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Showing 41 to 60 of 1429 Records
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2014 (12) TMI 1397
Disallowance of material expenses - expenses on account of steel, cement, glass, aluminum etc. were supported by the purchase bills, that the expenses claimed in respect of bricks, sand, earth etc. were not fully supported by proper bills, that many of the expenses regarding those items were claimed on the basis of self made cash vouchers and were not supported by Pucca bills of purchase, that same were not fully verifiable - HELD THAT:- AO had called for the details of various expenses incurred by the assessee, that it had furnished all the necessary details during the assessment proceedings, that the AO made a disallowance on estimate basis, that the audited accounts of the assessee were available to the AO and in the audit report there was nothing that could lead to the conclusion that the assessee had not incurred expenditure claimed in the books of account, that similar kind of expenses were disallowed in the earlier years by the AO were deleted by the Tribunal. We are of the opinion that the AO cannot make any addition/disallowance without giving proper reasons.
As a representative of the State, he is duty bound to pass a reasoned order. A reasoned order needs basic facts their analysis and conclusion. In the case under consideration, estimated disallowance has been made without assigning proper reasons. The AO has not rejected the books of account and has not pointed out any defects in the books. In these circumstances, in our opinion, he was not justified in making the disallowance. Therefore, confirming the order of the FAA, we decide the first ground of appeal against the AO.
Disallowance of labour and contingency expenses - HELD THAT:- We find that the assessee-firm had furnished books of account and audited statement of accounts and the AO was not able to pin-point the defects in such documents, that the quantity of material used in labour charges incurred were certified from time to time by the competent authorities and the AO was not able to negate the claim made by the assessee. It is also found that the AO had not disputed about the labour and contingency payment though he had made an ad hoc disallowance. We are of the opinion that the tax liability cannot be fastened to the assessee by the AO without bringing some positive evidence against the assessee on record, that the disallowance or addition has to be backed by some documentary/oral evidence which could prove that the claim made by it of an expenditure was not genuine. In the case under consideration, the AO has made a lump sum disallowance, but same is not backed by any evidence. We are of the opinion that the order of the FAA does not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity. - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (12) TMI 1396
Validity of block assessment u/s 158BD - Whether notice issued u/s 158BD does not satisfy the requirements of law on the ground that Assessing Officer has recorded satisfaction after completion of the block assessment under Section 158BC in the case of the person search? - tribunal has held that the satisfaction note has been recorded after the expiry of time limit under Section 158 BE in the case of the search person and therefore the notice issued under Section 158 BD is not validly issued - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the assessment year in the case of search as was made on 28.03.2003. The notice under Section 158BD is issued on 09.07.2003. The satisfaction note is prior to the date of issue of notice. But certainly, not either on the day the assessment order was passed in the case of searched person or before 31.03.2003. As held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment the satisfaction note has to be prepared immediately after the assessment proceedings are completed under Section 158BC of the Act of the searched person. Therefore on the ground that such a note was not prepared either at the time when the order was issued under Section 158BD or before 31.03.2003, the proceedings initiated under Section 158BD cannot be held valid.
What remains is the question of word “immediately” used in the aforesaid provision. However in the instant case we do not propose to go into the said question because the order passed by the tribunal has to be sustained on the ground that satisfaction has not been recorded in the case of the searched person.
Admittedly, in this case the satisfaction note is prepared in the case of the assessee itself. It ought to have been prepared in the case of the person searched. Therefore the entire initiation of proceedings under Section 158BD is vitiated. In that view of the matter the order passed by the tribunal confirming the order of the appellate authority cannot be found fault with.
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2014 (12) TMI 1395
Denial of benefit of Wage Revision by notional fixation and re-computation of their retiral dues (severance package) - HELD THAT:- The Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court have erred in law in allowing the wage revision benefits to the employees, who were not covered either under communication dated 8.8.2006 issued by the Government of India or the consequential Office Order dated 25.8.2006 whereby the wage revision is implemented.
In Sudhir Kumar Consul v. Allahabad Bank [2011 (2) TMI 1372 - SUPREME COURT], which also pertains to the question of fixing of cut-off date for granting retirement benefits, this Court has laid down that the cut-off date may be justified on the ground that additional outlay as involved or the fact that under the terms of appointment, the employee was not entitled to the benefit of pension or retirement.
Thus, it is not found that the cut-off date, i.e., 1.4.2003 for granting wage revision, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is arbitrary nor we find it violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - the employees, who were superannuated or voluntarily retired prior to 01.04.2003 from Appellant Corporation, are not entitled to notional wage revision as directed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, and the High Court - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2014 (12) TMI 1394
Dishonor of Cheque - Jurisdiction - power of Judicial/Metropolitan Magistrate to condone the delay in filing a private complaint - HELD THAT:- Factually, the statutory notice under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act issued by the respondent was received by the petitioner on 26.05.2005. As per Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, though the period of limitation expired on 11.07.2005, the complaint was admittedly presented before the learned Magistrate only on 12.07.2005. It was returned by the learned Magistrate repeatedly and finally cognizance was taken on 22.01.2007.
As held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy [1993 (4) TMI 326 - SUPREME COURT], so far as the offence under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, if there is a delay in presenting the complaint, the same requires to be satisfactorily explained only by the complainant and the Court cannot condone such delay in the interest of justice as it could be done under Section 473 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the Court to examine as to whether the complainant has satisfactorily explained the delay by showing sufficient cause and if he fails to do so, the Court shall dismiss the complaint. In other words, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation by the complainant for the delay, the Magistrate, on his own, by taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, shall not condone the delay as it could be otherwise done under Section 473 Cr.P.C.
In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases [2013 (11) TMI 1587 - SUPREME COURT], the Honourable Supreme Court has held that for computing the period of limitation, the crucial date shall be the date of presentation of the complaint. If the date of presentation of the complaint is beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 142 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, it is absolutely necessary for the complainant to explain such delay by showing sufficient cause. In the case on hand, admittedly, no such petition was filed and no such explanation was offered. But, the lower Court, without noticing that there was a delay in presenting the complaint, has inadvertently taken cognizance. Had the lower Court noticed the delay, it would have called upon the respondent herein to explain the delay. Thus there was some error on the part of the lower Court.
In the instant case, the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance deserves to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded back to the lower Court with a liberty to the respondent herein to file an appropriate petition seeking condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause - Petition closed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1393
Smuggling - Gold - petitioners case is that they are only a bailee under the bailment for doing the work - customs authorities can withhold the gold or not - HELD THAT:- The primary authority is to decide whether this gold articles are liable to be released to the petitioners is the authority under the Customs Act. If the gold articles brought by the petitioners are clearly identifiable and it is only for the purpose of job work, authority will not have any difficulty in releasing it. However, that has to be satisfied by the officer attached to the 4th respondent. Petitioners therefore shall make an application to release the good with documents and other relevant materials in terms of Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962. If petitioners make an application, that application shall be considered within a period of ten days from the receipt of such application.
Petition disposed off.
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2014 (12) TMI 1392
Unexplained investment in jewellery - unexplained cash - interest on deposits in FCNR accounts - addition on account of household expense - a profit of 25% was estimated besides an addition of unexplained cash credit was also made based on certain entries/notings found to be recorded in loose papers - HELD THAT:- As requested to restore the matter to CIT(A) to be decided the matter in light of decision in case of Chandrakant J Patel vs. V N Srivastava [2011 (3) TMI 1322 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] Nothing contrary has been brought to our knowledge on behalf of Revenue. Facts being similar, so following same reasoning we restore the matter to CIT(A) with direction to decide the matter in light of observation in Chandrakant J Patel - Appeal filed by assessee is allowed for statistical purpose.
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2014 (12) TMI 1391
Nature of income - agricultural income or income from other sources - AO had held that the agricultural land owned by the assessee was about 8 acres only and as such the assessee could not have earned huge agricultural income from the sale of vegetables and other agricultural produce - Tribunal directing the AO to accept the agricultural income declared and not to consider any part of the same as income from other sources - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal has observed that out of about 15000 saplings of Eucalyptus trees/Nilgiri trees which were planted in 1982-83, it is quite reasonable to assume that atleast 5000 saplings of Eucalyptus trees/Nilgiri trees will grow into full trees in the year 1990-91 relating to AY 1991-92 which could be cut and sold because as per the certificate issued by the Range Forest Officer no permission is required for cutting and sale of Eucalyptus trees/Nilgiri trees.
Tribunal as well as CIT(A) are justified in coming to the conclusion that there is no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The assessee HUG owns fertile agricultural land having irrigation facilities from which agricultural income has been shown and accepted by the revenue in earlier years also and the fact of assessee having been alloted agricultural land and 15000 Eucalyptus trees/Nilgiri trees in the year 1982-83 has been certified by Range Forest Officer. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings adopted and findings of fact arrived at by the lower authorities. Decided in favour of the assessee
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2014 (12) TMI 1390
Issue of car parking at Premises - leave under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure - whether the petitioners, who are not parties to the suit, can maintain the instant application? - HELD THAT:- While it is not disputed that the suit was instituted with leave under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is contended on behalf of Angad Merchants that no notice of the suit having been published as contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8 (2) of the CPC, the suit has not assumed representative character and, as such, a non-party to the suit cannot maintain any application therein.
There is nothing on record to show that notice of the suit has been given to all persons interested therein either by personal service or by public advertisement. Would that mean that a party who is similarly interested in the suit as the plaintiff is precluded from filing an application in the suit for appropriate reliefs even if he has actual notice of the suit? In my opinion, the answer must be in the negative. The provision of notice is there so that a party who would be bound by a decree passed in a representative suit does not find that he is bound by a decree without even having notice of the suit. The entire purpose of serving notice, be it individual notice or public notice, is to make all such persons aware that a representative suit has been filed so that such persons, if they choose can come forward and either support or oppose the cause.
A person having actual notice of the suit, even though the plaintiff has not served notice as contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8 (2) of the CPC, is entitled to make an application in the suit praying for reliefs which are within the scope of the suit - time to issue notice of the suit may be extended by the Court and such notice can be issued privately or by public advertisement at any stage of the suit. It is merely that until such notice is issued a non-party who is not before the Court will not be bound by any order or decree passed in the action - the issue is decided in favour of the petitioners.
The petitioners prayed that the Joint Administrators should take expeditious steps for the purpose of implementing the Division Bench order dated 11th August, 2006. Angad Merchants contends that the said order was obtained by suppressing their presence in the disputed portion of the basement and behind its back.
Application allowed in part.
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2014 (12) TMI 1389
Liability for license and deposit license fee and other taxes - Uttar Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 - N/N. 145/XXVII (5) Entertainment Tax/2005 dated 17.8.2005 - HELD THAT:- In pursuance of Section 21 of the Cable Television Network Act, 1995, the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, including the programme code, are fully applicable to the Cable operator. The Respondent got himself registered Under Section 3 by depositing ₹ 500/- as registration fee. The Respondent wants to run two private channels subscribing to 11,885 TV screens. The respondent is covered Under Section 2(aa) of the U.P. Cinema Rules, 1988 and is liable to pay fee under Rule 17.
By conduct the Respondent accepted the Rules, as he submitted an undertaking before the Court to comply with the Rules. He also deposited a license fee of ₹ 2400/- per year as imposed under Rule 17(1). The Respondent cannot choose and be selective as to which Rules will be applicable to him. The Respondent has also given an undertaking to comply with Rules 17(1) and 17(2). This Court in M/S. LAXMI VIDEO THEATERS VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS [1993 (7) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT], while considering the expression "Cinematograph" under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and its applicability on VCR and VCP which was developed in 1970, held that a definition must be given a meaning which takes into account the subsequent scientific developments in the field.
The Notification No. 145/XXVII (5) Entertainment Tax/2005 dated 17.8.2005 doesn't apply to the Respondent as it seeks to tax "Exhibition by means of Video". The Respondent's activities are not covered by the aforementioned expression - As long as there is no statutory sanction for imposition of a tax, no liability of paying a fee can be imposed relying on the alleged "consent" or acquiescence to the same imposition in part. The statutory sanction cannot be found under the Uttar Pradesh Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 or any rules made thereunder.
From a plain reading of the relevant provisions it is clear that the same are not applicable to the Respondent and hence the demand as well as the Recovery Certificate dated 6.8.2011 issued under Rule 17(2) of the Rules are bad in law - appeal dismissed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1388
Provisional attachment of property involved in money laundering - attachment on the ground that the said property was acquired by the Appellant from the proceeds of crime - existence of scheduled offence or not - HELD THAT:- The attachment of a property is liable to be vacated, if the existence of a scheduled offence is negated as the generation of proceeds of crime will also be negated. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances, attachment of proceeds of crime cannot continue, if the alleged scheduled offence is not established after trial. Given the scheme of the PMLA, attachment of property (proceeds of crime) must be lifted, if it is found that the scheduled offence and, on the basis of which attachment was effected, does not exist. In absence of a scheduled offence, the question of existence of any proceeds thereof, will not arise. Therefore, the attachment of the property is liable to be vacated, as in absence of scheduled offense, it cannot be inferred that the proceeds of crime were generated and the property by the Appellant had been purchased and constructed by the proceeds of crime generated by her husband.
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Rajiv Chanana Vs Dy. Director, Directorate of Enforcement [2014 (10) TMI 436 - DELHI HIGH COURT] had also held that in absence of scheduled offense, the attachment of property cannot continue.
The property as described herein above is released from attachment - Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2014 (12) TMI 1387
Relaxation of the condition of bail - service of summons - Section 56(1)(ii) read with 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is about 76 years old and he travels abroad frequently for medical treatment. He is permanent resident of Mumbai and is staying with his family at Mumbai.
There shall not be any apprehension that the petitioner will abscond and will not face the trial - condition of the bail modified - application disposed off.
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2014 (12) TMI 1386
Assessment u/s 153A - Unexplained gift u/s 69A - HELD THAT:- Where AO had not referred to any incriminating material found during the course of search based on which addition was made, then the AO had no jurisdiction to make addition in the assessment framed under s. 153A of the Act.
In the case of Jai Steel (India) v. CIT [2013 (6) TMI 161 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] held that the requirement of assessment or reassessment under s. 153A has to be read in the context of s. 132 or 132A of the Act, inasmuch as, in case nothing incriminating is found on account of such search or requisition, then the question of reassessment of the concluded assessments does not arise, which would require more reiteration and it is only in the context of the abated assessment under second proviso which is to be reassessed.
In number of cases, the Tribunal Benches have consistently taken the view that when no assessment is abated, question of making any addition or making disallowance which are not based on material found during search is bad in law - we hold that the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the learned CIT(A) is bad in law. We, therefore, allow original ground as well as additional ground of the appeal.
Addition u/s 68 on gift received treated as unexplained - HELD THAT:- Both the authorities below have categorically held that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of the donor. No confirmation of gift was filed along with the return of income of the assessee. It is claimed that the alleged gift was made in cash but the donor was not produced before the AO for examination. At this stage also, the assessee could not prove the genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of the donor. No additional evidence, whatsoever, was filed before us. in the absence of any supporting evidence, we are of the view that the addition is fully justified.
Disallowance on account of forfeiture of EMD made beyond the scope of s. 153A - HELD THAT:- Assessee did not bring any material on record to prove that the EMD amount as been forfeited by BPCL. In the absence of any documentary, evidence regarding forfeiture of EMD, the claim of the assessee cannot be accepted. At this stage also, the assessee has not brought any evidence to demonstrate that the claim made by it was justifiable. It is settled law that where an assessee claims deduction, the onus lies on him to bring all material facts on record to substantiate his claim. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the appeal filed by the assessee.
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2014 (12) TMI 1385
Appointment in the post of Senior Manager (Dairy) in a Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 - Whether a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against Co-operative Societies registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969? - HELD THAT:- Whether a body or authority is a State or not is a mixed question of fact which has to be examined, taking into consideration different factors including the constitution, finance, function, control etc. For deciding the said issue, the Court has to essentially enter into various facts. There being no foundation in the Writ Petition, it is neither necessary nor desirable to enter into the said issue. Thus, there being no foundation in the Writ Petition, the question as to whether respondents 2 to 4 are 'authorities' within the meaning of Article 12, cannot be considered.
The power of the High Court to issue certain writs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not confined to the traditional powers of the English Court to issue writs. Under Article 226, power has been given to the High Court to issue writ to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories.
The Apex Court had occasion to consider the question regarding maintainability of the Writ Petition against a Co-operative Society in A. UMARANI VERSUS REGISTRAR, COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND ORS. [2004 (7) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT]. The Writ Petition was filed in the High Court by the employees of the Co-operative Society. The learned Single Judge dismissed some of the Writ Petitions against which Writ Appeals were filed. The Division Bench framed various issues for consideration. One of the issues framed was as to whether the Writ Petition was maintainable. The Division Bench held that the Writ Petition was maintainable. The matter was taken to the Apex Court and a contention was also raised before the Apex Court that the Writ Petition is not maintainable against a Co-operative Society - Apex Court reiterated that a Writ Petition against a Co-operative Society is maintainable if the action of the Co-operative Society is violative of statutory provisions.
The Writ Petitions against Co-operative Societies are maintainable in certain circumstances. When the action complained in the Writ Petition is of any statutory violation on the part of the Co-operative Society, a Writ Petition will lie. The action of the Co-operative Society, if falls in a public domain or breach of the public duty is complained of, writ may also lie. However, in the absence of breach of any statutory duty or public duty, a Writ Petition cannot be entertained against a Co-operative Society.
Applicability of decision in the case of Bhaskaran & others v. Addl. Secretary & others [1987 (11) TMI 401 - KERALA HIGH COURT] - HELD THAT:- The judgment of the Full Bench in Bhaskaran confines to only consideration of a Co-operative Society under Article 12. In regard to Co-operative Society which does not fall under Article 12, writ cannot be maintainable against the Co-operative Society on that basis. However, as we have already observed by considering issue No. (i), Writ Petition may be maintainable against Co-operative Society in the circumstances mentioned therein.
The present Writ Petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Petition dismissed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1384
Disallowance u/s 14A - As per DR assessee to prove that a particular item of expenditure was incurred for earning taxable income and hence should not be disallowed u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- The assessee claims that the expenditure on interest, is incurred for the purpose of earning interest income but no evidence is lead by the assessee to prove this claim. Similarly on the issue of other expenses no evidence is lead to demonstrate that a particular expense cannot be said to have been incurred in relation to earning the income, which is not part of total income. Under these circumstances we are unable to accept the plea of the assessee.
Assessee argued that the AO has not recorded satisfaction that the computation of disallowance u/s 14A by the assessee is wrong. We find that the satisfaction is discernible from para 2 of the assessment order, where the AO has not agreed with the manner in which the assessee applied Rule 8D and has computed the disallowance in his own way. This was after considering the detailed reply given by the assessee on 28.12.2011. Hence these arguments of the Ld.Counsel is dismissed as devoid of merit.
CIT(A) has restricted the net disallowance u/s 14A. We are of the view that the disallowance has to be recomputed under Rule 8D (2)(ii). Thus for this limited purpose we set aside the matter to the file of the AO for computing the disallowance.
Disallowance of claim of short term capital loss - assessee has submitted that right to obtain shares is an asset and forfeiture of the same is, extinguishing of a right and hence covered u/s 2(47)(ii) of the Act - HELD THAT:- As decided in SHRI CHAND RATAN BAGRI [2010 (1) TMI 123 - DELHI HIGH COURT] held that forfeiture of the convertible warrant amounted to a transfer within the meaning of s.2(47) - A share in a company is nothing but a share in the ownership of the company. While the right of the assessee to share in the ownership of the company Stands extinguished on account of the forfeiture, the company, with all its assets, continues to exist. The forfeiture only results in one less shareholder. It is not as if the asset in which a share was being claimed was also extinguished - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (12) TMI 1383
Denial of TDS credit - HELD THAT:- We find that the credit has been allowed by the authorities below, it terms of Section 199 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (herein after ‘the Act’) and Rule 37BA(3) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (herein after ‘the Rules). The assessee declared interest income of ₹ 23,170/- and accordingly corresponding credit of TDS of ₹ 2,327/- has been allowed and excess credit claimed of ₹ 1,909/- has been disallowed, which is also in terms of the reply dated 14.12.2012, furnished by the assessee - Having regard to the above, the claim is bereft of merit and thus rejected.
Disallowance of electricity expenses - Addition as personal expenditure - HELD THAT:- We find that the disallowance sustained is excessive. The assessee is a bachelor and has claimed as rendering services as an advocate from residence. The ld CIT(A) has accepted said factual aspect. Therefore we restrict the disallowance to 50% of the expenditure incurred and claimed pertaining to electricity expenses of the residence. So, this ground is partly allowed.
Addition of client development expenses - HELD THAT:- We find no reason to interfere with the disallowance made. No evidence could be led to deny the factual finding, that the expenditure included expenditure on shoes, apparels, purses, toys etc. Thus such expenditure disallowed as personal expenditure is reasonable and is upheld.
Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r.8D - CIT(A) noted that the assessee has earned exempt income as dividend and as long term capital gain, but no expenses has been shown to have been incurred for earning the exempt income - HELD THAT:- we find that the assessee had made investments in Mutual Funds, shares of ₹ 85 lakhs approximately, and in respect of which an exempt income in the shape of dividend and long term capital gain has been claimed. No explanation has been furnished to satisfy that no expenditure was incurred to manage the above investment yielding tax free income. The books of account have been examined by the AO, who has held that disallowance under Rule 8D, is warranted - we decline to interfere with the conclusion of the authorities below. Ground raised is rejected.
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2014 (12) TMI 1382
Assessment of HUF - property in dispute is an individual property or joint family property - HELD THAT:- This Court by its order in earlier years [2012 (10) TMI 1249 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] allowed these appeals and held the property in dispute is a joint family property and accordingly relief was granted.
Thus these three appeals are to be allowed, setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal holding that the property in dispute is an individual property and holding that it is a joint family property. Accordingly, the assessing authority shall grant relief in terms of the said order.
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2014 (12) TMI 1381
Valuation - demand of differential duty u/s 4A of Central Excise Act, 1944 - petition was dismissed as there is no amount which is required to be stayed as per the provisions of Section 35F of Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in this case is regarding the demand of differential Central Excise duty under the provisions of Section 4A of Central Excise Act, 1944 as it applies to the period in question.
An identical issue has been decided by this Bench in the case of M/S ACME CERAMICS AND OTHERS VERSUS CCE RAJKOT [2014 (3) TMI 164 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] where it was held that prior to 01.03.2008, in the absence of any provisions for re-determining the RSP, in the form of prescribed rules, the Revenue authorities cannot re-determine the RSP under any of the provisions available to them. It has to be noted that there is no contrary view which has been taken by the Tribunal.
There are no reason to deviate from such a view already taken - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2014 (12) TMI 1380
Approval of Scheme of Amalgamation - section 230-232 of Companies Act - HELD THAT:- Various directions regarding holding and convening of various meetings issued - directions regarding issuance of various notices issued.
The scheme is approved - application allowed.
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2014 (12) TMI 1379
Stay of recovery - AR submitted before us that Stay was granted for the assessment year 2007-08 on identical issues and the case was heard by the Bench and the orders are awaited - HELD THAT:- We find merit in the contention of the Ld. AR. On identical matters, for the assessment year 2007-08, the case was heard and the order is likely to be pronounced shortly as submitted by the Ld. AR. Therefore, we hereby grant stay to the assessee from recovery of demand by the Revenue for a period of 60 days from this date or date of order whichever is earlier.
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2014 (12) TMI 1378
Correct head of income - Interest earned on bank deposits - Business income or income from other sources - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that assessee corporation is a government company promoted by H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd. The assessee has admittedly not started commercial operation in the year under consideration and was still in the pre-operative stage.
The assessee's counsel has referred to the accounts of the assessee to show that assessee received lesser interest of ₹ 625.97 lacs and paid interest on loan in the year under consideration would show that assessee has to pay more interest as against the small interest received by assessee. Therefore, if any adjustment is made against interest paid, still there is a liability of the assessee to pay interest on the loans. The assessee also explained that for effective funds management, the temporary surplus funds were kept in short term bank deposits and thereafter, interest was earned and so was also used for construction of the project and for paying interest to the power finance company which have not been adversely commented upon by the authorities below. Therefore, the reliance of the Assessing Officer on the decision in the case of Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. CIT [1997 (7) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] was totally misplaced.
It is clear that the funds with the assessee, even if temporarily used for savings/short term deposits, but the earning of the interest were directly connected with work of construction of the project employed by the assessee - earning of interest could not be treated as income from other sources, since the income was earned in the period prior to commencement of the business and it was the nature of capital receipt and was required to be set off against pre-operative expenses. We, therefore, set aside the orders of authorities below and delete the addition. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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9911796707
