Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1958 1958 (10) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 41 to 50 of 50 Records

• 1958 (10) TMI 10
  

  Whether the proceedings taken under section 34 against each of the said firms were without jurisdiction and void?

  Held that:- When the notice is issued under section 34(1)(a) the Income-tax Officer proceeds to act on the ground that the income, profits and gains of the firm which are chargeable to income-tax have been underassessed ; it is the income of the firm which is initially ascertained in the assessment proceedings under section 23 and it is in respect of the said income of the firm that the Income-tax Officer finds that a part of it has escaped assessment. We do not, therefore, think that the appellant's argument that the notice issued against the firm and served on the appellant was invalid under section 34(1)(a) can be accepted.

  Rule 6B has been made to clarify this position and to confer on the Income-tax Officer in express and specific terms such authority to review his own decision in the matter of the registration of the firm when he discovers that his earlier decision proceeded on a wrong assumption about the existence of the firm. In our opinion, there is no difficulty in holding that rule 6B is obviously intended to carry out the purpose of the Act and since it is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act its validity is not open to doubt.

  Rules 2 and 6 of the rules framed under section 59 of the Indian Income-tax Act are not ultra vires the rule-making authority.

  All that the appellants would be able to argue on this ground would be that the course adopted by the Income-tax Officer in making orders of fresh assessment is irregular and illogical and should be corrected. That is a matter concerning the merits of the orders of assessment and by no stretch of imagination can it be said to raise any question of jurisdiction under article 226. That is why we express no opinion on this point. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 9
  

  Whether income received by the respondent by the sale of trees growing in his forests is agricultural income exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(viii) of the Act?

  Held that:- This appeal is allowed, the order of the court below is set aside and the reference is answered in the affirmative.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 8
  

  Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 17,132 for 1943-44 and ₹ 47,029 for 1944-45 could be legally deemed to have been received in British India and were liable to tax under section 4(1) of the Act?

  Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the expenditure of ₹ 7,512 incurred in connection with a criminal litigation was admissible expenditure within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv) of the Act ?

  Held that:- Having regard to the method adopted by the appellant in keeping her books of account, it seems clear that, if the appellant's present contention is accepted, the decision as to remittances from Chistian to Khurja as well as the decision as to the rates at which the tax were to be levied on the appellant may have to be reopened. That is why we think, in the special circumstances of this case, we should not allow Mr. Sastri to raise the point that the appellant cannot trade with herself and so the relevant entries cannot justify the inference that the appellant has received income even though the entries are made in the accounts kept on mercantile basis - both the questions answered against the appellant. Appeals dismissed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 7
  

  Whether the expression "at the rate applicable to the total income of the company" as appearing in sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) to the second explanation to proviso to paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1952, means the rate at which a company's total income is actually assessed or the rate prescribed by the respective Finance Acts without taking into consideration the rebate allowed in the respective years in accordance with the provisions of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 ?

  Held that:- We accordingly hold that the rate applicable in sub-clause (b) of clause (ii) of the explanation read with clause (ii) of the proviso to paragraph B of Schedule I of the Act means the rate actually applied in a given case. On this construction the rate at which the appellant is liable to pay the additional income-tax would be the difference between the rate of five annas and the rate of sixteen pies in a rupee at which the appellant has in fact paid income-tax in the relevant year. That is to say, the additional income-tax is leviable at the rate of forty-four pies in a rupee. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 6
  

  Whether in the circumstances of the case the sum of ₹ 2,50,000 received by the assessee as damages or compensation for the premature termination of the contract of 9th May, 1940, is income assessable within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act?

  Held that:- On a consideration of all the facts established, we are of opinion that the receipt of ₹ 2,50,000 by the respondent is a revenue receipt and is chargeable to tax.

  In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court set aside and the order of the Tribunal restored

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 5
  

  Whether on the facts of this case any income accrued to Messrs. Vyas and Dhotiwala as the result of their associating themselves as financiers in the scheme for the distribution of standard cloth ; and, if so, whether such income was assessable in their hands ?

  Held that:- Section 4(3)(i-a) applies to income derived from business carried on on behalf of a religious and charitable institution when the income is applied solely to the purpose of the institution and the business is carried on in the manner provided. It is enough to say that the scheme, considered as a business, was not carried on on behalf of any religious or charitable institution. Once it is held that the assessees made the profits, how they use it would not matter. In the result, we would answer both parts of the question framed, in the affirmative. We hold that the profits were the income which accrued to the assessees and such income is assessable to income-tax and is not exempt from taxation under section 4(3)(i-a). The appeal is allowed

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 4
  

  Whether the aforesaid receipts from John H. Levy constitute income taxable under the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121 ?

  Held that:- In the view that we take namely, that the payments with which we are concerned, were income arising from the vocation of the appellant as a teacher of Vedanta, no question of exemption under section 4(3)(vii) of the Act arises. In order that a payment may be exempted under that section, it has to be shown that it did not arise from the exercise of a vocation. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 3
  

  Whether the commission payable to the managing agents under this agreement is to be ten per cent. of the profits of the assessee without deduction of the excess profits tax payable by it on its profits or after deduction?

  Held that:- nothing turns on the fact that at the date the agreement under consideration was made, the Excess Profits Tax Act had not come on the statute book nor perhaps been thought of, and, therefore, could not have been in the contemplation of the parties. If the net profits are the divisible profits, everything necessary to be excluded to arrive at the divisible profits has to be deducted whether it was in the contemplation of the parties or not. It is easy to imagine instances. Suppose after the agreement the Government imposed a licence fee on the payment of which alone the business could have been carried on and that licence fee was not in the contemplation of the parties when the agreement had been made. None the less it has clearly to be deducted in finding out the divisible profits. In the result we would answer the question framed in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 2
  

  Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment order under section 34 of the Act of the interest on arrears of rent is legal ?

  Held that:- In the result we hold that the Patna High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the decision of the Privy Council was information within the meaning of section 34(1)(b) and that the said decision justified the belief of the Income-tax Officer that part of the appellant's income had escaped assessment for the relevant year. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 1958 (10) TMI 1
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the attachment of cheroot tobacco for duty payable on beedi tobacco.
  2. Alleged breaking of the bank's lock and removal of goods.
  3. Liability of the Government for damages due to alleged wrongful detention of tobacco.
  4. Good faith of the Excise Department's actions.
  5. Bar of suit by limitation under Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Attachment of Cheroot Tobacco:
  The court examined Rule 215 of the Central Excise Rules, which incorporates Sections 168, 189, and 192 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, mutatis mutandis. It was determined that the cheroot tobacco was lawfully attached under Section 11 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, to recover duty due on beedi tobacco stored by Rahamatullah. The court concluded that the Excise Department acted within its legal rights, stating, "Section 11 completely gives power to the Government to take the action it did."
  
  2. Alleged Breaking of the Bank's Lock and Removal of Goods:
  The court found that the defendant or its servants did not break open the godown of Rahamatullah. Instead, the transfer of goods to Sundaram Pillai's godown was permitted by the Excise authorities upon application by the surety, Sundaram Pillai. The court noted, "Both the Courts have found that the defendant or its servants did not break open the godown of Rahamatullah and remove the goods."
  
  3. Liability of the Government for Damages Due to Alleged Wrongful Detention:
  The court held that the Government was not liable for damages as the attachment of cheroot tobacco was lawful. Furthermore, it was found that the plaintiff bank failed to prove that the Excise Department's actions directly caused the deterioration of the tobacco. The court stated, "The plaintiff completely failed to show that the Department unnecessarily and improperly withheld the tobacco."
  
  4. Good Faith of the Excise Department's Actions:
  The court emphasized that the burden of proving lack of good faith lay with the plaintiff bank. The court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Excise Department, noting, "The plaintiff has throughout failed to show want of good faith on the part of the Excise Officials." The court also referenced legal definitions of "good faith" to support its conclusion that the actions of the Excise Department were conducted honestly and without intention to deceive.
  
  5. Bar of Suit by Limitation under Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
  The court concluded that the suit was barred by limitation under Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as it was filed more than six months after the cause of action accrued. The court stated, "This suit instituted for an act done or ordered to be done, after the expiration of six months from the accrual of the cause of action... would be barred by limitation under Section 40(2)."
  
  Conclusion:
  The court dismissed the second appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. It affirmed that the attachment of cheroot tobacco was lawful, the Excise Department acted in good faith, and the suit was barred by limitation. The judgment concluded, "In the result, this second appeal is dismissed without costs."

  ---

123