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2011 (1) TMI 1286
Amendment brought into the Third Schedule of entry 23 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 during 2008 permitting imposition of tax on insecticides that are used other than for agricultural purposes at 12.50 per cent instead of at four per cent challenged
Held that:- Even assuming that the Joint Commissioner would not act other than the way in which instructions were issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, and it has to be treated as good an order passed by the Commissioner himself in the matter of assessment/reassessment, however, still a reading of the amendment to entry 23 would need interpretation in the background whether, straightaway it falls within the meaning of insecticides only to attract four per cent tax and there could not have been any distinction between using of insecticide for agricultural or horticultural purpose and for domestic purpose, and it is a matter of appreciation of facts as well as question of law is involved.
Petitions are disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Appellate Tribunal and to take all such contentions. The Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the matter within three months from the date of appearance of the petitioner.
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2011 (1) TMI 1285
Issues: 1. Justification of Tribunal in canceling assessment under compounded rate. 2. Interpretation of provisions under Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 regarding compounding scheme. 3. Permissibility of withdrawal from compounding scheme once opted by assessee.
Analysis: 1. The primary issue in this case was whether the Tribunal was justified in canceling the assessment under the compounded rate opted by the assessee under section 7 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The assessees had initially applied for compounding at a rate of 120% of the tax payable for the previous year. However, the compounded rate was later increased to 200% by the Finance Act, 2002. The assessees continued to pay the lower amount until October 2002 when they applied to withdraw from the compounding scheme and pay tax on the actual turnover. The assessing officer initially accepted this withdrawal but later rejected it based on a court decision stating that once compounding is opted and accepted, withdrawal is not permissible. The High Court, following a previous decision, allowed the revisions and restored the order of the first appellate authority confirming the assessment under section 19 at the compounded rate.
2. The assessments involved in this case were for the year 2002-03, where the assessees had applied for compounding at a certain rate which was later revised by the Finance Act, 2002. The assessees continued to pay the lower rate until they applied to withdraw from the compounding scheme. The assessing officer initially accepted this withdrawal but later rejected it based on the court decision that withdrawal from compounding is not permissible once opted and accepted. The High Court, following a previous decision, upheld the assessment under section 19 at the revised compounded rate, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.
3. The question of whether an assessee can withdraw from the compounding scheme once opted was a crucial aspect of this case. The assessing officer initially allowed the assessees to withdraw from the compounded rate and pay tax on the actual turnover. However, this decision was later reversed based on a court decision stating that withdrawal from compounding is not permissible once opted and accepted. The High Court, in line with the previous decision, emphasized the binding nature of opting for compounding and upheld the assessment under section 19 at the revised compounded rate, highlighting the importance of consistency and adherence to legal provisions in tax assessments.
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2011 (1) TMI 1284
Issues Involved: 1. Deletion of addition on account of bogus purchases. 2. Non-appreciation of inquiries establishing non-existence of suppliers. 3. Deliberate claim of purchase expenses to defraud revenue. 4. Reopening of assessment u/s 147. 5. Addition of 30% of total purchases. 6. Rejection of book results.
Summary:
1. Deletion of Addition on Account of Bogus Purchases: The Revenue contended that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 5,57,722/- for AY 2003-04 and Rs. 21,08,558/- for AY 2004-05 on account of bogus purchases. The CIT(A) observed that 30% of the purchase cost would be a reasonable amount to cover the gains of the appellant.
2. Non-Appreciation of Inquiries Establishing Non-Existence of Suppliers: The Revenue argued that the CIT(A) failed to appreciate the Department's inquiries, which established that suppliers M/s Girnar Sales Corporation and Shiv Metal Corporation did not exist at the given addresses. The assessee could not produce these parties before the AO or CIT(A) to establish the genuineness of the purchases.
3. Deliberate Claim of Purchase Expenses to Defraud Revenue: The Revenue claimed that the assessee deliberately claimed purchase expenses in the names of the two non-existent parties, thereby reducing its profit to defraud the revenue of its due taxes. The AO inferred that the purchases from these parties were bogus and rejected the book results u/s 145(3) of the Act.
4. Reopening of Assessment u/s 147: The assessee's appeal included a ground against the reopening of assessment u/s 147, which was not pressed by the learned AR on behalf of the assessee. Consequently, this ground was dismissed.
5. Addition of 30% of Total Purchases: The CIT(A) upheld the addition of Rs. 2,39,024/- for AY 2003-04 and Rs. 9,03,667/- for AY 2004-05, being 30% of the total purchases from M/s Girnar Sales Corporation and M/s Shiv Metal Corporation. The CIT(A) referred to several ITAT decisions and concluded that 30% of the purchase cost would be reasonable to cover the gains of the appellant.
6. Rejection of Book Results: The CIT(A) held that the AO had rejected the book results and made specific additions relating to non-genuine purchases. The assessee failed to establish the genuineness of the purchases, and the CIT(A) upheld the rejection of book results and sustained the addition based on ITAT decisions.
Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the cross appeals of both the Revenue and the assessee for the two assessment years, upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to add 30% of the purchase cost as a reasonable amount to cover the gains of the appellant. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds raised by both parties and confirmed the rejection of book results and the addition on account of bogus purchases.
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2011 (1) TMI 1283
Whether assessing authority and the Tribunal have erred in refusing to refund the excess amount?
Held that:- Section 7D provides a lump sum payment in the form of compounding money in lieu of tax payable. Section 2(n) defines "tax" which includes composition money. The applicant applied under the compounding scheme issued by the G.O. dated December 5, 2007 under the turnover slab of ₹ 200 crores. It was open to the assessing authority to accept the said application under the aforesaid slab or to reject it. In the present case the application has been accepted under the turnover slab of ₹ 200 crores. Under the compounding scheme for the turnover slab up to ₹ 200 crores the compounding money payable was ₹ 70 lacs only. Therefore, the assessing authority is not entitled to treat and accept any other amount over and above ₹ 70 lacs as compounding money under the scheme. The assessing authority as well as the Tribunal have erred in treating the entire deposit of ₹ 1 crore as compounding money after accepting the compounding application for the slab below ₹ 200 crores. The assessing authority is only entitled to retain the compounding money which is legally due. Any amount deposited in excess of the compounding money which is not due under the scheme is the excess amount of tax and is liable to be refunded under section 29 of the Act. The assessing authority and the Tribunal have erred in refusing to refund the excess amount. Appeal allowed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1282
Penalty levied under section 10A read with section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 challenged
Held that:- For the purpose of levy of penalty under clause (d) of section 10 of the Central Act, the relevant consideration is whether the goods purchased against form C have been used for the purpose for which registration has been granted or not. As stated above, the raw materials, etc., have been used for the printing of lottery tickets for which the registration was granted and, therefore, there was no violation of clause (d) of section 10 of the Central Act.
In the result, all the three revisions are allowed. The penalty levied under section 10A read with section 10(d) of the Central Act is hereby quashed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1281
Whether the highest tax payable to be reckoned from out of the preceding years is the assessed tax or the tax due under the return filed by the assessee?
Held that:- If the tax declared as payable in the return is equal or more than the tax found payable under the accounts, then such amount of tax as disclosed in the return has to be reckoned for the purpose of assessment of tax at compounded rate for the relevant year. So long as the provision in the statute does not provide for assessment of tax at compounded rate based on the tax assessed or demanded for any of the preceding three years, the Department cannot raise such a contention before the statutory authorities or before the Tribunal or before this court. We therefore uphold the order of the Tribunal and dismiss this revision case.
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2011 (1) TMI 1280
Whether when the assessment order was revised under section 21, the assessment order merged with that revisional order, therefore, the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had no jurisdiction to again revise the assessment order as it was not in existence at all?
if the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is exercising his power under section 22, setting aside the order of revisional authority as well as the assessment order, he should have set aside the entire order and should have remitted the matter back to the assessing authority for denovo enquiry and for fresh assessment, he could not have made a restricted remand and decided the other issues?
Held that:- It is not disputed that such a power is vested with the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. Therefore, when the revisional proceedings were initiated under section 22, revised order passed under section 21, the revision is maintainable and therefore, we do not see any substance in the said contention.
In the instant case, in respect of the matter where material available on record and on undisputed facts, he has passed the orders which is final. On matters where he did not have sufficient material and enquiry was required, he has remanded the matter to the assessing officer for enquiry. Therefore, said conduct cannot be found fault with as it is well within his jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1279
Issues Involved: Assessment of tax under the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. Appeal against the assessment order under section 31(1) of the Act. Enhancement of tax rate by the appellate authority under section 31(4)(a) of the Act. Compliance with rule 42 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 by the appellate authority.
The judgment deals with a case where the petitioner, a registered dealer under the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, was assessed to tax for the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. The petitioner appealed the assessment order under section 31(1) of the Act. The appellate authority, in its order dated October 11, 2010, dismissed the appeal but increased the tax rate from four percent to 12.5 percent on the disputed turnover under section 31(4)(a) of the Act. The petitioner challenged this order on the grounds that it contravened rule 42 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, which requires issuing a notice to the dealer before enhancing the tax amount. The court noted that while the appellate authority has the power to enhance the tax amount, compliance with rule 42 is essential. The absence of issuing a notice to the dealer for enhancing the tax amount was a defect in the impugned order. The court set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the appellate authority, instructing them to consider all pleas by the petitioner and dispose of the matter within eight weeks in accordance with the law after issuing notice.
In the present case, the main issue revolved around the enhancement of the tax rate by the appellate authority under section 31(4)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005. The court emphasized the importance of compliance with rule 42 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, which mandates issuing a notice to the dealer before determining the correct amount of tax payable. The court observed that the absence of such notice in the impugned order was a significant defect. Despite being a curable defect, the court set aside the order and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the appellate authority. This decision underscores the significance of procedural compliance in tax assessment matters, ensuring that dealers are given the opportunity to respond to any proposed enhancements in tax liability.
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2011 (1) TMI 1278
Whether the impugned order is totally arbitrary and amount to colourable exercise of power, as the learned Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, has given no reason to arrive at a decision, though he was to act as quasi-judicial authority while deciding a question under section 28-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act?
Whether the "textile machine clearer roller cleaner" is an item, which can only be used in textile machinery, and for no other purpose?
Held that:- The "textile machine clearer roller cleaner" can only be used in textile machinery and no other machinery. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is correct in contending that the impugned order, passed by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, cannot be sustained in law.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is arbitrary and non-speaking, also deserves to be accepted, for the reasons that even though the power exercised by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, was under section 28A, i.e., statutory power, but order is totally silent, with regard to reasons for coming to the conclusion, especially when with regard to other two items of similar nature, were held to be part of textile machinery.
Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to treat the textile machine clearer roller cleaner, be a part of textile machinery, assessable to four per cent tax
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2011 (1) TMI 1277
Issues involved: Submission of returns for assessment years 2006-07 to 2010-11, issuance of pre-assessment notices, objections filing, passing appropriate orders, return of cheques, setting aside of attachment notice.
Submission of returns for assessment years 2006-07 to 2009-10: The petitioner was directed to submit the returns for the assessment years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10 within 10 days from the date of receipt of the order if not filed already. Subsequently, the respondents were to issue pre-assessment notices for these years, allowing the petitioner to file objections, and then pass appropriate orders as per law.
Submission of return for assessment year 2010-11: The petitioner was also directed to file the return for the assessment year 2010-11. Following this submission, the respondents were authorized to pass necessary assessment orders for the year 2010-11 in accordance with legal procedures.
Return of cheques and setting aside of attachment notice: Cheques with specific numbers and dates were to be returned to the petitioner, and an attachment notice issued by the second respondent on a particular date was set aside. The writ petition was ordered accordingly, with no costs incurred, and connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1276
Condonation of delay of 110 days caused in filing Tax Appeal (Stamp) seeked
Held that:- The applicant has sufficiently explained the delay that has been caused in preferring the tax appeal and that there is no wilful negligence on the part of the applicant, nor has the applicant ever given up the cause. In the circumstances, the delay caused in filing the appeal deserves to be condoned. Application allowed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1275
Exemption u/s 10B OR u/s 10A - wrong claim by the assessee - technical mistake - Assessee is engaged in the business of software development - contention of the assessee is that the assessee is 100% EOU entitled for exemption u/s 10A and wrongly claimed the deduction u/s 10B and it was a technical mistake in claiming deduction u/s 10B - requirements of provisions of Section 10A fulfilled or not - HELD THAT:- We are agreeing with the department that the condition for allowance of deduction u/s 10A and 10B are stood on different footing. However, the department cannot thrust upon the assessee to avail deduction u/s 10B only. If the assessee entitled for deduction u/s 10A instead of 10B, that claim required to be examined by the assessing officer in all fairness.
The issue of allowance of deduction u/s 10A though assessee made a claim before the lower authorities has not examined by the assessing officer. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that it shall be in the interest of justice to set aside the issue in the grounds of appeal of the assessee to the file of assessing officer with a direction to decide the issue in accordance with law
The assessee appeal is allowed for statistical purpose.
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2011 (1) TMI 1274
Issues: Challenge to orders rejecting revision petitions under section 54 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006.
Analysis: The High Court of Madras, in the case involving writ petitions challenging orders rejecting revision petitions under the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, directed the petitioner to submit objections to the show-cause notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner within fifteen days. The court emphasized that the petitioner could file objections, including grounds raised in the revision petitions, and the first respondent would consider these objections and pass appropriate orders within four weeks. It was clarified that no recovery proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner until the first respondent passes appropriate orders. The court disposed of the writ petitions without costs and closed the connected miscellaneous petitions.
In a subsequent reference to W.P. Nos. 535 and 536 of 2011, the court decided that no further orders were necessary following the resolution of the issues in W.P. Nos. 533 and 534 of 2011. Consequently, the court closed the writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 535 and 536 of 2011, along with the connected miscellaneous petitions, without imposing any costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1273
Whether these petitions are to be considered on merits notwithstanding the availability of the statutory remedy of filing the appeal?
Do the impugned orders suffer from the vice of bias? Is the approach of the appellate authority likely to be biased in favour of the Revenue?
Held that:- the courts are not well-equipped to go into the scientific and technological aspects of the matter. It is therefore desirable that the petitioners file the statutory appeals. The appellate authority has to consider the case of the petitioners and the respondents by taking into account the materials placed on record. Given the nature of the subject, it may also be necessary for the appellate authority to embark on a fresh enquiry, perhaps by taking the assistance of the technical persons and technical bodies in the matter.
Thus, It cannot be said with any rate of success that these petitions involve pure and simple questions of law. They involve complicated, scientific and technological questions, which certainly fall within the realm of factual controversies. As held by the apex court in the case of Vicco Laboratories [2007 (11) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA], the writ court's interference is ruled out where factual adjudication is necessary.
That the Deputy Commissioner has taken part in the proceedings of the committee on the subordinate legislation or is instrumental in filing the review petition are no grounds for alleging the bias. In the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner has passed the similar reassessment orders for different assessment periods on July 31, 2006 and January 12, 2007 long before the meeting of the committee on subordinate legislation. On the similar set of facts, the Deputy Commissioner has passed the similar orders. Therefore he cannot be held to be at fault for passing the impugned orders.
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2011 (1) TMI 1272
Issues Involved: 1. Addition to book profit on account of Lease Equalization Charge. 2. Addition to total income on account of Lease Equalization Charge. 3. Disallowance of Bond Issue Expenses. 4. Disallowance of Depreciation on office building purchased from NBCC.
Summary:
1. Addition to book profit on account of Lease Equalization Charge: The first issue relates to confirming the addition of Rs.1,42,02,48,221/- to book profit on account of lease equalization charges. The assessee argued that lease equalization charges represent recovery of fair value of leased assets and should be deducted from lease rentals, in accordance with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India guidelines. The assessing officer rejected this, stating that the method of computation for Income-tax purposes is not determined by these guidelines. The CIT (A) upheld the addition based on the Authority for Advance Ruling in the case of NHPC Ltd., which was later reversed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Advanced Against Depreciation (AAD) is not a reserve for the purpose of section 115-JB and is an allowable deduction. ITAT, Delhi Bench also supported this view in the case of G.E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. Thus, lease equalization charges are not in the nature of reserve to be added under clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 115-JB(2). The assessing officer is directed to delete the addition.
2. Addition to total income on account of Lease Equalization Charge: The assessing officer added Rs.1,42,02,48,221/- to the total income under normal provisions of the Act. The CIT (A) upheld the disallowance following previous years' decisions. ITAT, Delhi Bench had previously decided this issue in favor of the assessee, stating that lease equalization charges should be allowed as deduction. The matter is set aside to the assessing officer for verification, following the precedent set by ITAT.
3. Disallowance of Bond Issue Expenses: The assessee incurred Rs.10,09,92,445/- towards bond issue expenses and claimed it as a deduction. The assessing officer treated it as capital expenditure. The CIT (A) upheld the disallowance. ITAT had allowed the appeal in favor of the assessee in previous years, following the Delhi High Court judgment in the case of M/s. Khirani Chemicals Ltd., which allowed such expenses as a permissible deduction. The assessing officer is directed to delete the addition.
4. Disallowance of Depreciation on office building purchased from NBCC: The assessee claimed depreciation on office building at Rs.1,45,16,016/-. The assessing officer disallowed it, stating that mere occupation is not sufficient without a registered sale deed. The CIT (A) upheld the disallowance. ITAT had previously allowed depreciation for the assessee in a similar case, stating that possession and payment are sufficient for claiming depreciation, even if registration formalities are pending. Following the precedent, the assessee is entitled to depreciation.
Conclusion: The appeal filed by the assessee is decided in favor of the assessee on all issues, with directions to the assessing officer to delete the additions and allow the deductions as indicated.
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2011 (1) TMI 1271
Issues involved: Appeals by the assessee against orders of CIT (A) regarding disallowance of interest paid and fringe benefits tax assessment.
Appeals related to interest paid disallowance: The assessee, a government undertaking providing housing loans, appealed against disallowance of interest paid to banks and financial institutions due to not showing interest income in profit and loss account. The assessing officer disallowed the interest claim as no interest income was offered. The CIT (A) upheld this decision. The assessee argued that recoveries from beneficiaries were not considered as income, and interest payments were part of expenditure. The department contended that no accounts for interest received were maintained. The ITAT found the assessee not in the construction business and allowed the interest payment claim, directing the assessee to provide details of interest received for assessment.
Appeal related to fringe benefits tax assessment: The assessee appealed against the imposition of fringe benefits tax by the assessing officer, upheld by the CIT (A). The assessee claimed exemption under section 12A, stating the corporation did not fall under the status of an employer. However, no evidence was produced to show income exemption under section 12A. The ITAT confirmed the lower authorities' decision on the fringe benefits tax assessment.
Conclusion: The ITAT partly allowed the appeals related to interest paid disallowance for statistical purposes, directing the assessee to provide interest details. The appeal regarding fringe benefits tax assessment was dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1270
Issues involved: Appeal against order passed by CIT(A) for assessment year 2005-06.
Issue 1: General ground not requiring adjudication - The first ground raised by the Revenue was deemed general and did not require further adjudication.
Issue 2: Deletion of addition of excess agency commission - The AO made an addition of Rs.32,11,200/- on account of excess agency commission paid to a foreign agent. - Assessee claimed the commission was payable at 10% of F.O.B. value for services rendered. - CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting substantial increase in profits despite commission payment. - ITAT upheld CIT(A)'s decision, stating the assessee has the discretion to determine commission percentage based on business exigencies.
Issue 3: Deletion of addition of rent, rates, and taxes - AO made an addition of Rs.2,55,827/- for property taxes claimed by partners of the assessee firm. - CIT(A) deleted the addition based on the argument that the properties were used for business purposes. - ITAT overturned CIT(A)'s decision, stating lack of evidence to prove business use of the properties.
Issue 4: Deletion of addition of labor charges - AO made an addition of Rs.4,62,376/- due to incomplete signing of labor register. - CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting subsequent signing of the register and proper payment of EPF & ESIC. - ITAT upheld CIT(A)'s decision, finding no basis for ad hoc disallowance and accepting the rectification proposal.
Issue 5: Payments to non-resident shipping companies - AO made an addition of Rs.17,29,389/- for payments made without deducting tax at source. - CIT(A) deleted the addition based on additional evidence submitted, contravening Rule 46A of IT Rules. - ITAT set aside CIT(A)'s decision, directing AO to decide the issue afresh after allowing the assessee to present evidence.
In conclusion, the ITAT partially allowed the appeal, directing a fresh assessment on the issue of payments to non-resident shipping companies in compliance with Rule 46A.
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2011 (1) TMI 1269
Whether the representations filed on behalf of the detenus were not disposed of in accordance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution?
Whether the manner of consideration and rejection of representation by the Central Government is in accord with the principles laid down by this Court on this aspect in several cases?
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2011 (1) TMI 1268
Whether exclusion of 'sport' as a subject from taxing entry 62, and inclusion of the same in non-taxing entry 33 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is intentional so as to deprive the State Legislature of their competence to tax 'sport' and leave that competence to Parliament under the residuary entry 97 of the Union List?
Whether the Division Bench judgment of this court in Chrysalis International Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2011 (1) TMI 1267 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], has been correctly decided by applying the law laid by the honourable Supreme Court in Geeta Enterprises v. State of U. P. [1983 (9) TMI 319 - SUPREME COURT]. The question is 'does the Homer nod'?
Held that:- We hold that the State Legislature is competent to impose entertainment duty/tax on entertainments and amusements, which include sports and accordingly question "(A)" is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
The learned judge then went on to observe that "We, in the Supreme Court, do 'nod' despite great care to be correct, and once a clear error in judgment is revealed, no sense of shame or infallibility complex obsesses us or dissuades this court from the anxiety to be ultimately right, not consistently wrong." We are happy to notice that we are saved of Homer's nod. Accordingly, the second question is also answered against the petitioners and in favour of the Revenue.
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2011 (1) TMI 1267
Whether such activities [ providing facilities for swimming, games of billiards, pool, etc.] carried out by the persons, who are participating in the sports or such like activity, are liable to entertainment duty under the Punjab Entertainments Duty Act, 1955?
Held that:- here cannot be any variation in the levying of rate of entertainment duty on the basis of the decision having been taken by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner. Unless the procedure laid down, as aforesaid, is complied with, the rate of levy of entertainment duty could not have been varied. Still further, even if any decision has been taken, there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. Consequently, the said argument is without any merit. Prior to June 29, 2001, the entertainment duty at 125 per cent would be payable, but thereafter, it would be payable at 25 per cent.
The notifications dated September 1, 1977 and June 29, 2001, provide that the State Government has published the notification in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 read with first proviso of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act. Meaning thereby that the publication of a draft notification has been dispensed with for fixation of rate of entertainment duty. Thus, the argument that the draft notification was not published, is not tenable as the same was expressly dispensed with.
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