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Showing 41 to 60 of 682 Records

• 2007 (2) TMI 691
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board (CLB) vis-`a-vis the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).
  2. Withdrawal of cheque signing powers from Ms. Poonam.
  3. Call notices for unpaid amounts on shares.
  4. Appointment of four additional directors.
  5. Holding of Annual General Meetings (AGMs).
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board (CLB) vis-`a-vis the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR):
  
  The respondents argued that the CLB lacked jurisdiction since the company was under BIFR purview. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in *NGEF Ltd. v. Chandra Developers (P.) Ltd.* and *Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. v. Official Liquidator*, which emphasized that BIFR retains control over a sick company's assets and that SICA provisions override the Companies Act. The petitioners, however, contended that the CLB had jurisdiction for issues not related to the sanctioned scheme (SS) by BIFR. The judgment clarified that the CLB could entertain petitions under sections 397/398 of the Companies Act if the allegations were unrelated to the SS.
  
  2. Withdrawal of cheque signing powers from Ms. Poonam:
  
  Ms. Poonam, a nominee of the petitioners, had been exercising cheque signing powers since the company's inception. The board's decision to withdraw these powers was allegedly due to the office's relocation, but later allegations suggested misuse of funds. The judgment noted that such decisions must be judged by the reasons recorded in the minutes, and additional reasons cannot validate a previously bad decision. The withdrawal of Ms. Poonam's powers was deemed oppressive, as it was not substantiated by the initial reasons given.
  
  3. Call notices for unpaid amounts on shares:
  
  The company issued call notices for unpaid amounts on shares with 9% interest, threatening forfeiture for non-payment. The petitioners argued that this decision was oppressive, especially since the board had previously decided not to charge interest. The judgment acknowledged that while calling for unpaid money is a company's prerogative, doing so under the given circumstances, especially after disputes arose, was oppressive. The board's earlier decision not to charge interest was not considered by the investors' grievance committee, questioning the legitimacy of the interest charge.
  
  4. Appointment of four additional directors:
  
  The appointment of four additional directors was challenged as a move to strengthen the 2nd respondent's control over the board. The judgment noted that while the Articles of Association (AOA) allowed for such appointments without prior agenda, the circumstances suggested an intent to alter the board's balance. The necessity of appointing four directors, especially when the AGM was imminent, was questioned. The judgment concluded that only one additional director might have been justified to avoid a board stalemate, and the appointment of four directors was not bona fide.
  
  5. Holding of Annual General Meetings (AGMs):
  
  The petitioners sought the holding of AGMs for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06. The respondents argued that the AGMs were delayed due to pending accounts and ongoing disputes. The judgment emphasized the statutory obligation to hold AGMs, which are crucial for shareholders' rights. It directed the company to hold AGMs to transact statutory businesses, excluding the adoption of accounts, which was stayed by AAIFR. The judgment allowed for the petitioners to request an independent Chairman for the AGMs if desired.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The judgment provided specific directions to address the issues raised:
  1. Ms. Poonam's cheque signing powers were to be reinstated.
  2. The four additional directors were barred from participating in board meetings until confirmed in the AGM.
  3. The issue of charging interest on unpaid amounts was to be reconsidered by the board with the special director's participation.
  4. The company was directed to convene AGMs for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 by 31-3-2007, excluding the adoption of accounts.
  5. The petitioners were given the liberty to apply for an independent Chairman for the AGMs.
  
  The petition was disposed of in these terms.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 690
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the interim injunction vacated by the learned Single Judge.
  2. Alleged deceptive similarity between the trademarks 'Meromer' and 'Meronem'.
  3. Applicability of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in staying the suit.
  4. Rights of the registered proprietor under Sections 29 and 32(e) of the Trade Marks Act.
  5. Prima facie satisfaction of the court regarding the invalidity of the registration of the mark.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Interim Injunction Vacated by the Learned Single Judge:
  The appellants/plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16th May 2006, which vacated the interim injunction granted on 6th October 2005. The interim injunction had restrained the respondent/defendant from using the trade name 'Meromer'. The learned Single Judge vacated the injunction based on the application filed by the respondent/defendant under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC and dismissed the application filed by the appellants/plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
  
  2. Alleged Deceptive Similarity Between the Trademarks 'Meromer' and 'Meronem':
  The appellants/plaintiffs argued that the trade name 'Meromer' is deceptively similar to 'Meronem'. The learned Single Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances, held that the two trademarks are phonetically not similar and are distinct. The comparison included aspects like composition, color combination, label background, label contents placement, shape of vials, and the trademarks themselves. The court found that the prefix 'Mero' is common to both marks and is derived from the drug 'Meropenem'. The suffixes 'nem' and 'mer' in 'Meronem' and 'Meromer' respectively, were found to be sufficiently distinct to avoid confusion. The decision emphasized that nobody can claim exclusive rights over a generic term like 'Mero', which is publici juris.
  
  3. Applicability of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in Staying the Suit:
  The appellants/plaintiffs contended that the suit should have been stayed under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as they had filed a rectification application for the removal of the trade mark 'Meromer'. The court clarified that Section 124(i)(b)(ii) applies only to applications for rectification that are already pending. Since the rectification application was filed after the institution of the suit, the court found no grounds to stay the proceedings. The learned Single Judge was justified in not staying the suit as the mere filing of a rectification application does not automatically stay the registration or affect the rights of the registered owner.
  
  4. Rights of the Registered Proprietor Under Sections 29 and 32(e) of the Trade Marks Act:
  The respondent/defendant argued that the appellants/plaintiffs' action for infringement is not maintainable under Sections 29 and 32(e) of the Trade Marks Act, which state that the use of a mark by its registered proprietor does not constitute infringement. The court upheld this view, noting that the respondent/defendant's trade mark 'Meromer' was registered effective from the date of application (2nd August 2004), and thus, the use of 'Meromer' by the respondent/defendant was lawful.
  
  5. Prima Facie Satisfaction of the Court Regarding the Invalidity of the Registration of the Mark:
  The court emphasized that for an application for rectification to be considered, the appellants/plaintiffs must show prima facie satisfaction of the court regarding the invalidity of the registration of the mark. In this case, the rectification application was still pending, and the court found no prima facie grounds to invalidate the registration of 'Meromer'. The learned Single Judge's decision to not stay the suit and to direct the respondent/defendant to maintain accounts of sales was upheld.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed, and the findings of the learned Single Judge were upheld. The court found no deceptive similarity between 'Meromer' and 'Meronem', and the interim injunction was rightly vacated. The appellants/plaintiffs' arguments regarding the stay of the suit under Section 124 and the alleged infringement under Sections 29 and 32(e) were not accepted. The decision emphasized the importance of prima facie satisfaction in rectification applications and the publici juris nature of generic terms in trademark disputes.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 689
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
  2. Applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  3. Validity of the transfer under Section 41 and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  4. The effect of the death of Udham Kaur on the property rights.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Interpretation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

  This appeal raises an interesting question of law in regard to the interpretation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("the Act", for short).

  Issue 2: Applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act

  The appellant raised a plea that he was a bonafide purchaser for value, whereas the case of Udham Kaur was that as the properties were purchased during the pendency of the suit, the same was hit by the 'doctrine of lis pendens, as envisaged u/s 52 of the Act. The said contention of the respondent was not accepted by the learned Trial Judge as also by the First Appellate Court holding that the transaction was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

  Issue 3: Validity of the transfer under Section 41 and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act

  The High Court, although, rejected the contention of the respondent herein that Section 41 of the Act would be attracted, but opined that Section 43 would. The distinction between the said two provisions is apparent. Section 41 provides that a transfer by an ostensible owner cannot be avoided on the ground that the transferor was not authorised therefore, subject to the condition that the transferee should take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer and to act in good faith before a benefit thereof is claimed by him. Section 43, on the other hand, enables the transferee to whom a transferor has made a fraudulent or erroneous representation to lay hold, at his option, of any interest which the transferor may subsequently acquire in the property, unless the right of any subsequent purchaser for value without notice is in effect.

  Issue 4: The effect of the death of Udham Kaur on the property rights

  In applying the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, the High Court, however, held: (i) It was Harcharan Singh who had pleaded the mischief; (ii) After the death of Udham Kaur, Harcharan Singh would be the natural heir of the half share of her property.

  Conclusion:

  We have noticed hereinbefore that the transaction was not void. It was not contrary to any provision of law. It was not hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. We, therefore, do not accept the submission of the learned Counsel that the ingredients of Section 41 would also be applicable in a case falling under Section 43 of the Act. The plea of inapplicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act could have been taken by Harcharan Singh and not by the appellant, who has based his claim on the basis of the Will. The principle of feeding the estoppel will apply against Harcharan Singh and not against the appellant. He could not have, in our opinion, therefore, raised the said plea.

  For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 5,000/-.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 688
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the respondent company neglected to pay the debt as per the decree.
  2. Whether the debt is bona fide disputed.
  3. Applicability of limitation period for filing winding-up petition.
  4. Discretion of the court in ordering winding-up.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Neglect to Pay Debt:
  The petitioner firm, M/s Karpara Project Engineering, filed a company petition u/s 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, against Ballarpur Industries Ltd. for non-payment of dues amounting to Rs. 41,50,192/- with interest. The petitioner had obtained a decree from the Madras High Court for Rs. 92,89,721.59/- with interest at 18% per annum from 17-7-2001 till realization. Despite repeated notices, the respondent company failed to pay the amount, leading to the filing of the winding-up petition.
  
  2. Bona Fide Dispute:
  The respondent company admitted the decree but claimed it was ex parte and disputed the amount, stating they had filed appeals against the decree. They argued that the debt was not due as their advocate could not attend the case due to a paralytic stroke, resulting in the ex parte decree. The petitioner countered that no stay was granted in the appeal, and the Madras High Court refused to set aside the ex parte decree. The court found that the respondent's defense was not bona fide and lacked substance, emphasizing that the debt due under the decree could not be disputed.
  
  3. Limitation Period:
  The respondent argued that the winding-up petition was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The court rejected this argument, stating that the money decree could be executed within 12 years, making the limitation of 3 years irrelevant.
  
  4. Court's Discretion:
  The court referred to various judgments, including those of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to explain that a winding-up petition is not a legitimate means to enforce payment of a bona fide disputed debt. However, in this case, the court found that the respondent's defense was not bona fide, and the deeming fiction u/s 434(1)(a) applied. The court emphasized that commercial solvency was not relevant when there was neglect to pay a debt due under a decree.
  
  Conclusion:
  The petition was admitted, and the petitioner was permitted to issue a public notice inviting interested parties to participate in further hearings. The court stayed the order for four weeks to allow the respondent to take appropriate steps.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 687
  
  Issues involved:
  Challenge to order quashing complaint u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act due to lack of court's leave u/s 446 of Companies Act after company winding up by Gujarat High Court.
  
  Comprehensive Details:
  
  1. Background and Non-Appearance:
  The revision application challenges the order quashing the complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act due to lack of court's leave u/s 446 of the Companies Act after the company's winding up by the Gujarat High Court. Despite being on board for two weeks, no appearance was made for the applicant on various dates. Respondent No. 1, a company wound up by the Gujarat High Court, had a liquidator appointed. No appearance was made on behalf of the official liquidator or respondents Nos. 2 to 8.
  
  2. Facts and Proceedings:
  The complaint was filed by the applicant against respondent No. 1 for a dishonoured cheque. Despite notice, no payment was made, leading to the complaint in 1996. The Gujarat High Court's order directed winding up of respondent No. 1 and appointed an official liquidator. The accused filed an application to dismiss the complaint, citing the lack of court's leave u/s 446 of the Companies Act. The Metropolitan Magistrate quashed the proceeding based on this provision.
  
  3. Interpretation of Section 446(1) of Companies Act:
  Section 446(1) of the Companies Act states that no legal proceeding can be commenced or continued against a company after winding up without the court's leave. The term "other legal proceeding" includes criminal proceedings related to the company's civil liabilities. The liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arises from the company's civil liability, making it fall under "other legal proceeding" as per section 446(1).
  
  4. Decision and Conclusion:
  The record confirms the company's winding up and the appointment of a liquidator by the Gujarat High Court. Despite time given, the applicant failed to obtain leave from the court for continuing the proceedings under section 138. Therefore, the Metropolitan Magistrate's order to quash the proceeding was deemed appropriate. Consequently, the revision application was dismissed.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 686
  
  Issues involved: Application for relief to step into the shoes of ICICI Bank Ltd. as a secured creditor of the Company in liquidation.
  
  Summary:
  The applicant sought to step into the shoes of ICICI Bank Ltd., a secured creditor of the Company in liquidation. It was acknowledged that ICICI Bank had assigned the debt to the applicant. The Official Liquidator (OL) raised concerns regarding the assignment process, but the Court noted that the scheme of arrangement of the Company was to be considered by stakeholders at a meeting. To ensure the correct representation of secured creditors, the Court allowed the applicant to participate in the meeting as the representative of the debt formerly held by ICICI Bank.
  
  In the hearing, it was confirmed that ICICI Bank had assigned the debt to the applicant. The OL raised issues regarding the assignment process, but the Court emphasized the importance of allowing the applicant to participate in the meeting of secured creditors for proper representation. The Court directed that the applicant be permitted to represent the debt formerly held by ICICI Bank at the upcoming meeting of secured creditors.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 685
  

  Concealment of income - search conducted on a train by the police authorities - employee of the appellant was returning from Amritsar by train and were found in the possession cash in a search by Railway Police - According to the Appellant, he had gone to Amritsar to make some purchases of gold but the transaction did not materialise - Held that:- The Assessing Officer was of the view that the amount represented sales of gold made by the Appellant on earlier occasions and that the sale proceeds were being carried back to Delhi. The departmental authorities have considered the statements of some persons such as Arun Kumar, Neeraj Kumar and Kimti Lal, who were examined by the Department as well as some other material that has been placed on record. The view taken by all the authorities below is plausible and is not perverse in any manner. The Appellant was disbelieved for adequate reasons.

  We do not think that any substantial question of law arises for our consideration. It is merely a matter decided on the evidence on record.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 684
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of 'creamy layer' amongst backward classes.
  2. Validity of the Narendran Commission Report and the subsequent notification.
  3. Compliance with the Supreme Court's directions in Indra Sawhney-I and II, and Ashoka Kumar Thakur.
  4. Validity of the Kerala State Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments or Posts in the Services Under the State) Act, 1995.
  5. Criteria for identifying 'creamy layer' and the exclusion of certain categories.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Interpretation of 'creamy layer' amongst backward classes:
  The primary issue was the interpretation of the Supreme Court's judgment regarding the identification and exclusion of the 'creamy layer' among backward classes. The Court reiterated that the 'creamy layer' should be excluded from the benefits of reservation as per the guidelines laid down in Indra Sawhney-I.
  
  2. Validity of the Narendran Commission Report and the subsequent notification:
  The Narendran Commission was appointed by the State of Kerala to determine the criteria for identifying the 'creamy layer'. The Commission recommended raising the income limit for exclusion to Rs. 3 lakhs and excluding income from salary and agriculture. The Supreme Court found the Narendran Commission's recommendations arbitrary and not based on scientific data. The Court held that the report failed to justify the significant increase in the income limit and criticized the exclusion of salary and agricultural income without adequate reasoning.
  
  3. Compliance with the Supreme Court's directions in Indra Sawhney-I and II, and Ashoka Kumar Thakur:
  The Court noted that the State of Kerala had previously been found guilty of contempt for not complying with the directions in Indra Sawhney-I. The Court emphasized that the identification of the 'creamy layer' must be done realistically and in line with the constitutional scheme. The Court also criticized the State for attempting to provide maximum protection to backward classes rather than excluding those who had ceased to be backward.
  
  4. Validity of the Kerala State Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments or Posts in the Services Under the State) Act, 1995:
  The Court had previously struck down the provisions of the State Act that declared no socially advanced section existed in Kerala. The Court reaffirmed that the Act's provisions were unconstitutional as they violated the principles laid down in Indra Sawhney-I and II.
  
  5. Criteria for identifying 'creamy layer' and the exclusion of certain categories:
  The Court examined the criteria for identifying the 'creamy layer' and found that the Narendran Commission's approach was flawed. The Court held that the criteria should be based on social and economic advancement, and those who had reached a higher social status should be excluded from the backward classes. The Court directed the State to appoint a new Commission to re-evaluate the criteria for identifying the 'creamy layer' and to ensure compliance with the constitutional principles and previous judgments.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the Narendran Commission's report and directed the State of Kerala to appoint a new Commission to re-evaluate the criteria for identifying the 'creamy layer'. The Court emphasized the need for a realistic and scientifically based approach in line with the constitutional scheme and previous judgments. The writ petition was allowed with specific directions, and the contempt petitions were kept pending.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 683
  

  Addition u/s 68 - Cash credits entries and purchases genuine or not - HELD THAT:- Considering the finding of the Tribunal, especially, on the issue raised in first question, concurrent finding is there and even for the issue raised in second question, no defect was found in books of accounts. Even ST Number of the party which has supplied the goods, has been shown.

  No interference is called for - The appeal stands dismissed.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 682
  
  Issues involved:
  1. Classification of liquidated damages as capital or revenue receipt.
  2. Taxability of interest on refund of cash compensatory support.
  
  Issue 1: Classification of liquidated damages
  The High Court addressed the first issue concerning the classification of liquidated damages received by the assessee for delayed possession of immovable property. The revenue contended that the liquidated damages should be treated as a revenue receipt. However, the Court, following a previous decision, held that the receipt of liquidated damages was a capital receipt. It was concluded that no substantial question of law was raised under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and thus rejected the revenue's contention.
  
  Issue 2: Taxability of interest on refund of cash compensatory support
  The second issue involved the taxability of interest received by the assessee on the refund of cash compensatory support. Initially, the Tribunal had considered the cash compensatory support as a capital receipt and non-taxable. However, a retrospective amendment to the statute made the support taxable as business income. The revenue argued that the interest amount accrued to the assessee should also be taxed. The Court noted that the interest amount had already been paid by the assessee to the revenue, and since the assessee did not retain any amount, taxing the interest would negate the retrospective effect of the amendment. The Tribunal's decision to reject the revenue's contentions was upheld by the Court, stating that no substantial question of law arose for their interference under section 260A of the Income-tax Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 681
  
  Issues involved: Assessment under U.P. Trade Tax Act, validity of penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act, interpretation of Section 28-A of the Act.
  
  Assessment under U.P. Trade Tax Act: The case involved a dispute regarding the transportation of goods from Delhi to Kolkata, where the goods were intercepted at Kanpur. The driver's statement and documents found in the vehicle indicated that the goods were intended for delivery at Kanpur, contrary to the transit pass obtained. The Tribunal initially allowed the release of goods on deposit of tax, which was challenged by the Commissioner of Trade Tax. The High Court directed additional security and compliance with Tribunal's order, leading to the release of goods. Penalty proceedings were initiated under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act, which was upheld by the Joint Commissioner but later quashed by the Tribunal based on the goods leaving U.P. and the surrender of the transit pass at the exit check post.
  
  Validity of Penalty under Section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act: The penalty was imposed due to suspicions that the goods were intended for sale at Kanpur, supported by discrepancies in documents and statements. The Standing Counsel argued that the penalty should be judged based on circumstances at the time of seizure, emphasizing the intent to evade tax by selling goods in U.P. The opposite party contended that the goods were in transit to Kolkata, and surrendering the transit pass at the exit check post absolved them of liability. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the opposite party, considering the goods' movement and the surrender of the transit pass.
  
  Interpretation of Section 28-A of the Act: Section 28-A was discussed in light of previous court decisions, emphasizing its role in preventing tax evasion. The Apex Court clarified that the section raises a rebuttable presumption of goods being sold in U.P. if the transit pass is not surrendered. The High Court highlighted that the genuineness of consignor and consignee is irrelevant for this section, placing the responsibility on the vehicle owner or in-charge. The judgment stressed that mere deviations in the transportation route do not warrant adverse inferences.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the revision, upholding the Tribunal's decision to quash the penalty under section 15-A(1)(o) of the Act. The judgment emphasized the importance of proper enforcement at check posts to prevent collusion and manipulation, holding departmental officers responsible for combating tax evasion effectively.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 680
  
  The High Court of Bombay dismissed the notice of motion seeking condonation of 302 days delay in filing an appeal against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for the AY 1991-1992. The court found that the reasons provided for the delay were not sufficient to warrant condonation.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 679
  
  The High Court of Delhi dismissed the Revenue's appeal regarding a case of "dividend stripping" for the assessment year 2001-2002. The Assessing Officer's decision was not considered erroneous based on a previous court ruling, and no substantial question of law was found. The appeal was dismissed.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 678
  
  The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Mumbai granted waiver of pre-deposit of service tax and penalty in a case involving a demand of &8377; 5,35,94,363 and a penalty of &8377; 100 per day. The demand was confirmed against the applicants engaged in providing general insurance service for policies issued before 10-9-2004. The Tribunal found a prima facie case for waiver due to the department's changing stand on tax rates, and accordingly waived pre-deposit and stayed recovery pending appeal. The appeal was fixed for out of turn hearing on 12-4-2007.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 677
  
  The Gujarat High Court admitted the appeal based on the substantial question of law regarding the exclusion of sums related to Sales Tax and Excise duty from total turnover for computing profits derived from export under section 80HHC of the Act. The appeal is listed for final hearing after three months.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 676
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed a Civil Appeal due to a delay of 601 days in filing the appeal. The application for condonation of delay was rejected as the reason provided was considered vague.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 675
  
  Issues involved: Determination of liability to pay service tax, imposition of penalty, invocation of longer period for demand, interpretation of Notification No. 13/2003-S.T.
  
  Liability to pay service tax: The impugned order demanded service tax and Education Cess from July 2003 to March 2005 under proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act 1994. The appellants contested this, stating they were engaged in providing commission agent services, not advertising services. They argued that they were exempt from service tax under Notification No. 13/2003-S.T. as commission agents. The Adjudicating authority's finding contradicted the Show Cause Notice, which indicated the appellants were providing business auxiliary services as commission agents. The Tribunal found the invocation of the longer period unjustified due to lack of evidence of suppression of facts, thus allowing the appeal solely on the basis of time bar.
  
  Imposition of penalty: The Adjudicating authority imposed penalties under Sections 76 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, along with interest under Section 75. The appellants strongly challenged these penalties. However, the Tribunal did not address the issue of penalties in its decision, focusing instead on the time bar aspect of the case.
  
  Invocation of longer period for demand: The Show Cause Notice was issued on 30-9-2003, covering the period from July 2003 to March 2005. The appellants argued that unless the extended period under proviso to Section 73(1) was justified, the demand would be time-barred. The Tribunal noted the extensive correspondence between the Revenue and the appellants regarding the leviability of service tax, dating back to 27-12-2001. Despite the Revenue's direction to register under advertisement services, the appellants contested this classification. The Tribunal found the invocation of the longer period unjustified, as there was no evidence of suppression of facts, ultimately allowing the appeal on the grounds of time bar.
  
  Interpretation of Notification No. 13/2003-S.T.: The appellants relied on Notification No. 13/2003-S.T. to argue for their exemption from service tax as commission agents. The Tribunal observed that the Adjudicating authority's finding contradicted the Show Cause Notice, which indicated the appellants fell under the purview of the notification. The Tribunal did not delve into the specific interpretation of the notification, as the appeal was allowed based on the time bar issue.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 674
  
  Issues involved: Denial of Modvat credit for goods produced in 2004-2005 due to dispute over branded goods clearance in 2003-04.
  
  Summary:
  
  The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT NEW DELHI, in the case, dealt with the denial of Modvat credit to the appellant for goods produced in the financial year 2004-2005. The issue arose from a dispute regarding certain goods cleared as branded goods in 2003-04, which were now being questioned.
  
  Upon hearing both sides and examining the records, the Tribunal noted that the assessment for 2003-04 had attained finality, and the revenue authorities were not reopening those assessments. Consequently, the Tribunal opined that it was not permissible for the revenue to argue that the goods assessed as branded in 2003-04 had transformed into unbranded goods. The Tribunal found the demand unsustainable on the face of it and, therefore, allowed the stay application. As a result, recovery was stayed pending the appeal's disposal.
  
  The judgment was delivered by Mr. C.N.B.Nair, Member Technical, and Mr. M.V.Ravindran, Member Judi. The legal representatives present were Sh. R.Santhanam, Advocate for the Appellant, and Sh. S.M.Tata, SDR for the Respondent. The order was dictated and pronounced in open court.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 673
  
  The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Mumbai overturned penalties imposed on the appellant for not registering as 'Mandap Keepers' and not paying service tax. The tribunal found that the appellant was not aware of their liability and promptly paid the tax and interest upon realizing. The penalty was deemed unsustainable, and the appeal was allowed.

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• 2007 (2) TMI 672
  
  The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT MUMBAI ruled in favor of the appellants, setting aside the penalty of Rs. 1,46,222 imposed under Sections 76, 77 & 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. The appellants, providers of 'Mandap Keeper' service, paid the service tax and interest but failed to register, pay service tax, and file returns due to ignorance of the law. Since there was no willful negligence, the penalty was deemed unnecessary, and the appeal was allowed.

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