|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 217 Records
-
1993 (11) TMI 77
Issues involved:
1. Correct assessment year for income earned during the period of amalgamation.
2. Interpretation of the provisions of section 3 of the Income-tax Act.
3. Validity of the revisional order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax.
4. Applicability of the option to choose the previous year by the assessee.
5. Legal tenability of extending the previous year to a period of 18 months.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The main issue in this case was determining the correct assessment year for the income earned by the assessee-company during the period of amalgamation with another company. The Commissioner of Income-tax contended that the income for the six months ending on 31-12-1984 should have been assessed in the assessment year 1985-86, whereas it was assessed in the assessment year 1986-87. The CIT argued that the income should have been assessed in the earlier year based on the provisions of section 3 of the Income-tax Act.
2. The interpretation of the provisions of section 3 of the Income-tax Act was crucial in this case. The CIT relied on section 3 to argue that the previous year of the assessee is the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year or any period of 12 months following such period. The CIT held that since the income was earned during the financial year 1984-85, it should have been assessed in the assessment year 1985-86. The CIT's decision was based on a strict interpretation of the statutory provisions.
3. The validity of the revisional order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax was challenged by the assessee. The counsel for the assessee argued that the CIT erred in concluding that the assessment order was prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The counsel contended that there was no material to support the CIT's conclusion of prejudice. Additionally, the counsel pointed out that the CIT failed to demonstrate any tax loss resulting from the assessment.
4. The issue of the assessee's option to choose the previous year was raised during the proceedings. The counsel for the assessee highlighted that the definition of the previous year in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act allows the assessee to choose the previous year. The counsel argued that the CIT's order did not consider this provision and incorrectly directed the addition of income in the assessment year 1985-86 without excluding it from the assessment year 1986-87.
5. Finally, the legal tenability of extending the previous year to a period of 18 months was examined by the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that the option to choose the previous year is to be exercised by the assessee. Since the assessee had consistently followed the year ending on 30th June, the Tribunal held that the CIT's direction to extend the previous year to 18 months was legally untenable. Consequently, the Tribunal canceled the order passed by the CIT and allowed the appeal of the assessee.
-
1993 (11) TMI 76
Issues:
1. Allegation of non-compliance with natural justice principles.
2. Validity of statements made by partners.
3. Dispute regarding the location of the head office.
4. Distinction between the revision applicants and Bengal Sales Agency.
5. Installation of power press machine without intimation.
6. Clandestine production of excisable goods.
7. Imposition of personal penalty.
Issue 1 - Allegation of non-compliance with natural justice principles:
The applicants alleged non-observance of natural justice principles, claiming insufficient opportunity for a hearing. However, the government found that multiple opportunities were provided for hearings, and the applicants failed to respond or avail themselves of these opportunities. The government clarified that natural justice requires a reasonable opportunity to be granted, and there was no violation in this case as sufficient chances were given for the applicants to present their case.
Issue 2 - Validity of statements made by partners:
The government emphasized that statements made by partners should be evaluated in conjunction with other evidence and cannot be dismissed solely on grounds of inducement. Merely alleging inducement is not enough to discredit such statements.
Issue 3 - Dispute regarding the location of the head office:
The applicants disputed the location of their head office, claiming it was not the same as the premises where goods were seized. However, the government noted that the applicants themselves admitted conducting business activities from the premises where the goods were seized, indicating a connection between the two locations.
Issue 4 - Distinction between the revision applicants and Bengal Sales Agency:
While the applicants argued that they were separate entities from Bengal Sales Agency, the government highlighted commonalities such as shared partners and business premises, indicating a close relationship between the two entities. The government found the argument of disassociation weak, especially considering the lack of records for purchases from other suppliers.
Issue 5 - Installation of power press machine without intimation:
The applicants installed a power press machine without notifying the Central Excise Department, claiming it was for producing non-excisable items. However, investigations revealed no stock of non-excisable goods, suggesting the machine was used for manufacturing excisable goods, supporting the allegation of clandestine production.
Issue 6 - Clandestine production of excisable goods:
Based on the evidence and discussions, the government upheld the confiscation of goods and their redemption on payment of fines and appropriate duty, concluding that the applicants were involved in clandestine production of excisable goods as alleged.
Issue 7 - Imposition of personal penalty:
The government acknowledged an error in the calculation of the penalty amount, leading to a reduction in the personal penalty imposed on the applicants. Granting the benefit of doubt, the government reduced the penalty from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 5,000, while upholding the orders of the lower authorities in all other aspects.
-
1993 (11) TMI 75
Issues:
- Interpretation of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 regarding the presumption of goods being smuggled.
- Determination of foreign origin of seized goods and its significance in invoking the presumption under Section 123.
- Evaluation of evidence presented by the party, specifically related to invoices and discrepancies in valuation.
- Application of the benefit of doubt principle in the absence of conclusive evidence of smuggling.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the interpretation of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, regarding the presumption of goods being smuggled. The advocate argued that the seized diamonds, being of inferior quality and likely of Indian origin, should not be presumed as smuggled. The advocate emphasized that the origin of the goods is crucial in invoking the presumption under Section 123, citing a Supreme Court judgment that defined 'smuggled' as goods of foreign origin imported from abroad. The advocate contended that since the diamonds were of inferior quality and mainly cut and polished in India, they were likely of Indian origin, making them ineligible for the presumption of being smuggled.
The judgment scrutinized the evidence presented by the party, particularly focusing on the invoices related to the seized goods. It was noted that while discrepancies were alleged in the valuation, weight, and number of diamonds in the invoices, the actual seized goods were of lesser weight and number than stated in the invoices. The judgment highlighted that discrepancies in valuation alone could not be the basis for rejecting the party's evidence, especially considering variations in diamond assessments and the tendency of seizing officers to value goods on the higher side. The authenticity of the invoices was presumed as genuine, as they were reportedly verified by the Department.
Ultimately, the judgment concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the seized diamonds were of foreign origin or were likely smuggled goods. Given the lack of conclusive proof of smuggling and the benefit of doubt principle, the government decided to grant relief to the applicant by setting aside the orders of the lower authorities. The judgment underscored that in the absence of concrete evidence supporting the presumption of smuggling under Section 123, the benefit of doubt should be extended to the party involved, leading to a favorable outcome for the applicant.
-
1993 (11) TMI 74
Issues:
Petitioner seeking return of gold seized despite Tribunal orders.
Analysis:
The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution after obtaining an order from the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) directing the central excise authorities to return 250 grammes of gold seized. The confiscation proceeding initiated resulted in the confiscation of 484 grammes of gold, with the original authority directing confiscation of 434.900 grammes and imposing penalties. The CEGAT, in its order dated 19th June 1990, directed the confiscation of 250 grammes of gold but allowed redemption on payment of a fine of Rs. 25,000. The petitioner complied with the order by depositing the required amounts within the stipulated period. Despite this, the gold was not returned, leading to further orders from the Tribunal. The Collector of Central Excise did not challenge these orders, rendering them final and binding.
The Union Government contended that the petitioner did not deposit the entire redemption fine within the stipulated period and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass subsequent orders. However, the Court found that the petitioner had complied with the Tribunal's directions, and the Collector was bound by the Tribunal's orders. The Court rejected the Union Government's arguments regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the deposit of the redemption fine. The Court also dismissed the argument that the non-inclusion of another party in the proceedings was fatal to the petition, as the necessary parties were already involved in the appeal.
Furthermore, the Court addressed the Union Government's argument regarding a pending criminal proceeding and its connection to the gold confiscation orders. The Court held that the criminal case did not affect the delivery of the confiscated gold as per the Tribunal's order. The pendency of the criminal case did not disentitle the petitioner from receiving the gold. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ petition, issuing a writ of mandamus to deliver 250 grammes of gold to the petitioner within three weeks from the date of receipt of the writ, in accordance with the Tribunal's order. The writ application was allowed with costs, and a hearing fee was assessed.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the petitioner's right to receive the confiscated gold as per the Tribunal's orders, emphasizing the binding nature of the Tribunal's decisions on the concerned authorities and dismissing the Union Government's objections regarding the redemption fine, jurisdiction of the Tribunal, inclusion of parties, and the impact of the pending criminal case on the gold delivery.
-
1993 (11) TMI 73
The High Court of Judicature at Madras rejected a writ appeal based on a previous decision stating that a notification was prospective, not retrospective, as it rescinded an earlier notification with effect from a specific date. The writ appeal was rejected. [Case: The Superintendent of Central Excise, Villupuram Range, Villupuram v. The Madras Vanaspathi Ltd]
-
1993 (11) TMI 72
The High Court of Judicature at Madras upheld the validity of the Project Imports Regulations, 1986, excluding service establishments like photographic studios from project import benefit. The Supreme Court decision in Subhash Photographics v. Union of India supported this exclusion, leading to the dismissal of the appeals with no costs, but granting appellants four weeks to pay the remaining duty.
-
1993 (11) TMI 71
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are the provisional assessment of duty on a vessel imported into Indian Waters for demolition, alteration of tonnage by Customs Authorities, imposition of additional duty, interpretation of Excise Duty exemption, and the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ application.
Provisional Assessment of Duty:
The petitioners challenged the alteration of the tonnage of the vessel by Customs Authorities without basis, leading to an additional duty being imposed. The petitioner contended that the alteration was wrongful and relied on previous judgments to support their argument, including the equivalence of Customs Duty to Excise Duty.
Excise Duty Exemption Interpretation:
The petitioners argued that an exemption of Excise Duty in 1986 for ships intended for demolition without power usage should also nullify the Customs Duty. They referred to previous judgments to support their position on the interpretation of the third section of the Customs Tariff Act.
Jurisdiction of High Court:
The judgment delves into the jurisdictional aspect of approaching a High Court for a writ application when multiple High Courts may have a connection with the cause of action. It discusses the discretion of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition based on the dominant connection of the cause of action with a particular High Court, emphasizing that the petitioner cannot choose the High Court solely based on convenience.
Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the writ application based on jurisdictional grounds, highlighting the importance of the dominant connection of the cause of action with a specific High Court for seeking remedies. The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the appropriate High Court for further consideration, and the stay of operation of the order was refused.
This judgment emphasizes the significance of jurisdictional considerations in approaching the High Court for writ applications and underscores the principle of connecting the cause of action with the appropriate High Court for seeking legal remedies.
-
1993 (11) TMI 70
Issues:
1. Validity of consent order affecting plea of limitation.
2. Interpretation of consent order and its impact on classification list.
3. Alleged violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
4. Error apparent on the face of the record in the consent order.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addressed the validity of a consent order that deprived the petitioners of raising the plea of limitation in a dispute regarding excisable goods classification. The petitioners argued that this violated their rights under the Constitution and statutory provisions. They contended that the consent order restricted their ability to challenge the classification list, affecting their substantive rights.
2. The interpretation of the consent order and its impact on the classification list were central to the case. The petitioners raised concerns about the retrospective effect of any changes to the classification list and the procedure to be followed by the Excise authorities. They argued that any modification should be prospective and in accordance with the law, emphasizing the importance of due process.
3. The petitioners alleged a violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, claiming that the consent order unfairly targeted them, leading to financial constraints and potential closure of their operations. They argued that the order pre-judged the matter and limited their ability to defend their position, creating an unequal situation compared to other manufacturers.
4. The judgment analyzed whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record in approving the consent order. It emphasized the need to uphold the approved classifications and allow the petitioners to raise the plea of limitation. The Court directed the Excise authorities to follow due process in any changes to the classification list, ensuring fairness and adherence to legal procedures.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the review petition, emphasizing the importance of upholding statutory rights and ensuring procedural fairness in matters of excisable goods classification. The judgment highlighted the need for prospective changes, adherence to due process, and protection of the petitioners' rights in line with constitutional principles.
-
1993 (11) TMI 69
The High Court of Judicature at Madras modified the Tribunal's order, reducing the pre-deposit amount from sixteen lakhs to eight lakhs. The petitioner was given eight weeks to make the deposit and provide a bank guarantee or security for the remaining amount. The writ petition was allowed with no costs.
-
1993 (11) TMI 68
The High Court of Judicature at Madras ordered the petitioner to deposit Rs. 1 lakh within two months to proceed with the appeal after rejecting the application for waiver of pre-deposit. The Tribunal dismissed the application due to a strange request for the presence of a departmental representative before arguing the waiver application.
-
1993 (11) TMI 67
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of show cause notice and demand notice.
2. Classification of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
3. Whether the preparation of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles constitutes a manufacturing process.
4. Applicability of excise duty on agglomerated marble slabs/tiles.
5. Maintainability of the writ petition in light of alternative remedies and disputed facts.
Summary:
1. Validity of Show Cause Notice and Demand Notice:
The petitioner sought to quash the show cause notice dated October 14, 1991 (Annexure 5) and the demand notice dated October 25, 1991 (Annexure 7). The court held that the notices were issued based on a wrong assumption that the preparation of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles involves a manufacturing process, thereby wrongly acquiring jurisdiction.
2. Classification of Agglomerated Marble Slabs/Tiles:
The petitioner argued that their product should be classified under Item No. 2504.21 and 2504.31 of Chapter 25 of the Schedule appended to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and not under Item No. 68.04. The court agreed, stating that the product contains more than 90% natural marble and should be classified under Chapter 25, not Chapter 68.
3. Manufacturing Process:
The court examined whether the preparation of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles constitutes a manufacturing process u/s 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It was determined that the process does not result in a new commercial commodity with distinct name, characteristics, and use. The court cited various precedents, including Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P) Ltd., and Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packer, to support this conclusion.
4. Applicability of Excise Duty:
The court held that the preparation of agglomerated marble slabs/tiles does not involve a manufacturing process and, therefore, no excise duty is leviable on them. The court referenced multiple cases, including M/s. Amrutsheele & Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., and Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Fine Marble and Minerals Pvt. Ltd., to substantiate this point.
5. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The respondents argued that the writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of alternative remedies and the involvement of disputed facts. The court rejected this argument, stating that the petitioner had challenged the vires of the entries of 2504.21 and 2504.31 of Chapter 25 of the Schedule of the Act of 1985, which the respondent authorities were not competent to decide. The court cited Beharilal Shyamsundar v. Sales Tax Officer, CUI Circle, Cuttak and Anr., and M/s. Raza Textiles v. Income Tax Officer, Kanpur, to support its jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was allowed, and it was held that the petitioner's product, Agglomerated Marble Slabs/Tiles (VILLA NOVA), is not exigible to tax under the Act of 1944. The show cause notice (Annexure 5) and the demand notice (Annexure 7) were quashed. No order as to costs.
-
1993 (11) TMI 66
The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's liability to pay excise duty under Tariff Item 15(1) and directed the Revenue to refund the excess amount deposited and encashed bank guarantees. The appeal was allowed with no costs.
-
1993 (11) TMI 65
Issues:
1. Recovery of Excise Duty arrears from a petitioner by invoking the Revenue Recovery Act.
2. Estoppel claim by the petitioner due to an arrangement with a third party for payment of arrears.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a small scale unit manufacturing dyestuffs, defaulted on excise duty payments from November 1977 to March 1978. The total due was Rs. 18,620.31, with an agreement to pay in monthly installments. Despite reminders, the arrears remained unpaid. The petitioner then entered an arrangement with another company to pay the arrears, but only partial payments were made. The second respondent sought recovery under the Revenue Recovery Act, leading to the writ petition for quashing the proceedings.
2. The petitioner argued that the second respondent, having agreed to receive arrears from the third party, should not recover the balance from the petitioner. However, the court held that the primary liability to pay the dues rested with the petitioner. The court found the petitioner's claim frivolous, emphasizing the abuse of payment privileges and the continuous liability until the dues are cleared. The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the liability of the petitioner remains unchanged until fully paid, regardless of arrangements with third parties. The court upheld the right of the second respondent to recover the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act, as the petitioner failed to fulfill their statutory responsibilities.
Overall, the court rejected the petitioner's estoppel claim and upheld the recovery of Excise Duty arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act, emphasizing the continuous liability of the petitioner until fully paid.
-
1993 (11) TMI 64
Issues:
1. Classification of goods under Central Excise Tariff Act.
2. Denial of exemption under Notification No. 180/88.
3. Disputed Excise Duty demands.
4. Request for certificate of duty payment under Rule 57-E.
5. Interpretation of "payment" vs. "deposit" in the context of MODVAT credit eligibility.
6. Comparison with relevant case laws - Union of India v. Jain Spinners Limited and Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs.
7. Dismissal of writ petitions seeking mandamus for certificate issuance.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner-company, engaged in manufacturing aluminum rough castings, faced a re-classification issue by the Revenue from exemption under Notification No. 180/88 to machinery parts under Chapter 87 of the Central Excise Tariff Act. This reclassification led to disputed demands for Excise Duty totaling Rs. 92,44,023. The company sought a certificate of duty payment to enable its buyers to claim MODVAT credit under Rule 57A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
2. The respondents contended that the deposits made by the petitioner as per the third respondent's order for stay pending appeals did not constitute payment of duty. They argued that issuing a certificate under Rule 57-E for MODVAT credit would complicate matters if the petitioner succeeded in their appeals and became eligible for a refund of the pre-deposit.
3. The petitioner's counsel argued that the deposits should be considered as duty paid, emphasizing the provisions of Rule 57-E for recoveries or adjustments. They relied on a Tribunal order for a similar case, but the court found the facts distinguishable. The petitioner's intention to claim MODVAT credit was challenged due to the nature of the deposits made.
4. The court examined the distinction between "payment" and "deposit," emphasizing the dictionary meaning of deposit as something entrusted for safekeeping. It concluded that the petitioner's deposits were made in compliance with the stay order, not as direct duty payments. The court referenced the Calcutta High Court judgment in Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs to support the view that such deposits should not be treated as payment of duty.
5. Ultimately, the court dismissed the writ petitions seeking a mandamus for the issuance of a certificate of duty payment under Rule 57-E. It held that the deposits made by the petitioner did not qualify as duty payments, and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to claim MODVAT credit for the deposits. The respondents were not obligated to issue the requested certificate.
-
1993 (11) TMI 63
Issues:
1. Validity of show cause notice dated 30-8-1993 issued by the first respondent.
2. Validity of Trade Notice 12/1993 dated 5-2-1993 issued by the third respondent.
3. Interpretation of Rule 57F(2) and Rule 57F(4) of the Central Excise Rules.
4. Applicability of Trade Notice in determining the removal of waste and scrap.
5. Quasi-Judicial Authority's discretion in deciding cases based on Trade Notices.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought to quash a show cause notice dated 30-8-1993 issued by the first respondent, demanding duty for the removal of 'ash' and 'dross' during a specific period. The petitioner argued that the removal was under Rule 57F(2) for refining and reconditioning goods without duty payment. However, the respondents contended that Rule 57F(4) applied to waste and scrap removal. The Court held that the petitioner must explain why Rule 57F(2) applies and not Rule 57F(4), dismissing the petition at the show cause notice stage.
2. The Trade Notice 12/1993 issued by the third respondent was challenged by the petitioner, claiming it influenced the show cause notice. The Trade Notice clarified that Rule 57F(2) covers removal of inputs during manufacturing, not waste or scrap. The Court emphasized that Trade Notices are general and authorities must examine cases individually. The Trade Notice did not bind the first respondent, who had discretion to decide based on merits. The Court declined to entertain the writ petitions solely based on the Trade Notice.
3. The petitioner relied on a judgment regarding notional interest in assessable value, which was distinguished by the Court. The judgment highlighted the Quasi-Judicial Authority's role in factual assessments and the impact of circulars or trade notices on their powers. The Court concluded that the previous judgment did not apply to the present case's facts.
4. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the writ petitions at the show cause notice stage, allowing the petitioner to submit explanations and proceed according to the law. The judgment emphasized the Quasi-Judicial Authority's role in determining the applicability of rules and notices in individual cases, maintaining discretion in decision-making processes.
-
1993 (11) TMI 62
The petitioner sought quashing of charges framed by the Court of Shri B.S. Mehandiratta. The Collector imposed duty on suppressed production of sodium silicate, but the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order. The court dismissed the petitioner's application and framed charges. The respondent did not contest the petition. The High Court quashed the charges and proceedings, stating that no default was committed in payment of excise duty.
-
1993 (11) TMI 61
Issues:
1. Challenge to orders dated 30th October, 1980 and 19th December, 1980 passed by Respondent No. 2.
2. Legality of the order dated 2nd February, 1983 rejecting petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation.
Detailed Analysis:
The petitioner, a Private Limited company operating a factory in Bombay, was registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and as a Small Scale Industry. A show cause notice was issued in 1978 for alleged non-payment of excise duty. The Assistant Collector directed the petitioner to pay excise duty and imposed a fine. The Collector later set aside the recovery order but imposed a penalty and ordered confiscation of property. The Government of India disposed of the revision application setting aside the confiscation order but upholding the penalty. Subsequently, detention orders were passed in 1980 based on the Collector's order. The petitioner sought to challenge these detention orders but had not challenged the Collector's order or the Government's decision, which were prerequisites for challenging the detention orders. The court held that relief could not be granted regarding the detention orders without challenging the earlier orders.
Furthermore, the petitioner argued that exemption granted for a subsequent period showed compliance with conditions, but the court found this argument invalid as compliance for the relevant period was not established. The petitioner also requested consideration of the legality of the Collector's and Government's orders, which was rejected as the petitioner had not specifically challenged these binding orders despite being aware of them. Ultimately, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a case for relief regarding the detention orders, leading to the dismissal of the petition without costs.
-
1993 (11) TMI 60
The High Court admitted and heard an appeal seeking to quash an endorsement on a letter allowing duty-free reimportation of goods. The Court directed the Collector of Customs to decide the appeal on merits without considering the Single Judge's observations.
-
1993 (11) TMI 59
Issues:
Challenge to order rejecting refund of customs duty due to arithmetical error.
Analysis:
The petitioners imported goods under Import Licences OGL/3/80, allowed for actual user only, used for manufacturing commercial vehicles. They imported spares for a grinding machine and paid customs duty of Rs. 1,84,646.42 instead of Rs. 42,646.42 due to arithmetical error, seeking a refund of Rs. 1,42,000. The Assistant Collector rejected the claim as time-barred under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Appellate Authority upheld the rejection. The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging these orders.
The petitioners argued a bona fide mistake in calculations, highlighting the excess payment of Rs. 1,42,000. The Court considered whether the arithmetical error in customs duty assessment should bar the refund claim under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. The Court opined that in such cases, it should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to direct refund. However, due to amended provisions of Section 27, the appropriate authority must handle refund claims.
The Court noted the necessity for petitioners to follow the procedure under the amended provisions of Section 27 for claiming a refund. The petitioners were directed to make a fresh application to the appropriate authority, which must be disposed of within six months without limitation grounds. The Court emphasized that the petitioners had imported goods for their own use, not for sale to outsiders, eliminating the issue of passing the duty incidence to consumers.
Ultimately, the petition succeeded, and the impugned orders rejecting the refund application were quashed. The petitioners were instructed to reapply under Section 27 of the Customs Act, with the assurance of timely processing by the appropriate authority. The judgment was made considering the unique circumstances of the case, with no costs imposed.
-
1993 (11) TMI 58
Issues:
Interpretation of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 regarding post-manufacturing expenses; Violation of principles of natural justice in issuing additional demand without notice.
Analysis:
1. The petitioners, a Public Limited Company engaged in cigarette manufacturing, faced a controversy over the interpretation of Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, specifically regarding post-manufacturing expenses. The issue was resolved by a Supreme Court judgment. Various Collectors of Central Excise were issuing show cause notices on the assessable value determination method. The Director General ultimately directed the inclusion of the entire money value consideration in the assessable value for excise duty calculation. A workshop calculated the differential duty for different units, with the Bangalore unit owing Rs. 3,32,70,390.75. The petitioner paid the demanded amount without filing an appeal against the Director General's order.
2. The cause of action for the writ petition arose when the second respondent demanded an additional sum of Rs. 27,57,93,086.75 without issuing a show cause notice or allowing the petitioner to participate in the determination process. The petitioner appealed to the first respondent, seeking waiver of pre-deposit duty. Upon apprehending unfavorable proceedings, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the demand. The first respondent dismissed the appeal, prompting the petitioner to file another writ petition against the dismissal order.
3. The judgment refers to a decision by the High Court of Patna on the violation of principles of natural justice. The Patna High Court ruled that demanding additional excise duty without providing notice to the company violates natural justice and the Act's scheme. Following this precedent, the present writ petition was allowed, setting aside the impugned demand. The respondents were directed to issue fresh orders after giving proper notice and allowing the petitioners to present objections in a fair inquiry. Consequently, one writ petition was allowed, and the other was dismissed as unnecessary, with no costs awarded.
....
|
9911796707
