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Showing 41 to 60 of 577 Records

• 1999 (8) TMI 992
  
  Issues Involved:
  The issues involved in this case are the deficiency in service by developers, the validity of the claim petition filed beyond the prescribed time limit, the continuation of cause of action, the substitution of agreements, and the legal remedy available to the respondents.
  
  Deficiency in Service:
  The respondents filed a complaint against the developers for failing to provide a flat as promised under a written agreement. The National Commission decreed the claim in favor of the respondents for a sum of money, interest, and compensation for pain and suffering.
  
  Validity of Claim Petition:
  The appellants contended that the claim was time-barred as it was filed beyond the prescribed period. However, the Commission held that since the rights under the original agreement were not given up, there was a continuing cause of action, and the claim was not beyond time.
  
  Continuation of Cause of Action:
  The second agreement did not extinguish the rights under the original agreement. The appellants were under an obligation to provide a flat, and the respondents could legally claim specific performance of the original agreement as the amount was not paid as stipulated in the subsequent contract.
  
  Substitution of Agreements:
  The appellants argued that the new agreement substituted the original contract, and the respondents should approach the civil court for recovery. However, the Commission rejected this plea, citing the principle of novation of contract and the fact that the rights under the original agreement were not extinguished.
  
  Legal Remedy Available:
  The respondents were justified in claiming deficiency in service as the appellants failed to provide evidence to support their case. The Commission's decree was upheld as the entire amount due had been paid to the respondents, including interest, and the appeal was dismissed.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the National Commission's decision, emphasizing the importance of honoring contractual obligations and providing legal remedies for cases of deficiency in service.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 991
  
  The application to be impleaded as a party in a tax reassessment case was rejected by the Gujarat High Court. Third parties cannot intervene in income tax proceedings unless required as witnesses. Assessment proceedings are confidential between the revenue and the assessee. The court found no reason to allow the applicant to be involved in the case.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 990
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the termination order dated 26th February, 1979.
  2. Compliance with principles of natural justice.
  3. Validity of the High Court and Tribunal's findings.
  4. Impact of the termination order on the respondent's future employment.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Termination Order:
  The appellant institution terminated the services of the respondent, a lecturer in Chemistry, on 26th February, 1979, after she failed to comply with the conditions of her granted leave. The respondent had applied for leave to pursue higher studies, initially for a Ph.D. course, which was rejected, and subsequently for an M.Phil course, which was granted under specific conditions. The conditions included registering for the M.Phil course and returning to duty if registration was not completed by a specified date. The respondent failed to register for the M.Phil course and instead registered for a Ph.D. course without the institution's permission. Despite reminders and show cause notices, she did not return to duty. The Supreme Court found that the respondent violated the conditions of her leave and acted contrary to her affidavit. Therefore, the termination order was deemed legal.
  
  2. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice:
  The High Court and the Tribunal held that the termination violated principles of natural justice as no proper enquiry was conducted. However, the Supreme Court noted that the respondent was given multiple opportunities to explain her actions, including a second show cause notice dated 20th December, 1978, which she responded to. The termination order considered her reply and other correspondence. The Court concluded that sufficient opportunity was given to the respondent, and there was no violation of natural justice.
  
  3. Validity of the High Court and Tribunal's Findings:
  The High Court and the Tribunal set aside the termination order, citing the lack of an enquiry and opportunity for the respondent to defend herself. The Supreme Court disagreed, highlighting that the respondent admitted to not fulfilling the conditions of her leave and did not provide a plausible defense. The Court found that the facts were clear and undisputed, making an enquiry unnecessary. Thus, the findings of the High Court and the Tribunal were deemed incorrect, and the termination order was upheld.
  
  4. Impact of the Termination Order on the Respondent's Future Employment:
  The respondent's counsel argued that the termination order would stigmatize her and affect her future employment. The Supreme Court held that the termination was an order of termination simpliciter and did not carry any stigma. The Court further protected the respondent by stating that the order should not be construed as stigmatizing her.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order dated 25th September, 1989, and the Tribunal's order dated 13th February, 1980. The termination order dated 26th February, 1979, was upheld, and it was concluded that the respondent acted in violation of her leave conditions and did not provide a sustainable defense. The Court also ensured that the termination order would not be read as stigmatizing the respondent. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 989
  
  Issues Involved:
  The petition under Section 482 of Cr. PC for quashing proceedings in CC No.995 of 1997 on the file of the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by accused No.2 in the said CC, facing a charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Quashing of Proceedings
  The petitioner, accused No.2, sought quashing of the proceedings on the grounds of lack of necessary averments under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act holding him liable for criminal action. The petitioner argued that being a Director of Accused No.1 Company, he was not involved in day-to-day affairs or aware of the transactions with the complainant. The complaint lacked specific averments to make him criminally liable under Section 138.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  Section 141 imposes liability on company officials for offenses under Section 138. The petitioner contended that the complaint did not establish his role as being "in-charge of, and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business." The respondent argued that the complaint contained sufficient averments showing the petitioner's active participation in the Company's affairs and knowledge of the cheque issuance.
  
  Decision and Rationale:
  The Court noted that the complaint indicated the petitioner's active involvement in the Company's operations, such as arranging loans and persuading for repayment. While the exact words of Section 141 were not reproduced, the complaint's averments suggested the petitioner's responsibility and participation. The Court emphasized that during a Section 482 petition, the focus is not on meticulous scrutiny but on whether statutory requirements for constituting an offense are broadly alleged. The Court declined to quash the proceedings, leaving the determination of Section 141 compliance to the trial court based on evidence presented.
  
  Conclusion:
  The petition was dismissed, with the Court's observations on the petitioner's role intended solely for the petition's decision, not binding the trial court's independent evaluation of Section 141 requirements based on trial evidence.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 988
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the notice for voluntary retirement.
  2. Proper channel for submitting the notice.
  3. Timeliness and effectiveness of the refusal of the voluntary retirement notice.
  4. Validity of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner post-retirement.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the notice for voluntary retirement:
  The petitioner, a Branch Manager at United Bank of India, exercised his option for voluntary retirement under Rule 29 of the Pension Regulations, 1995, by submitting a notice on May 14, 1996, specifying a 90-day period ending on August 12, 1996. The court found this notice valid, as it complied with the requirement of a three-month notice period. The court clarified that a "period" of three months should reasonably be interpreted as 90 days, considering the average length of a month as 30 days. Thus, the petitioner's notice was deemed properly served and effective from the expiry of August 12, 1996.
  
  2. Proper channel for submitting the notice:
  The respondents contended that the notice should have been routed through the Regional Manager. However, the court dismissed this argument, stating that submitting the notice to the General Manager (Personnel) was sufficient. The court emphasized that the point of routing through the proper channel was unsubstantial and did not affect the validity of the notice.
  
  3. Timeliness and effectiveness of the refusal of the voluntary retirement notice:
  The respondents attempted to refuse the petitioner's voluntary retirement by letters dated August 12, 1996, and August 13, 1996. However, these letters did not reach the petitioner until August 17, 1996. The court held that for a refusal to be effective, it must be communicated to the petitioner before the expiry of the notice period. The court found no evidence that the respondents lost control over the refusal letters on the dates they were purportedly issued. Consequently, the refusal was deemed ineffective, and the petitioner's retirement became effective on August 12, 1996.
  
  4. Validity of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner post-retirement:
  Two disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, one in September 1996 for unauthorized absence and another in November 1998 for alleged monetary transactions. The court ruled that if the petitioner had effectively retired on August 12, 1996, any disciplinary proceedings against him post-retirement were improper and illegal. Since the court found the petitioner's retirement valid, both disciplinary proceedings were quashed.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, establishing that he had effectively retired on August 12, 1996, and consequently, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him were invalid. The respondents were directed to release all arrears due to the petitioner with interest and pay the costs of both applications. The court emphasized the importance of written communication for notices and refusals under the relevant regulations to avoid disputes.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 987
  
  The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the revision petition filed by the Commissioner, Trade Tax against the Trade Tax Tribunal's order regarding the detention of a consignment of Mentha Oil. The Tribunal found the seizure unjustified and the security demanded illegal, ruling in favor of the opposite party, a commission agent. The Tribunal's decision will not be binding in any future proceedings initiated against the opposite party or the principal dealer in regular assessment.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 986
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of the expression 'personal use' in sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.
  2. Bona fide requirement of additional accommodation under Section 11(8) of the Act.
  3. Comparative hardship to the tenant versus the benefit to the landlord under the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Interpretation of 'Personal Use' in Sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Act:
  The core issue revolves around the interpretation of 'personal use' within the context of Section 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The appellant argued that 'personal use' should encompass any bona fide requirement for additional accommodation, including starting a new business. The respondent contended that 'personal use' should be confined to the expansion of the existing business only. The court emphasized that words in a statute should be given their natural, ordinary meaning and that 'personal use' is an expression of wide amplitude. It was concluded that 'personal use' should not be restricted to the expansion of the existing business but should include any bona fide requirement for additional accommodation for any business or purpose of the landlord's choice.
  
  2. Bona Fide Requirement of Additional Accommodation:
  The appellant, a landlord, sought eviction of the respondent, a tenant, from a shop room on the grounds of bona fide requirement for starting a new jewellery and textile business. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority both dismissed the eviction petition, finding that the appellant did not genuinely need the additional accommodation and that the respondent would face more hardship if evicted. The High Court upheld these findings. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the landlord's bona fide requirement for additional accommodation under Section 11(8) should not be limited to the expansion of an existing business but could include starting a new business.
  
  3. Comparative Hardship to the Tenant:
  The court examined the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11, which mandates that the Rent Controller must consider whether the hardship caused to the tenant by eviction would outweigh the benefit to the landlord. Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority found that the respondent would suffer more hardship than the appellant would benefit. The High Court did not address this aspect due to its interpretation of Section 11(8). The Supreme Court emphasized that even if the landlord's bona fide requirement is established, the relief under Section 11(8) cannot be granted without a finding in favor of the landlord under the first proviso to sub-section (10).
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration, directing it to evaluate the issue of comparative hardship as required under the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act. The appeal was allowed, and the case was sent back to the High Court for a new decision in accordance with the law.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 985
  
  Issues:
  1. Admissibility of the complaint based on the period of limitation.
  2. Specific performance of the Agreement in consumer disputes.
  3. Application of the Limitation Act to complaints under the Consumer Protection Act.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. Admissibility of the complaint based on the period of limitation:
  The case involved a dispute where the respondent filed a complaint against the appellants for not executing a sale deed despite receiving the full payment for a flat. The appellants argued that the complaint was time-barred. The Supreme Court clarified that before the insertion of Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act, no specific period of limitation was prescribed. Section 24A mandated that complaints must be filed within two years from the date of the cause of action, with provisions for condoning delays. The Court emphasized that the Act aimed to protect consumer rights and did not originally include a limitation period. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the complaint was time-barred, highlighting that the Act did not prescribe a limitation period before the amendment.
  
  2. Specific performance of the Agreement in consumer disputes:
  The respondent sought specific performance of the Agreement for the flat. The State Commission allowed the appeal, directing the appellants to fulfill the Agreement. The Court noted that the appellants had acknowledged their liability to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The appellants' notice to the respondent further confirmed this acknowledgment. The Court observed that no specific timeframe for performance was set in the Agreement. The respondent's complaint, filed within a reasonable time, was deemed admissible. The Court upheld the State Commission's decision for specific performance, emphasizing the respondent's entitlement to seek redressal for the sub-standard construction of the flat.
  
  3. Application of the Limitation Act to complaints under the Consumer Protection Act:
  The Court addressed the applicability of the Limitation Act to complaints under the Consumer Protection Act. It noted that the Act did not initially incorporate a limitation period. The Court referenced a previous judgment where the application of the Limitation Act was discussed but not conclusively determined. The Court clarified that even if the Limitation Act were to apply, the respondent's complaint was timely filed based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court emphasized that the Act's objective was to safeguard consumer interests and promote consumer rights, highlighting the importance of protecting consumers against unfair trade practices and ensuring access to redressal mechanisms.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the State Commission's decision for specific performance of the Agreement. The Court upheld that the complaint was not time-barred and emphasized the importance of protecting consumer rights under the Consumer Protection Act.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 984
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Jamna Prasad Kanhaiyalal vs. CIT to returns filed under the Amnesty Scheme, 1985.
  2. Genuineness of the purchase of gold ornaments by the assessee-firm from its partners and their family members.
  3. Assessment of the income derived from the alleged purchase of gold ornaments.
  
  Summary of Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Applicability of Supreme Court Decision
  The CIT(A) erred in holding that the Supreme Court decision in Jamna Prasad Kanhaiyalal vs. CIT is not applicable to returns filed under the Amnesty Scheme, 1985. The CIT(A) argued that the Amnesty Scheme is a non-statutory scheme, unlike the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme (VDS), which was statutory. The CIT(A) relied on a CBDT letter stating that no inquiry into the true nature and source of the disclosed amount was to be made unless positive material existed. However, the Tribunal disagreed, stating that the benefits of the Amnesty Scheme are restricted to the declarants themselves and do not extend to third parties.
  
  Issue 2: Genuineness of Purchase
  The assessee-firm claimed to have purchased gold ornaments worth Rs. 1,53,02,266 from its partners and their family members, who had declared the jewellery under the Amnesty Scheme. The AO found several discrepancies and concluded that the transactions were not genuine. Key findings included:
  - The jewellery was declared by all 18 persons on the same day and valued by the same valuer.
  - The jewellery was converted into new ornaments and sold to the firm in the same year.
  - The declarants, including minors, claimed to have acquired the jewellery from undisclosed sources but could not provide details about the jewellers from whom the jewellery was purchased.
  - The jewellery was not found during a search action in September 1982.
  - The purchase consideration was credited to the accounts of the declarants and not paid in cash.
  
  Issue 3: Assessment of Income
  The AO added Rs. 1,53,02,266 to the income of the assessee-firm, concluding that the purchases were financed out of its income from undisclosed sources. The CIT(A) deleted the addition, arguing that the tax effect would be the same even if the amnesty was availed of by the assessee-firm. However, the Tribunal upheld the AO's findings, stating that the assessee-firm could not prove the purchases and that the entire scheme appeared to be a tax planning device. The Tribunal emphasized that the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Jamna Prasad Kanhaiyalal applies, allowing the Department to investigate the true source of the amount, even if it was declared under the Amnesty Scheme.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restored that of the AO, thereby allowing the appeal of the Department. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee-firm is liable for the addition of Rs. 1,53,02,266 to its income for the assessment year 1988-89.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 983
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction u/s 263 of the IT Act, 1961.
  2. Consideration of sales to foreign airlines as export turnover for relief u/s 80HHC.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Jurisdiction u/s 263 of the IT Act, 1961
  
  The assessee appealed against the order of the CIT dated 24th March 1992, made u/s 263 of the IT Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1987-88. The CIT issued a notice u/s 263 seeking to set aside the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) on the grounds that the AO allowed a deduction u/s 80HHC without verifying if the sales to airlines were within India and thus not export sales, and wrongly allowed a deduction on account of incremental liability for a capital asset as revenue expenditure. The CIT concluded that there was no need for revision on the second issue but set aside the first issue for reconsideration by the AO.
  
  Issue 2: Consideration of Sales to Foreign Airlines as Export Turnover for Relief u/s 80HHC
  
  The assessee, a hotelier with a flight kitchen unit, claimed a deduction u/s 80HHC for supplies to foreign airlines. The AO revised the claim from Rs. 7.32 lacs to Rs. 15 lacs based on assessed income. The CIT argued that the AO allowed the deduction without proper discussion and consideration of whether the sales constituted export turnover. The assessee's counsel argued that the AO had applied his mind, evidenced by the audit report in Form 10 CCAC and the discussion of related sales-tax liability in the assessment order. The CIT's reliance on the denial of deduction in the subsequent year was invalid as the CIT(A) had allowed the deduction on appeal.
  
  Tribunal's Findings:
  
  The Tribunal found that the AO had duly considered the issue of deduction u/s 80HHC, supported by three indicators: the audit report, the enhancement of the deduction amount by the AO, and the discussion of sales-tax liability on flight kitchen sales. The Tribunal referenced the authoritative pronouncement in CIT vs. Gabriel India Ltd., emphasizing that an erroneous order is one not in accordance with law or made without enquiry. The Tribunal concluded that the AO's order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the Revenue's interest, and the CIT had not demonstrated how the deduction was legally incorrect.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Tribunal quashed the CIT's order u/s 263, holding that the AO's order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the Revenue's interest. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 982
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Scope of jurisdiction under proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
  2. Interpretation of 'undue hardship' in the context of pre-deposit of duty/penalty.
  3. Examination of prima facie merits in determining 'undue hardship'.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Scope of Jurisdiction under Proviso to Section 35F:
  The judgment addresses the conflict between two Single Bench judgments regarding the scope of jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The referring judge noted that while M/s. Auma (India) Ltd. emphasized examining prima facie merits of the dispute, M/s. Sunshine Tube Pvt. Ltd. focused solely on financial hardship.
  
  2. Interpretation of 'Undue Hardship':
  The petitioner, a public limited company, challenged the demand for additional duty without a show-cause notice, which was initially set aside by the High Court of Madras. Upon re-issuance of the show-cause notice, the petitioner argued that the additional consideration should be added to the wholesale price, not the assessable value. The Appellate Authority partially waived the pre-deposit requirement, directing the petitioner to deposit Rs. 15 crores. The petitioner contended that the Appellate Authority failed to consider the strong prima facie case and relied on the decision of the Special Bench of CEGAT, affirmed by the Supreme Court.
  
  3. Examination of Prima Facie Merits:
  The court examined various judgments, including those from the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, and Kerala, which supported the view that a strong prima facie case should be considered in determining 'undue hardship'. The court endorsed the view in M/s. Wipro Infotech Ltd., holding that authorities must balance the interests of the exchequer and fairness, considering the prima facie merits of the dispute. The court clarified that 'undue hardship' includes cases where the amount demanded is not legally due, and financial hardship is not the sole criterion.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the petitioner had a strong prima facie case, supported by binding precedents, and insisting on the pre-deposit would cause undue hardship. The court modified the Appellate Authority's order, granting a complete waiver of the pre-deposit requirement, subject to the condition that the petitioner would pay the amount with interest if the appeal failed. The Appellate Authority was directed to dispose of the appeal without insisting on the pre-deposit. The judgment in M/s. Sunshine Tube Pvt. Ltd. was not approved to the extent it conflicted with this view.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 981
  
  Issues Involved: Establishment of Lokpal, Measures by Comptroller and Auditor General, Chief Vigilance Commissioner, and Central Bureau of Investigation, Study of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Implementation of Lokayukta in States, and Review of Judgment against Capt. Satish Sharma.

  The Supreme Court judgment addressed multiple issues raised in a writ petition filed by Mr. H.D. Shourie, seeking the establishment of Lokpal, measures by key institutions to curb corruption, a study to strengthen the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the implementation of Lokayukta in states. Additionally, it reviewed previous judgments against Capt. Satish Sharma concerning arbitrary allotments of petrol pumps.

  Issue 1: Establishment of Lokpal

  The petitioner sought a writ directing the Union of India to declare when it would bring a bill for the establishment of Lokpal or a similar institution. The Court noted that efforts were being made to draft a consensus bill, but it was ultimately a matter for Parliament.

  Issue 2: Measures by Comptroller and Auditor General, Chief Vigilance Commissioner, and Central Bureau of Investigation

  The petitioner requested directions for these institutions to indicate steps to overcome inadequacies in checking corruption. The Court did not issue specific directions but acknowledged the importance of these institutions in curbing corruption.

  Issue 3: Study of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

  The petitioner sought a commission to study and recommend strengthening the Act. The Court did not appoint a commission but highlighted the necessity of robust anti-corruption measures.

  Issue 4: Implementation of Lokayukta in States

  The petitioner requested directions for state governments to implement suggestions for Lokayukta, including establishing the institution in every state, achieving uniformity in provisions, and conferring constitutional status. The Court emphasized the need for effective Lokayukta systems but did not issue specific orders.

  Issue 5: Review of Judgment against Capt. Satish Sharma

  The review petition related to judgments canceling petrol pump allotments made by Capt. Satish Sharma and directing him to show cause for criminal breach of trust and pay exemplary damages. The Court reviewed the legal position on exemplary damages and the tort of misfeasance in public office.

  Key Findings and Directions:

  The Court found that Capt. Sharma's actions were arbitrary and mala fide but reconsidered the award of exemplary damages and the direction for CBI investigation. It held that the petitioner did not commit the tort of misfeasance in public office as the essential elements were not met. The direction for exemplary damages of Rs. 50 lakhs was recalled, and any amount deposited was ordered to be refunded. The direction for CBI investigation into criminal breach of trust or any other offence was also recalled, emphasizing the need for clear evidence before such directions.

  In conclusion, the Supreme Court addressed the issues raised in the writ petition, emphasizing the importance of anti-corruption measures and effective institutions while recalling the directions for exemplary damages and CBI investigation against Capt. Satish Sharma due to errors apparent on the face of the record.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 980
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Constitutional validity of Item 4(1)(f) of the Schedule to the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976.
  2. Discrimination between inter-State and intra-State contract carriages.
  3. Power of the State to levy and reduce taxes under Section 22 of the Act.
  4. Nexus of classification with the object of taxation.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Constitutional Validity of Item 4(1)(f):
  The original writ petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Item 4(1)(f) of the Schedule to the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976, as amended by Section 4 of the Kerala Finance Act, 1994. The Single Judge upheld the validity, stating that the legislature has the power to impose taxes which are compensatory and/or regulatory in nature under Entry 56 or 57 of List II of the 7th Schedule. The Division Bench, however, found the classification arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  
  2. Discrimination Between Inter-State and Intra-State Contract Carriages:
  The petitioners argued that the reduction of tax liability for intra-State contract carriages without extending the same benefit to inter-State carriages amounted to arbitrary discrimination, violating Article 14. The Single Judge concluded that the two types of carriages formed different classes for tax purposes, a view reversed by the Division Bench, which found the classification arbitrary and without nexus to the object of taxation.
  
  3. Power of the State to Levy and Reduce Taxes u/s 22:
  The State contended that it had the power to reduce taxes under Section 22 of the Act to alleviate hardship for intra-State contract carriage operators. The Single Judge supported this view, while the Division Bench disagreed, stating that the hardship rationale should apply equally to inter-State operators.
  
  4. Nexus of Classification with the Object of Taxation:
  The State argued that the classification was based on reasonable differentia, such as seating capacity and operational scope, which justified different tax treatments. The Division Bench found no nexus between the classification and the object of taxation. The Supreme Court, however, held that the classification had a reasonable basis and was not arbitrary, thus upholding the State's power to classify and tax differently.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, upholding the validity of the notification reducing the tax for intra-State contract carriages. The Court recognized the State's legislative discretion in tax matters and found the classification reasonable and in public interest. The appeals were allowed, with no order as to costs, and the State was directed not to demand enhanced tax for the period between the Division Bench's judgment and the Supreme Court's judgment.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 979
  
  The judgment concerns the issue of whether Cess under Section 12 of the Rubber Act can be levied on imported natural rubber. The Tribunal ruled that Cess is not applicable to imported rubber based on previous judgments and circulars issued by the Government of India. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeals were allowed.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 978
  
  Issues:
  1. Challenge to notices issued under section 131(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Authority of the officer issuing the notices.
  3. Relevance of section 55A in the case.
  4. Powers of assessing authority under section 131(1)(d).
  5. Role of Valuation Officer and determination of fair market value of a capital asset.
  6. Jurisdiction and competence of Valuation Officer.
  7. Compliance with principles of natural justice by Valuation Officer.
  8. Validity of notices issued by Valuation Officer.
  9. Interpretation of statutory provisions and judicial observations.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The petitions challenge notices issued under section 131(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, claiming the officer exceeded authority. The respondents argue the notices were validly issued for determining capital gains and income assessment. The power vested in assessing authorities under section 131(1)(d) is significant for discovery and production of evidence, not for fishing inquiries. The powers are to be exercised against individuals suspected of assessable income, even if not assessed yet.
  
  2. The argument regarding section 55A and its applicability is examined. Section 55A pertains to determining the fair market value of a capital asset, crucial for tax assessment and other purposes. The fair market value is relevant for various assessments, not limited to capital gains. The Valuation Officer, as per the Wealth-tax Act, is a statutory entity empowered to issue notices and determine values affecting civil rights.
  
  3. The Valuation Officer's jurisdiction and competence are upheld, as observed in a previous judgment. Even if a wrong section is mentioned in a notice, the officer's power remains valid if traceable to another statutory provision. The Valuation Officer's authority to assess capital gains is affirmed independently of past judgments, based on the definition of 'capital asset.'
  
  4. The High Court concludes that the authorities under section 131 are competent, the Valuation Officer is a statutory creation, and their determinations are relevant for various purposes beyond capital gains. The Valuation Officer's exercise of judicial power through issuing notices is deemed valid. A Division Bench precedent further supports the authority of the assessing officers to appoint commissions under section 131(1).
  
  5. Citing the rationale from a previous case, the petitions challenging the notices are dismissed as lacking merit. The Valuation Officer's actions, based on statutory provisions and judicial interpretations, are deemed valid and compliant with principles of natural justice.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 977
  
  Issues:
  1. Opportunity of hearing to the respondent-writ petitioner before referring the matter to the Valuation Officer.
  2. Justification for seeking assistance from the Valuation Officer without providing an opportunity of hearing.
  3. Validity of the notice issued by the ITO for valuation by the Valuation Officer.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The primary issue in this case was whether the ITO was required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the respondent-writ petitioner before referring the matter to the Valuation Officer. The respondent argued that principles of natural justice were not followed as no hearing was granted before appointing the Valuation Officer. The Court acknowledged the importance of natural justice but held that in this instance, the initial step of issuing a commission did not necessitate a prior hearing. The Court emphasized that the respondent had already presented its own valuation, and the appointment of the Valuation Officer was to verify this valuation, not to prejudge the matter.
  
  2. The second issue revolved around the justification for seeking assistance from the Valuation Officer without providing an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. The appellant contended that the assessing authority was justified in seeking assistance due to discrepancies in the valuation of construction costs. The Court examined the relevant provisions of section 131 and section 55A, highlighting the power of the ITO to call for information necessary for assessment. It was established that the appointment of the Valuation Officer was in line with the objectives of the Income-tax Act, specifically Chapter IV, to ascertain the fair market value of a capital asset. The Court referenced a previous Full Bench decision to support the validity of such references to Valuation Officers.
  
  3. Lastly, the Court addressed the validity of the notice issued by the ITO for valuation by the Valuation Officer. The Court reiterated that the purpose of the assessment was to determine the fair market value of the capital asset for Chapter IV compliance. It was clarified that the Valuation Officer, being a statutory authority, had the right to conduct the assessment as per the commission issued under section 131(1)(d). The Court emphasized that while the Valuation Officer must provide an opportunity of hearing, the initial referral did not necessitate a hearing for the assessee. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, upholding the validity of the notice issued by the ITO for valuation by the Valuation Officer.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment clarified the procedural requirements regarding the appointment of a Valuation Officer, emphasizing the distinction between the roles of the assessing authority and the Valuation Officer in determining the fair market value of a capital asset under the Income-tax Act.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 976
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Non-compliance with price printing on packages.
  2. Applicability of Rule 6 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977.
  3. Obligations under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
  
  Summary:
  
  Non-compliance with Price Printing on Packages:
  The respondent filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Delhi, alleging that the appellant was selling Kodak films without the price being printed on the packages, which is mandatory u/r 6 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977. The District Forum directed the appellant to display the sale price on the packages. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission modified the order, requiring the appellant to publish the price in a national daily fortnightly, print notices on invoices, issue circulars to dealers, and attach price tags on each unit. The National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission upheld this order with clarifications for wholesale and retail sales.
  
  Applicability of Rule 6 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977:
  The appellant contended that sub-rule (2) of Rule 6, which excludes the dealer from affixing the price on the package, was applicable. However, the court found that sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 applies to both manufacturers and dealers, emphasizing that the stress is on the package, not the person selling it. The court clarified that sub-rule (2) is in addition to the obligations under sub-rule (1), and the amendment on 8-8-1986 did not alter this obligation.
  
  Obligations under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986:
  The court highlighted that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, was enacted to protect consumer interests, influenced by international obligations and consumer protection movements. The Act mandates a rational approach to interpreting relevant laws to achieve its objectives. The court noted that the appellant's actions were in violation of the rules and that compliance with Rule 6 was necessary to prevent retailers from charging exorbitant prices without informing consumers.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court found no infirmity or illegality in the order of the National Commission and dismissed the appeal without any order as to costs. The appellant is required to comply with the provisions of Rule 6 of the Standards of Weights and Measures (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 1977.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 975
  
  Issues Involved: Condonation of delay in preferring the appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta.
  
  Summary:
  The Supreme Court granted leave limited to the question of condonation of a 1418-day delay in preferring the appeal arising from the High Court of Calcutta's order. The Division Bench had dismissed the appeal due to the delay, which was not condoned initially.
  
  The appellant, represented by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Senior Advocate, argued that the delay was due to misrepresentation by the appellant's own counsel. The appellant was under the impression that the appeal had been filed, but upon investigation by a new advocate, it was revealed that no appeal had actually been filed before the Division Bench.
  
  The Court acknowledged the unusually long delay but found the circumstances to be exceptional. The appellant had been misled by their advocate and had taken steps to inquire about the case's progress. The Court held that the appellant had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay and remitted the matter back to the High Court for further proceedings.
  
  Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the appellant had acted diligently once aware of the situation. No costs were awarded in the case.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 974
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Effect of the prohibitory order dated March 6, 1979, and notice dated January 18, 1988, issued u/s 226(3) of the Income Tax Act.
  2. Whether non-payment of rent by the appellant to the landlord after service of the said order/notice amounts to wilful default u/s 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
  3. Legality of the High Court's decision in allowing CMP No.13064 of 1996 and ordering eviction u/s 10(3)(c) of the Act.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1 & 2: Effect of Prohibitory Order and Notice u/s 226(3) of the Income Tax Act
  The appellant, a tenant, stopped paying rent to the landlords after receiving a prohibitory order from the Tax Recovery Officer on March 6, 1979, and subsequently paid the accumulated rent to the Tax Recovery Officer upon receiving a notice u/s 226(3) on January 18, 1988. The Supreme Court analyzed whether this non-payment constituted 'wilful default' u/s 10(2)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Court held that the prohibitory order did not cover future rent, and the appellant's belief that he was prohibited from paying rent to the landlord was reasonable. Hence, the non-payment of rent during the period from March 6, 1979, to February 24, 1988, was not considered wilful default. Similarly, for the periods after February 24, 1988, the appellant's non-payment of rent to the landlord was justified as the notice u/s 226(3) suspended the landlord's right to receive rent until the tax dues were cleared. Therefore, the appellant was not liable for eviction on the ground of wilful default.
  
  Issue 3: Legality of High Court's Decision Allowing CMP No.13064 of 1996 and Ordering Eviction u/s 10(3)(c)
  The High Court allowed the landlords to raise an additional ground u/s 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation and ordered eviction. The Supreme Court noted that while the High Court was correct in allowing the additional ground, it should have required an amendment of pleadings and given the tenant an opportunity to contest the new ground. The Court emphasized that the requirements of clause (a) and clause (c) of Section 10(3) are distinct and must be separately established. The High Court failed to consider the comparative hardship to the tenant as required by the proviso to Section 10(3)(c). Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Appellate Authority's judgment, allowing the landlords to seek eviction under clause (c) if permissible by law.
  
  The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

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• 1999 (8) TMI 973
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Credibility of the dying declaration.
  2. Alleged discrepancies between multiple dying declarations.
  3. Influence of external parties on the dying declarations.
  4. Testimony of the deceased's parents.
  5. Mental soundness of the deceased.
  6. Legal implications of using statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  7. Benefit of doubt and acquittal.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Credibility of the Dying Declaration:
  The judgment emphasizes the necessity of scrutinizing dying declarations with meticulous circumspection due to their inherent weaknesses, as they are not made under oath or in the presence of the accused, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. The court reiterates that dying declarations should be subjected to very close scrutiny to ensure their reliability.
  
  2. Alleged Discrepancies Between Multiple Dying Declarations:
  The court identified a significant contradiction between the two dying declarations (Ext.P-11 and Ext.P-14) given by Lakshmi Devi. Ext.P-14 stated that she was set on fire while lighting a stove, whereas Ext.P-11 mentioned she was set on fire while sweeping. This material divergence was not adequately addressed by the High Court, which failed to reconcile the discrepancies, thus affecting the credibility of the declarations.
  
  3. Influence of External Parties on the Dying Declarations:
  The judgment notes that neighbors testified about two cousins of the deceased allegedly brainwashing her at the hospital. The defense maintained that these cousins had personal vendettas against the appellant, which could have influenced the dying declarations. This potential external influence further undermines the credibility of the declarations.
  
  4. Testimony of the Deceased's Parents:
  The parents of the deceased (PW-7 and PW-8) testified that their daughter initially told them she caught fire while cooking milk. The prosecution did not cross-examine them, and their testimony, which contradicted the dying declarations, was binding on the prosecution. The High Court's dismissal of this crucial evidence was deemed inappropriate by the Supreme Court.
  
  5. Mental Soundness of the Deceased:
  The court considered the evidence provided by the deceased's parents regarding her mental instability. Given the slight doubt about her mental soundness, the court found it unsafe to base a conviction solely on her dying declarations.
  
  6. Legal Implications of Using Statements Recorded Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
  The judgment highlights that Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure restricts the use of statements recorded under Section 161, except for contradicting the witness. The High Court's reliance on these statements without proper questioning in court was deemed a violation of legal procedures.
  
  7. Benefit of Doubt and Acquittal:
  The Supreme Court concluded that the dying declarations did not withstand scrutiny and were too fragile to base a conviction upon. Consequently, the appellant was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. The court also extended this benefit to the appellant's mother, Narayanamma, who had not filed an appeal, to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of both the appellant and his mother, directing their release unless required in any other case. The judgment underscores the importance of rigorous scrutiny of dying declarations and adherence to legal procedures to ensure justice.

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