|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 747 Records
-
2009 (9) TMI 1075
The Supreme Court of India heard two cases involving the interpretation of Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act for the assessment year 2001-2002. One case was listed for final hearing, allowing parties to complete pleadings and file additional documents by November 25, 2009. The other case was dismissed after condoning the delay.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1074
Issues Involved:
1. Obligation of IMCL to provide free medical treatment under the lease agreement.
2. Interpretation of the terms "free medical, diagnostic and other necessary facilities."
3. Maintainability of the writ petition against a private entity performing public duties.
4. Right to health as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
5. Compliance with the terms of the agreement by IMCL.
6. Role of non-state actors in providing public health services.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Obligation of IMCL to Provide Free Medical Treatment:
The court examined the lease agreement dated 16th March 1994 between the GNCTD and IMCL, which mandated IMCL to provide free medical treatment to 1/3rd of indoor patients and 40% of outdoor patients. The obligation was established to ensure that the poor and needy citizens received free medical treatment, aligning with Articles 21, 39(e), 41, and 47 of the Constitution of India.
2. Interpretation of the Terms "Free Medical, Diagnostic and Other Necessary Facilities":
The court interpreted the terms "free medical, diagnostic and other necessary facilities" to include all aspects of medical treatment, including medicines and consumables. The court emphasized that the agreement's purpose was to provide comprehensive free treatment to the poor and vulnerable sections of society. The court rejected IMCL's argument that the term did not include medicines and consumables, stating that such an interpretation would defeat the agreement's purpose.
3. Maintainability of the Writ Petition Against a Private Entity Performing Public Duties:
The court held that the writ petition was maintainable against IMCL, a private entity performing public duties. The court referenced several judgments, including Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru SMVSJM Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, which established that writs could be issued to any person or body performing a public function. The court concluded that IMCL, by agreeing to provide free medical services, had taken on the mantle of a state instrumentality.
4. Right to Health as a Fundamental Right Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India:
The court reiterated that the right to health is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It cited several Supreme Court judgments, including Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, which recognized the right to health as integral to the right to life. The court emphasized that the state has a constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical services to the people.
5. Compliance with the Terms of the Agreement by IMCL:
The court noted that IMCL had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, as evidenced by reports from various committees. The reports highlighted several deficiencies, including inadequate provision of free beds, discriminatory treatment of free patients, and lack of proper records. The court directed IMCL to comply with the agreement's terms and provide free treatment to 1/3rd of indoor patients and 40% of outdoor patients.
6. Role of Non-State Actors in Providing Public Health Services:
The court discussed the role of non-state actors in providing public health services, referencing international instruments and guidelines. It emphasized that private entities involved in public health must comply with accepted health and human rights standards. The court highlighted the importance of ensuring that private healthcare providers fulfill their obligations to provide free medical services as mandated by agreements with the state.
Directions Issued:
1. IMCL to provide 1/3rd of free beds (200 beds) with adequate facilities to indoor patients and free facilities to 40% of outdoor patients.
2. Establishment of Special Referral Centres in government hospitals for referring patients to IMCL for free treatment.
3. Proper identification and classification of persons entitled to free treatment.
4. IMCL to maintain records of free and paid treatments, subject to inspection and audit.
5. Quarterly reports by IMCL on free treatment provided, to be audited by the Principal Secretary (Health)/DGHS.
Costs:
IMCL was directed to pay Rs. 2 lakhs as costs, to be shared equally between the petitioner and GNCTD.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1073
Issues involved: Interpretation of arbitration award regarding grant of interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree.
The appellant, a proprietary concern, received a work order from Coal India Limited for transportation of coal/coke and operation of a stockyard. Disputes arose, leading to arbitration and an award in favor of the appellant. The respondent challenged the award, but subsequent appeals upheld the award. The respondent then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed. An execution proceeding followed, with the respondent contending that the decree directing payment of interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree was inexecutable. The Calcutta High Court held the decree inexecutable, directing the appellant to refund the interest amount. The appellant appealed, but the Division Bench upheld the decision, leading to the present special leave petition.
The key question in this appeal was whether the Division Bench was correct in setting aside the order of the Executing Court directing payment of interest at the rate of 18% from the date of the award till the date of the decree. The facts revealed that the award did not grant post-award interest, only pre-reference interest and interest during the pendency of arbitration proceedings. The appellant did not object to the lack of post-award interest in the award but applied for a decree in terms of the award under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Citing relevant case law, it was established that the Executing Court should not exceed the award's terms while passing a decree.
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a previous case overruled a decision regarding the arbitrator's power to grant pendente lite interest. The Court clarified three periods for which interest could be awarded by the arbitrator. In the present case, interest was granted for the first two periods but not for the last period. The Executing Court's decision to grant interest for the post-award period, not included in the award, was deemed beyond its jurisdiction, rendering the decree a nullity. The Court referenced a similar case where exceeding the terms of the award was considered an excess of jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Court found no merit in the appeal as the appellant had not objected to the award's terms but sought a decree in its favor. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1072
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "within 15 days of the close of every month" in para 38 of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.
2. Applicability of wage month versus British calendar month for calculating the due date for Provident Fund contributions.
3. Legality of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's order imposing penalties under Section 14B of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of "within 15 days of the close of every month":
The petitioners challenged the interpretation of "within 15 days of the close of every month" in para 38 of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The counsel for the petitioners argued that this phrase should be interpreted as "within 15 days of the close of the wage month" rather than the British calendar month. They contended that the wage month could start and end on any date within a calendar month, as per the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which allows employers to fix their wage periods.
2. Applicability of Wage Month Versus British Calendar Month:
The petitioners maintained that their wage month commenced from the 16th of each English calendar month and ended on the 15th of the following month. They argued that contributions should be deposited within 15 days of the close of this wage month. They also pointed out that the Provident Fund authorities had inspected their records regularly from 1978 to 1989 without raising any objections to this practice. The respondents, however, argued that the term "month" should be understood as the British calendar month, starting from the 1st and ending on the last day of the month. They contended that the forms and provisions of the Provident Fund Scheme indicated that contributions should be made according to the British calendar month.
3. Legality of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's Order Imposing Penalties:
The petitioners received a notice from the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner in 1990, stating that they had defaulted in payment of dues from May 1978 to November 1989. The petitioners argued that this notice was time-barred and that their contributions were made within the prescribed period according to their wage month. They contended that the impugned order imposing penalties was bad in law and ignored the wage month concept. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the penalties were justified as the contributions were not made within 15 days of the close of the British calendar month.
Judgment:
The court held that the term "month" in para 38 of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, should be interpreted as the wage month and not the British calendar month. The court reasoned that the basic wages are emoluments earned by an employee for work done, and the wage month could be fixed by the employer as per the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The court found that the petitioners had been making contributions within 15 days of the close of their wage month and that the impugned order imposing penalties was not justified. The court set aside the order imposing penalties but clarified that the respondents could impose penalties for any defaults in making timely payments even after considering the wage month from the 16th of each English calendar month to the 15th of the following month.
Conclusion:
The petitions were allowed, and the impugned order imposing penalties under Section 14B of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, was set aside. The court emphasized that the wage month concept should be applied for calculating the due date for Provident Fund contributions.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1071
Issues involved: Assessment under A.P. VAT Act, 2005 and CST Act, 1956 based on alleged excess input tax credit claims, denial of opportunity to respond to Enforcement report.
Assessment under A.P. VAT Act, 2005 and CST Act, 1956:
The petitioner, a registered dealer under the A.P. VAT Act, 2005 and the CST Act, 1956, received two assessment notices alleging excess input tax credit claims for specific periods. The Enforcement officials' report indicated that the petitioner had claimed more credit than eligible due to improper application of the prescribed formula. The assessment order was made based on this report without providing a fair opportunity to the petitioner to respond or file objections.
Denial of opportunity to respond to Enforcement report:
The petitioner challenged the assessment order on grounds of lack of fair notice and opportunity to review the Enforcement department's report. The respondent admitted the lack of a reasonable opportunity for the petitioner to address the report's contents. Consequently, the High Court set aside the assessment order dated 26-05-2009, remanding the matter to the respondent for a fresh assessment after providing the petitioner with a copy of the Enforcement officials' report. The petitioner will have the chance to submit objections within a stipulated timeframe before a new assessment order is issued.
This judgment highlights the importance of procedural fairness in tax assessments and emphasizes the right of the taxpayer to respond to allegations before a final decision is made.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1070
Issues involved: Revision against order allowing examination of complainant as a witness under Section 311 Cr.P.C and appointment of Commissioner under Section 284 Cr.P.C.
Issue 1: Examination of complainant as a witness under Section 311 Cr.P.C
The revision petitioner filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The respondent filed a petition under Section 311 Cr.P.C to summon the complainant for examination, which was allowed by the trial Court. The complainant, a 71-year-old lady with health issues, requested to be examined at her residence. The Sessions Judge set aside the order, leading to the present revision. The petitioner argued that the Sessions Judge reversed the order without sufficient reasons, while the respondent claimed the complainant only sought examination after realizing she could not avoid it. The Court noted that the complainant was now willing to give evidence and could do so by filing a proof affidavit under Section 139 of the Act.
Issue 2: Appointment of Commissioner under Section 284 Cr.P.C
The trial Court appointed an Advocate Commissioner to record the complainant's evidence based on medical reasons. The Sessions Judge held that the Magistrate lacked power to appoint an Advocate Commissioner under Section 284 Cr.P.C. The Court observed that while the appointment of a Commissioner should be sparingly resorted to in criminal cases, considering the complainant's health condition, it was appropriate in this instance. However, the appointment of an Advocate Commissioner was found impermissible under the law. The Court directed the Magistrate to personally go to the complainant's residence in Anna Nagar, Chennai, to record her evidence, setting aside the Sessions Judge's order.
This judgment clarifies the permissible procedures for examining witnesses and appointing Commissioners in criminal cases under Sections 311, 284, 285, and 286 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ensuring a fair trial while accommodating the health needs of the parties involved.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1069
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this judgment include the quashing of a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, based on allegations of fraud and neglecting to pay a due amount, along with the consideration of legal principles and precedents related to fraud in judicial proceedings.
Issue 1: Adjournment and Trial Delay
The Writ Petitions were filed in 2006, and due to interim relief granted, the trial had not commenced for three years. Despite adjournments sought by the petitioner, the stay was vacated, and the Metropolitan Magistrate was directed to expedite the trial.
Issue 2: Complaint and Allegations
The complaint, filed in 2005, alleged that the accused failed to pay an amount of Rs.50,000, leading to a bounced cheque. The petitioner claimed that the prosecution was launched with an ulterior motive and out of vendetta, emphasizing that the cheques were issued but disputed the circumstances.
Issue 3: Legal Defenses and Presumptions
The petitioner argued that the cheque was obtained by fraud and presented documents to support this claim. However, Section 139 of the Act presumes that a cheque is issued for the discharge of a debt unless proven otherwise. The burden of proof lies with the issuer of the cheque, and in this case, the Court found it challenging to conclude that the onus was discharged.
Issue 4: Precedents and Fraud Allegations
The petitioner cited various judgments related to fraud in judicial proceedings to support the claim that the complaint should be quashed due to alleged fraud. However, the Court noted that proving fraud is a question of fact and must be established before legal consequences can follow. The Court found it difficult to determine if fraud was proven in this case, especially considering the mandate of Section 139 of the Act.
Issue 5: Quashing of Complaint
Referring to legal principles outlined in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court analyzed the allegations in the complaint and concluded that a prima facie case existed, leading to the dismissal of the petitions and discharge of the Rule.
This judgment addresses the delay in trial proceedings, the allegations of neglecting payment leading to a bounced cheque, legal defenses regarding fraud, the burden of proof under Section 139 of the Act, the application of legal precedents related to fraud in judicial proceedings, and the criteria for quashing a complaint based on the principles outlined in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1068
Issues involved: Appeal against order of CIT(A) u/s 143(3)/147 for AY 2002-03 regarding addition of deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) of IT Act.
Summary:
Issue 1: Addition of deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) of IT Act
The assessee, a resident of Canada and director of an Indian company, received an advance of Rs.8 lakh from the company. The AO initiated reassessment proceedings u/s 147, treating the advance as deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) of the IT Act and DTAA between India and Canada. The CIT(A) upheld the AO's decision, stating that all conditions u/s 2(22)(e) were fulfilled. However, the ITAT held that the DTAA prevails over the IT Act, and the advance cannot be considered as deemed dividend under Article 10 of the DTAA with Canada, which defines dividends as income from shares or rights participating in profits. Citing relevant case laws, the ITAT concluded that the loan received by the assessee cannot be treated as deemed dividend under the DTAA.
Decision:
The appeal of the assessee was allowed, and it was held that the advance received by the assessee cannot be considered as deemed dividend under the DTAA.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1067
Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC.
2. Interim injunction and its vacation.
3. Application by Defendant No. 7 regarding business name change.
4. Withdrawal of applications by plaintiffs.
5. Dismissal of applications due to the vacation of the interim injunction.
Summary:
Compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC:
The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs complied with the mandatory requirements of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC after obtaining an ex parte ad interim injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to deliver or send by registered post within one week, a copy of the application for ad interim injunction, the affidavit, the plaint, and the documents relied upon. The statutory requirement is unambiguous, and non-compliance with this provision necessitated the vacation of the interim order.
Interim Injunction and its Vacation:
The court emphasized the mandatory nature of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, citing precedents such as A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD. The plaintiffs' failure to comply with the statutory requirements led to the vacation of the interim order dated 22nd July 2009. The court insisted on strict compliance to prevent plaintiffs from enjoying an ex parte ad interim stay indefinitely by pleading genuine mistakes.
Application by Defendant No. 7 Regarding Business Name Change:
Defendant No. 7 sought to restrain the plaintiffs from impeding its business under a changed name. The court noted that the plaintiffs' grievance was the alleged infringement of their trademark by Defendant No. 7. The plaintiffs were permitted to file an affidavit listing clients allegedly approached by the defendants within two weeks. The application was listed for further consideration on 27th October 2009.
Withdrawal of Applications by Plaintiffs:
The plaintiffs' counsel withdrew IA No. 12060/2009, which was dismissed as withdrawn.
Dismissal of Applications Due to Vacation of Interim Injunction:
IA No. 12061/2009 and IA No. 12066/2009 were dismissed as they became infructuous following the vacation of the interim injunction. Defendant No. 8 was advised to file an appropriate application seeking directions in accordance with law.
Further Proceedings:
IA Nos. 12062, 12064, and 12065/2009 were listed for hearing on 27th October 2009.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1066
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the matter in issue before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in O.S. No. 235 of 2008 is directly and substantially the same in the company petition (C.P. No. 243 of 2008) pending before the Company Law Board, attracting the mandatory provisions of Section 10 of the CPC?
2. Whether the Company Law Board in exercise of the inherent power vested in regulation 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991, shall stay the proceedings in C.P. No. 243 of 2008 until the disposal of the civil suit in O.S. No. 235 of 2008?
3. Whether the BIFR order dated February 16, 2006, prohibiting the promoter/guarantors from changing their shareholding pattern or alienating/encumbering or disposing of their shares in the company without its specific permission, is a legal bar against the transfer of shares in favor of SM?
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue (i) and (ii):
The issues (i) and (ii) are intertwined and adjudicated simultaneously. Section 10 of the CPC mandates that no court shall proceed with the trial of a suit where the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same as in a previously instituted suit pending between the same parties. Regulation 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991, akin to Section 151 of the CPC, allows the Company Law Board to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Bench.
In the civil suit (O.S. No. 235 of 2008), NS seeks a permanent injunction restraining the company from effecting the transfer of shares to SM or his nominees. NS claims the memorandum of understanding and agreement were for pledging shares, not for transferring them. SM advanced Rs. 10.55 crores to the company and Rs. 6.50 crores to the promoters as a loan, categorized as "unsecured loans" in the company's books.
In the company petition (C.P. No. 243 of 2008), SM contends that NS and VA agreed to transfer 100% of the company's shares to SM for Rs. 15 crores. SM lodged the share certificates and transfer forms with the company, which neither registered the transfer nor conveyed any refusal. NS then filed the civil suit and obtained an injunction against the transfer.
The Company Law Board has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 111/111A of the Act to order rectification of the register of members. However, if rectification involves complicated questions of facts or law, the parties will be relegated to a competent civil court, as supported by the Supreme Court's observations in Ammonia Supplies Corporation P. Ltd. v. Modern Plastic Containers P. Ltd. [1998] 94 Comp Cas 310.
The High Court directed SM to approach the trial court under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaints in O.S. No. 235 of 2008 and O.S. No. 1232 of 2008. The prayer for rectification in the company petition involves the same issue of whether the memorandum of understanding/agreement is for the sale or pledge of shares, which should be decided by the civil court first to avoid conflicting decisions.
Therefore, the proceedings in the company petition must be stayed until the final adjudication of the civil suit in O.S. No. 235 of 2008 to meet the ends of justice. The issues (i) and (ii) are answered in the affirmative.
Issue (iii):
The memorandum of understanding and agreement were executed in November 2005, with Rs. 10 crores paid as advance and Rs. 4.50 crores towards workers' dues. The share certificates and transfer forms for 90% of the shares were delivered to SM. The BIFR order dated February 16, 2006, prohibited the company from disposing of or encumbering its assets and the promoters from changing their shareholding pattern without BIFR's permission.
The BIFR, in its hearing on November 15, 2007, noted the disputes between the company and SM regarding the transfer of shares and assets. The BIFR order dated March 16, 2009, clarified that its proceedings would not prejudice any order by the Company Law Board, but this clarification was later deleted. The High Court stayed the deletion, allowing the Company Law Board proceedings to continue.
However, the company petition must wait for the civil suit's outcome. The issues related to the rehabilitation schemes, promoter status, and BIFR orders should be addressed before the BIFR.
Conclusion:
The proceedings in C.P. Nos. 244 to 252 of 2008 are also stayed pending the final adjudication of the civil suit in O.S. No. 235 of 2008. The parties may apply for further orders upon the civil suit's disposal.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1065
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the order directing framing of charges under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Evaluation of the prosecution's evidence and statements.
3. Contradictory statements and their impact on the case.
4. Legal principles for framing charges.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Order Directing Framing of Charges:
The petitioner challenged the order dated 18th April 2009, which directed the framing of charges against him under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with FIR No. 765/2006. The petitioner argued that the trial court's decision to frame charges was not based on a proper evaluation of the evidence and that there was no prima facie case against him.
2. Evaluation of the Prosecution's Evidence and Statements:
The prosecution's case was based on a complaint filed by the deceased's father, which alleged that the deceased was attacked by Mahesh Sharma, Manish Sharma, and Prashant Bhaskar @ Rinku. The initial statements recorded by the police on 6th April 2006 from the complainant, his son Vipin Mittal, and the deceased's wife Deepika did not implicate the petitioner. These statements mentioned a trivial altercation and scuffle but did not suspect anyone of causing the deceased's death.
3. Contradictory Statements and Their Impact on the Case:
The initial statements recorded immediately after the incident did not mention the petitioner. However, supplementary statements recorded on 10th July 2006, three months later, implicated the petitioner. The court noted that these supplementary statements were contradictory and made significant improvements over the initial statements. The court found that there was no explanation for the delay and the changes in the statements, making them unreliable.
4. Legal Principles for Framing Charges:
The court emphasized the principles for framing charges, stating that at this stage, the court must evaluate the materials and documents on record to determine if there is a prima facie case. The court should not act as a mere post-office for the prosecution but must exercise judicial mind to ascertain if the evidence discloses the ingredients of the alleged offence. The court referred to several Supreme Court judgments, including Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, which outlined the scope and ambit of consideration at the stage of framing charges.
The court also referred to the judgment in Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), which stated that the court must evaluate the material to see if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The court noted that the material placed on record by the prosecution in this case was contradictory and did not raise a strong suspicion against the petitioner.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the prosecution failed to make out a case raising strong suspicion of the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the offence. The order dated 18th April 2009, directing and framing charges against the petitioner, was set aside and quashed. The petition was allowed, and the charges against the petitioner were dismissed.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1064
Issues involved: IPO scam, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, unlawful conduct, disgorgement of illegal gains, equitable remedy.
Summary:
The judgment pertains to an appeal filed by an individual involved in an IPO scam discovered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India. The appellant was restrained from dealing in securities for two years and directed to disgorge unlawful gains of Rs. 72 lacs. The appellant claimed to be a financier who borrowed funds and financed IPO applicants without proper documentation. The whole time member found that the appellant and a finance company unlawfully enriched themselves by cornering shares meant for retail investors. The appellant was required to disgorge Rs. 72 lacs, representing the illegal gains made. Disgorgement is an equitable remedy to prevent wrongdoers from unjust enrichment due to illegal conduct. The judgment upheld the order for disgorgement as fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
The appeal was heard along with other appeals and the request to withdraw the appeal was declined. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent Board was awarded costs of Rs. 1 lac due to the fraudulent conduct of the appellant and the finance company.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1063
Issues Involved:
1. Alleged abuse and misuse of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) allotment process.
2. Alleged violation of Section 12A of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, Regulations 3 and 4 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003, and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000.
3. Directions for disgorgement and prohibition from accessing the securities market.
4. Imposition of monetary penalty under Chapter VIA of the Act.
Summary:
1. Alleged abuse and misuse of the IPO allotment process:
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) initiated a probe into the alleged misuse of the IPO allotment process. Investigations revealed that certain entities had cornered IPO shares reserved for retail investors by making applications through thousands of fictitious/benami applicants. Specifically, the appellant received 10160 shares of Suzlon Energy Limited from 635 different demat accounts in off-market transactions. It was found that 61 persons filed 635 multiple applications for 96 shares each, financed by the appellant, who routed money through 22 different bank accounts.
2. Alleged violation of Section 12A of the SEBI Act, 1992, Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003, and the SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000:
The appellant was alleged to have violated Section 12A of the SEBI Act, 1992, Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003, and the SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000. The show cause notice alleged that the appellant financed multiple applications, cornered shares, and made windfall gains by selling them at a higher market price post-listing.
3. Directions for disgorgement and prohibition from accessing the securities market:
The whole time member concluded that the appellant manipulated the retail segment of the Suzlon IPO, distorted market integrity, and made an unlawful gain of Rs. 33,52,636/-. Consequently, the appellant was directed to disgorge the said amount with interest at 10% and was debarred from accessing the securities market for three years. The findings were based on the fact that the appellant financed the applications, received shares in off-market transfers, and sold them at a profit.
4. Imposition of monetary penalty under Chapter VIA of the Act:
The Adjudicating Officer imposed a monetary penalty of Rs. 55 lacs on the appellant for her wrongful acts. The penalty was based on the profit made by the appellant from the sale of the shares. The appellant's argument that there was no prohibition on making multiple applications was rejected. The guidelines clearly specified the reservation for retail individual investors, and the appellant's actions were found to be fraudulent and in violation of the regulations.
Conclusion:
Both appeals were dismissed, and the findings of the whole time member and the Adjudicating Officer were upheld. The appellant was required to disgorge the unlawful gains and was penalized for her fraudulent conduct. The Board was awarded costs of Rs. 50,000/- in both appeals.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1062
Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing material facts.
2. Non-compliance with the requirement of an affidavit in the prescribed form.
3. Alleged corrupt practices and their impact on the election result.
4. Procedural propriety in dismissing the election petition at the threshold.
Summary:
Issue 1: Compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing material facts
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the election petition did not comply with the mandatory requirement of furnishing material facts to disclose a cause of action. The Court emphasized that "material facts" are primary or basic facts necessary to prove the cause of action. The election petition lacked specific averments on how the alleged omissions by the Returning Officer materially affected the election result, thus failing to meet the requirements of Section 83(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Issue 2: Non-compliance with the requirement of an affidavit in the prescribed form
The election petition was also dismissed for not being supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form, as required under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. The Supreme Court reiterated that non-filing of an affidavit in support of allegations of corrupt practices is an incurable and fatal defect, rendering the petition liable to be dismissed.
Issue 3: Alleged corrupt practices and their impact on the election result
The election petitioner alleged several corrupt practices, including the Returning Officer's failure to circulate specimen signatures, the first respondent's pressure tactics, and the circulation of a fabricated 'Fatva'. However, the petitioner conceded that without the requisite affidavit, the ground of corrupt practices could not be pressed. The Court noted that the allegations lacked the necessary material facts to constitute a complete cause of action under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.
Issue 4: Procedural propriety in dismissing the election petition at the threshold
The Supreme Court dismissed the argument that the High Court should not have exercised its power under Order VI Rule 16 or Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reject the election petition at the threshold. The Court held that the provisions of the Code apply to the trial of an election petition, and the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition to prevent meaningless litigation. The Court also clarified that the absence of Section 83 in Section 86 of the Act does not preclude the dismissal of an election petition for non-disclosure of material facts.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the election petition for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of furnishing material facts and the requisite affidavit, thereby upholding the election of the first respondent. The appeal was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1061
Issues involved: Interpretation of the term 'landlord' u/s 3(iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950.
The judgment involves an appeal against a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur, where the Trial Court's order was restored, setting aside the Single Judge's order. The suit was regarding eviction and arrears of rent, with the respondent claiming to be authorized by the Trust to act as the landlord. The main issue revolved around the interpretation of the term 'landlord' as per the Act.
The definition of 'landlord' u/s 3(iii) of the Act was crucial in this case, which includes a person entitled to receive rent, whether on their own account or as an agent. The appellant argued that there was no default in rent payment as it was being paid to an individual collecting on behalf of the Trust. On the other hand, the respondent contended that as the landlord, rent should have been paid to them directly, alleging default in payment.
The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a purposive interpretation of the term 'landlord' under the Act. While the natural landlord is typically the owner, the definition allows for agents or authorized persons to collect rent. A literal interpretation leading to absurd consequences was to be avoided, as seen in previous legal precedents.
The Court found that the respondent had not provided evidence of written authorization from the Trust to act on its behalf. Without such proof, the respondent, not being the owner, could not unilaterally file for eviction. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for further examination, allowing the respondent to present documented authorization from the Trust and implead the Trust as a proforma-defendant.
In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for a fresh decision, with all contentions left open for both parties to argue. No costs were awarded in this matter.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1060
Issues Involved:
1. Deletion of addition of Rs. 9,76,322/- being difference of estimated development fees.
2. Invoking provisions of Section 145(3) of the I.T. Act.
3. Restriction of disallowance of interest from Rs. 5,49,000/- to Rs. 27,472/-.
4. Deletion of addition of Rs. 40,74,165/- made u/s 68 of the I.T. Act.
5. Assessee's cross objection regarding disallowance of Rs. 27,472/-.
Summary:
Issue 1: Deletion of Addition of Rs. 9,76,322/-
The Assessing Officer (AO) added Rs. 9,76,322/- by estimating development fees at 2% of booking receipts, alleging arbitrary fee charges. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] deleted the addition, noting no defects in the books and no evidence of higher fees charged. The Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s decision, confirming no basis for the AO's estimation and rejecting the Revenue's ground.
Issue 2: Invoking Provisions of Section 145(3)
The AO invoked Section 145(3) to reject the books of account, alleging arbitrary fee charges. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal found no defects in the books and no justification for rejection. Thus, this ground of the Revenue's appeal was also rejected.
Issue 3: Restriction of Disallowance of Interest
The AO disallowed Rs. 5,49,000/- of interest, alleging non-charging of interest on Rs. 30,50,000/-. The CIT(A) reduced the disallowance to Rs. 27,472/-, noting that part of the interest was transferred to project cost. The Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s decision, finding no basis for further disallowance and rejecting the Revenue's ground.
Issue 4: Deletion of Addition u/s 68
The AO added Rs. 40,74,165/- u/s 68, questioning the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of deposits. The CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting the assessee provided sufficient details, including PAN and addresses. The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for further verification, directing the assessee to submit complete details for independent investigation.
Issue 5: Assessee's Cross Objection
The assessee's cross objection regarding the disallowance of Rs. 27,472/- was dismissed, following the Tribunal's confirmation of CIT(A)'s order on the related issue.
Conclusion:
The appeal of the Revenue was partly allowed for statistical purposes, and the assessee's cross objection was dismissed. The Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s decisions on most grounds, directing further verification only for the addition u/s 68.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1059
Issues involved: Age discrimination in employment based on short-listing criteria.
Summary:
The judgment by the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue of age discrimination in employment based on short-listing criteria. The Petitioner had introduced an age criterion which led to the exclusion of applicants falling below a certain age range. The Court found that this discriminatory practice was unreasonable and violated the principles of equality enshrined in the Constitution.
The Court emphasized that under Article 14 of the Constitution, equal treatment and protection of laws should be provided to all individuals. While reasonable classification is permissible, discrimination solely based on age is not justified. The Petitioner's action of limiting the application to a specific age group was deemed arbitrary and against the spirit of equality.
The Court rejected the Petitioner's justifications for age discrimination, stating that age is not a relevant factor in determining merit or competence. The judgment highlighted that age discrimination without a rational basis is unacceptable under the constitutional framework.
Referring to legal precedents, the Court distinguished cases where reasonable criteria were set for selection based on qualifications or experience. In the present case, selecting candidates solely based on age disregarded other important factors contributing to merit and competence.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the age discrimination by the Petitioner was arbitrary and contrary to the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution. The writ petition was dismissed for lacking merit.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1058
Issues Involved:
1. Addition of Rs. 38022 in respect of maintenance charges.
2. Disallowance at 1% of daily allowance of Rs. 14.75 lakhs.
3. Disallowance of Rs. 5209 on staff welfare and incidental charges.
4. Disallowance of Rs. 38247 in respect of certain expenses.
5. Disallowance of Rs. 10955 in respect of traveling expenses.
6. Disallowance of Rs. 5 lakhs being expenses on labours.
7. Disallowance of Rs. 1.03 lakhs being expenses on pooja materials.
8. Disallowance of Rs. 50000 on pooja expenses.
9. Disallowance of Rs. 4.14 lakhs being traveling expenses of partners.
10. Disallowance of Rs. 1.26 lakhs being expenses on security.
11. Disallowance of Rs. 1.22 lakhs being payments for undervaluation of apartment.
12. Relief of Rs. 1.19 lakhs subject to verification of AO.
13. Disallowance of Rs. 3.3 lakhs being pre-paid property tax expenses.
14. Addition of Rs. 82340 on free check-up camp expenses.
15. Verification and quantification of Rs. 15.26 lakhs towards risk insurance policy on contractor.
16. Recompute the actual work-in-progress of Rs. 43.30 lakhs.
17. Disallowance of Rs. 1 lakh as service compensation to Shri M.P. Shetty.
18. Addition of Rs. 95240 being DA paid to mechanical staff as excess.
19. Addition of Rs. 37150 being development expenses incurred on the land belonging to the lady members of RN Shetty group.
20. Addition of Rs. 129300 under the head general charges, temporary huts, business expenses etc.
21. Addition of Rs. 55645 being 5% of the traveling expenses by the directors.
22. Addition of Rs. 92746 towards non-business expenses.
23. Addition of Rs. 366262 being purchase of water heaters installed in the residence of chairman.
24. Disallowance of Rs. 203106 out of pooja expenses.
25. Disallowance of Rs. 55655 towards directors' traveling expense.
26. Disallowance of Rs. 719042 towards sales promotion expenses.
27. Disallowance of security expenses of Rs. 216179.
28. Disallowance of Rs. 123663 towards free check-up camp expenses.
29. Disallowance of Rs. 37500 being part of cash payments to administrative staff as a special promotional offer.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Addition of Rs. 38022 in respect of maintenance charges:
The assessee claimed Rs. 38022 as maintenance charges received from Naveen Hotels Limited. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition on the grounds that the charges should have been claimed by Naveen Hotels Limited, not the assessee. The Tribunal upheld this decision due to lack of evidence from the assessee to justify the disallowance only to the extent of Rs. 15000.
2. Disallowance at 1% of daily allowance of Rs. 14.75 lakhs:
The AO disallowed 2% of the daily allowance, citing no uniformity in payments. The CIT(A) reduced this to 1%, and the Tribunal upheld this decision, noting that the genuineness of the expenses was not in question, but the lack of uniformity justified the minor disallowance.
3. Disallowance of Rs. 5209 on staff welfare and incidental charges:
The AO disallowed Rs. 10418 due to lack of supporting evidence, which the CIT(A) reduced to Rs. 5209. The Tribunal upheld this, considering the volume of expenses and the reasonableness of the AO's approach.
4. Disallowance of Rs. 38247 in respect of certain expenses:
The AO disallowed 2% of the expenses due to self-made vouchers lacking details. The CIT(A) reduced this to 1%. The Tribunal deleted the disallowance, noting the adverse conditions under which the expenses were incurred and the lack of substantial evidence from the AO.
5. Disallowance of Rs. 10955 in respect of traveling expenses:
The AO disallowed 5% of the traveling expenses, which the CIT(A) reduced to 2.5%. The Tribunal upheld this, noting the personal usage element admitted by the assessee.
6. Disallowance of Rs. 5 lakhs being expenses on labours:
The AO disallowed Rs. 3348372 based on a proportionate method. The CIT(A) reduced this to Rs. 5 lakhs, and the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the AO for verification of the details provided by the assessee.
7. Disallowance of Rs. 1.03 lakhs being expenses on pooja materials:
The AO disallowed Rs. 103947 as non-business expenses. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of details and supporting evidence.
8. Disallowance of Rs. 50000 on pooja expenses:
The AO disallowed Rs. 252745 out of Rs. 455881 claimed for pooja expenses. The CIT(A) reduced this to Rs. 50000, which the Tribunal deleted, considering the cultural context and lack of evidence from the AO.
9. Disallowance of Rs. 4.14 lakhs being traveling expenses of partners:
The AO disallowed Rs. 414973 for a partner's travel to Mauritius. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of evidence linking the travel to business purposes.
10. Disallowance of Rs. 1.26 lakhs being expenses on security:
The AO disallowed Rs. 126063 for security expenses at partners' residences. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of direct business connection.
11. Disallowance of Rs. 1.22 lakhs being payments for undervaluation of apartment:
The AO disallowed Rs. 122720 as a penal payment for undervaluation. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting it could not be claimed as revenue expenditure.
12. Relief of Rs. 1.19 lakhs subject to verification of AO:
The AO disallowed Rs. 119674 as loss on sale of asset. The CIT(A) directed the AO to verify the claim, and the Tribunal upheld this direction.
13. Disallowance of Rs. 3.3 lakhs being pre-paid property tax expenses:
The AO disallowed Rs. 333066 out of Rs. 552207 for expenses beyond the business period. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the proportionate allowance was judicious.
14. Addition of Rs. 82340 on free check-up camp expenses:
The AO disallowed 10% of the expenses due to lack of third-party vouchers. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of details provided by the assessee.
15. Verification and quantification of Rs. 15.26 lakhs towards risk insurance policy on contractor:
The AO allowed Rs. 563536 out of Rs. 2089805 claimed. The CIT(A) directed the AO to verify the details, and the Tribunal upheld this direction.
16. Recompute the actual work-in-progress of Rs. 43.30 lakhs:
The AO added Rs. 4330358 as undisclosed work-in-progress. The CIT(A) directed the AO to recalculate, and the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the AO for comprehensive verification.
17. Disallowance of Rs. 1 lakh as service compensation to Shri M.P. Shetty:
The AO disallowed Rs. 1 lakh as service compensation. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of commercial expediency.
18. Addition of Rs. 95240 being DA paid to mechanical staff as excess:
The AO disallowed 2% of Rs. 4761998 due to lack of uniformity. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of proper vouchers.
19. Addition of Rs. 37150 being development expenses incurred on the land belonging to the lady members of RN Shetty group:
The AO disallowed Rs. 3.71 lakhs due to lack of agreement. The CIT(A) reduced this to Rs. 37150, which the Tribunal upheld, noting the lack of supporting evidence.
20. Addition of Rs. 129300 under the head general charges, temporary huts, business expenses etc.:
The AO disallowed 2% of Rs. 6464000 due to self-made vouchers. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the reasonableness of the disallowance.
21. Addition of Rs. 55645 being 5% of the traveling expenses by the directors:
The AO disallowed 5% of Rs. 1112000 due to personal usage. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the personal element.
22. Addition of Rs. 92746 towards non-business expenses:
The AO disallowed Rs. 92746 as non-business expenses. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of explanation from the assessee.
23. Addition of Rs. 366262 being purchase of water heaters installed in the residence of chairman:
The AO disallowed Rs. 366262 as personal expenses. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the AO to verify the ownership of the property.
24. Disallowance of Rs. 203106 out of pooja expenses:
The AO disallowed Rs. 203106 as excessive pooja expenses. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of evidence.
25. Disallowance of Rs. 55655 towards directors' traveling expense:
The AO disallowed Rs. 55655 as non-business expenses. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of details.
26. Disallowance of Rs. 719042 towards sales promotion expenses:
The AO disallowed 10% of Rs. 1438084 due to lack of details. The CIT(A) reduced this to 5%, which the Tribunal upheld, noting the reasonableness of the disallowance.
27. Disallowance of security expenses of Rs. 216179:
The AO disallowed Rs. 216179 for security at partners' residences. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of business connection.
28. Disallowance of Rs. 123663 towards free check-up camp expenses:
The AO disallowed 10% of Rs. 1236630 due to lack of details. The CIT(A) upheld this, and the Tribunal agreed, noting the lack of details.
29. Disallowance of Rs. 37500 being part of cash payments to administrative staff as a special promotional offer:
The AO disallowed Rs. 37500 due to lack of supporting vouchers. The CIT(A) reduced this to 10%, which the Tribunal upheld, noting the reasonableness of the disallowance.
Conclusion:
The appeals were partly allowed, with several issues remanded back to the AO for verification and others upheld based on the reasonableness and lack of supporting evidence from the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized the need for proper documentation and justification for claims made by the assessee.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1057
Issues involved: Company petition for interim reliefs including injunction, oppression and mismanagement allegations, jurisdiction of the Company Law Board.
Interim Relief - Injunction:
- Petitioners sought injunction to restrain eviction of company from leased property.
- Lease deed dated February 11, 1974, for 36 years with provision for building construction and cinema theatre business.
- Subsequent lease deed dated December 28, 1977, extended tenure till 2018.
- Owners acting in dual capacity, entered developmental agreement with third party.
- Petitioners feared business disruption due to lease expiry.
- Jurisdiction under Sections 397/398 to address oppression and mismanagement.
- Court's power to pass interim orders u/s 403 of Companies Act.
- Respondents argued against injunction, citing registered lease deed terms.
- Bench examined lease agreements, ownership rights, and shareholder interests.
- Decision: Bench lacks power to enforce unregistered lease agreement.
- Owners' prerogative to decide on lease extension, not within Bench's scope.
- Petitioners not entitled to relief, case adjourned for further adjudication.
Interim Relief - Oppression and Mismanagement:
- Allegations of oppression and mismanagement raised by petitioners.
- Jurisdiction of Company Law Board to address such issues.
- Reference to Madras High Court judgment on court's powers u/s 403.
- Court's authority to regulate company affairs in case of oppression.
- Prima facie case required for interim relief under Section 403.
- Bench's limitations in dealing with disputed documents.
- Summary nature of proceedings under Sections 397/398.
- Equitable relief granted by Bench, not involving disputed agreements.
- Petitioners' reliance on previous judgment deemed inapplicable.
- Direction for respondents to file counters within three weeks.
-
2009 (9) TMI 1056
Murder - Offence Punishable u/s 307 and 302 r/w Section 34 IPC - Conflicting judgments of the trial court and the High Court - Whether view taken by the trial court's is possible or plausible? - The appellant and other accused and the deceased belonged to the Burma colony. All of them went to the temple and came out at 2.00 p.m. after worshipping and taking food from the temple. The crowd before the temple dispersed and people started running. Accused No. 3 threw an aruval on P.W.1 After receiving the injury, P.W.1 managed to run. Then accused No. 2 gave cut injury to Jambu on his head and back. Dhanapal stabbed Jambu on his chest. Accused No. 4 stabbed Jambu on his back. Thereafter, all the accused ran away with their weapons. The deceased was attacked near the house of one Subramania Thevar by the side of a light post. P.W.3 at about 2.00 p.m. on 8.5.1988 saw the deceased lying dead at the scene of crime.
The High Court in the impugned judgment set aside the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Judge and allowed the appeal filed by the State. The High Court held accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 guilty for an offence punishable u/s 302 r/w Section 34 IPC and imposed sentence of life imprisonment and held accused No. 3 guilty for the offence punishable u/s 307 IPC and imposed sentence of five years.
It may be pertinent to mention that accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4 died during the pendency of appeal before the High Court. The only surviving appellant herein (who was accused No. 1 before the High Court) has filed the present appeal against the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.
HELD THAT:- There are conflicting judgments of the trial court and the High Court, therefore, we have carefully gone through the entire evidence de novo. The High Court, in our considered view, could not have shifted the burden of proof on the accused. According to the fundamental principles of the Evidence Act, it is for the prosecution to have proved its own case.
According to P.W.2, the occurrence took place after deceased and the witnesses came to the temple and after worshipping and taking food they came out at 2.00 p.m. The stomach of the deceased must, therefore, contain food particles. Whereas, according to the doctor, who conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, found that the stomach was empty. This casts serious doubt on the veracity of the testimony of P.W.2. The trial court also rejected the testimony of another eye witness P.W.3.
P.W.10, Inspector of Police, took up the investigation and went to the scene of occurrence at 6.30 p.m. and on account of lack of sufficient light, he did not hold the inquest, but went and searched for the accused after posting two constables to guard the body of the deceased.
The trial court was of the opinion that the medical evidence also does not support the prosecution case. The trial court was of the view that on such quality of evidence it would not be safe to record the conviction and acquitted the accused.
The High Court was not justified in weaving out a different and new prosecution version. The Court is under the bounden duty and obligation to deal with the evidence as it is. No improvement or rewriting of evidence is permissible. In the instant case, P.W.1 had turned hostile and P.W.3 also did not support the prosecution case. The testimony of P.W.2 is also not wholly reliable.
On proper evaluation of the trial court judgment, we hold that the view taken by the trial court was certainly a possible or a plausible view. It is a well settled legal position that when the view which has been taken by the trial court is a possible view, then the acquittal cannot be set aside by merely substituting its reasons by the High Court. In our considered view, the impugned judgment of the High Court is contrary to the settled legal position and deserves to be set aside.
This Court reiterated the principles and observed that presumption of innocence of accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The appellate court could have interfered only for very substantial and compelling reasons.
In Tota Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab [1987 (4) TMI 495 - SUPREME COURT], the Court reiterated the same principle in the following words: ''Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.''
In Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P.[2002 (3) TMI 918 - SUPREME COURT], the Court repeated one of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008 (7) TMI 951 - SUPREME COURT], a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion to deal with most of the cases referred in this judgment. The exercise of surveying relevant judgments has again been taken with the hope that the Appellate Courts would keep in view the settled legal position while dealing with the trial courts' judgments of acquittals.
The following principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.
2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court.
3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so.
5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.
On careful marshalling of the entire evidence and the documents on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is certainly a possible or plausible view. The settled legal position as explained above is that if the trial court's view is possible or plausible, the High Court should not substitute the same by its own possible view. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court in the impugned judgment was not justified in interfering with the well reasoned judgment and order of the trial court.
Consequently, this appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and disposed of and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.
........
|
9911796707
