appellant for contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, regarding the failure to realize the proceeds of exports. The appellant, a proprietor of a business, exported goods to West Germany but faced challenges with the delivery of export bills to the correct party, resulting in the foreign buyer refusing to accept the goods. The appellant made efforts to redirect the bills to alternate buyers but faced delays due to the bank's actions. The appellant's complaint against the bank under the Consumer Protection Act further supported these facts.
The appellate tribunal found that the charge of contravention against the appellant was not sustainable in law or on facts. The delivery of goods to the foreign buyer had been frustrated due to the bank's errors and negligence, absolving the appellant of blame for non-realization of export proceeds. The tribunal highlighted that the appellant had not made exports against an advance payment and that evidence regarding the auction of goods should have been with the appellant's bank. The adjudicating authority's adverse inferences were deemed unjustified, especially regarding the appellant's efforts and the evidence possessed by the bank.
The tribunal criticized the adjudicating authority for misconceiving facts and ignoring crucial evidence, such as the documentary proof in the bank's possession. The authority's findings regarding the appellant's alleged lack of efforts for repatriation of export proceeds were deemed unfounded, given the circumstances of the failed delivery to the foreign buyer. Ultimately, the tribunal set aside the impugned order, citing the lack of cogency in the findings and the failure to consider the evidence on record.
In conclusion, the appellate tribunal allowed the appeal, overturning the penalty imposed on the appellant for the alleged contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The judgment emphasized the importance of considering all relevant facts and evidence in such cases to ensure a fair and just outcome.
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1995 (12) TMI 430
Issues: Appeal against penalty imposed for contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 by acquiring foreign exchange without permission.
Analysis: 1. Adjudication Order and Allegations: The appeal was filed against an Adjudication Order imposing a penalty for contravention of section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant, a resident in India, was accused of acquiring foreign exchange without the required permission. The order also included confiscation of the foreign currency. The penalty had already been deposited, leading to the disposal of the appeal on merits.
2. Contentions of the Appellant: The appellant's counsel argued that the order was untenable and contrary to the evidence presented in the show-cause notice (SCN) and on record. The evidence included a letter from income-tax authorities confirming a search at the appellant's premises and the recovery of foreign currency. The appellant's statement under section 40 of the Act and subsequent letters indicated that the foreign currency was given by his non-resident son to the daughter-in-law for her expenses. The appellant's retired status and the funds held by his son in an NRE account were also highlighted as reasons why he had no motive to acquire foreign exchange.
3. Defense and Counterarguments: The appellant's counsel further contended that the sole reason for finding the appellant guilty was inadequate, as the daughter-in-law had previously stored foreign exchange in a locker during the same visit. It was argued that this fact, along with evidence of the currency belonging to the son, should have absolved the appellant of the contravention.
4. Respondent's Justification: The respondent attempted to justify the order, aligning with the Assistant Director's reasoning, which was deemed to lack merit. The plea to retain the confiscation order was also made, despite the penalty being set aside.
5. Judgment and Findings: The Chairman found the contravention of section 8(1) baseless, agreeing with the appellant's arguments. The plea to uphold the confiscation order was rejected, emphasizing that the seized currency belonged to the daughter-in-law, a non-resident entitled to spend or take back the funds. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order and confiscation were set aside, and the penalty amount and foreign currency were ordered to be returned to the appellant within 45 days.
This detailed analysis highlights the legal arguments, evidence, and reasoning considered in the judgment, leading to the decision to overturn the penalty and confiscation orders based on the lack of merit in the allegations and the rightful ownership of the foreign currency.
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1995 (12) TMI 429
Issues: - Imposition of penalties for non-realization of export proceeds under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. - Dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit. - Allegations of factual inaccuracies and unfair trial leading to penalties. - Misconceptions by the Adjudicating Officer regarding evidence and agreements. - Appellants' efforts to realize outstanding export proceeds and legal actions taken. - Justification for setting aside the penalties imposed.
Analysis:
1. The judgment deals with an appeal against the imposition of penalties amounting to Rs. 2,50,000 each on the appellant for non-realization of export proceeds, contravening provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The penalties were imposed under sections 18(2), 18(3), and 68(1) of the Act.
2. The appellants sought dispensation from pre-deposit, arguing that they had initiated legal action and obtained a decree in their favor against the alleged outstanding amount. The Chairman waived the pre-deposit requirement, considering it would cause undue hardship to the appellants, and proceeded to hear the case on merits.
3. The appellant's counsel contended that the Adjudicating Officer's findings were based on wrong facts and omitted relevant evidence, resulting in a flawed adjudication order. The Chairman found merit in the submissions, noting factual inaccuracies in the order that led to a miscarriage of justice.
4. The Chairman highlighted discrepancies in the Adjudicating Officer's findings, such as misinterpretation of statements and misconceptions regarding agreements and actions taken by the appellants. The appellants' efforts to realize export proceeds, including legal actions against the foreign buyer, were deemed appropriate and diligent.
5. It was established that the appellants had taken prudent steps, including legal proceedings, to recover the outstanding export proceeds. The successful outcome of obtaining a decree against the foreign buyer was considered as strong evidence of the appellants' efforts in realizing the dues.
6. Consequently, the Chairman concluded that the appellants had taken sufficient measures to recover the export proceeds, and the finding of contravention under section 18(2) could not be upheld. As a result, both appeals were allowed, and the impugned order imposing penalties was set aside against the appellants.
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1995 (12) TMI 428
Issues Involved: 1. Contravention of Section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. Validity of the seizure of foreign and Indian currency. 3. Allegation of framing and false implication. 4. Violation of principles of natural justice. 5. Voluntariness and truthfulness of the appellant's statement. 6. Request for the return of seized articles.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Contravention of Section 8(1) and 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973: The appellant was penalized for contravening sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Act, which pertain to unauthorized dealings in foreign exchange. The department alleged that the appellant was involved in transactions of foreign exchange without authorization. However, the Board found that the evidence presented, including the appellant's statement and the panchnama, was insufficient to substantiate the allegations. The Board concluded that the charge of contravention could not be sustained due to lack of credible evidence.
2. Validity of the Seizure of Foreign and Indian Currency: The department claimed to have seized US $47,500 and Rs. 4,104 from the appellant. However, the Board noted discrepancies and contradictions in the panchnama and police reports. The panchnama, witnessed by Mehedi Hussain and Syed Sarvath Hussain, was found to be unreliable as it contained implausible details and was not prepared by authorized personnel. The testimonies of the panch witnesses during cross-examination further discredited the department's case. Consequently, the Board concluded that the alleged seizure could not be substantiated.
3. Allegation of Framing and False Implication: The appellant contended that he was falsely implicated and framed by the department. The Board found merit in this argument, noting that the search warrants were issued before the appellant allegedly provided information, indicating a premeditated action by the department. The Board also observed that the panchnama and other documents appeared fabricated. Thus, the Board accepted the appellant's contention of false implication.
4. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: The appellant argued that the adjudicating officer did not disclose all relevant documents and did not summon Dr. Meher Prasad, who examined the appellant for physical injuries. The Board agreed that the non-disclosure of documents and the refusal to summon the doctor constituted a violation of natural justice. However, it concluded that this did not result in a material miscarriage of justice as the primary evidence itself was unreliable.
5. Voluntariness and Truthfulness of the Appellant's Statement: The appellant retracted his statement, alleging it was obtained under duress. The Board found that the circumstances under which the statement was recorded, including allegations of physical abuse and lack of summons under section 40, indicated that the statement was not voluntary. Moreover, the Board found the statement lacked credibility and could not be used as evidence.
6. Request for the Return of Seized Articles: The appellant consistently denied ownership of the seized foreign and Indian currency. The Board noted that possession of foreign exchange is prohibited unless lawfully acquired. Since the appellant did not prove lawful acquisition or ownership, the Board rejected the request for the return of the seized articles. The Board also noted that the appellant's plea for return contradicted his defense that the articles were not seized from him.
Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of contravention of sections 8(1) and 8(2) and the penalty imposed were set aside. However, the order of confiscation was upheld as the true owner of the foreign currency did not come forward to claim it lawfully. The Board concluded that the appellant's plea for the return of seized articles was misconceived.
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1995 (12) TMI 427
Issues: 1. Imposition of penalties under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. Joint appeal filed by two appellants. 3. Delay in finalizing the appeal due to a connected case. 4. Allegations of abetment and contravention under different sections. 5. Submissions made by both parties during the hearing. 6. Evaluation of findings and submissions by the Adjudicating Officer. 7. Analysis of factual details and remittances received by the appellant. 8. Decision on contravention charges and penalties imposed.
The judgment involves an appeal against penalties imposed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appeal was filed jointly by two appellants, with a delay in finalizing it due to a connected case involving another individual. The allegations included abetment and contravention under different sections of the Act. The appellant's submissions during the hearing reiterated the contentions in the memoranda of appeal. The Adjudicating Officer's findings were considered, with arguments presented by both parties.
Regarding the charge of abetment, it was found that the appellant's role in a transaction did not amount to abetment of contravention by another individual. The investigation failed to establish the appellant's guilt in the alleged contravention. The charge under a different section lacked proper investigation and evidence to sustain the finding of contravention against the appellant. The judgment concluded that the second appellant could not be held guilty, leading to the setting aside of the impugned order against both appellants.
In summary, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The respondents were directed to refund the pre-deposit amounts to both appellants within a specified timeframe. The judgment thoroughly analyzed the charges, submissions, and findings to reach a decision on the contravention charges and penalties imposed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
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1995 (12) TMI 426
Issues: 1. Imposition of penalty for non-realization of export proceeds under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. 2. Consideration of appellant's efforts to realize outstanding export proceeds. 3. Assessment of the proportionality of the penalty imposed. 4. Determination of the appropriate quantum of penalty.
Detailed Analysis: 1. The appeal was filed against the imposition of a penalty of Rs. 2.5 lakhs on the appellant for non-realization of export proceeds, contravening section 18(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The appellant complied with the Board's order by depositing the penalty amount, leading to the disposal of the appeal on merits.
2. The appellant argued that despite efforts to recover the outstanding amount from a financially troubled foreign buyer, the export proceeds were not received. The appellant sought extensions and even refunded cash assistance, demonstrating bona fide intentions. However, the respondent contended that the appellant should have taken more proactive steps, such as re-importing goods or finding an alternate buyer, to realize the outstanding amount.
3. The respondent argued that the quantum of penalty was proportionate to the appellant's non-realization of export proceeds. The appellant, on the other hand, claimed that the penalty was excessive compared to the outstanding amount and that the non-realization was not intentional but due to circumstances beyond their control.
4. The Chairman found merit in the respondent's submissions, emphasizing that the appellant should have taken more decisive actions to recover the export proceeds. Despite the appellant's efforts, the Chairman concluded that the steps taken were not effective in realizing the outstanding amount. However, considering the appellant's financial losses and export performance, the Chairman reduced the penalty to Rs. 50,000, deeming it sufficient for the case.
5. Ultimately, the Chairman directed the retention of Rs. 50,000 as the penalty amount, refunding the balance to the appellant within 45 days. The decision balanced the appellant's efforts and circumstances with the need for accountability under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
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1995 (12) TMI 425
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 1995 (12) TMI 425. Judges were Mr. J.S. Verma and Mr. K. Venkataswami.
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1995 (12) TMI 424
Issues: - Validity of agreement for sale of immovable property - Application of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act - Consideration of evidence and circumstances in determining genuineness of transaction - Use of agreement as a shield or sword in legal proceedings
Detailed Analysis:
Validity of Agreement for Sale of Immovable Property: The case involved a dispute over an agreement for the sale of land, where the petitioner claimed ownership rights based on the agreement executed with the wife of the judgment debtor. The petitioner contended that the agreement was genuine and valid, enabling him to retain possession of the land and resist the attachment and sale by the respondents. However, the respondents argued that the agreement was collusive and fraudulent, aimed at defeating their rights to recover the dues owed to them. The trial court initially decreed in favor of the petitioner, but the Division Bench of the High Court overturned this decision, dismissing the suit.
Application of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act: The petitioner relied on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides protection to transferees in possession of property under an unregistered contract for sale. The petitioner claimed that he had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement and was entitled to retain possession of the land. However, the High Court held that the petitioner did not qualify as a genuine transferee under the provisions of Section 53-A due to the fraudulent nature of the agreement and lack of consideration. The court emphasized that Section 53-A operates as a shield, not a sword, and cannot be used to establish ownership rights independently.
Consideration of Evidence and Circumstances: The High Court extensively analyzed the evidence and circumstances surrounding the agreement, highlighting discrepancies and fraudulent intent on the part of the petitioner. It was established that the petitioner did not have the claimed consideration for the agreement, and the transaction was orchestrated to protect the interests of the judgment debtor's family. The court found that the petitioner's possession was a facade to shield the property from legitimate recovery efforts by the respondents. The court scrutinized the conduct of the parties and concluded that the petitioner was complicit in fabricating documents to support his claim.
Use of Agreement as a Shield or Sword in Legal Proceedings: The High Court emphasized that the petitioner's attempt to use the agreement as a sword to defeat the respondents' rights was impermissible. Despite the existence of a written agreement, the court determined that the petitioner's conduct was fraudulent and did not entitle him to the benefits of Section 53-A for a declaration of ownership. The court highlighted that the petitioner's actions amounted to an abuse of legal processes and denied him relief under the statutory provisions.
In conclusion, the High Court's decision to dismiss the petitioner's suit was based on a thorough examination of the facts, evidentiary considerations, and legal principles governing agreements for the sale of immovable property. The judgment underscored the importance of upholding the integrity of legal proceedings and preventing the misuse of statutory provisions for unjust enrichment.
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1995 (12) TMI 423
Issues Involved: 1. Allegation of discriminatory conduct by Defendant No. 1. 2. Allegation of fraudulent conduct by Defendant No. 1. 3. Request for an ad interim injunction to restrain encashment of the performance bank guarantee. 4. Application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegation of Discriminatory Conduct by Defendant No. 1: The plaintiff alleged that Defendant No. 1 had discriminated against it by granting extensions of time to other contractors until June 15, 1995, while refusing to grant a similar extension to the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiff's initial contract was to supply 25,000 metric tonnes of urea by March 31, 1995. The plaintiff had sought and was granted two extensions, first until April 30, 1995, and then until May 31, 1995. The court found no evidence of discrimination, stating that it was unclear when other contractors were initially supposed to fulfill their contracts and whether the extensions granted to them were the first or second extensions. The court concluded that the plaintiff's need for an extension until the end of July 1995 did not demonstrate discriminatory conduct by Defendant No. 1.
2. Allegation of Fraudulent Conduct by Defendant No. 1: The plaintiff claimed that Defendant No. 1's actions in accepting tenders at higher rates from other contractors led to an increase in international urea prices, which in turn caused the plaintiff's supplier to refuse to supply urea at the agreed rate. The court found that the plaintiff's claim lacked evidence and that the increase in international prices could not be attributed to any fraudulent conduct by Defendant No. 1. The court also noted that the plaintiff did not have a concluded transaction with its supplier, McDaniel Co., at the time of entering the contract with Defendant No. 1. The court held that the failure of the plaintiff to secure urea at the expected rate was not due to any fraudulent activity by Defendant No. 1.
3. Request for an Ad Interim Injunction to Restrain Encashment of the Performance Bank Guarantee: The plaintiff sought an ad interim injunction to prevent Defendant No. 1 from encashing the performance bank guarantee. The court referred to established principles laid down by the apex court, emphasizing that bank guarantees must be honored free from interference by courts unless there is a prima facie case of fraud or irretrievable injustice. The court found no evidence of fraud or irretrievable injustice in the plaintiff's case. The terms of the bank guarantee allowed Defendant No. 1 to encash it if the plaintiff failed to perform its contractual obligations. Given the plaintiff's own admission of its inability to supply the urea by May 31, 1995, the court held that Defendant No. 1 was justified in mobilizing the bank guarantee.
4. Application for Appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act: The plaintiff filed a suit under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of an arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties. However, the court's primary focus in the judgment was on the request for an ad interim injunction and the allegations of discrimination and fraud. The court did not provide a detailed analysis of the application for the appointment of an arbitrator in the judgment.
Conclusion: The court dismissed the plaintiff's application (I.A. No. 7356 of 1995) for an ad interim injunction, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud or irretrievable injustice. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims of discriminatory and fraudulent conduct by Defendant No. 1. The interim injunction passed on July 17, 1995, was vacated, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 2,000.
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1995 (12) TMI 422
Issues Involved: 1. Constitutional validity of Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 2. Interpretation of the terms "Hindutva" and "Hinduism." 3. Compliance with Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 4. Whether the speeches made by Bal Thackeray constituted corrupt practices under Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Act.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutional Validity of Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951: The appellants contended that Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 are constitutionally invalid as they violate the guarantee of free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was argued that these provisions should be read as reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order to get the protection of Article 19(2). The Court rejected this argument, stating that the restriction imposed by these provisions is limited to the election period and does not affect the general freedom of speech and expression. The Court held that these provisions are constitutionally valid as they impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of decency and morality, which are permissible under Article 19(2).
2. Interpretation of the Terms "Hindutva" and "Hinduism": The Court clarified that the terms "Hindutva" and "Hinduism" are not to be narrowly construed as religious terms alone. They are indicative of the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian culture or ethos. The Court emphasized that mere reference to these terms in an election speech does not automatically bring it within the net of Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 unless the speech can be construed as an appeal to vote for a candidate on the ground of his religion or to refrain from voting for a candidate on the ground of his religion.
3. Compliance with Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951: The appellants argued that the notice given to Bal Thackeray under Section 99 was not in conformity with the provision and that there was non-compliance with the requirements of Section 99. The Court found that the notice was given after the entire evidence had been recorded, and the noticee was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, call evidence in his defense, and be heard. The Court held that there was no non-compliance with Section 99 as the noticee had the same opportunity as a party to the petition to defend himself against the charge of corrupt practice.
4. Whether the Speeches Made by Bal Thackeray Constituted Corrupt Practices Under Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Act: The Court examined the contents of the three speeches made by Bal Thackeray on 29-11-1987, 9-12-1987, and 10-12-1987. The Court found that the speeches made clear appeals to the Hindu voters to vote for Dr. Ramesh Prabhoo because he is a Hindu, and derogatory references were made to Muslims. The Court held that these speeches amounted to corrupt practices under Sub-section (3) of Section 123, and the first speech also constituted a corrupt practice under Sub-section (3A) of Section 123. The Court concluded that Dr. Ramesh Prabhoo and Bal Thackeray were guilty of these corrupt practices, and the election of Dr. Ramesh Prabhoo was declared void.
Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, and the Court emphasized the need for political leaders to maintain decency and propriety in their election campaigns to preserve the secular polity and cultural heritage of India. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the Court.
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1995 (12) TMI 421
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the notification u/s 4(1) and exercise of power u/s 17(1) read with Section 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry u/s 5-A. 2. Urgency and necessity to dispense with the inquiry u/s 5-A. 3. Alleged violation of Article 21 of the Constitution due to deprivation of livelihood.
Summary:
Validity of the Notification u/s 4(1) and Exercise of Power u/s 17(1) read with Section 17(4) Dispensing with the Inquiry u/s 5-A: The appellants challenged the notification under Section 4(1) and the exercise of power under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5-A. The court found that the State Government is statutorily empowered to exercise power u/s 17(4) when it forms an opinion of urgency to take immediate possession for building houses for Dalits. The court emphasized that the opinion of urgency formed by the Government is a subjective conclusion based on the material before it and is entitled to great weight unless vitiated by mala fides or colorable exercise of power.
Urgency and Necessity to Dispense with the Inquiry u/s 5-A: The court held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) and Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassing the right to residence and settlement. The State's duty to provide housing to weaker sections, including Dalits, is a constitutional mandate. The court referred to various precedents, including Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, to support the view that dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A should be exceptional and justified by urgency. The delay by officials does not nullify the urgency if the need for housing persists.
Alleged Violation of Article 21 of the Constitution Due to Deprivation of Livelihood: The appellants contended that the acquisition deprived them of their only source of livelihood, violating Article 21. The court rejected this argument, stating that the State's exercise of eminent domain for public purpose, such as providing housing, is valid. Compensation, solatium, and interest provided under Sections 23 and 28 of the Act adequately address the deprivation of property. Therefore, the plea of deprivation of livelihood under Article 21 was deemed unsustainable.
Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no illegality in the notification warranting interference. The urgency to provide housing for Dalits justified the exercise of power under Section 17(4) and dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A. The appeal was dismissed without costs.
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1995 (12) TMI 420
Issues Involved: 1. Allegations of false promise of marriage and subsequent sexual exploitation. 2. Induced abortions under false pretenses. 3. Legal validity of the alleged secret marriage. 4. Criminal proceedings under Sections 312, 420, 493, 496, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Maintenance during the pendency of the criminal case. 6. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to award interim compensation.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegations of False Promise of Marriage and Subsequent Sexual Exploitation: The complainant, a student, alleged that the accused, a lecturer, developed a romantic relationship with her under the false assurance of marriage. The accused visited her residence frequently and declared his love in November 1989. He allegedly promised marriage to procure sexual intercourse deceitfully. The complainant stated that this led to a prolonged relationship, during which she became pregnant twice.
2. Induced Abortions Under False Pretenses: The complainant asserted that she was coerced into undergoing abortions twice-once in October 1993 and again in April 1994-under the pretext that childbirth would prevent the accused's parents from accepting her as their daughter-in-law. The accused allegedly signed the consent forms for the abortions under a false name, further demonstrating his deceitful intentions.
3. Legal Validity of the Alleged Secret Marriage: The complainant claimed that the accused performed a secret marriage ceremony by applying vermilion on her forehead in front of the God he worshipped. She believed this act constituted a lawful marriage. However, the accused later denied the validity of this marriage, stating it was merely a pretext to manage the situation.
4. Criminal Proceedings Under Sections 312, 420, 493, 496, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code: The complaint was registered under these sections, which pertain to causing miscarriage, cheating, cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage, marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage, and cruelty by husband or relatives of husband, respectively. The accused sought to quash the complaint, but the High Court dismissed his petition, and the Supreme Court upheld this decision.
5. Maintenance During the Pendency of the Criminal Case: The Supreme Court took suo motu notice and issued a notice to the accused to show cause why he should not pay maintenance to the complainant during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The accused, in his affidavit, denied the allegations and stated that he was unemployed after his termination from Cachar College. Despite this, the Court examined the necessity of interim maintenance.
6. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to Award Interim Compensation: The Supreme Court highlighted its broad jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to enforce Fundamental Rights, which includes the power to award compensation for their violation. The Court referred to its inherent jurisdiction to pass orders for complete justice and cited precedents where it had awarded compensation for violations of Fundamental Rights.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court, considering the prima facie evidence and the serious allegations against the accused, directed him to pay Rs. 1,000 per month as interim compensation to the complainant during the pendency of the criminal case. The Court also mandated the payment of arrears from the date of the complaint's filing. This interim order was made without prejudice to the final decision of the Magistrate based on the evidence presented during the trial.
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