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2008 (11) TMI 695
Detention order passed u/s 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Whether the detenue’s right to make a representation against the order of detention, is hampered by non-supply of the particular document?
HELD THAT:- As rightly contended by ld counsel for the State the documents were read over and an endorsement to that effect has been made by the detenu. While examining whether non supply of a document would prejudice a detenu the Court has to examine whether the detenu would be deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document. Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non supply thereof would prejudice to the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced. The High Court has lost sight of the relevant factors and, therefore, the impugned order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is therefore set aside.
Considering the nature of the order of detention which is essentially preventive in character, it would be appropriate for the State Government and the detaining authority to consider whether there is any need to take the detenu back to detention for serving the remainder of the period of detention which was indicated in the order of detention. The exercise shall be undertaken within two months.
The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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2008 (11) TMI 694
Pre-deposit - penalty - reduction in quantum of - Held that: - the Tribunal has taken lenient view in favour of the petitioner by asking him to deposit ₹ 2 crores - The learned counsel for the petitioner also failed to point out any financial hardship in order to substantiate his say that the amount of pre-deposit should be reduced - appeal rejected - decided against appellant.
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2008 (11) TMI 693
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT MUMBAI allowed the appeal regarding denial of cenvat credit for service tax paid on canteen services used by the manufacturer, following a decision by the larger bench that such credit is admissible. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was set aside.
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2008 (11) TMI 692
Issues involved: Appeal against order of CIT(A) allowing deduction u/s 10B without setting off losses of non-EOU units and interpretation of sec. 10B w.e.f. 01.04.2001.
Issue 1: Deduction u/s 10B without setting off losses
The assessee, a 100% EOU engaged in pharmaceutical products manufacturing, claimed exemption u/s 10B for export profits in EOU and domestic profits. The AO set off losses of non-EOU units against entire EOU unit profit, disallowing carried forward benefit. CIT(A) granted relief to assessee citing precedent in CIT vs. Himatasingake Seide Ltd. where deduction u/s 10A was allowed without setting off losses of non-10A unit. ITAT upheld CIT(A)'s decision, stating that deduction u/s 10B should be allowed in respect of EOU profits without setting off losses of non-EOU units, as per the appellant's claim.
Issue 2: Interpretation of sec. 10B w.e.f. 01.04.2001
The revenue contended that deduction u/s 10B should be allowed from 'total income' as per amendment w.e.f. 01.04.2001. However, CIT(A) and ITAT held that deduction u/s 10B should be granted in respect of EOU profits without setting off losses of non-EOU units, following the principle of liberal construction of beneficent provisions. The ITAT dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue, upholding the decision of CIT(A) to grant relief to the assessee as claimed.
In conclusion, the ITAT Bangalore ruled in favor of the assessee, allowing deduction u/s 10B in respect of EOU profits without setting off losses of non-EOU units, based on the interpretation of relevant legal provisions and precedents. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed, affirming the decision of the CIT(A) and providing relief to the assessee in accordance with the law.
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2008 (11) TMI 691
The Supreme Court allowed the petitioner to move the High Court for review/clarification regarding a family arrangement not considered in the previous judgment. The petitioner can submit additional documents for consideration. Stand over for eight weeks.
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2008 (11) TMI 690
Issues involved: Petition seeking direction for releasing 10 kgs. of silver jewellery seized u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Summary:
The petitioner, sharing residence and business with his adoptive father, had 10 kgs. of silver jewellery seized during a search. After various assessment orders, it was acknowledged that the seized jewellery belonged to the petitioner. However, the tax authority requested a succession certificate for return of the jewellery following the adoptive father's demise. The petitioner argued that this requirement should not apply when ownership is established. The court examined section 132B(3) of the Act, emphasizing that procedural provisions should not override substantive rights. As there was no dispute over ownership, the court directed the return of the jewellery to the petitioner within two months, ruling in favor of the petitioner's undisputed title.
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2008 (11) TMI 689
Issues involved: Appeal u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the assessment year 2000-01.
The High Court considered an appeal u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal pertaining to the assessment year 2000-01. The substantial question of law framed was whether the Tribunal was correct in allowing the assessee's claim of alleged profits derived from the business of power generation while computing book profits u/s 115JA of the Act, especially when the power generated was solely for captive consumption. It was noted that similar issues had arisen in the assessee's case for the assessment year 1997-98, where the Tribunal had dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal in the present case relied on its earlier judgment from 1997-98. Since the Revenue's appeal against the 1997-98 judgment had been dismissed by the High Court, the present appeal met the same fate and was consequently dismissed.
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2008 (11) TMI 688
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of CEGAT and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The appeal will be heard again by CESTAT, with a request to dispose of it by February 2009. The appeal was allowed.
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2008 (11) TMI 687
Issues involved: Applicability of provisions of section 201 and 201(1A) for default in deducting tax at source.
Summary:
Issue 1: Applicability of provisions of section 201 and 201(1A) for default in deducting tax at source
The assessee, a subsidiary of Bank of Baroda engaged in credit card business, did not deduct tax at source on payments made to Master Card International and Visa International. The Assessing Officer held the assessee in default for not deducting tax under section 195. The CIT(A) upheld the decision, stating that adjustments in payments to non-residents are covered under "any other mode of payment." The Tribunal set aside the default under section 201(1) but held the assessee liable for interest under section 201(1A) for any delay in payment, citing it as compensatory in nature. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for further examination.
This judgment clarifies the liability of an assessee in deducting tax at source under section 195 and the consequences of default under sections 201 and 201(1A). The Tribunal emphasized the importance of complying with tax deduction obligations while also recognizing the compensatory nature of interest under section 201(1A.
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2008 (11) TMI 686
Issues involved: Department's failure to take instruction, waiver of pre-deposit by Appellate Tribunal, interpretation of Notification No.89/95-CE, absence of substantial question of law.
The High Court noted that the department failed to take any instruction on multiple adjourned dates, leading to delays in the proceedings. Despite granting time to the department, no one appeared on their behalf, resulting in further adjournments. A letter produced later indicated that no clearance had been received by the High Power authority, causing additional delays in the case.
The judgment highlighted the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, which granted a waiver of pre-deposit based on the merits of the case. The Tribunal's order detailed the appellant's use of duty paid iron and steel products in manufacturing exempted railway wagons, along with the recycling of waste and scrap within the factory. The Tribunal's prima facie view favored the appellants, stating that they had a good case on merits. The department did not challenge this order at the time, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal and application, as no substantial question of law was found to be involved.
The interpretation of Notification No.89/95-CE was crucial in the case, as the appellants claimed exemption for waste and scrap used in manufacturing wagons. The Revenue contended that the notification did not apply due to the appellants also manufacturing dutiable wagons. However, the appellants argued that they proportionately paid duty on waste and scrap used for dutiable wagons. This interpretation played a significant role in the Tribunal's decision to grant a waiver of pre-deposit.
Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the appeal and application, stating that no substantial question of law was present. As a result, permission from the High Power Committee, to which the matter was adjourned multiple times, was deemed unnecessary. All parties were instructed to act on a xerox signed copy of the order, and urgent certified copies were to be provided upon application and compliance with formalities.
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2008 (11) TMI 685
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as no case was made out to interfere with the impugned order based on factual findings by the Tribunal. (Case citation: 2008 (11) TMI 685 - SC)
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2008 (11) TMI 683
Issues involved:
The issue involves the interpretation of Article 8 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and Australia regarding the taxation of income on freight pertaining to slot arrangements received on account of vessels neither owned nor chartered by the assessee.
Summary:
Issue 1: Interpretation of DTAA provisions
The assessee, a non-resident and tax-resident of Australia engaged in shipping business, claimed exemption from tax under Article 8 of the DTAA between India and Australia. The Assessing Officer initially rejected the claim due to lack of evidence, but the CIT(A) admitted additional evidence and allowed the claim based on findings that the assessee was engaged in shipping business and cargo was transported through ships belonging to partners.
Issue 2: Scope of "operation of ships"
The ITAT Mumbai bench referred to the case of Balaji Shipping Co. (U.K.) Ltd. and held that transportation of cargo through feeder vessels with slot charter arrangements falls within the scope of "operation of ships" under Article 8 of the DTAA. However, it emphasized that the benefit under Article 8 is available only if cargo is transported by ships owned/chartered by the assessee, and transportation by feeder vessels must be ancillary to the main transportation by mother vessel.
Issue 3: Verification of evidence
The ITAT found that while some evidence supported the claim that transportation by feeder vessels was ancillary to the main activity, further verification was needed for 125 consignments. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification, with the assessee directed to provide necessary evidence linking cargo transported through feeder vessels to the mother vessel for transportation to Australia.
Conclusion:
The ITAT partly allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, modifying the CIT(A) order and directing verification of evidence for 125 consignments to establish the linkage between feeder vessels and mother vessels for tax exemption under Article 8 of the DTAA.
Judges: K.C. Singhal, Vice President and Rajendra Singh, Accountant Member
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2008 (11) TMI 682
Issues involved:
The issue involves the entitlement of the assessee to raise an additional ground before the first appellate authority for the first time, the consideration of the question of limitation in the original orders of assessment in an appeal filed against the order passed while redoing the original assessment, and the statutory provisions governing the appellate authority's powers in modifying assessment orders.
Entitlement to Raise Additional Ground:
The Tribunal narrated that the assessee, a business owner, filed the original return under section 139(4) of the IT Act for the assessment year 1987-88. Subsequently, after a search and seizure by the Revenue under section 132 of the Act, the assessee filed a revised return. The assessing authority completed the assessment, and the first appellate authority remitted the matter back for a fresh assessment. The assessee raised an additional ground before the first appellate authority, contending that the assessment order was barred by limitation due to the filing of the original return under section 139(4) instead of section 139(1). Citing legal precedents, the first appellate authority accepted this ground, leading to the Tribunal also upholding this decision against the Revenue's appeal.
Statutory Provisions and Appellate Authority's Powers:
The Revenue challenged the first appellate authority's decision, arguing that the additional ground was impermissibly raised and that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the appeal. The counsel for the assessee defended the decisions, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Jute Corporation of India Ltd. vs. CIT, emphasizing the plenary powers of the appellate authority to modify assessment orders on additional grounds. The apex court's declarations highlighted that the appellate authority's powers are coterminous with that of the assessing authority, allowing for the consideration of additional grounds even if not raised before the initial assessment. The Tribunal's discretion to allow new grounds was acknowledged, with the necessity to correctly assess the tax liability of the assessee being a key factor.
Conclusion:
The High Court, in line with the legal principles established by the apex court, upheld the first appellate authority's decision to consider the additional ground raised by the assessee. The Court emphasized that the appellate authority possesses plenary powers to modify assessment orders based on additional issues, even if not raised initially. Therefore, the question of law framed by the Revenue was answered against them and in favor of the assessee, leading to the order being upheld accordingly.
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2008 (11) TMI 681
Block assessment order passed u/s 158BC - Bogus share capital unexplained cash credits u/s 68 or not - increase in share capital - deletion of levy of surcharge - It is noticed that the Revenue has not been able to specifically show that the investments had emanated from the coffers of the assessee in this case.
Undisclosed Share Capital - HELD THAT:- The decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in Value Capital Services Ltd.[2008 (4) TMI 263 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as also Hon’ble Supreme Court in Divine Leasing & Finance Ltd.[2008 (1) TMI 927 - SC ORDER], wherein the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) in regard to the alleged bogus shareholders represented by the increase in share capital of the assessee cannot be treated as unexplained cash credits in the hands of the assessee.
Respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court we direct the AO to delete the addition made u/s. 68. However, the Department is free to proceed to reopen the individual assessments of the share applicants in accordance with law. We direct accordingly.
Deleting the levy of surcharge - HELD THAT:- In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta [2008 (1) TMI 396 - SUPREME COURT] held that proviso to s. 113 inserted by the Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1st June, 2002 is clarificatory in nature, we confirm the action of AO and allow this ground in favour of assessee.
In the result, both the appeals of the assessee and that of the Revenue are allowed in part.
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2008 (11) TMI 680
The Delhi High Court admitted the case for consideration. The key question was whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in allowing interest amounting to Rs. 73.89 lakhs as revenue expenditure. The court directed the filing of paper books within three months.
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2008 (11) TMI 679
Regularization of permanent services from the date of completion of 360 days of service with salary and other benefits - Entitlement for absorption against Group C and D' posts and their entire service upto the date of absorption has to be counted for the purpose of fixation of seniority and grant of other benefits including promotion - Government scheme for absorption of company-paid staff as was done through the 1978 Scheme of Department of Company Affairs - discriminating the Court Liquidator's staff vis--vis the regular employees of the office of Official Liquidator - principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women -"due process of law" - doctrine of legitimate expectation - petitioners had been working for last 20 to 25 years, neither their services were regularized nor they were paid at par with similar employees of other departments/offices and they were retired at the age of 58 years without any financial benefit.
HELD THAT:- We consider it necessary to remove the misgivings entertained by the respondents and the High Courts that while dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants in the earlier round of litigation, this Court had endorsed the directions given by Calcutta and Kerala High Courts for absorption of company paid staff without any rider.
However, the fact of the matter is that Government of India not only framed and notified the 1999 Scheme within six months from the date of judgment, but also issued guidelines for implementation of the same. Therefore, the orders passed by Calcutta and Kerala High Courts and the direction given by this Court in Writ Petition will be deemed to have become ineffective and inoperative and the respondents cannot derive any benefit from those orders and direction.
Now on merits. Rules 308 and 309 of 1959 Rules, which were framed by this Court u/s 643 of the Companies Act, 1956 to facilitate employment of special or additional staff in any liquidation and payment of salaries and allowances to such staff.
They were neither selected in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution nor they were appointed against the posts sanctioned by the Government of India. It is thus clear that the company paid staff constitute a separate and distinct class. While deciding the appeals in the earlier round of litigation, this Court must have been alive to the aforementioned facts and this appears to be the reason why the directions given by Calcutta and Kerala High Courts for absorption of all company paid staff were stayed for six months and an opportunity was given to the Central Government to frame a new scheme within that period.
In our opinion, after having applied for and accepted employment/engagement as company paid staff with fixed tenure superimposed by a stipulation that they will have no right to continue in service or to be absorbed in the regular cadres, the respondents are estopped from seeking a direction for their absorption against the posts sanctioned by the Government of India and the High Courts committed a serious error in granting their prayer.
In view of the above stated legal position, we hold hat the directions given by the High Courts for creation of supernumerary posts to facilitate absorption of the company paid staff are legally unsustainable and are liable to be set aside.
The concept of "due process of law" has played a major role in the development of administrative law. It ensures fairness in public administration. The administrative authorities who are entrusted with the task of deciding lis between the parties or adjudicating upon the rights of the individuals are duty bound to comply with the rules of natural justice, which are multifaceted. The absence of bias in the decision making process and compliance of audi alteram partem are two of these facets. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a nacent addition to the rules of natural justice. It goes beyond statutory rights by serving as another device for rendering justice. At the root of the principle of legitimate expectation is the constitutional principle of rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability and certainty in government's dealings with the public
The principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women embodied in Article 39(d) was first considered in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs. Union of India [1961 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] and it was held that the said principle is not capable of being enforced in a Court of law. After 36 years, the issue was again considered in Randhir Singh vs. Union of India [1982 (2) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT], and it was unequivocally ruled that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and can be enforced by reading it into the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
In Halsbury's laws of England (Fourth Edition), the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been described in the following words:
"A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice."
On the basis of our discussions, we hold that-
(i) the respondents are not entitled to absorption against the sanctioned posts in Group C of the Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, as of right.
(ii) The 1999 Scheme does not suffer from any legal or constitutional infirmity insofar as it provides for absorption of the company paid staff only to the extent of 50% vacancies in direct recruitment quota of Group C posts.
(iii) The decision taken by the Government of India to reduce the number of posts in direct recruitment quota and consequential abolition of posts in the Department of Company Affairs is not vitiated by arbitrariness or violation of the doctrine of equality or malafides.
(iv) The doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked for sustaining the directions given by the High Courts of Calcutta and Delhi for creation of supernumerary posts to facilitate absorption of all company paid staff in the regular cadres.
(v) The respondents are not entitled to have their pay fixed in the regular scales and other monetary benefits at par with regular employees working under the Official Liquidators.
Notwithstanding our conclusion that the directions given by the Calcutta and Delhi High Courts for absorption of company paid staff against Group C posts and grant of monetary benefits to them at par with regular employees of the Department of Company Affairs are legally unsustainable, we are inclined to accept the contention of the respondents that failure of the Government of India to frame scheme for absorption of Group D posts has resulted in invidious discrimination qua one section of the company paid staff.
Since the employees who could be eligible for absorption on Group D posts were appointed in 1985 and thereafter, the Government of India should have, while framing the 1999 Scheme, taken cognizance of their presence and made appropriate provision for their absorption. Its failure to do so has certainly resulted in unintended discrimination qua one section of the company paid staff. It is, therefore, appropriate to direct that the Government of India should frame a scheme for absorption of eligible and suitable employees against Group D posts. The scheme should be modeled on the 1999 Scheme. The needful be done within six moths. Thereafter, eligible and suitable members of the company paid staff should be absorbed against Group D posts.
We also feel that the salaries and allowances payable to the company paid staff should be suitably increased in the wake of huge escalation of living cost. We direct the Official Liquidators attached to various High Courts to move the concerned Court for increasing the emoluments of the company paid staff.
In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments and orders are set aside subject to the direction for framing of scheme for absorption of eligible and suitable employees against Group D posts and implementation thereof and increase in the salaries and emoluments payable to the company paid staff.
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2008 (11) TMI 678
Issues Involved:
1. Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for incorrect set-off of long-term capital loss.
2. Proportionate disallowance u/s 14A.
Summary:
1. Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) for incorrect set-off of long-term capital loss:
The assessee filed a return declaring income under "House Property and Business Income" and long-term capital gain. The Assessing Officer (AO) determined the total business income and long-term capital gain, initiating penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) due to incorrect set-off of long-term capital loss against short-term capital gains, contrary to section 74 of the Act. The CIT(A) confirmed the AO's calculation, and the assessee argued that the provisions were clarified only after an amendment effective from 1.4.2003. The Tribunal noted that prior to the amendment, the law did not specify the order of set-off, and the assessee's belief in setting off long-term capital loss against short-term capital gain was bona fide. The Tribunal referenced the Special Bench decision in JCIT vs. Montgomery Emerging Markets Funds, which supported the assessee's method. Consequently, the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was deemed unjustified and deleted.
2. Proportionate disallowance u/s 14A:
The AO made a proportionate disallowance u/s 14A, which was confirmed by the CIT(A). The assessee contended that the issue was still debatable, as different Benches had varied views on the matter. The Tribunal agreed, noting the ongoing debate and differing judicial opinions, and concluded that the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) could not be levied for the disallowance made u/s 14A.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and deleted the penalty u/s 271(1)(c), allowing the assessee's appeal. The judgment emphasized the bona fide belief of the assessee and the debatable nature of the issues involved. The order was pronounced in open court on 12.11.2008.
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2008 (11) TMI 677
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal as it did not raise any substantial question of law. The books of accounts were not rejected by the Assessing Officer, so there was no basis for estimation without proper rejection.
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2008 (11) TMI 676
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the consideration of whether the absence of a 15 days' notice to the assessee renders an assessment under section 158BC void, and whether the proceedings can be sustained in the absence of such notice without causing prejudice to the assessee.
Issue 1: Absence of 15 days' notice under section 158BC
The search conducted at the residence resulted in the seizure of documents, following which an assessment was completed after issuing a notice under section 158BD. The assessee appealed for relief, which led to further appeals by both the revenue and the assessee. A difference of opinion during the Tribunal hearing prompted a reference to the Special Bench to determine the impact of the absence of a 15 days' notice on the validity of the assessment under section 158BC. The Special Bench held that the defect in notice was curable and directed the Assessing Officer to issue a fresh notice under section 158BC. Consequently, the assessment proceedings were quashed.
Issue 2: Sustainment of proceedings without prejudice
The counsel for the revenue argued that the proceedings could be sustained even in the absence of a 15 days' notice as there was no prejudice caused to the assessee. The counsel for the assessee also supported this stance, abandoning the objection based on the invalidity of the notice. In light of these submissions, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, directing the Tribunal to deal with the appeals of both the revenue and the assessee in accordance with the law.
Conclusion:
The High Court's judgment focused on the impact of the absence of a 15 days' notice under section 158BC on the validity of assessment proceedings and the necessity to ensure that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the law to avoid any prejudice to the parties involved. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal for further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural requirements in tax assessments.
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2008 (11) TMI 675
Issues Involved:
1. Execution of the decree and attachment of Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs).
2. Applicability of proviso (g) to Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court in altering the decree of the Trial Court.
4. Maintainability of the revision petition filed by the Bank.
Summary:
1. Execution of the Decree and Attachment of FDRs:
The Respondent No.1 Bank sanctioned a loan to Respondent No.2, with the appellant as guarantor. The loan was not repaid, leading to a suit decreed in favor of the Bank, directing recovery through the auction sale of a hypothecated Matador. The Bank initiated execution proceedings but could not trace the vehicle and sought attachment of the appellant's FDRs. The Executing Court allowed this but later released the FDRs, directing the auction of the Matador first. The High Court, however, directed the appellant to deposit Rs. 50,000 and furnish the Matador for auction, which led to the appellant filing a Review Petition, dismissed in limine.
2. Applicability of Proviso (g) to Section 60(1) of CPC:
The appellant argued that his FDRs, representing retiral benefits, could not be attached under proviso (g) to Section 60(1) of the CPC. The High Court's direction to adjust the decretal amount from the FDRs was challenged, citing that retiral benefits retain their character even after conversion into FDRs. The Supreme Court agreed, referencing multiple decisions affirming that gratuity and pensionary benefits are exempt from attachment.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court in Altering the Decree:
The appellant contended that the High Court erred in altering the Trial Court's decree, which clearly directed the sale of the Matador first before touching other properties. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that the High Court committed a jurisdictional error by altering the decree and placing the onus on the appellant to produce the Matador.
4. Maintainability of the Revision Petition Filed by the Bank:
The appellant argued that the Bank's revision petition was not maintainable under Section 115 of the CPC, as it was against an interlocutory order. The Supreme Court, however, held that the order impugned in the revision petition sought to finally decide the manner of satisfying the decree, thus not attracting the bar under Section 115(1) of the CPC.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the Executing Court's order. The Bank was directed to take appropriate steps for recovering the Matador for its dues, and the appellant's FDRs were ordered to be released as per the Executing Court's directions.
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