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Showing 161 to 180 of 1046 Records
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2008 (7) TMI 969
Issues:
Challenge to the rejection of application seeking re-examination of witnesses under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Detailed Analysis:
The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which rejected the petition filed by the appellant. The primary issue was the rejection of the application seeking re-examination of witnesses under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Trial Court had rejected the application based on the timeline of events related to the case, which the High Court concurred with.
In support of the appeal, the counsel for the appellant argued that certain relevant documents had not been proved during the examination of a witness, even though other witnesses had already proven some of these documents. The respondents, on the other hand, supported the orders of the lower courts.
The Supreme Court delved into the provisions of Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which grants discretionary authority to a court to summon, examine, or recall witnesses at any stage of an inquiry or trial. The section is divided into two parts, with the first part being discretionary and the second part being mandatory if new evidence is deemed essential to the just decision of the case. The court emphasized that the objective of the section is to prevent a failure of justice due to the omission of valuable evidence or ambiguity in witness statements.
The court clarified that the power under Section 311 is not limited to benefiting the accused and can be used to summon witnesses at any stage of the proceedings. The discretion conferred by the section must be judiciously exercised, considering the necessity for a judicial approach. The court highlighted that the best available evidence should be presented before the court, and the failure to do so can lead to adverse inferences.
Referring to previous judgments, the court emphasized that Section 311 aims to ensure a just decision by bringing forth evidence from various perspectives, including that of the accused, prosecution, and society at large. The right to cross-examine a witness called by the court arises from the Evidence Act, and in cases where a witness called by the court provides evidence against the complainant, the complainant should be allowed to cross-examine.
In the specific case at hand, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court should have permitted the prayer for re-examination of witnesses. Therefore, the rejection of the prayer by the trial court was deemed improper, and the High Court should not have declined to interfere. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, directing the Trial Court to fix a date for calling the witnesses in question, granting an opportunity to the accused persons, and proceeding with the trial within three months.
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2008 (7) TMI 968
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of intra-court appeal.
2. Maintainability of writ petitions.
3. Maintainability of claim petitions.
4. Voluntariness of the retirement scheme.
5. Order to refund the amount received under the retirement scheme.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of Intra-Court Appeal:
The Division Bench of the High Court held that intra-court appeals were not maintainable as the writ petitions were filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, which pertains to supervisory jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction under Article 226. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that the nomenclature of the proceeding or reference to a particular Article is not final or conclusive. The substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against was under Article 227, thus intra-court appeals were not competent.
2. Maintainability of Writ Petitions:
The workmen argued that the writ petitions were barred by constructive res judicata and Order XXIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure since the Company had withdrawn a previous writ petition without obtaining leave to file a fresh one. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the withdrawal was due to practical difficulties and logistic problems raised by the High Court's Registry, and not an abandonment of the claim. The Company filed fresh petitions immediately after withdrawing the omnibus petition, indicating no intention to give up the claim.
3. Maintainability of Claim Petitions:
The Company contended that the claim petitions were not maintainable as the workmen had accepted voluntary retirement, severing the master-servant relationship. The Labour Court, Industrial Court, and the Single Judge of the High Court rejected this contention, noting that the issue involved mixed questions of law and fact, particularly whether the acceptance of the scheme was voluntary. The Supreme Court supported this view, emphasizing that all issues should generally be tried together, especially in industrial disputes where delay can jeopardize industrial peace.
4. Voluntariness of the Retirement Scheme:
The workmen claimed they were coerced into accepting the retirement scheme and did not receive full benefits. The Supreme Court refrained from expressing any opinion on this issue, as the claim petitions were still pending before the Labour Court. The Court directed the Labour Court to consider the matter on merits and pass an appropriate order in consonance with the law.
5. Order to Refund the Amount:
The Division Bench of the High Court directed the workmen to refund the amount received under the retirement scheme if they wanted to maintain their claim petitions. The Supreme Court upheld this direction, stating that the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitable. The Court noted that the workmen could not retain the benefits of the scheme while challenging their retirement. The direction to refund the amount was seen as balancing equities and ensuring justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court confirmed the Division Bench's order, extending the time for the workmen to refund the amount until December 31, 2008. The Labour Court was directed to proceed with the claim petitions only if the refund was made. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case, and all contentions remained open for consideration by the Labour Court. The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2008 (7) TMI 967
Issues Involved:
1. Non-supply of Inquiry Officer's report.
2. Violation of principles of natural justice.
3. Prejudice to the delinquent employee due to non-supply of the report.
4. Applicability of the precedent set by B. Karunakar.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Non-supply of Inquiry Officer's Report:
The core issue in this case is whether the non-supply of the Inquiry Officer's report to the delinquent employee before the Disciplinary Authority made its decision constitutes a violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the delinquent employee has a right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report before the Disciplinary Authority concludes on the employee's guilt or innocence. This right is integral to the employee's ability to defend against the charges, and its denial breaches the principles of natural justice.
2. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The Court reiterated that the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of *audi alteram partem* ("hear the other side"), require that adverse material, such as the Inquiry Officer's report, be supplied to the delinquent employee. The failure to do so constitutes a breach of natural justice. However, the Court also noted that the concept of natural justice is not rigid and must be applied flexibly, depending on the circumstances of each case.
3. Prejudice to the Delinquent Employee Due to Non-supply of the Report:
The Court highlighted that non-supply of the Inquiry Officer's report does not automatically nullify the disciplinary proceedings or the punishment imposed. The delinquent employee must demonstrate that the non-supply of the report caused prejudice and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court emphasized that it is not sufficient to merely allege a breach of natural justice; the employee must show how the breach adversely affected their case.
4. Applicability of the Precedent Set by B. Karunakar:
The judgment extensively referenced the Constitution Bench decision in *B. Karunakar*, which established that non-supply of the Inquiry Officer's report is a breach of natural justice but does not automatically invalidate the disciplinary proceedings. The delinquent employee must prove that the non-supply caused prejudice. The Supreme Court in the present case found that the High Court had incorrectly applied this precedent by assuming prejudice without requiring the delinquent employee to demonstrate it.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in setting aside the order of punishment solely on the grounds of non-supply of the Inquiry Officer's report without assessing whether the delinquent employee had suffered any prejudice. The matter was remitted to the High Court to determine if the non-supply of the report had caused prejudice to the delinquent employee. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside, with no order as to costs.
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2008 (7) TMI 966
Issues:
Challenge to order of High Court dismissing writ petition on demand for contribution under Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and payment of interest on delayed contribution.
Analysis:
1. The main issue in this case was the challenge to the order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant regarding the demand for contribution under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The Employees State Insurance Corporation raised a demand for contribution on the efficiency bonus component for a specific period. The appellant contested the demand, citing a bonafide dispute about eligibility for the efficiency bonus under the Act.
2. The appellant argued that the eligibility for the efficiency bonus was subject to specific conditions and fell outside the definition of wages under the Act. The matter was taken to the ESI Court, which disposed of it after re-verification and the appellant paid the determined amount. However, the Corporation later demanded interest on the amount paid for the specified period. The appellant contended that there was a compromise as indicated by the ESI Court's order, but the Corporation insisted on the statutory liability to pay interest.
3. The appellant further argued that there was an order of stay in place, and the Corporation's statement that nothing further was payable implied a compromise for waiving interest. The appellant claimed that the payment was made to avoid further disputes, even though the case was similar to a precedent judgment. On the other hand, the respondent contended that there was no provision for compromise regarding interest, as it was statutorily payable, and supported the High Court's decision.
4. The statutory provisions regarding contributions and interest were crucial in this case. Sections 39 and Regulations 31 and 31A of the Act specified the liability of the principal employer to pay contributions on time and the consequences of delayed payments, including the payment of interest at a specified rate. The Corporation had issued notices and orders due to delays in contribution payments, emphasizing the statutory nature of the interest liability.
5. The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and statutory provisions, concluded that the liability to pay interest on delayed contributions was statutory, and there was no provision for compromise or waiver. The Court noted that the ESI Court's order only referred to the contribution payable and did not absolve the appellant from the statutory interest payment. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
In summary, the judgment upheld the statutory liability of the appellant to pay interest on delayed contributions under the Employees State Insurance Act, rejecting the appellant's argument of a compromise to waive interest and affirming the decision of the High Court.
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2008 (7) TMI 965
Issues:
Challenge to the acquittal under Section 17 of the NDPS Act, violation of Section 50, sufficiency of evidence, applicability of Section 50 for search, integrity of seals, surrender of the accused.
Acquittal Challenge:
The appeal challenged the acquittal directed by the Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The accused was initially found guilty under Section 17 of the NDPS Act by the Additional Sessions Judge III, Hissar, and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. The trial judge convicted the accused based on the prosecution's established case.
Violation of Section 50:
The High Court allowed the appeal citing a violation of Section 50 of the Act. It noted the absence of elaborate reasons for suspicion regarding the accused's possession of opium and the lack of independent witnesses at the railway station where the recovery was made. The defense argued that Section 50 did not apply as it was a search of a bag, not a personal search, and there was no legal requirement to record reasons for suspicion.
Sufficiency of Evidence:
The defense contended that the High Court's reasoning was flawed as there was no evidence to suggest the seals were not intact, and the official witnesses' testimony remained credible. The Trial Court found the procedures were followed, and the High Court's doubts were unfounded regarding the suspicion recording and witness examination.
Applicability of Section 50:
The defense emphasized that Section 50 pertains to personal searches, not searches of bags or containers, citing relevant case law to support this interpretation. The judgment highlighted the clarity of Section 50's language and the settled legal position on its application, dismissing the High Court's finding of non-compliance.
Integrity of Seals:
The Trial Court affirmed the seals' integrity based on official witness testimony, contrary to the High Court's conclusion. The defense argued that no evidence challenged the seals' integrity, and the Trial Court's findings were conclusive on this matter.
Surrender of the Accused:
The judgment set aside the High Court's decision, ordering the accused to surrender immediately to serve the remaining sentence. The defense raised concerns about the accused's age and the quantity of opium involved, but the Court upheld the original conviction and sentencing.
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2008 (7) TMI 964
Issues Involved:
1. Violation of conditions of Notification No. 36/97-Cus.
2. Validity of Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC).
3. Jurisdiction of the Committee of Chief Commissioners.
4. Applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata.
Summary:
1. Violation of conditions of Notification No. 36/97-Cus.:
The Revenue contended that Kotex Infrastructure Limited (KIL) violated the conditions of Notification No. 36/97-Cus., dated 1-4-1997, by not fulfilling the export obligation and misrepresenting facts to procure an Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC). The goods imported under the Special Import Licence (SIL) were suspected to have been sold or loaned, contrary to the conditions of the SIL and the Notification. The Adjudicating Authority, however, found that the goods were supplied to the project site and the conditions of the Notification were met. The Tribunal upheld this finding, noting that the goods were assembled at the site, fulfilling the requirement of "supply" as per the Notification.
2. Validity of Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC):
The EODC issued by the DGFT was challenged by the DRI, but the Additional DGFT dropped the proceedings. The Appellate Committee remanded the matter, but the EODC remained valid. The Tribunal noted that the EODC had not been suspended or cancelled and that the Bond and Bank Guarantee were cancelled after the fulfillment of the export obligation. Thus, the Tribunal agreed with the Adjudicating Authority that KIL was entitled to the benefit of the Notification.
3. Jurisdiction of the Committee of Chief Commissioners:
The Respondent argued that the Committee of Chief Commissioners, Mumbai Zone-I & Zone-II, did not have jurisdiction as the case originated in Gujarat. The Tribunal acknowledged the procedural error but held that it did not warrant dismissal of the appeal, emphasizing that substantive rights should not be defeated by procedural infirmities.
4. Applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata:
The Tribunal rejected the argument that the present show cause notice was hit by the principle of constructive res judicata. It upheld the Adjudicating Authority's view that the obligation under Notification 36/97 was a continuing one, justifying the invocation of the extended period for fulfilling the export obligation.
Additional Observations by Vice-President:
The Vice-President concurred with the findings of the Member (Technical) and added that the assembly of cranes, sky masters, crushers, and cutters at the site amounted to manufacture, fulfilling the conditions of the Notification. The EODC and the cancellation of the Bond and Bank Guarantee indicated compliance with the export obligation. The judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Apollo Sea Foods v. Union of India supported this view.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, affirming that KIL had complied with the conditions of Notification No. 36/97-Cus. and was entitled to the exemption.
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2008 (7) TMI 963
The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that the Central Board of Excise and Customs did not challenge the finding that polyvinyl alcohol denkapoval was consumable. The appeal was dismissed with no costs. (Case: 2008 (7) TMI 963 - SC)
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2008 (7) TMI 962
The Supreme Court dismissed two Special Leave Petitions - one on the ground of delay and merits, and the other on the ground of delay. (Citation: 2008 (7) TMI 962 - SC)
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2008 (7) TMI 961
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction to appoint Public Prosecutors.
2. Authority of the State of Tamil Nadu to appoint Public Prosecutors for a case transferred to Pondicherry.
3. Applicability of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
4. Ensuring a fair trial for the accused.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction to appoint Public Prosecutors:
The appellant challenged the appointment of Public Prosecutors by the State of Tamil Nadu for a case transferred to Pondicherry. The court examined the provisions of Chapter II of the Cr.P.C., particularly Section 24, which deals with the appointment of Public Prosecutors. It was concluded that the State Government has the power to appoint Public Prosecutors for cases within its jurisdiction. Once a case is transferred to another state, the transferor state no longer has control over the prosecution in the transferee state.
2. Authority of the State of Tamil Nadu to appoint Public Prosecutors for a case transferred to Pondicherry:
The appellant contended that the State of Tamil Nadu had no right to appoint Public Prosecutors for a case pending in Pondicherry. The court held that the State of Tamil Nadu could not appoint Public Prosecutors for cases outside its jurisdiction. The power to appoint Public Prosecutors for the transferred case lies with the State of Pondicherry, as per Section 24 of the Cr.P.C.
3. Applicability of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.):
Section 24 of the Cr.P.C. outlines the procedure for appointing Public Prosecutors. The court emphasized that the power to appoint Public Prosecutors for a district or sessions division rests with the state government where the trial is conducted. In this case, since the trial was transferred to Pondicherry, the State of Pondicherry has the authority to appoint Public Prosecutors.
4. Ensuring a fair trial for the accused:
The transfer of the case from Tamil Nadu to Pondicherry was based on the apprehension that the accused would not receive a fair trial in Tamil Nadu. The court noted that the role of the Public Prosecutor is crucial in ensuring a fair trial. Therefore, allowing the State of Tamil Nadu to appoint Public Prosecutors for a case in Pondicherry would undermine the purpose of the transfer. The court directed that the State of Pondicherry appoint the Public Prosecutor to ensure impartiality and fairness in the trial.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court, directing that the State of Pondicherry appoint the Public Prosecutor for the case. The expenses for conducting the trial, including the Advocate fees, are to be borne by the State of Tamil Nadu. The appeal was allowed to the extent indicated, ensuring that the prosecution of the case continues in accordance with the law under the jurisdiction of Pondicherry.
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2008 (7) TMI 960
The High Court of Bombay rejected the appeal regarding levying duties under Section 11D of the Central Excise Act. The Tribunal ruled that for Section 11D to apply, there must be a sale, which was not proven in this case. The appellant's argument about increased value of goods due to processing was not considered as it was not raised before the Tribunal. The appeal was rejected as no new legal questions arose.
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2008 (7) TMI 959
High Court Bombay High Court Citation: 2008 (7) TMI 959 - Bombay High Court. D.K.DESHMUKH & J.P.DEVADHAR, JJ. The appeal was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to adopt appropriate remedy before the Tribunal.
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2008 (7) TMI 958
Issues Involved:
The judgment pertains to the issuance of notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 1996-97.
Jurisdiction Issue:
The Tribunal found that the notice issued by the Assessing Officer, Ludhiana was without jurisdiction as the assessee had shifted her residence to New Delhi in 1997. The assessee had provided evidence of requesting transfer of records from Ludhiana to New Delhi, which was acknowledged by the authorities. The Tribunal concluded that only the revenue authorities at New Delhi had jurisdiction over the assessee's cases post-transfer, and hence, the notice from Ludhiana was invalid.
The Tribunal considered the letters exchanged between the Income-tax Officers at Ludhiana and New Delhi, highlighting the request for transfer of assessment records and the no objection from the Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted returns for subsequent assessment years at New Delhi, further supporting the transfer of jurisdiction. The assessee's response to the notice under section 142(1) also indicated the Income-tax Officer at New Delhi as her Assessing Officer. Based on these facts, the Tribunal concluded that the revenue authorities at New Delhi were competent to issue the notice under section 148, dismissing the appeal by the revenue.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that no substantial question of law arose in the case. The Court found no grounds for interference with the Tribunal's order and dismissed the appeal.
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2008 (7) TMI 957
Unexplained deposits in bank account - addition on unsecured loans - creditworthiness of the loan creditors - Assessee had taken loan from 18 parties - AO accepted the loans taken from three persons and the balance amount out of total unsecured loans was opined to be not satisfactory explained and made addition u/s 68 -
HELD THAT:- In the present case, a perusal of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal reveals that assessee has discharged its onus to prove the genuineness of the cash credit by placing on record before the AO sufficient material/evidence. Not only the identity of the creditor has been established by producing the record of the assessee in which those transactions have been duly accounted for, but the assessee has also discharged its onus in explaining the nature of source and the cash credit. It is also well settled that the assessee can be made to explain the source of the credits in the books of account, but not the source of the source, i.e., source of the creditors.
In our view, the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal while taking into consideration the material and documents and appreciating the evidence available on the record, have recorded a pure finding of fact which cannot be interfered by this court in appeal filed by the revenue. It has been held in Raichand Kothari (HUF) v. CIT[1996 (8) TMI 90 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT] that in cash credit cases the Tribunal is the final fact-finding body.
Further, it has been held in CIT v. Shree Gopal & Co. [1993 (4) TMI 48 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT] that the High Court cannot, in a reference/appeal, embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence. The question of the genuineness of a credit or the correctness of the assessee’s explanation is a question of fact which cannot be interfered in appeal by this Court u/s 260A of the Act.
Thus, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order as the counsel for the appellant could not point out any illegality or perversity in the said finding of fact. Therefore, in our opinion, no substantial question of law, much less a substantial question of law, is arising from the decision of the Tribunal.
Dismissed.
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2008 (7) TMI 956
Whether deemed exports has to be included for the purpose of determining entitlement in the DTA - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. & CUS., SURAT Versus AMITEX SILK MILLS P. LTD. [2007 (7) TMI 279 - CESTAT, AHMEDABAD] contested, where it was held that there is no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner in not demanding the duty on the raw materials which have gone into manufacture of finished products/wastes and rejects, which have been sold in DTA with the permission of the Development Commissioner - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2008 (7) TMI 955
Issues involved: Appeal u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against ITAT order for Assessment Year 2001-02 regarding disallowance of interest on investment in capital work-in-progress.
The High Court heard an appeal filed by the Revenue u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the ITAT order dated 27.3.2007 for the Assessment Year 2001-02. The appeal raised the substantial question of law regarding the deletion of disallowance of Rs. 1,32,57,500/- made on account of interest relatable to investment in capital work-in-progress, despite the requirement of explanation 8 to section 43(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The issue was whether the ITAT was correct in deleting the disallowance.
During the proceedings, the counsel for the Revenue highlighted that the issue in this appeal is covered by a Full Bench decision of the Court in a previous case titled "Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Ludhiana Versus M/s. Vardhman Polytex Limited, Chandigarh Road, Ludhiana". However, the counsel for the assessee pointed out that the same question had been considered and decided by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax versus Core Health Care Ltd. (2008) 298 ITR 194 (SC), where the decision was against the Revenue. The Revenue did not contest this legal position.
Considering the decision of the Supreme Court where the issue had already been settled, the High Court concluded that no substantial question of law remained to be addressed. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
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2008 (7) TMI 954
Initiation of reopening proceedings u/s 148 - mere change of opinion - income has escaped assessment - Whether the original assessment made in AY 1991-92, u/s. 143(1)(a), could resort to proceedings u/s. 147 be termed as based on mere change of opinion? - HELD THAT:- The judgment rendered in Phool Chand Bajrang Lal's case [1993 (7) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] it was held, that sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief is not for the Court to judge.
Here, No subsequent information, or material have come to the notice of the AO, to enable him to form a requisite belief, that any particular income has escaped assessment, which was liable to be assessed. we again pointedly asked the learned counsel for the Revenue to point out, as to how these findings are wrong, and to show even to us, if there is any material, which might have come to the notice of the AO subsequently, but the learned counsel for the Revenue could not point out any one.
That being the position, in our view, it was rightly found by the learned CIT(A), and the learned Tribunal, that it was merely a change of opinion on the part of the learned AO, about admissibility of claim of depreciation on tractors, and in view of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in CIT vs. Bhanji Lavji's case [1971 (1) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT], the AO could not initiate reassessment proceedings.
Therefore question No. 1 is answered against the Revenue, and it is held, that the resort to proceedings u/s. 147, was outcome of mere change of opinion. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, in our view it does not arise in the present case.
Thus, we do not find any force in the appeal, and the same is, therefore, dismissed.
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2008 (7) TMI 953
Summary: The Bombay High Court rejected an appeal where the Tribunal suspended a license for abetting conspiracy without evidence to support the finding. No question of law arose.
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2008 (7) TMI 952
Issues involved: Interpretation of section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 regarding exclusion of sums relatable to Sales Tax and Excise Duty from total turnover for claiming benefit under section 80HHC.
Summary:
The Revenue filed a Tax Appeal for the Assessment Year 1993-94, questioning the direction given by ITAT to exclude sums related to Sales Tax and Excise Duty from total turnover for claiming benefits under section 80HHC. The issue was whether such sums should be included in the turnover for computing profits derived from export. The Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Lakshmi Machine Works, [2007] 290 ITR 667 (SC) was cited, which clarified that Section 80HHC is a beneficial section intended to promote exports by exempting profits related to exports. The Court emphasized that excise duty and sales tax, like commission and interest, do not form part of turnover for the purpose of section 80HHC. The formula in section 80HHC aims to disallow concessions not directly linked to exports, necessitating a semantic interpretation of "total turnover." The amendments made over time indicate that items like brokerage, commission, interest, and rent are not considered business profits if they lack a nexus with export activities. Therefore, excise duty and sales tax should also be excluded from the total turnover under section 80HHC(3) to ensure the formula's workability. As the issue was settled by the Supreme Court's decision, the Court ruled in favor of the assessee and dismissed the appeal without costs.
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2008 (7) TMI 951
Whether the injuries caused to Brij Raj Singh P.W.2 could have been caused by the same shot that killed the deceased?
Whether the prosecution story of a single shot causing injury to two persons, that is bullet injury to deceased and pellet injury to Brij Raj Singh, with the accused as the aggressor, stands sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt?
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2008 (7) TMI 950
Legal Judgment: Supreme Court dismissed the review petition as misconceived. (2008 (7) TMI 950 - SC)
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