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Showing 161 to 180 of 781 Records
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2009 (12) TMI 910
Issues Involved:
1. Voluntariness and admissibility of statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
2. Requirement of corroboration for statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
3. Retraction of statements and its impact on the case.
4. Legality of the respondent's detention and alleged maltreatment.
5. Sufficiency of evidence for conviction.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Voluntariness and Admissibility of Statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act:
The petitioner argued that the statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act were sufficient to convict the respondent. However, the trial court found that the statements were not made voluntarily. The court noted that the respondent was subjected to maltreatment and coercion, and there was no corroborative evidence to support the statements. The Additional Sessions Judge highlighted that the prosecution witnesses could not prove the voluntariness of the statements. The cross-examination of PW1 R.D. Gupta revealed inconsistencies and lack of memory about crucial details, which weakened the prosecution's case.
2. Requirement of Corroboration for Statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act:
The petitioner contended that there is no legal requirement for corroboration of statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. However, the trial court and the High Court emphasized that prudence requires such statements to be corroborated by independent evidence, especially when they are retracted. The court cited various judgments, including UOI & Ors. Vs. Bal Mukund, which stated that retracted confessions need independent corroboration to be admissible.
3. Retraction of Statements and Its Impact on the Case:
The respondent retracted his statement immediately upon being produced before the court, claiming it was obtained under duress. The trial court found this retraction significant and noted that the prosecution failed to provide any rebuttal to the allegations of torture. The High Court supported this view, stating that a retracted statement, without corroboration, cannot form the basis of conviction.
4. Legality of the Respondent's Detention and Alleged Maltreatment:
The respondent claimed he was illegally detained by NCB officials from 21.11.1987 to 24.11.1987 and was subjected to maltreatment. His brother, DW2, corroborated this by testifying about the illegal detention and the telegram sent to the authorities. The trial court found these claims credible, especially since the prosecution did not provide any evidence to counter these allegations. The High Court reiterated that the respondent's detention and the manner in which the statements were obtained cast doubt on their voluntariness.
5. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction:
The trial court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no recovery of contraband from the respondent, and the case relied heavily on the retracted statements, which lacked independent corroboration. The High Court agreed with the trial court's assessment, emphasizing that when two views are possible, the one favoring the accused should be adopted. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petitioner's request for leave to file an appeal, finding no reason to overturn the trial court's judgment.
Conclusion:
The High Court upheld the trial court's judgment, which acquitted the respondent due to the lack of voluntary and corroborated evidence. The court emphasized the importance of corroboration for retracted statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and highlighted the respondent's illegal detention and maltreatment as significant factors undermining the prosecution's case. The petitioner's appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that the benefit of doubt should favor the accused.
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2009 (12) TMI 909
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the cancellation of an assessment order u/s 143(3)/147 due to the absence of a notice u/s 143(2), the applicability of sections 292BB & 292B, and the justification of the assessment order passed without issuing a notice u/s 143(2).
Cancellation of Assessment Order u/s 143(3)/147:
The Tribunal canceled the assessment order due to the absence of a notice u/s 143(2) for completion of the assessment, questioning the validity of the assessment. The Court referred to a previous judgment to support the decision, stating that the issue was already settled.
Applicability of Sections 292BB & 292B:
The second question pertained to the amendments to sections 292BB & 292B, effective from April 1, 2008, and their prospective application for the A.Y. 1999-2000. The Court indicated that this question was closely related to the previous issue and deemed it unsustainable.
Justification of Assessment Order without Notice u/s 143(2):
Questions three and four were considered as variations of the second issue regarding the necessity of issuing a notice u/s 143(2). The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of substantial questions of law, emphasizing the importance of legal knowledge for advocates representing the Revenue.
Separate Judgment by Judges:
The judges highlighted the importance of advocates being well-versed in recent judgments and legal matters, expressing concern over the lack of preparedness and legal knowledge displayed by an advocate in this case. They urged the Revenue Department and the Chairman of the CBDT to take corrective measures to ensure better administration of justice. A copy of the order was directed to be sent to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and the Chairman, CBDT for further action.
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2009 (12) TMI 908
Issues involved: Determination of tax rate for stainless steel fan hooks under different entries of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act.
The judgment addresses the issue of whether stainless steel fan hooks made by the appellant attract tax at 12.5 per cent under entry 103 of Notification SRO No. 82/006 or fall under subentry (21) or (22) of entry 43 of the Third Schedule to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act. The appellant argued that fan hooks are not specifically covered under the clarification issued by the Commissioner, which mentioned hooks and eyes as taxable at 12.5 per cent. The appellant contended that fan hooks are simple products made by bending stainless steel rods, falling under sub-entries (21) and (22) of entry 43. The court directed the Commissioner to clarify the tax rate on stainless steel fan hooks within one month of receiving the application from the appellant, and until then, the excess tax assessed should not be recovered for two months.
The court considered the clarification issued by the Commissioner regarding the tax rate on hooks and eyes, which are attachments for windows, and found that fan hooks were not explicitly mentioned in the clarification. The appellant argued that fan hooks are essentially stainless steel rods cut to size and bent, constituting a simple manufacturing process covered under sub-entries (21) and (22) of entry 43. Since stainless steel fan hooks were not specifically listed in the notification except under the residuary entry of entry 103, the court directed the Commissioner to provide clarification on the tax rate for fan hooks upon application by the appellant. The court instructed the assessing officer to adjust the tax rate based on the Commissioner's clarification and to refrain from recovering any excess tax for two months.
In conclusion, the judgment focused on the interpretation of the relevant entries in the Kerala Value Added Tax Act to determine the appropriate tax rate for stainless steel fan hooks manufactured by the appellant. The court emphasized the need for clarification from the Commissioner on the tax treatment of fan hooks and instructed the assessing officer to await the clarification before making any adjustments to the tax rate applied to the appellant.
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2009 (12) TMI 907
Whether the KAT was justified in observing that the expression 'manufacturing unit' employed under section 5A of the Act should not be construed in strict sense?
Whether the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the levy of penalty imposed under section 5A(2) and (3) of the KST Act?
Held that:- In the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the authorities were themselves under doubt as to the applicability or category under which respondent-assessee was to be categorized. Hence, we do not find that there has been any misdeclaration by the assessee in availing of the benefit of the notification. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that substantial questions of law which have been framed hereinabove is with regard to categorizing the activity of the respondentassessee, we answer question No. 2 in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
In so far as question No. 1 as to whether the expression "manufacturing unit" employed under section 5A of the Act Revision petition is dismissed and question No. 1 is answered in favour of the Revenue
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2009 (12) TMI 906
Whether entry 17A in Part C of the Second Schedule as unconstitutional, discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India, so far as the coconut oil sold under the brand name, either in sachets or in bottles?
Held that:- The learned judge has not taken into account distinction between the hair oil and edible oil. Since this aspect has not been considered, we are of the view the learned judge has committed an error in granting a relief to the assessee in declaring the amendment as unconstitutional in violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Considering the facts and background of the amendment brought in, we are of the view that whenever coconut oil is manufactured and sold as hair oil, the same would attract tax at higher rate of 15 per cent and 20 per cent as per the amendment brought to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, and coconut oil sold as pure coconut oil, as a brand name would attract only four per cent as the same can be used as an edible oil not exclusively as a toilet articles. In view of this distinction, we allow this appeal.
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2009 (12) TMI 905
Whether the crane sold by the assessee is taxable at 16 per cent under entry 8 of Part F of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 or at five per cent under entry 33 of Part C of the First Schedule?
Held that:- The hydraulic mobile crane cannot be encom-passed within entry 8 "lifts and hoists", which are only for the purpose of raising or lifting something to a higher position and the user would also know the way as stated above. Though specifically mobile crane has not been included, the phraseology used in entry 33 "similar varieties of machinery of which a mechanically propelled vehicle forms an integral part which is subsidiary to their main function" would definitely encompass with it mobile crane, if we read the provision in ejusdem generis principle. In our view, the Tribunal has taken a correct view with a clear and cogent finding. We do not find any irregularity in the finding of the Tribunal having regard to enumeration of goods stated in entry 33 of Part C of the First Schedule to the TNGST Act, during 1994-95. Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (12) TMI 904
Issues:
1. Assessment of sales turnover of raw materials for safety matches.
2. Revenue recovery proceedings against arrears of tax and penalty.
3. Priority of debt between State Government and secured creditors.
4. Challenge to proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
5. Loan repayment and mortgage by Ramanathapuram District Cottage Match Manufacturers Association to Khadi and Village Industries Commission.
Analysis:
1. The judgment involves the assessment of the sales turnover of raw materials for safety matches under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The second respondent, a business dealing with raw materials, was assessed for arrears of tax and penalty by the petitioner. Subsequently, revenue recovery proceedings were initiated, leading to the attachment of immovable properties and a notice of sale issued.
2. The third respondent, holding additional charge of the Ramanathapuram District Cottage Match Manufacturers Association, faced public auction of properties due to unsettled arrears. However, complications arose when the first respondent, seeking to recover a loan amount, took possession of the properties under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The petitioner intervened, asserting Government dues' prime charge over the properties.
3. A critical issue addressed in the judgment concerns the priority of debt between the State Government and secured creditors. Citing a precedent, the court highlighted that while the State Government can claim priority over tax arrears, secured creditors with assets have secured interests, superseding the State's first charge principle.
4. The Khadi and Village Industries Commission, having granted a substantial loan to the Ramanathapuram District Cottage Match Manufacturers Association, filed a writ petition challenging the proceedings of the second respondent. The petition sought a writ of certiorari, contesting the actions taken against the third respondent for non-repayment of the loan amount and interest, leading to the mortgage of properties.
5. In light of the Division Bench's decision emphasizing the priority of secured creditors over State claims in certain scenarios, the court dismissed one writ petition while allowing another. Consequently, the writ petition challenging the proceedings against the third respondent was granted, highlighting the complexities of debt priority and recovery actions in the legal landscape.
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2009 (12) TMI 903
Whether an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, could be compounded under Section 147 of the said Act read with Section 320 Cr.P.C.?
Held that:- It is true that the application under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was made by the parties after the proceedings had been concluded before the Appellate Forum. However, Section 147 of the aforesaid Act does not bar the parties from compounding an offence under Section 138 even at the appellate stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find no reason to reject the application under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act even in a proceeding under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Since the parties have settled their disputes, in keeping with the spirit of Section 147 of the Act, we allow the parties to compound the offence, set aside the judgment of the courts below and acquit the appellant of the charges against him. Appeal allowed.
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2009 (12) TMI 902
Rectification of the assessment under section 37(1) of the AGST Act - whether there was mistake of factual nature apparent from the records of the case?
Held that:- On examination of the show-cause notice dated September 11, 2003 issued by the Commissioner, the basis for alleging that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue is not discernible to the court. In the revisional order also, apart from making a bald assertion that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, nothing is indicated as to the basis for reaching such conclusion by the revisional authority. Accordingly, having regard to the scope and ambit of the provisions of section 36 and also the decisions relied upon by the assessee, I am of the view that in the present case, the exercise of suo motu revisional power by the Joint Commissioner was not supported by law. W.P. allowed.
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2009 (12) TMI 901
Issues:
Challenge to the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, dated October 26, 2006 in S.T.A. Nos. 619-24/2001. Interpretation of the order passed by the High Court in S.T.R.P. No. 121 of 2004 dated June 29, 2006 regarding jurisdiction and merits of the case.
Analysis:
The Revenue challenged the legality and correctness of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal's order dated October 26, 2006, raising questions regarding conformity with the High Court's previous orders. The High Court noted the history of the case, emphasizing the appeal filed by the aggrieved assessee before the Tribunal in S.T.A. Nos. 619-24 of 2001, questioning both the jurisdiction of the revising authority and the merits of the order. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on May 16, 2003, leading the Revenue to file a revision petition before the High Court in S.T.R.P. No. 121 of 2004. The High Court, in its order on June 29, 2006, remanded the matter to the Tribunal solely to reconsider the jurisdiction issue without delving into the merits of the case. This order was the subject of challenge in the present revision petition.
The key issue before the High Court in the revision petition was whether the previous order of June 29, 2006, was a remand solely on the question of jurisdiction or required the Tribunal to reconsider the entire case on merits. Upon examining the previous order, the High Court noted that it explicitly directed the Tribunal to consider all points, including jurisdiction and merits. The High Court clarified that the Tribunal's duty was not limited to jurisdiction but extended to a fresh consideration of the case on merits as well. Consequently, the High Court found that the Tribunal's interpretation of the remand order was incorrect, as it focused only on jurisdiction and neglected the merits of the case. Therefore, the High Court ruled in favor of the Revenue, setting aside the Tribunal's order of May 16, 2003, and remanding the matter back to the Tribunal for a reconsideration on merits and in accordance with the law.
In conclusion, the High Court allowed the petition, overturned the Tribunal's order of May 16, 2003, and directed the Tribunal to reexamine the case comprehensively on its merits and in adherence to legal principles.
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2009 (12) TMI 900
Whether the circular dated March 18, 2002 in any manner violates, varies or modifies the notification dated October 10, 1995 issued by the State Government in exercise of its power under section 8(5) of the Central Act?
Held that:- The only power which can be exercised is to exempt the goods from tax. In the present case we find that under the U.P. Act the electronics goods is generally liable to be taxed at 2.5 per cent. including surcharge which is lower than four per cent. and the notification issued under section 8(5) prescribed the rate of tax at two per cent. Thus the case in hand would be covered by sub-section (2A) of section 8 of the Central Act and not by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 8.
Our above view finds support from the phrase used "tax on such sales shall be calculated at such lower rates than those specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as may be mentioned in the notification". The use of words lower rates implies that rate of tax may be lowered down than the rate of tax as provided under the State Act. Further the reference of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is indicative of the fact that a notification can be issued only with respect to the rate of tax referred in aforestated sub-sections and not to sub-section (2-A) of section 8.
The circular therefore, clarifying the above legal position is not in any manner illegal or contrary to law.
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2009 (12) TMI 899
Whether for facilitating the implementation of Scheme of 2002 the State Government framed rules known as the Madhya Pradesh Bakaya Rashi Saral Samadhan Yojana, 2002 whereunder rule 2(1)(h) defines "amount of arrear" and the said definition nowhere categorises that the assessee, enjoying the benefit of payment of instalments, will not be covered?
Held that:- In the case at hand, admittedly prior to the circular dated February 8, 2002 the Scheme of 2002 do not categorise that the assessee, availing of the benefit of instalments, will be excluded from consideration under the Scheme of 2002. Further clarification circulated vide annexure P2 does include the class of assessee, who are being given the benefit of instalments and otherwise covered by the Scheme and it was only by letter dated February 8, 2002 that the Commissioner, Commercial Tax, has instructed its subordinate staff not to accept the applications and not to issue form No. 2 under the Scheme of 2002 to such class of persons.
In the considered opinion of this court, since the petitioner had filed an application on January 24, 2002 and had deposited the amount, as sought for under the Scheme of 2002, i.e., much before the issuance of letter dated February 8, 2002, it was incumbent upon the respondents to have accepted the same and have issued the form No. 2. Petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to accept the application preferred by the petitioner in pursuance of Scheme of 2002 and decide the same on its own merit.
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2009 (12) TMI 898
Assessment orders, reassessment orders and notices under section 21(2) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 on the transactions of job-work and goods-returned treated as sales under section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 challenged
Held that:- In all the cases, in which transactions of job-work and goods-returned are involved, the assessment orders only to the extent that the tax was imposed on such transactions for want of form F of the Central sales tax are set aside. The petitioners will appear and submit before the assessing authority a certified copy of this judgment in six weeks to complete the assessment proceedings with regard to such transactions only, on its own merits, after examining the transactions between the parties, and keeping in mind that the assessee is not in a position to obtain form F for no fault of his; and
In the cases where the assessee has been subjected to reassessment proceedings in which the transactions of job-work and goods-returned are involved, the reassessment orders only to the extent that the tax was imposed on such transaction/s for want of form F of the Central sales tax are set aside. The assessee will appear before the reassessing authority and submit a certified copy of this judgment in six weeks, to complete the reassessment proceedings in respect of such transactions only, on its own merits after examining the transactions between the parties, keeping in mind the findings recorded earlier on such transactions, and also that the assessee is not in a position to obtain form F, for no fault of his.
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2009 (12) TMI 897
Refusal to verify the books of account of the petitioner as requested by the petitioner - Held that:- perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal would reveal that the matter was remanded only for the purpose of cross-examination alone, whereas, the entire assessment order was set aside. It means that the assessing authority has to make a fresh assessment by taking into consideration not only the evidence of witnesses but also the books of account.
For making any assessment, books of account are necessary and the evidence of witnesses cannot be taken into consideration in isolation by the authorities without considering or taking up the books of account. It should be comprehensive exercise by the authority to make an assessment.
As stated in the Division Bench judgment, the best judgment assessment could be only by taking into account the books of account and evidence of witnesses in toto. W.P. allowed
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2009 (12) TMI 896
Issues:
Appeal against suo motu revision of assessment order by Appellate Assistant Commissioner based on defects found in accounts and materials collected during a search of dealer's premises.
Analysis:
The case involves an appeal by the assessee against the suo motu revision of the assessment order by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessing officer had rejected the accounts due to defects and materials found during a search at the dealer's premises. The total and taxable turnover was determined at Rs. 85,79,460, with a penalty imposed under section 12(3) of the TNGST Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal, citing lack of purchase or sale bills, absence of confirmation statement, and disownment of records by the appellant. The Joint Commissioner, after examining the matter, found the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue, leading to the restoration of the assessing officer's order.
The inspection and search of the dealer's place of business and residence revealed books and slips with names and addresses of dealers whose registration certificates were canceled. The assessing officer obtained bills from relevant authorities showing these dealers were of a different nature, with canceled certificates. The appellant was given opportunities to contest the case, request details, and cross-examine individuals, but the request for cross-examination was denied. Despite materials being found at the dealer's premises, the appellant denied their connection, leading to the Joint Commissioner's decision to revise the order.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner's remittal of certain turnover related to dealers with canceled certificates was deemed unnecessary, as these dealers had not taken steps to rectify the canceled certificates. The Joint Commissioner's revision was based on the evidence suggesting clandestine transactions and the correctness of canceling registration certificates. The court found no illegality in the Joint Commissioner's decision to set aside the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order and restore the assessing officer's assessment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without costs.
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2009 (12) TMI 895
Cancelling the TNGST Certificate challenged - Held that:- In the present case also the certificate is valid for only two days 30th and 31st March, 1999 as per the provision of law. There is no specific indication as to when the renewal has to be effected. Furthermore, the cancellation of the certificate has been done without proper notice and without opportunity to the petitioner and that fact is not seriously disputed. There is, therefore, clear violation of principles of natural justice.
The proceedings initiated by the respondent cancelling the TNGST Certificate No. 1521561/98-99 dated March 31, 1999 is bad and consequently such order is set aside. The respondent is, however, at liberty to initiate proper proceedings after issuance of a show-cause notice to the assessee before proceeding further in the matter. The writ petition is allowed
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2009 (12) TMI 894
Issues:
Assessment based on inspection results, revision of taxable turnover, penalty imposition, appeal process, question of law regarding levy of tax on turnover, interpretation of Section 6A of the CST Act, applicability of Supreme Court judgment, absence of findings on misrepresentation or collusion.
Assessment based on inspection results:
The petitioner was initially assessed on a total and taxable turnover, which was later revised following an inspection by enforcement officers. The taxable turnover was re-fixed at a higher amount, and a penalty was levied based on the inspection results.
Appeal process:
The petitioner appealed the revised assessment before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who granted relief by reducing the turnover and penalty amount. Subsequently, the petitioner further appealed to the Sales Tax Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, leading to the revision filed before the High Court.
Question of law regarding levy of tax on turnover:
The main issue raised in the revision was whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision to confirm the levy of tax on a specific turnover was correct, considering the exemption claimed under Section 6A of the CST Act initially accepted by the assessing authority.
Interpretation of Section 6A of the CST Act:
The High Court referred to a Supreme Court judgment on Section 6A, highlighting that the order under this section is conclusive unless vitiated by fraud, collusion, misrepresentation, or other specified grounds. The judgment emphasized that a mere change in opinion or discovery of new material is not sufficient to reopen proceedings.
Applicability of Supreme Court judgment:
The High Court applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, emphasizing that without a finding of misrepresentation or collusion, the assessing authority cannot reopen proceedings solely based on a change in opinion or new material.
Absence of findings on misrepresentation or collusion:
Since none of the authorities recorded any finding of misrepresentation or collusion in the case, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order confirming the tax levy on a specific turnover. Consequently, the turnover amount and penalty related to that turnover were deleted, and the tax case revision was allowed in favor of the petitioner.
Costs:
The High Court ruled that no costs were to be imposed in this matter.
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2009 (12) TMI 893
Whether the applicant-company was liable to pay purchase tax and interest in addition to the penalty imposed by the assessing authority?
Held that:- As the learned advocate produced ledger copies showing purchase of raw materials, consumables and packing materials on payment of appropriate rate of VAT. At this stage, it is difficult for us to adjudicate on the points of facts.
Regarding levy of interest we do not find any rhyme or reason as to how he came to the conclusion that the applicantcompany was liable to pay any interest when he himself determined the output tax at "nil". Though the appellate authority substantially reduced the quantum of interest, it is not clear how he came to the findings that the applicant-company did not pay tax for an amount of ₹ 9,08,701.14. There was no finding of the assessing authority in this regard.
As regards imposition of penalty under section 30E read with rules 44 and 45 of the VAT Rules, we would like to observe that no penalty can be imposed under rule 45 without issuing a show-cause notice. From the records, it is not apparent whether any notice in form 8 as required under rule 45 of the VAT Rules was at all issued. Remand the matter back for making a fresh assessment
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2009 (12) TMI 892
Whetehr the Tribunal grossly erred in its conclusion that the Revenue has not established even on a single case that the assessee has handled the goods - Held that:- On the basis of the materials adduced to establish that the assessee has acted only as a commission agent, the Tribunal has in our view rightly come to the conclusion that the order of the assessing officer as well as the appellate authority in so far as sustaining the levy of suppression and the other component is not in consonance with the statutory requirement. Revision dismissed.
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2009 (12) TMI 891
Rate of tax applicable on cut chillies, spent chillies and chilly seeds - whether attracts 12.5 per cent tax under section 4(1)(b) of the Act for the period April 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006 and with effect from April 1, 2006, the above goods are eligible to be taxed at the rate of four per cent in view of entry 89 of the Act?
Held that:- The crushed chilly, spent chilly is a spice by itself which can be sold and traded in common parlance and accordingly, tax leviable would be at the rate of four per cent and it comes within entry 61 under the definition of "dry chillies" and accordingly, we answer the questions of law formulated hereinabove in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by holding that the Advance Ruling Authority was in error.
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