Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 2002 2002 (3) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 21 to 40 of 454 Records

• 2002 (3) TMI 941
  
  Issues:
  1. Disposal of CP No 49/2001 regarding control of a family company.
  2. Application for correction and modification of certain terms of the order.
  3. Dispute over ownership of the company and distribution of shares in M/S Vardhman.
  4. Allegations of mistake of law and facts in the order.
  5. Power of the Company Law Board (CLB) to modify its order.
  
  Issue 1: Disposal of CP No 49/2001 regarding control of a family company:
  The Company Law Board (CLB) decided that control of the family company should go to the petitioner based on equitable grounds, directing the transfer of assets and liabilities. The respondents agreed to hand over control to the petitioner with certain conditions regarding the distribution of shares in M/S Vardhman. The CLB emphasized equitable considerations in its decision, aiming to protect the interests of the petitioner.
  
  Issue 2: Application for correction and modification of certain terms of the order:
  The respondents sought corrections in the order, disputing the recording of concessions made during the proceedings. The CLB acknowledged the need for clarity and corrected the order by deleting a portion that inaccurately suggested concessions by the respondents. The CLB relied on legal precedent to support the correction, emphasizing the importance of accurate records in judicial decisions.
  
  Issue 3: Dispute over ownership of the company and distribution of shares in M/S Vardhman:
  The respondents contested the decision to transfer control to the petitioner, highlighting changes in circumstances regarding the conversion of warrants in M/S Vardhman. They argued for a modification in the distribution of shares to prevent adverse effects on their interests. The CLB, however, rejected the request for modification, citing the need for timely disclosure of relevant information during the proceedings.
  
  Issue 4: Allegations of mistake of law and facts in the order:
  The parties presented arguments regarding alleged mistakes of law and facts in the order. The respondents claimed that certain statements in the order misrepresented their positions, while the petitioner emphasized the finality of the CLB's decision. The CLB clarified the record but maintained its original decision based on the information available during the proceedings.
  
  Issue 5: Power of the Company Law Board (CLB) to modify its order:
  The CLB addressed the question of its authority to modify the order after its issuance. It distinguished between changes in circumstances known to the parties during the proceedings and those brought to light after the order was passed. The CLB emphasized the importance of timely disclosure of relevant information and rejected the request for modification based on post-order developments.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment reflects the CLB's careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the need for accurate records, and the limitations on modifying orders based on subsequent events. The decision underscores the importance of transparency, timely disclosure, and adherence to legal principles in resolving disputes related to company ownership and control.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 940
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legislative competence of Section 27 of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993.
  2. Violation of Articles 265, 286, and 300A of the Constitution of India.
  3. Confiscatory nature of Section 27.
  4. Validity of Sections 8(i)(c) and 8(3)(iv) of the Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legislative Competence of Section 27:
  The petitioners challenged Section 27 of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, arguing that it is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. They contended that Section 27 includes turnover outside the purview of Entry 54 of List II and amounts not exigible to Sales Tax under the Act or the Central Act. The court referred to precedents, including the State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerly & Co., and the Builders' Association of India v. Union of India, which clarified the State's power to levy sales tax on the value of goods involved in a works contract. The court concluded that Section 27 is a machinery provision for tax collection and not a substantive provision for imposing tax, thus within the legislative competence of the State.
  
  2. Violation of Articles 265, 286, and 300A:
  The petitioners argued that the deduction of tax at source under Section 27 violates Articles 265, 286, and 300A of the Constitution of India. They cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Bhawani Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. State of Orissa, which held that arbitrary deduction of tax at source without provision for exemption is unconstitutional. The court distinguished these cases by noting that Section 27 of the Assam Act provides for deduction of tax at source only in respect of goods liable to tax under the Act, thereby not violating the constitutional provisions.
  
  3. Confiscatory Nature of Section 27:
  The petitioners claimed that Section 27 is confiscatory in nature as it purports to realize tax on turnover not taxable under the Act. The court rejected this argument, stating that Section 27 is a machinery provision for advance tax collection and not confiscatory. The court emphasized that the liability to pay tax is determined under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, and Section 27 merely facilitates tax collection.
  
  4. Validity of Sections 8(i)(c) and 8(3)(iv):
  Some petitioners also challenged Sections 8(i)(c) and 8(3)(iv) as ultra vires and violative of Article 286 of the Constitution, arguing that these sections do not provide for deduction of the value of goods used in inter-State trade or commerce. The court held that these provisions are not ultra vires or illegal when read in conjunction with the charging sections and the permissible deductions under the Act. The court clarified that Section 27 should be read together with Sections 7 and 8, and deductions and exemptions provided under these sections apply to tax deduction at source under Section 27.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court upheld the validity of Section 27 and related provisions of the Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993, by reading them down to ensure compliance with constitutional provisions and judicial precedents. The court emphasized that deduction of tax at source is permissible under the law, and dealers/assessees can claim permissible deductions during final assessment. All writ petitions were disposed of in light of these observations, with no costs awarded.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 939
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
  2. Invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  3. Allegation of mala fide in the acquisition process.
  4. Non-delivery of possession despite court orders.
  5. Right of landowners to file objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Acquisition Proceedings:
  The acquisition proceedings for Premises No. 27/1 and 27/B on Dehi Serampore Road, Calcutta, initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, were challenged multiple times. The initial notification under Section 4 was issued on 17.12.1982, and a declaration under Section 6 followed on 13.12.1989. These proceedings were quashed by the Calcutta High Court, leading to a series of fresh notifications and subsequent legal challenges. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the validity of the acquisition, stating that the premises were required for the students of the National Medical College, and the urgency for acquisition was evident.
  
  2. Invocation of Urgency Clause under Section 17:
  The urgency clause under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act was invoked by the State Government, allowing them to bypass the usual procedure under Section 5A. The Supreme Court emphasized that the question of urgency is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and is not ordinarily open to judicial scrutiny unless there is evidence of non-application of mind or mala fide. The Court found that the premises were urgently needed for the National Medical College, and the repeated quashing of notifications had caused significant delays, justifying the invocation of the urgency clause.
  
  3. Allegation of Mala Fide in the Acquisition Process:
  The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had quashed the acquisition on the grounds of mala fide, primarily due to the non-compliance with an earlier court order to deliver possession to the owner. The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, stating that the purpose of the acquisition was genuine and not a camouflage. The Court held that the mere non-delivery of possession did not constitute mala fide, especially when the premises were needed for a public purpose, and the urgency was clear.
  
  4. Non-Delivery of Possession Despite Court Orders:
  The High Court had previously directed the delivery of possession to the owner, which was not complied with. The Supreme Court acknowledged this non-compliance but clarified that it did not invalidate the subsequent acquisition proceedings. The Court emphasized that the urgency for acquiring the premises for the National Medical College justified the actions taken under Section 17, and the non-delivery of possession was not a sufficient ground to annul the acquisition.
  
  5. Right of Landowners to File Objections under Section 5A:
  The respondents argued that the invocation of Section 17 deprived them of their valuable right to file objections under Section 5A. The Supreme Court noted that Section 5A provides landowners with an opportunity to object to the acquisition within 30 days of the notification. However, the Court held that the urgency clause under Section 17 could be invoked in cases of grave emergency where immediate possession is required. Given the long-standing occupation of the premises by the Medical College and the repeated legal interventions, the Court found the invocation of Section 17 justified and not illegal.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, upheld the validity of the acquisition proceedings, and ruled that the invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17 was justified. The Court concluded that the acquisition was not mala fide and was in accordance with the law, emphasizing the genuine public purpose and the urgency involved. The appeal was allowed, and the acquisition proceedings were deemed lawful.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 938
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of Clause 63 of the General Conditions of Contract.
  2. Applicability of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  3. Determination of whether claims fall under 'excepted matters'.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Interpretation of Clause 63 of the General Conditions of Contract:
  Clause 63 of the General Conditions of Contract provides that all disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract shall be referred to arbitration, except for 'excepted matters'. 'Excepted matters' are divided into two categories: (i) matters specified in certain clauses of the General Conditions, and (ii) matters covered by any clauses of the Special Conditions of the Contract. The clause further states that 'excepted matters' shall be excluded from arbitration.
  
  2. Applicability of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940:
  The respondent moved a petition u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to refer six claims to arbitration. The Single Judge of the High Court directed two claims to be referred to arbitration but held that claims 3 to 6 were 'excepted matters' and not arbitrable. The Division Bench, however, directed all claims to be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court held that while dealing with a petition u/s 20, the Court must determine whether the difference is one to which the arbitration agreement applies. If it is an 'excepted matter', the Court should not refer it to arbitration.
  
  3. Determination of whether claims fall under 'excepted matters':
  Claims 3 to 6 were examined to determine if they fell under 'excepted matters'. The Supreme Court found that:
  - Claim 3: Pertained to increased costs of building materials, covered by Clause 9.2 of Special Conditions, which states that no material price variation shall be payable.
  - Claim 4: Related to idle machinery, covered by Clause 21.5 of Special Conditions, which states that no claim for idle machinery will be entertained.
  - Claim 5: Concerned delays in site availability, covered by Clause 11.3 of Special Conditions, which states that no claim for delays will be entertained.
  - Claim 6: Related to losses due to less output, also covered by Clause 11.3.
  
  The Court concluded that these claims were 'excepted matters' as they were explicitly excluded from arbitration by the contract terms. The Court emphasized that an 'excepted matter' does not require a departmental remedy to be non-arbitrable. The interpretation of whether a claim is an 'excepted matter' can be determined by the Court while disposing of a petition u/s 20.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Division Bench's decision, and restored the Single Judge's decision, holding that the claims in question were 'excepted matters' and not arbitrable. The Court reiterated that the determination of 'excepted matters' is within the Court's purview and not solely for the arbitrator to decide.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 937
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Passing off and trademark infringement.
  2. Generic nature of the term "NAUKRI".
  3. Bad faith and dishonest intention in domain name registration.
  
  Summary:
  
  Passing off and trademark infringement:
  The plaintiff sought a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants for using the domain name 'NAUKRI.COM' or any deceptively similar name, alleging that the defendant's use of 'NAUKRI.COM' as a hyperlink to 'JOBSOURCEINDIA.COM' constitutes passing off. The court recognized that a domain name serves the same function as a trademark and is entitled to equal protection. The court cited the YAHOO.COM v. AKASH ARORA case, where it was held that domain names are not mere addresses but identifiers of internet services, warranting protection against passing off.
  
  Generic nature of the term "NAUKRI":
  The defendant argued that 'NAUKRI.COM' is generic and incapable of trademark significance or secondary meaning. However, the court noted that even descriptive or generic terms could acquire a secondary meaning through long use and reputation. The plaintiff demonstrated that 'NAUKRI.COM' had gained distinctiveness and a secondary meaning, as evidenced by press clippings and write-ups indicating its established reputation in the market.
  
  Bad faith and dishonest intention in domain name registration:
  The plaintiff accused the defendant of bad faith and dishonest intention by registering a similar domain name to divert internet traffic. The court found that the defendant's registration of 'NAUKRI.COM' along with 'JOBSOURCEINDIA.COM' and the subsequent diversion of traffic indicated bad faith. The court referred to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, which considers intentional attempts to attract internet users for commercial gain through confusion as evidence of bad faith.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from using the domain name 'NAUKRI.COM' or any similar mark and from hyperlinking it to 'JOBSOURCEINDIA.COM' until the disposal of the suit. The court emphasized that the views expressed were tentative and subject to final decision in the suit.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 936
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Debarring from accessing the capital market and dealing in securities.
  2. Compliance with regulation 7(1) of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997.
  3. Procedural compliance in investigation and adherence to principles of natural justice.
  4. Legality of directions and penalties imposed by SEBI.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Debarring from accessing the capital market and dealing in securities:
  The appellant and others were debarred from accessing the capital market and dealing directly or indirectly in securities for a period of one year. This direction was found to be beyond the scope of regulation 44(a), which only empowers SEBI to direct persons not to further deal in securities, particularly those of the target company. The Tribunal held that the direction to debar from accessing the capital market and dealing in all securities was not justified and was beyond SEBI's powers under regulation 44(a) and sections 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act. The Tribunal set aside this part of the order, emphasizing that such a direction should be in the interest of the securities market, which was not demonstrated in this case.
  
  2. Compliance with regulation 7(1) of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997:
  The appellant failed to disclose the acquisition of over 5% of the shares in Bombay Dyeing within the stipulated four days, as required by regulation 7(1). The Tribunal rejected the appellant's argument that the duty to disclose did not include persons acting in concert. It was held that the acquisition by persons acting in concert must be considered collectively for disclosure purposes. The Tribunal also dismissed the appellant's contention that the disclosure requirement was not mandatory, affirming that the use of "shall disclose" indicates a mandatory requirement. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not comply with regulation 7(1) as the disclosure letter did not reach Bombay Dyeing.
  
  3. Procedural compliance in investigation and adherence to principles of natural justice:
  The appellant argued that SEBI did not follow proper procedures in the investigation and violated principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found that SEBI had complied with regulation 39(2) by issuing an order to investigate without prior notice in the interest of investors. SEBI had also communicated the findings of the investigation and provided an opportunity for the appellant to be heard, fulfilling the requirements of regulation 42(1). The Tribunal noted that the appellant was given access to documents and an opportunity to inspect them, and cross-examination was not necessary as no statements from individuals were relied upon. The Tribunal concluded that SEBI adhered to the principles of natural justice.
  
  4. Legality of directions and penalties imposed by SEBI:
  The Tribunal examined the legality of the directions and penalties imposed by SEBI. It was noted that regulation 44(a) does not empower SEBI to debar entities from accessing the capital market or dealing in all securities. The Tribunal held that such a direction was beyond SEBI's powers and not justified by the facts of the case. The Tribunal also clarified that non-compliance with regulation 7(1) does not make the acquisition itself violative of the regulations, but it attracts monetary penalties under section 15A(b) of the SEBI Act. The Tribunal upheld SEBI's decision to appoint an Adjudicating Officer to inquire into the violations and impose penalties if warranted, as this process is separate and provides an opportunity for the appellant to be heard.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal set aside the direction debarring the appellant from accessing the capital market and dealing in securities, finding it beyond SEBI's powers and not in the interest of the securities market. The Tribunal upheld the finding of non-compliance with regulation 7(1) and SEBI's decision to appoint an Adjudicating Officer for further inquiry and penalties.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 935
  
  Issues:
  Amendment application rejection based on belatedness and change in nature of suit.
  
  Analysis:
  The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition, upholding the Trial Court's rejection of the amendment to the plaint in a recovery suit. The Trial Court found the application belated and observed that the proposed amendments introduced a new cause of action, altering the entire pleadings. It noted attempts to withdraw admissions from the original plaint, which could change the suit's nature and character. The High Court concurred that the amendments sought to change the suit's character but recognized no change in cause of action or total amount claimed. It highlighted discrepancies in the original plaint and the Agreement, emphasizing the need for a liberal approach in amendment applications. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, finding the proposed amendments permissible. It clarified that while the amendments expanded the plaint and altered relief figures, they did not introduce new pleas or reliefs. The Court emphasized the undisputed Agreement's centrality, noting that the amendments provided clarity without prejudicing the respondents.
  
  The High Court's concern about changes in the suit's character was deemed unfounded by the Supreme Court, which emphasized that the amendments did not alter the suit's basis significantly. The Court highlighted the importance of clarity and accuracy in pleadings, noting that the amendments did not retract from the original plaint's admissions. It emphasized that the proposed changes did not introduce new causes of action, merely elaborating on existing claims. The Court concluded that the rejection of the amendments was legally unjustified and directed the amendments to be allowed. However, the Court ordered the deletion of certain unnecessary allegations from the proposed amendments, while awarding costs to the respondents due to delays by the appellants. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and Trial Court, allowing the appeal and permitting the plaint's amendment upon payment of costs within a specified timeframe.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 934
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Termination of Tenancy u/s 3 and 4 of the Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980.
  2. Legality of Eviction by Force.
  3. Applicability of Public Purpose for Eviction.
  4. Applicability of West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Termination of Tenancy u/s 3 and 4 of the Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980:
  The respondents, who were tenants of shops, offices, and go-downs in the Great Eastern Hotel, challenged their eviction by the State Government. The State argued that the tenancy stood automatically terminated u/s 3 and 4 of the Act of 1980, which vested the undertaking of the company in the State Government. The Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant continued even after the takeover, with the State Government stepping into the shoes of the erstwhile company as the landlord. The acceptance of rent by the Hotel Authority, acting on behalf of the government, further affirmed this relationship.
  
  2. Legality of Eviction by Force:
  The Court examined whether the State Government's action of taking possession by force was lawful. It reiterated the settled position of law that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless authorized by a specific provision of law. The Court cited previous judgments, including Bishan Das & Ors. vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. and State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Maharaja Dharamander Prasad Singh & Ors., which held that possession can only be resumed in a manner recognized by law. The Court concluded that sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 4 of the Act of 1980 did not authorize the use of force for eviction.
  
  3. Applicability of Public Purpose for Eviction:
  The State argued that the eviction was for a public purpose, as the hotel was acquired to ensure better facilities for the public. The High Court rejected this contention, stating that the hotel was a commercial venture meant for the affluent section of society, not the general public. The Supreme Court upheld this view, stating that there was no element of public purpose or public interest in the eviction.
  
  4. Applicability of West Bengal Government Premises (Tenancy Regulation) Act, 1976:
  The State contended that the respondents could be evicted by invoking Section 6A of the Act of 1976, which allows for the eviction of unauthorized occupants. The Court held that the respondents were lawful tenants and could not be evicted under this provision. The Court did not decide whether the Act of 1976 applied only to residential premises, as held by the High Court.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, stating that the State Government's action of evicting the respondents by force was not justified in law. The appeals were dismissed, with costs on the parties.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 933
  
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by defendants in a recovery suit, modifying the terms set by the High Court for setting aside the ex-parte decree. Defendants were directed to deposit an additional sum of Rs. 50,000 within four weeks. The rest of the impugned order remained unchanged.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 932
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2002 (3) TMI 932 - SC. Mr. N. Santosh Hegde and Mr. Doraiswamy Raju were the judges.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 931
  
  The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the writ petition as it was seen as a delay tactic to avoid tax payment. The petition claimed that an application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not disposed of by the Commissioner, but the court found no apparent error on record. The petitioner was advised to appeal to the Tribunal if not time-barred.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 930
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Rejection of the petitioner's application for sales tax exemption due to late filing.
  2. The petitioner's claim of an error in the date of commencement of commercial production.
  3. The absence of an application for condonation of delay.
  4. The applicability of the principles of natural justice.
  5. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 86 of the Rajasthan Sales and Purchase Tax Act, 1994.
  6. The legal maxim "nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong).
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Rejection of the petitioner's application for sales tax exemption due to late filing:
  The petitioner established a new industry and applied for benefits under the Sales Tax Incentive Scheme, 1989. The application was rejected by the District Level Scrutiny Committee (DLSC) on 6.8.97 for being time-barred, as it was filed beyond the 180-day period from the commencement of commercial production. The appeal against this decision was also rejected by the Rajasthan Tax Board on 31.8.2001.
  
  2. The petitioner's claim of an error in the date of commencement of commercial production:
  The petitioner initially stated that commercial production began on 4.8.96 but later claimed it actually started on 2.10.96. This correction was made by the Competent Authority but was not submitted to the DLSC before the application was rejected. Even with the corrected date, the application was still filed late, on 31.5.97, beyond the 180-day limit.
  
  3. The absence of an application for condonation of delay:
  No application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner, nor were any "sufficient grounds" shown for condoning the delay. The DLSC was under no obligation to consider the time-barred application without such a request. The principles of natural justice were not applicable in this scenario, as there was no requirement for the DLSC to ask the petitioner to file for condonation of delay.
  
  4. The applicability of the principles of natural justice:
  The court held that the principles of natural justice do not apply when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion is possible. In this case, the application was time-barred, and there was no obligation to provide a hearing to the petitioner. The doctrine of natural justice cannot be rigidly applied and must be conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each case.
  
  5. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 86 of the Rajasthan Sales and Purchase Tax Act, 1994:
  The court's power of revision under Section 86 can only be exercised when the case involves a question of law. A finding on a question of fact is final unless it is unsupported by evidence or is perverse. In this case, the finding that the application was time-barred was based on the petitioner's own admission and could not be challenged in revision.
  
  6. The legal maxim "nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" (No man can take advantage of his own wrong):
  The petitioner cannot take advantage of his own failure to file a timely application for condonation of delay. The court emphasized that the law should prevent wrong-doers from benefiting from their own wrongs. The petitioner's delay in filing the application and the absence of a request for condonation cannot be used to blame the opposite party or claim non-compliance with natural justice.
  
  Conclusion:
  The revision was dismissed as the application was time-barred, and no legal question was involved. The court found no grounds to interfere with the decisions of the DLSC and the Tax Board. The principles of natural justice and the scope of revisional jurisdiction were correctly applied, and the petitioner could not take advantage of his own delay.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 929
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Whether the confessional statement is true and voluntary?
  2. Whether there is any corroboration to the said statement?
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Whether the confessional statement is true and voluntary?

  The appellant was convicted by the Designated Court-I, New Delhi for offences u/s 3(2)(i) of TADA and Section 120-B read with Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 323, 436, and 427 of the IPC, sentenced to death, and fined Rs. 10,000/-. The appellant contended that the confessional statement was neither voluntary nor true and lacked corroborative evidence. The prosecution's evidence included testimonies from PW37 Inspector Severaia Kujur and PW83 Inspector Tej Singh Verma, who detailed the appellant's arrest and subsequent disclosure statements. However, discrepancies were noted, such as the absence of a cyanide capsule panchnama and the fact that the confessional statement was not produced before the ACMM. The Court observed that the confessional statement was recorded by DCP B.S. Bola, the Investigating Officer, raising doubts about its voluntariness and truthfulness. The Court cited Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing the need for the court to ensure no coercion or duress during custodial interrogation. The Court found it unsafe to rely solely on the confessional statement recorded by the investigating officer, as it lacked the necessary certification and was not corroborated by independent evidence.

  Issue 2: Whether there is any corroboration to the said statement?

  The Court noted that the confessional statement lacked corroboration from independent witnesses or material evidence. The co-accused, Daya Singh Lahoria, was acquitted due to the absence of evidence and confessional statements. The Court highlighted that none of the neighbors or landlords testified that the appellant stayed in the mentioned premises, and no incriminating articles were found. The Court referred to Topandas v. State of Bombay, emphasizing that one person alone cannot be held guilty of criminal conspiracy. The Court concluded that without corroborative evidence, it would be difficult to rely solely on the confessional statement for conviction. The Court held that such a confessional statement cannot be the basis for awarding a death sentence.

  Conclusion:

  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and death sentence, and acquitted the appellant, directing his release if not required in any other case. Consequently, the Death Reference Case (Crl.) No. 2 of 2001 was disposed of accordingly.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 928
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in this case are the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment passed by a single Judge under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  
  Judgment Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal
  The Supreme Court considered the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court referred to previous cases and observed that a Letters Patent Appeal would lie unless the concerned statute excludes it. The Court analyzed Section 54 of the Act and concluded that there is no bar to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal. This decision aligned with the view taken in a previous case, Basant Kumar vs. Union of India.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act
  The Court examined Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which states that an appeal shall only lie to the High Court from the award or decree of the Court. The appellant argued that the use of "an appeal shall only lie" indicates only one appeal is allowed. However, the Court disagreed, stating that the term "an appeal" includes a Letters Patent Appeal. The Court emphasized that Section 54 does not exclude an appeal under the Letters Patent.
  
  Issue 3: Comparison with Previous Judgments
  The Court compared the present case with previous judgments, such as Baljit Singh's case and Asia Industries case. It highlighted that these cases were based on different statutes and did not address the specific provisions of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court clarified that the decision in Baljit Singh's case, which was based on a concession, was not applicable to the current scenario.
  
  Conclusion
  The Supreme Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against a judgment passed by a single Judge under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 54 and the historical practice of High Courts allowing such appeals. The case was referred to a Division Bench for further considerations on other aspects.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 927
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Deletion of the addition of Rs. 81,69,717 made by AO under Section 69 of the Act on account of unexplained investment in the property constructed for sale.
  2. Validity of reference to the DVO for determining the cost of construction under Section 131(1)(d) of the Act.
  3. Application of net profit rate by the AO and CIT(A) on contract receipts/work-in-progress.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Deletion of the Addition of Rs. 81,69,717:
  The Revenue challenged the deletion of the addition of Rs. 81,69,717 made by the AO under Section 69 of the Act for unexplained investment in the property constructed for sale. The AO had noted several discrepancies in the assessee's stock register and other records, leading to the rejection of the books of account under Section 145(3) of the Act. The AO then referred the matter to the DVO, who estimated the cost of construction significantly higher than declared by the assessee. The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that the DVO's report was advisory and the AO could not base the addition solely on this report without proper basis. The CIT(A) also noted procedural lapses in the issuance of notice under Section 131 by the DVO, which was challenged by the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, noting that the AO's reliance on the DVO's report without addressing the assessee's objections and procedural issues was not justified.
  
  2. Validity of Reference to the DVO:
  The AO issued a commission under Section 131(1)(d) to the DVO for determining the investments in the properties. The CIT(A) held that the DVO had no powers to issue notice under Section 131 and that the reference was invalid. The Tribunal, however, reversed this finding, stating that the AO was within his rights to issue such a commission under Section 131(1)(d) for obtaining expert opinion on the cost of construction. The Tribunal cited several judicial precedents to support the validity of the reference, emphasizing that the DVO's report, while not binding, had persuasive value and could be considered by the AO in the assessment process.
  
  3. Application of Net Profit Rate:
  The AO applied an 8% net profit rate on contract receipts and a 10% rate on work-in-progress, rejecting the books of account maintained by the assessee. The CIT(A) reduced the net profit rate to 4% for both completed and incomplete projects, noting that this rate was applied in other similar cases. The Revenue argued that the CIT(A) had no basis for reducing the rate and that the books of account were rightly rejected due to discrepancies. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had provided reasons for applying the 4% rate and dismissed the Revenue's appeal on this ground. However, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the rejection of books of account based on non-maintenance of a separate stock register was not justified. The AO was directed to accept the book results declared by the assessee for the contract business.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition made by the AO under Section 69, reversed the finding on the invalidity of the reference to the DVO, and directed the AO to accept the book results declared by the assessee for the contract business. The Tribunal emphasized the need for proper procedural adherence and consideration of expert opinions in the assessment process.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 926
  
  Issues:
  The issues involved in the judgment are the validity of Rule 25 of the Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976 concerning seniority, the classification of recruits under different recruitment rules, and the constitutional validity of the rules under Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution.
  
  Validity of Rule 25 of Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976:
  The appellant, a direct recruit to the Rajasthan Administrative Service, challenged the validity of Rule 25 of the Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976, which provided a special rule for seniority based on a notional year of allotment. The appellant argued that the rule was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The appellant contended that the classification between recruits under different rules lacked intelligible differentia and had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The appellant further argued that the basis for determining seniority under the rule was arbitrary and imaginary, as it depended on monthly emoluments without any rationale provided by the Rule Making Authority.
  
  Classification of Recruits under Different Recruitment Rules:
  The appellant highlighted the classification of recruits under the Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976 and the Recruitment Rules of 1954. The appellant argued that all recruits form one class and providing a separate rule for seniority based on the year of allotment for Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976 recruits was discriminatory. The appellant contended that the Emergency Recruitment Rules allowed for the recruitment of individuals with inferior qualifications, judged on an inferior standard, which should not grant them any premium for past experience in administrative service.
  
  Constitutional Validity under Articles 14 and 16:
  The judgment discussed the constitutional validity of the Emergency Recruitment Rules in light of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was noted that the Emergency Recruitment Rules aimed to address the urgent need for administrative service personnel, similar to emergency recruitment in other states. The court rejected the argument that recruits under the Emergency Recruitment Rules were inefficient or judged on an inferior standard. The judgment emphasized the importance of maintaining efficiency in administration, as mandated by the Constitution, even in the context of special recruitment provisions.
  
  The judgment concluded that the burden of proving unequal treatment under Article 14 lies on the party alleging discrimination. It was noted that without sufficient evidence of unequal treatment, claims of provisions being violative of Article 14 cannot be entertained. The court rejected the appellant's arguments of discrimination based on hypothetical scenarios and lack of concrete evidence supporting the claim of undue advantage gained by recruits under the Emergency Recruitment Rules.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 925
  
  Issues involved:
  1. Valuation of property for wealth tax assessment.
  2. Entitlement to claim deduction under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act.
  
  Issue 1: Valuation of property for wealth tax assessment
  
  The case involved the valuation of a property, Gopal Talkies, for wealth tax assessment purposes. The assessee, a partner in the partnership firm owning the property, submitted a return showing a credit balance. The Wealth Tax Officer initially concluded that the property was undervalued and referred the valuation to the valuation officer. However, the valuation report was made without notice to the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner struck down the valuation report and allowed a deduction under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's appeal, leading to the High Court referral.
  
  The High Court emphasized the importance of serving notice to the assessee before valuation, as required by section 16A(2) of the Act. The purpose of notice is not only for document production but also to allow the assessee to present material supporting the property valuation. The Court held that non-service of notice to the individual assessee, who was a partner in the firm, was a violation of natural justice principles. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to strike down the valuation was upheld.
  
  Issue 2: Entitlement to claim deduction under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act
  
  The question arose whether the assessee, as a partner in the firm, was entitled to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act for a property owned by the partnership. The revenue argued against the exemption, citing a previous High Court judgment. However, the assessee relied on a Supreme Court decision stating that partners are entitled to exemption for their share of partnership property. The Court upheld the Supreme Court decision, emphasizing that partners can claim exemption for their apportioned share of partnership property.
  
  Furthermore, the revenue contended that the property must be used exclusively for residential purposes to qualify for exemption. They referenced a High Court decision emphasizing the residential use requirement. However, the Court noted that the statute no longer required exclusive residential use post-amendment. The Court also referred to a Full Bench judgment clarifying that the property should be used for residential purposes, not commercial use, to claim exemption. The Court held that the strict interpretation of the statute did not mandate the property to be solely residential for exemption.
  
  In conclusion, the Court affirmed that the assessee was entitled to claim exemption under section 5(1)(iv) for their share in the partnership property, regardless of whether it was used for residential or commercial purposes, as long as it belonged to the assessee.
  
  This summary provides a detailed overview of the judgment, addressing the issues of property valuation and entitlement to exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 924
  
  Legal judgment by Supreme Court in 2002 (3) TMI 924 - SC Order by B.N. Kirpal and Arijit Pasayat, JJ. Delay condoned. Appeal admitted. No stay.

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 923
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions as there was no deficiency in qualification after the circular of the Government dated 6.11.1990. (Citation: 2002 (3) TMI 923 - SC)

  ---

• 2002 (3) TMI 922
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the respondent's appointment and regularization in Assam Legal Service without High Court's consultation.
  2. Lien status of the respondent in Assam Judicial Service.
  3. The High Court's authority under Article 235 of the Constitution.
  4. Appropriate relief considering the respondent's circumstances.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Validity of Appointment and Regularization
  The respondent No.1 was initially appointed as a judicial officer in Assam Judicial Services Grade-III and later applied for a temporary post of Deputy Secretary in Assam Legal Service. His appointment was made under Regulation 3(e) of APSC (Limitation of Function) Regulations, 1951, and was temporary until filled through the APSC. When the post was advertised for regular appointment, the respondent applied, was selected, and his appointment was regularized without the High Court's consultation. The High Court was neither consulted before nor after this regularization, violating the mandatory requirement of consultation under Article 235 of the Constitution.
  
  Issue 2: Lien Status in Judicial Service
  The respondent No.1 claimed his lien in Assam Judicial Service was terminated upon his regularization in Assam Legal Service. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed, stating his lien in judicial service automatically terminated by operation of law with effect from 18.7.1986. However, the Supreme Court found this invalid due to the lack of mandatory consultation with the High Court, thus the lien in judicial service did not terminate.
  
  Issue 3: High Court's Authority under Article 235
  Article 235 vests control over district courts and subordinate courts in the High Court, including posting, promotion, and grant of leave. The Supreme Court emphasized that any action affecting the service career of a judicial officer requires meaningful and effective consultation with the High Court. The failure to consult the High Court while appointing the respondent No.1 to Assam Legal Service and promoting him from Grade-III to Grade-II rendered the actions invalid.
  
  Issue 4: Appropriate Relief
  Considering the respondent No.1's long tenure in Assam Legal Service, nearing retirement, and his son's serious neurological condition requiring treatment in Gauhati, the Supreme Court provided a balanced relief. The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside on questions of law. The State of Assam was directed to decide within six weeks if the respondent could be posted in a different office within Assam Legal Service, excluding the roles of Secretary (Judicial) and Legal Remembrancer. If not feasible, the respondent would be repatriated to the High Court as a member of judicial service with a suitable posting, considering his son's medical needs.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent's appointment and regularization in Assam Legal Service without High Court's consultation were invalid. The lien in judicial service remained intact. The State of Assam was given six weeks to decide on the respondent's posting in Assam Legal Service, failing which he would be repatriated to judicial service. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs.

  ---

123456........ 23