|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 776 Records
-
2005 (2) TMI 897
Title: Supreme Court of India Judgment 2005 (2) TMI 897 - SC Order
Judges: Mrs. Ruma Pal, Dr. A.R. Lakshmanan, Mr. C.K. Thakker
Decision: Tribunal's order upheld, appeal dismissed. No costs awarded.
-
2005 (2) TMI 896
Issues:
Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condensation of delay in filing the writ petition.
Analysis:
The counsel for the applicant argues that the delay in filing the petition should be condoned, citing previous Supreme Court judgments. However, the court emphasizes that the law of limitation applies equally to government bodies and private parties. The court notes that the reasons provided for the delay in the application are vague and general, lacking specific dates and details. The court highlights the lack of diligence in decision-making by the officers involved in filing the writ petition. It is emphasized that condoning delay is not a right, and sufficient cause must be shown. The court finds the explanation provided in the application insufficient to justify condoning the delay.
Judgment:
The court dismisses the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condensation of delay. Consequently, the writ petition is also dismissed based on the order passed regarding the delay condensation application.
-
2005 (2) TMI 895
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the respondent qualifies as a 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Whether the termination of the respondent's services was justified.
3. Applicability of the principle of res judicata.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the respondent qualifies as a 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The primary issue was whether the respondent, employed as a Legal Assistant, fell under the definition of 'workman' as per Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court initially determined that the respondent's duties were of a "legal clerical nature," thus qualifying him as a 'workman.' This decision was upheld by a learned Single Judge and later by a Division Bench of the High Court.
However, the Supreme Court scrutinized the nature of the respondent's duties, which included preparing legal documents, giving legal opinions, representing the appellant in various cases, and conducting departmental enquiries. The Court noted that these duties involved a significant degree of creativity and quasi-judicial functions, which are not typically associated with clerical work. Citing precedents, the Court emphasized that the job's dominant nature must fit within the categories mentioned in Section 2(s) to qualify as a 'workman.' The Court concluded that the respondent's role did not meet this criterion, as his job was not merely clerical but involved substantial legal and quasi-judicial functions.
2. Whether the termination of the respondent's services was justified:
The Labour Court had ruled that the respondent's termination was unjustified due to non-compliance with Section 25F of the Act, which mandates certain procedures for retrenchment. Consequently, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement with 50% back wages. This decision was partially modified by the Single Judge, who awarded compensation instead of reinstatement, considering the respondent's subsequent employment as an advocate and Additional District Attorney.
The Division Bench of the High Court later reinstated the Labour Court's order of reinstatement but allowed the respondent to seek further wages through Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court, however, found that since the respondent was not a 'workman,' the Labour Court and High Court's orders regarding his termination and reinstatement were not legally sustainable.
3. Applicability of the principle of res judicata:
The respondent argued that the appellant could not contest the Single Judge's decision as it had not been appealed, invoking the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court clarified that res judicata, a procedural principle, does not apply to jurisdictional questions. The Court referenced Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, stating that a jurisdictional error cannot be shielded by res judicata. The Court also cited Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, reiterating that jurisdictional questions, if wrongly decided, do not attract res judicata.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Labour Court and the High Court, ruling that the respondent did not qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, the orders regarding his termination and reinstatement were invalid. However, the Court directed the appellant to pay the balance of 50% back wages, as previously agreed, within eight weeks. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.
-
2005 (2) TMI 894
The Supreme Court of India ordered to place the matter on Friday after four weeks. The reply of the other side should be given to the petitioners' counsel in the meantime. (Citation: 2005 (2) TMI 894 - SC)
-
2005 (2) TMI 893
Issues: Transfer of proceedings from one Debt Recovery Tribunal to another.
In the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India, the main issue revolved around the transfer of proceedings from one Debt Recovery Tribunal to another. The petitioner had been facing actions by various Banks and Financial Institutions for the recovery of outstanding amounts. While most institutions had initiated proceedings in Mumbai, the Respondent, Punjab National Bank, had started proceedings in Jabalpur. The State Bank of India, being the lead Bank, had also initiated proceedings in Mumbai. It was noted that several of the Banks and Financial Institutions in Mumbai held a first charge, whereas Punjab National Bank held a second charge.
The Court, considering the undisputed facts and circumstances, decided to transfer O.A. No.54 of 2001 titled Punjab National Bank Vs. M/s. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. & Ors. from the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Jabalpur to the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Mumbai. The directive was clear that the Debt Recovery Tribunal in Jabalpur should promptly transfer the case records to the Mumbai Tribunal. This decision was made to streamline the proceedings and ensure a more cohesive approach to the recovery process.
The judgment emphasized the importance of efficient and effective handling of recovery proceedings, especially when multiple Banks and Financial Institutions are involved. By transferring the case to a single jurisdiction where most proceedings were already taking place, the Court aimed to avoid duplication of efforts and conflicting decisions. This transfer was deemed necessary to maintain consistency and coherence in the recovery process, given the differing charges held by the Banks and Financial Institutions involved.
Overall, the judgment highlighted the Court's role in ensuring a smooth and coordinated legal process in matters of debt recovery involving multiple parties and jurisdictions. The decision to transfer the proceedings from one Debt Recovery Tribunal to another was based on the need for consolidation and uniformity in dealing with the recovery actions initiated by various Banks and Financial Institutions.
-
2005 (2) TMI 892
Issues:
Interpretation of the expression "Undue hardship" in Proviso to Section 19 of FEMA.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the interpretation of the term "undue hardship" in the context of a case where a bank was required to make a pre-deposit of 50% of a penalty amount to appeal an order under FEMA. The petitioner argued that "undue hardship" should not be limited to financial hardship only but should also consider cases where a party has a strong prima facie case. The court referred to various legal definitions and precedents to explain that "undue hardship" includes situations where the burden imposed is disproportionate to the fault or guilt. It highlighted that a strong prima facie case can be a valid reason for waiver of deposit, even without financial hardship.
The judgment further analyzed similar provisions in other laws, such as the Customs Act and Central Excise Act, to establish the principles for granting waiver of deposit. It emphasized that the existence of a prima facie case is crucial, and if a party has a very strong case or errors in the order are evident, waiver of pre-deposit can be granted to avoid undue hardship. The court outlined factors to be considered, including balance of convenience, financial hardship, capacity to pay, and irreparable loss, while exercising judicial discretion in granting waiver of deposit.
In the specific case under consideration, the court examined the facts where the bank was penalized for accepting deposits without proper authorization under FERA. The court noted that the bank had a strong prima facie case and raised questions about negligence leading to abetment of an offense. It acknowledged the arguments presented by both parties and concluded that the petitioner should deposit 50% of the penalty amount within a specified time for the appeal to be heard and disposed of. The judgment allowed the writ petition to the extent of directing the petitioner to make the required deposit within the stipulated timeframe for further legal proceedings.
Overall, the judgment delves into the nuanced interpretation of "undue hardship" in the context of FEMA, citing legal definitions, precedents, and principles from related laws to guide the decision-making process regarding the waiver of pre-deposit requirements in appeals under FEMA.
-
2005 (2) TMI 891
Issues:
- Appeal against CIT(A) order for assessment year 1989-90.
- Justification of penalty under section 271(1)(c) for cash credit of Rs. 89,000.
- Explanation of income concealment by using brother's name.
- CIT(A) and Assessing Officer findings on penalty imposition.
- Assessee's argument on explanation and difference of opinion.
- Applicability of legal judgments on penalty imposition.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Appeal Against CIT(A) Order:
The appeal was filed against the order of the CIT(A), Bhatinda, for the assessment year 1989-90. The primary issue raised in this appeal was the cancellation of the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerning a cash credit of Rs. 89,000 in the name of the assessee's brother, Sh. Sudershan Kumar.
2. Justification of Penalty Imposition:
The Assessing Officer added Rs. 89,000 as income from an undisclosed source due to the inability of the assessee to prove the creditworthiness of the creditor and the genuineness of the transactions. Subsequently, penalty proceedings were initiated under section 271(1)(c) for concealing income particulars related to this addition and other undisclosed credits.
3. Explanation of Income Concealment:
The assessee contended that the credit was supported by a confirmation from the creditor, Sh. Sudershan Kumar, and the source of the credit was explained. However, the Assessing Officer alleged that the assessee concealed income by using his brother's name for introducing unaccounted income. The CIT(A) and Tribunal upheld this view, leading to the imposition of a penalty of Rs. 49,100.
4. CIT(A) and Assessing Officer Findings:
The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's findings, emphasizing the concealment of income and the misuse of the brother's identity for financial transactions. The assessee challenged this decision, leading to the current appeal before the Bench.
5. Assessee's Argument and Legal Judgments:
The assessee argued that the addition was based on a difference of opinion, citing the judgments of various High Courts and ITAT cases to support the contention that penalty imposition requires evidence of dishonest or contumacious conduct. The assessee maintained that the explanation provided for the credit was plausible, despite the addition being sustained initially.
6. Conclusion and Judgment:
After considering the submissions and evidence, the Bench concluded that the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) was not justified. Citing legal precedents and the plausibility of the assessee's explanation, the Bench set aside the CIT(A) order and canceled the penalty. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
-
2005 (2) TMI 890
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Respondent's appointment and termination.
2. Application of the principle of res judicata.
3. Consideration of the belated claim by the Respondent.
Detailed Analysis:
Validity of the Respondent's Appointment and Termination:
The Respondent was appointed as a Typist on an ad hoc basis for 89 days without any advertisement or notification to the Employment Exchange and did not possess the requisite qualifications initially. Her appointment was subject to the approval of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Haryana, who later relaxed the qualification requirements. The Respondent's appointment was extended periodically until 30.5.1986, after which her services were not continued, and no formal termination order was issued. The Respondent later joined Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) on 10.8.1988. The Appellant-Bank argued that her entry into service was a back-door appointment, rendering it null and void, and her services automatically ended with the expiry of the contractual period.
Application of the Principle of Res Judicata:
The Respondent initially filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was withdrawn on 11.5.1993 to approach the Labour Court. The Labour Court dismissed her claim on the grounds of delay and res judicata, stating that her withdrawal of the writ petition without leave barred her from seeking relief in another forum. However, the Supreme Court opined that the Labour Court wrongly applied the principles of res judicata. The writ petition was not adjudicated on merits, and the Respondent was entitled to seek an alternative remedy. The principles of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lay down public policy, were deemed inapplicable in this context.
Consideration of the Belated Claim by the Respondent:
The Respondent issued a demand notice on 30.9.1993, seeking a reference of the industrial dispute by the State. The Labour Court dismissed her claim as belated, noting that she had been gainfully employed with HUDA since 10.8.1988. The Supreme Court highlighted that while the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe a limitation period, the courts have discretion in granting relief. The Court emphasized that the relief should be molded based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The decision in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited was cited, but it was clarified that it did not establish a universal principle applicable to all cases. The Court noted that the Respondent's claim was stale, having approached the Labour Court after more than seven years, and her conduct in accepting alternative employment was a relevant factor.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Labour Court's decision to refuse relief based on delay and the Respondent's acceptance of alternative employment was justified. The High Court's interference with the Labour Court's discretionary jurisdiction was deemed unwarranted. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and no costs were awarded. The Court noted that the Respondent's service with the Appellant was ad hoc, and her reinstatement would not be equitable given her long-term employment with HUDA and the creation of third-party rights in the Appellant-Bank.
-
2005 (2) TMI 889
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of a winding-up petition based on a foreign decree.
2. Requirement to seek execution of a foreign decree under Section 44-A of the CPC.
3. Validity of a foreign decree under Section 13 of the CPC.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of a Winding-Up Petition Based on a Foreign Decree:
The petitioner sought to wind up the respondent company based on an ex-parte foreign decree from the High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division, London. The primary contention was whether such a foreign decree constitutes a "debt" under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, and whether the petition is maintainable without first executing the decree under Section 44-A of the CPC. The court held that a decree, including a foreign decree, constitutes a "debt" within the meaning of Section 433(e) of the Act. It was affirmed that the decree holder has the option to file a winding-up petition without necessarily executing the decree first.
2. Requirement to Seek Execution of a Foreign Decree Under Section 44-A of the CPC:
The respondent company argued that the petitioner must seek execution of the foreign decree under Section 44-A of the CPC before filing a winding-up petition. The court concluded that while it is not mandatory to execute the decree first, the company court must still examine the validity of the decree, especially when challenged on grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the CPC. The court emphasized that a winding-up petition based on a foreign decree would be maintainable, but the decree's validity could be contested in the winding-up proceedings.
3. Validity of a Foreign Decree Under Section 13 of the CPC:
The court examined whether the foreign decree was binding and enforceable under Indian law, specifically under Section 13 of the CPC. The respondent company contended that the decree was not given on the merits, lacked jurisdiction, and was obtained in violation of natural justice. The court found that the decree did not appear to be on the merits of the case and lacked evidence of proper adjudication. Consequently, the court held that the foreign decree was not binding under Section 13 of the CPC due to its failure to meet the necessary legal standards, such as being given on the merits and following principles of natural justice.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the winding-up petition, concluding that the foreign decree's validity needed to be tested in execution proceedings under Section 44-A of the CPC. The court emphasized that while a foreign decree can constitute a debt, its enforceability must be scrutinized under Section 13 of the CPC to prevent misuse of the winding-up process.
-
2005 (2) TMI 888
Issues:
1. Discrepancy in Gross Profit (GP) calculation in building contracts.
2. Tribunal's authority to fix GP rate lower than that fixed by the Assessing Officer (AO).
Analysis:
1. The appeal before the High Court concerned a dispute over the Gross Profit (GP) calculation in building contracts for the assessment year 1992-93. The Revenue challenged the Tribunal's decision to set the GP rate at 2 per cent, which was lower than the prescribed standard profit rate of 8 per cent for such contracts. The main issue raised was whether the Tribunal erred in arriving at an extremely low GP rate given the admitted facts and evidence collected by the AO.
2. The High Court observed that the Tribunal had thoroughly examined the matter and concluded that the income taxable for the period should be calculated at 2 per cent of the gross receipts of the assessee. The Tribunal also considered the CIT's finding that interest earned by the assessee during business operations should be treated as business income and not separately. The Tribunal's decision to fix the GP rate at 2 per cent was based on factual evidence, and the High Court determined that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision to maintain the GP rate at 2 per cent and rejecting the Revenue's challenge.
3. In conclusion, the High Court ruled that the appeal by the Revenue failed, and it was dismissed without any costs. The judgment highlighted the importance of factual evidence in determining GP rates for building contracts and affirmed the Tribunal's authority to fix a GP rate lower than that determined by the AO based on the evidence presented during the proceedings.
-
2005 (2) TMI 887
Issues Involved:
1. Misuse and abuse of the court process.
2. Validity of the petitioners' appointments and their subsequent cancellation.
3. Legality of interchanging placements between petitioners.
4. Concealment of material facts by the petitioners.
5. Permissibility of mutual transfers under the relevant Act.
6. Consequences of misleading the court and obtaining interim orders through fraud.
7. Non-impleadment of necessary parties.
8. Imposition of costs and initiation of criminal contempt proceedings.
Comprehensive Analysis:
1. Misuse and Abuse of the Court Process:
The court noted that the petitioners misused and abused the court process. One petitioner, whose appointment was already canceled by operation of law, managed to join a college of his choice by playing fraud upon the court.
2. Validity of the Petitioners' Appointments and Their Subsequent Cancellation:
The petitioners were selected for appointment as Lecturers by the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission. However, they did not join their respective colleges and instead requested an interchange of placements. The Director did not approve this request, and the appointments were automatically canceled when the petitioners failed to join within the stipulated time. The court emphasized that there was no requirement for the Director or the college management to inform the petitioners about the cancellation, as it was automatic.
3. Legality of Interchanging Placements Between Petitioners:
The court found that the petitioners could not legally interchange their placements. The Director's placement orders were based on the specific requirements of the colleges and the merit of the candidates. The petitioners' attempt to interchange placements was contrary to the provisions of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980.
4. Concealment of Material Facts by the Petitioners:
The court noted that the petitioners deliberately concealed material facts, including the fact that one petitioner was already employed as a Lecturer in another college. This concealment misled the court into granting an interim order that allowed the petitioners to interchange their placements.
5. Permissibility of Mutual Transfers Under the Relevant Act:
The court examined the provisions of the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980, and concluded that mutual transfers were not permissible under the Act. The Act and the relevant rules and regulations did not provide for such transfers, and the Director did not have the authority to approve them.
6. Consequences of Misleading the Court and Obtaining Interim Orders Through Fraud:
The court emphasized that misleading the court and obtaining interim orders through fraud amounted to criminal contempt. The petitioners' actions obstructed the administration of justice and warranted serious consequences. The court cited several Supreme Court judgments to support its stance that interim relief should not be granted if it amounts to final relief and that misleading the court is a serious offense.
7. Non-Impleadment of Necessary Parties:
The court noted that the petitioners failed to implead Harendra Kumar, whose appointment was directly challenged in the petition. This non-impleadment of a necessary party was another ground for dismissing the petition.
8. Imposition of Costs and Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings:
The court imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000 on each petitioner, to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Additionally, the court initiated criminal contempt proceedings against the petitioners for deliberately misleading the court and obtaining an interim order through fraud. The petitioners were directed to show cause why they should not be punished for criminal contempt.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition, vacated the interim order, and initiated criminal contempt proceedings against the petitioners for their fraudulent actions and deliberate concealment of material facts. The court also imposed costs on the petitioners for their misuse of the court process.
-
2005 (2) TMI 886
Issues:
Appeal arising out of civil Writ Petition, rejection of tender process, validity of Chartered Accountant's certificate, mandatory requirements for tender acceptance, High Court's judgment review, misreading of material on record.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Civil Writ Petition and Tender Rejection:
The appeals arose from a civil Writ Petition challenging the rejection of a tender process for providing pre-paid telephone services in a specific district. The contesting respondent sought to quash the tender process, alleging that their offer was wrongly rejected by the second respondent, leading to the contract being awarded to the appellant. The High Court, upon entertaining the writ petition, found the rejection arbitrary and unfair, cancelling the contract and directing a fresh tender process.
2. Validity of Chartered Accountant's Certificate:
The appellant challenged the High Court's decision primarily on the grounds that the Chartered Accountant's certificate submitted by the respondent was not genuine, influencing the original judgment. The appellant withdrew a Special Leave Petition to approach the High Court through a review petition, highlighting the certificate's lack of authenticity. However, the High Court dismissed the review petition, emphasizing the significance of the Chartered Accountant's certificate in the original judgment.
3. Mandatory Requirements for Tender Acceptance:
The appellant contended that the respondent's tender was rightfully rejected by the department due to the failure to provide mandatory information as required in the tender form. The department specified essential requirements, including turnover details, work experience, and a certified profit and loss account by a Chartered Accountant. The absence of these documents led to the rejection of the respondent's offer, a decision supported by the department's counter.
4. High Court's Judgment Review:
Following unsuccessful attempts to challenge the High Court's decision through a review petition, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The appellant argued that the High Court erred in concluding that certain documents were not mandatory for tender submission, contrary to the specified requirements in the tender form and annexures. The Supreme Court found the High Court's judgment to be based on a misinterpretation of the tender conditions and set aside the orders made by the lower court.
5. Misreading of Material on Record:
The Supreme Court determined that the High Court had misread the material on record, leading to factual errors that influenced the judgment in favor of the respondent. Due to this misinterpretation, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the lower court's orders and dismissing the original writ petition. The Court found that the High Court's decision was not justified based on the evidence presented and the requirements outlined in the tender documents.
6. Final Decision:
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was flawed, and the relief granted to the respondent was based on incorrect factual assessments. As a result, the Supreme Court set aside the lower court's orders, dismissing the writ petition and upholding the rejection of the tender process. No separate order was deemed necessary for the appeal arising from the review order of the High Court.
-
2005 (2) TMI 885
Dishonour of Cheque - Procedure to try complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Scope of Section 145 - evidence by way of affidavit - permission to cross examine the complainant - whether the Court can dispense with his / her appearance and instead, take affidavit of the complainant and treat the same as examination in chief - HELD THAT:- The petitioners are justified in their assertion that the newly added provisions of the Act in question would be rendered nugatory if complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act are not disposed of expeditiously. The judicial system itself cannot acquire efficacy, credibility or respectability if a complaint of this nature takes five to seven years before it is finally adjudicated by the Metropolitan Magistrate.
It has become imperative for us to take all necessary steps to ensure that these complaints are disposed of expeditiously and unscrupulous people do not take undue advantage of the pendency of these complaints before the Courts.
Undoubtedly, dishonoured of a cheque by the bank causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience to the payee, and the entire credibility of the business transaction within and outside the country suffers a serious set back. The Parliament, in order to restore the credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment, specifically incorporated the provisions of Sections 138 to 142 of the Act.
The provisions of Section 138 of the Act would be attracted only when the cheque has been issued for the discharge of any debt or other legally enforceable liability. The maker of the cheque is not liable for prosecution if the cheque is given by way of a gift, present or donation and is dishonoured.
Subsection (1) of Section 145 gives complete freedom to the complainant either to give his evidence by way of affidavit or by way of oral evidence. If this is made on affidavit, the same has to be accepted and such affidavit is required to be kept on record by the Court. The second part of subsection (1) provides that the complainant may give his evidence on affidavit and may, subject to all just exceptions, be read in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Thus, it is clear that once the evidence of the complainant is given on affidavit, it may be read in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding, and it may be subject to all just exceptions.
We are clearly of the opinion that according to the language of Section 145 of the Act, the evidence (examination in chief) of the complainant can be given on affidavit, and thereafter, if the accused so desires, he / she may request the Court to call the complainant for cross examination.
All these petitions are accordingly disposed of. Rule is partly made absolute in Criminal Writ Petition. All intervention applications stand disposed of.
-
2005 (2) TMI 884
Issues: Mismanagement and oppression of affairs under section 397 of the Companies Act, 1956.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Allegations of Mismanagement and Oppression:
The petition was filed against the respondent company for mismanagement and oppression under section 397 of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner group, referred to as the "Geeta Group," alleged that the respondent group, known as the "S. B. Patil Group," unilaterally enhanced the share capital in 1997 without notice, reducing the petitioner group's shareholding. The enhancement was deemed an attempt to acquire total control clandestinely, as no prior notice was given, and shares were allotted at a lower value than the book value. Various instances of financial mismanagement, including interest-free loans and non-payment of dividends, were highlighted as prejudicial to the company's interest.
2. Maintainability of the Petition:
The respondent's counsel argued that the petition was not maintainable under section 399 of the Companies Act, as the petitioner did not meet the required shareholding criteria. Additionally, it was contended that there was no justification for winding up the company, as there was no deadlock. Citing relevant case laws, the respondent's counsel sought dismissal of the petition on these grounds.
3. Response to Allegations:
The respondent's counsel refuted the allegations of mismanagement, stating that decisions like interest-free loans and non-declaration of dividends were strategic management choices and not oppressive to any member. The respondent group claimed that the petitioner group was aware of the company's affairs, including share capital increases and loan advancements. They argued that the petition was an abuse of the legal process and should be dismissed with costs.
4. Judgment and Direction:
After considering the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, the Board directed that the petitioner group be allotted shares on a proportionate basis, maintaining the ratio at the company's inception. The respondent company was instructed to offer shares to the petitioners within a specified timeframe. If the petitioners accepted the offer, the shares would be allotted accordingly. Failure to respond within the stipulated time would result in the offer lapsing. The authorized capital of the company would be increased accordingly. No costs were awarded in the judgment.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the allegations of mismanagement and oppression, analyzed the maintainability of the petition, considered the responses to the allegations, and provided a specific direction for the allotment of shares to the petitioner group, thereby disposing of the petition.
-
2005 (2) TMI 883
Murder - Offences punishable u/s 302 r/w Section 120B of the IPC - transfer of an under-trial prisoner from jail - arrest after the cancellation of bail - respondent was permitted to address a political meeting while he was still under custody - illegal activities in jail premises - HELD THAT:- It is true that in a normal trial the Criminal Procedure Code requires the accused to be present at the trial but in the peculiar circumstances of this case a procedure will have have to be evolved, which will not be contrary to the rights given to an accused under the Criminal Procedure Code but at the same time protect the administration of justice. Therefore, as held by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai 2003 (4) TMI 570 - SUPREME COURT], we think the above requirement of the Code could be met by directing the trial by video conferencing facility.
In our opinion, this is one of those rare cases wherein a frequent visit from the place of detention to the court of trial in Bihar would prejudice the security of both the respondent and others involved in the case. Apart from being a heavy burden on the State exchequer. It is in this background the CBI has submitted that the prisons at Chennai. Palayamkottai Central Jail, Vellor Central Jail, Coimbatore Central Jail all in the State of Tamilnadu and Mysore Central Jail in the State of Karnataka has video conferencing facilities. Therefore the respondent can be transferred to any one of those Jails.
Taking into consideration the overall fact situation of the case, we think it appropriate that the respondent be transferred to Tihar Jail at Delhi and we direct the seniormost officer-in-charge of Tihar Jail to make such arrangements as he thinks is necessary to prevent the reoccurrence of the activities of the respondent of the nature referred to hereinabove and shall allow no special privileges to him unless he is entitled to the same in law. His conduct during his custody in Tihar Jail will specially be monitored and if necessary be reported to this Court. However, the respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of the visit of his family as provided for under the Jail manual of Tihar. He shall also be entitled to such categorization and such facilities available to him in law.
We also direct that the trial of the case in Patna shall continue without the presence of the appellant by the court dispensing such presence and to the extent possible shall be conducted with the aid of video conferencing. However, in the event of the respondent making any application for his transfer for sole purpose of being present during the recording of the statement of any particular witness same will be considered by the learned Sessions Judge on its merit and if he thinks it appropriate, he may direct the authorities of Tihar Jail to produce accused before him for that limited purpose. This, however, will be in a rare and important situation only and if such transfer order is made the respondent shall be taken from Tihar Jail to the court concerned and if need be detained in appropriate Jail at the place of trial and under the custody and charge of the police to be specially deputed by the authorities of Tihar Jail who shall bear in mind the factual situation in which the respondent has been transferred from Patna to Delhi.
As stated above the respondent shall be entitled for the visitation rights of his family members as provided under the Tihar Jail manual. It shall be strictly followed and will be confined to only such persons who are entitled for such visit.
In compliance of this order, we direct the State of Bihar to transfer the respondent from Beur Jail, Patna to Tihar Jail, Delhi and hand over the prisoner to the authorized officer by prior intimation to Tihar Jail authorities of his arrival in Delhi. The authorities escorting the respondent from Patna to Delhi shall strictly follow the rules applicable to the transit prisoners and no special privilege should be shown, any such act if proved, will be taken serious note of. The respondent shall be transferred to Tihar Jail from Patna within one week from the date of this order.
-
2005 (2) TMI 882
Issues: Quashing of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 based on the delay in filing the complaint.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard a case where the appellant filed a complaint against the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The High Court had quashed the proceedings based on the sole ground that the complaint was not filed within the stipulated period after the cheque was dishonored. The Court found that the respondent did not raise this ground in the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the statutory notice of dishonor was given only once before filing the complaint within the prescribed period. The Court emphasized that raising a defense on facts should not be a basis for quashing proceedings as it involves disputed questions of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, allowed the criminal appeal, and directed that the complaint should proceed in accordance with the law.
This judgment highlights the importance of following the procedural requirements under the Negotiable Instruments Act and refraining from using factual disputes as grounds for quashing proceedings. The Court emphasized that the delay in filing the complaint should not automatically lead to the quashing of proceedings and that such decisions should be based on legal grounds rather than factual disputes. This case serves as a reminder for parties to adhere to the statutory timelines and procedures while dealing with matters under the Negotiable Instruments Act to ensure a fair and just resolution of disputes.
-
2005 (2) TMI 881
Issues Involved:
1. Right of journalists to interview a convict.
2. Freedom of press under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
3. Impact of media interference on ongoing investigations.
4. Right of an accused to silence and protection against self-incrimination.
5. Balance between freedom of press and public order.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Right of Journalists to Interview a Convict:
The petitioners, accredited journalists associated with a News Agency and a T.V. Channel, sought permission to interview a life convict, who was also an accused in a high-profile murder case. They argued that interviewing the convict would provide the public with various possible angles of the incident, asserting that their right to propagate ideas is protected under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
2. Freedom of Press under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution:
The petitioners contended that the inaction of the respondents in granting permission violated their fundamental rights. They emphasized that freedom of press, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, has been interpreted as part of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The importance of press freedom was highlighted through various Supreme Court judgments, which recognized the press as a public educator essential for a democratic society.
3. Impact of Media Interference on Ongoing Investigations:
The respondents, represented by the Government Pleader, argued that the case was at the primary stage of investigation and any media interference could negatively affect the investigation. The Court noted that while the press has the right to freedom of speech and expression, this right is not absolute and must be exercised without meddling with the course of investigation or prosecution of cases. The Court emphasized that any intrusion by the media could mislead or water down the prosecution and impair the trial.
4. Right of an Accused to Silence and Protection Against Self-Incrimination:
The Court underlined that under Indian Criminal Law, the State has the prerogative to prosecute individuals, and accused persons have the right to silence. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and the Evidence Act ensure that any statement made by an accused during investigation cannot be used against them. Article 20(3) of the Constitution further protects an accused from being compelled to be a witness against themselves. The Court held that neither the State nor the press could invade this right, as it would expose the accused to several perils and make their condition vulnerable.
5. Balance Between Freedom of Press and Public Order:
The Court recognized the crucial role of the press but noted that unrestricted freedom could lead to disorder and anarchy. The Court cited various judgments to emphasize that the freedom of press must be balanced with public order, decency, and morality. The Court expressed concern over the sensational and unedited reporting by the electronic media, which could have a significant impact on society and the judicial process. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, which criticized the phenomenon of "trial by press" and its potential to cause miscarriage of justice.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the petitioners' request to interview the convict could not be granted at this stage due to the potential impact on the ongoing investigation and the trial. The Court suggested that the petitioners could renew their request after the charge-sheet was filed. The writ petitions were disposed of with no order as to costs.
-
2005 (2) TMI 880
Issues:
1. Copyright infringement of software by defendants.
2. Trademark infringement by defendants.
3. Passing off of counterfeit software as genuine.
4. Relief sought by the plaintiff.
Copyright Infringement:
The plaintiff, a registered proprietor of the trademark 'MICROSOFT,' alleged that the defendants were loading software onto computers without a license, causing financial loss. Evidence included affidavits proving the plaintiff's ownership and registration of software programs and trademarks. The defendants did not contest the claims, leading to an ex-parte proceeding. Affidavits from technical experts and employees demonstrated the loading of pirated software by the defendants. The court found the defendants liable for copyright infringement, based on the plaintiff's unrebutted evidence and the unauthorized copying of software onto computers sold by the defendants.
Trademark Infringement:
Apart from copyright infringement, the plaintiff also alleged trademark infringement by the defendants. The evidence presented included certificates of registration for the 'MICROSOFT' trademark and affidavits establishing the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's trademarks on products sold by the defendants. The court found the defendants liable for trademark infringement, as they were selling products with deceptive variants of the plaintiff's trademarks without permission.
Passing Off:
The plaintiff further claimed passing off of counterfeit software as genuine products. Affidavits and evidence showed that the defendants were distributing software and products bearing deceptive variants of the plaintiff's trademarks without authorization. The court held the defendants responsible for passing off counterfeit software as genuine, causing confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the products.
Relief Sought:
The plaintiff sought various reliefs, including permanent injunctions, delivery-up of infringing copies, rendition of accounts of profits earned through infringement, and damages. The court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, granting injunctions against the defendants, delivery-up of infringing copies, and compensation of Rs. 19.75 lacs. The damages were to be paid jointly and severally by the defendants with an interest rate of 9% per annum. The plaintiff was also awarded costs, and a decree was to be prepared upon payment of the court fee for the damages awarded.
-
2005 (2) TMI 879
Issues:
1. Necessity of "Letters of Administration" for claiming gold ornaments.
2. Requirement of actual payment for redemption of pledged property.
3. Examination of witnesses and evidence in the case.
Issue 1: Necessity of "Letters of Administration" for claiming gold ornaments
The appeal originated from a judgment directing the Bank to return gold ornaments to the plaintiffs upon payment of the loan amount with interest. The trial court initially held that "Letters of Administration" were essential for claiming the ornaments, leading to the dismissal of the suit. However, the appellate court, in a subsequent appeal, ruled that such letters were not necessary. The appellate court allowed the appeal, directing the Bank to return the ornaments without the requirement of "Letters of Administration." The appellant Bank challenged this decision, arguing that the appellate court failed to discuss the trial court's reasons adequately. The appellant cited legal precedents emphasizing the need for appellate courts to address and provide reasons for differing from trial court findings. The respondent's counsel contended that the appellate court had considered both sets of reasons and was entitled to form its own conclusions. The court found that the appellate court had sufficiently explained its reasoning, thereby upholding the decision to return the ornaments without the "Letters of Administration."
Issue 2: Requirement of actual payment for redemption of pledged property
The appellant argued that the plaintiffs failed to make actual payment of the loan amount, which was necessary for stopping the accrual of interest. The appellant contended that mere willingness or offers to pay were insufficient, emphasizing the need for actual tender of the amount due to halt interest accumulation. Legal principles were cited to support this argument, highlighting the conditions for a valid tender to cease interest. The respondent countered by stating that the Bank's insistence on "Letters of Administration" created uncertainty for the plaintiffs, affecting their willingness to make full payment. The respondent referred to cases where the failure to return pledged goods affected the obligation to pay interest. The court noted the circumstances leading to the plaintiffs' hesitation in making the payment, ultimately agreeing with the appellate court's decision to limit the liability for interest payment until August 1982. The court found no fault in the appellate court's conclusion, dismissing the appeal.
Issue 3: Examination of witnesses and evidence in the case
The appellant raised concerns about the lack of examination of a key witness, the son of plaintiff No. 1, who inquired about the loan amount with the Bank. The absence of his testimony was argued to indicate a lack of genuine offer by the plaintiffs to repay the loan. The respondent countered by stating that the Bank's actions and demands, including transferring another loan account to the plaintiffs, influenced the plaintiffs' decision not to make the payment. Legal precedents were cited to support the argument that the Bank's failure to return the pledged goods affected the plaintiffs' obligation to pay interest. The court considered the circumstances and the Bank's actions, ultimately supporting the appellate court's decision regarding the interest liability. The court found no legal flaw in the appellate court's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.
In conclusion, the court upheld the appellate court's decision, ruling in favor of the respondents and dismissing the appeal with costs.
-
2005 (2) TMI 878
Issues:
1. Violation of SEBI regulations regarding fraudulent and unfair trade practices.
2. Allegations of synchronized or matched trades between related entities.
3. Interpretation of SEBI regulations on market manipulation and genuine trade transactions.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the violation of SEBI regulations by the appellants, who were directed not to deal in securities for six months due to alleged violations of Regulation 4(b) and (c) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulation, 1994. The case involved transactions related to the re-issuance and subsequent trading of forfeited shares of a company, which raised concerns about creating false appearances or reflecting non-genuine prices in the securities market.
2. The appellants, who were related entities, engaged in transactions that SEBI considered synchronized or matched deals, leading to the imposition of the trading restriction. SEBI argued that such trades, even for tax planning purposes, could be manipulative and prohibited under the regulations. The appellants contended that related entity transactions are permissible as long as they do not impact the market. The judgment compared SEBI's stance on synchronized trades in a previous case involving ICICI Brokerage Services Ltd. to determine the legality of the transactions in question.
3. The analysis of the transactions, market behavior, and investigation reports revealed that the impugned trades did not manipulate the market or influence prices significantly. SEBI's objection to the trades on specific dates was refuted by the lack of evidence supporting deliberate price manipulation by the appellants. The judgment emphasized that for trades to be objectionable under the regulations, they must influence the market, which was not the case here. The interpretation of SEBI regulations highlighted the necessity for trades to create false appearances or reflect non-genuine prices to warrant regulatory action.
4. Ultimately, the appeals were allowed, and the impugned order was set aside as the transactions in question did not meet the criteria for market manipulation or violation of SEBI regulations. The judgment emphasized the importance of evidence of market influence and manipulation to justify regulatory actions against trading practices, even between related entities. No costs were awarded in the case.
........
|
9911796707
