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Showing 61 to 65 of 65 Records

• 1961 (12) TMI 5
  

  Whether the dividend income of ₹ 11,09,332 received from the Binod Mills was chargeable under the War Profits Tax Ordinance ?

  Held that:- The dividend received by the respondent from the Binod Mills Ltd. was properly included by the assessing authorities in the computation of the taxable profit of the respondent under the Ordinance and that the High Court erred in answering the reference in favour of the assessee. We have already pointed out that the High Court did not deal with or express any opinion on the two subsidiary contentions urged by the respondent with reference to the first question. Those points were also naturally not argued before us and we do not express any opinion on them. It is obvious that the reference cannot be disposed of without deciding these contentions and the case would have to be remanded to the High Court for dealing with these subsidiary points. Appeal allowed.

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• 1961 (12) TMI 4
  

  Whether the sum of ₹ 40,000 paid to Mr. J. H. Philips on his retirement from the service of the company was not an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ?

  Held that:- The proper test to apply in this case is, was the payment made as a matter of practice which affected the quantum of salary or was there an expectation by the employee of getting a gratuity or was the sum of money expended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business. But this has not been shown and therefore the amount claimed is not a deductible item under section 10(2)(xv). Appeal dismissed.

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• 1961 (12) TMI 3
  

  Whether under section 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, no court shall be entitled to require the appellant to produce before it the said documents as they formed part of the record of an assessment proceeding taken before the relevant income-tax authority?

  Held that:- We cannot accept the argument of learned counsel that the order directing the production of the documents was made under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that that section is not hit by the prohibition under section 54 of the Income-tax Act. This argument is advanced on the basis that the non abstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 54 of the Income-tax Act only relates to the Indian Evidence Act and not to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The non abstante clause cannot restrict the embargo placed on the court under section 54 of the Income-tax Act : the said clause only operates to make it clear that the said general ban prevails notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Evidence Act. That apart, section 54 of the Income-tax Act contains in effect an unconditional prohibition against a public servant producing any such document, and that prohibition does not exclude any criminal process from its operation. We, therefore, hold that there are no merits in this contention either. Appeal allowed.

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• 1961 (12) TMI 2
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the assessment should have been made under Section 30(b) or Section 31 of the Sea Customs Act.
  2. Whether the Collector of Customs, Visakhapatnam, failed to provide a hearing and disclose the material upon which the assessment was based.
  3. Whether the Central Board of Revenue's decision was invalid due to reliance on undisclosed reports and records.
  4. Whether the Central Government's dismissal of the revision petition without a hearing was justified.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Assessment under Section 30(b) vs. Section 31:
  The petitioners argued that the assessment should have been made under Section 31 of the Sea Customs Act, rather than Section 30(b). Section 31 mandates that if the real value of goods is correctly stated in the Bill of Entry or shipping bill, the goods shall be assessed accordingly. The petitioners declared the value of their shipments, but the Customs Department did not accept this valuation and assessed a higher value. The court noted that the petitioners' declared value was based on actual transactions and analysis reports, which were not considered by the Customs authorities. The court found that the assessments were not made in accordance with the law as the declared value and the analysis reports were disregarded without valid reasons.
  
  2. Failure to Provide Hearing and Disclose Material:
  The petitioners contended that the Collector of Customs, Visakhapatnam, did not provide them with a hearing or an opportunity to rebut the material used for assessment. The court observed that the Collector's order was not a "speaking order," meaning it did not provide reasons or disclose the basis for the assessment. The court emphasized that in quasi-judicial proceedings, it is essential to follow the principles of natural justice, which include giving a hearing and disclosing the material used for decision-making. The court concluded that the Collector's failure to provide a hearing and disclose the material vitiated the assessment order.
  
  3. Central Board of Revenue's Reliance on Undisclosed Reports:
  The petitioners argued that the Central Board of Revenue relied on the Collector's report and other records, which were not disclosed to them, thereby denying them an opportunity to rebut this evidence. The court noted that the Board's order was also not a speaking order and did not provide reasons for dismissing the appeal. The court held that the Board's reliance on undisclosed material violated the principles of natural justice and rendered the order invalid.
  
  4. Dismissal of Revision Petition by Central Government:
  The petitioners claimed that the Central Government dismissed their revision petition without giving them a hearing. The court observed that the final order of the Government of India was very brief and did not provide any reasons for dismissing the revision petition. The court reiterated that even if the proceedings were administrative, the authorities were required to give reasons for their decisions to ensure transparency and fairness. The court found that the dismissal of the revision petition without a hearing was unjustified.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the assessments were not made in accordance with the law and violated the principles of natural justice. The orders of the Customs Collector, Visakhapatnam, and the Central Board of Revenue were quashed. The court directed that a reassessment be made in light of the observations in the judgment. The petitioners were granted the opportunity to file appeals against the reassessment, and the limitation period would start from the date of reassessment. The petitioners were awarded costs of Rs. 500.

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• 1961 (12) TMI 1
  

  Whether the terms of Rule 10A of the Excise Rules, 1944 were insufficient to cover the cases of the appellants and that in consequence the demand made on them and the attempt to recover the sums by resort to the coercive process provided for by Section 11 of the Central Excise Act was illegal and without statutory authority?

  Held that:- a duty of excise is a tax-levy on home-produced goods of a specified class or description, the duty being calculated according to the quantity or value of the goods and which is levied because of the mere fact of the goods having been produced or manufactured and unrelated to and not dependent on any commercial transaction in them. The duty in the present case satisfies this test and therefore it is unnecessary to seek other grounds for sustaining the validity of the tax.

  The words "deficiency in duty if the duty has for any reason been short-levied" are, in our opinion, wide enough to include cases of deficiency arising like those in the circumstances of the present case, viz., where 8 annas out of the 14 annas of the duty has been collected in the first instance but 6 annas remains to be collected. We consider, therefore, that there is no substance in the objection that Rule 10A is not wide enough to cover the recovery of the duty from the appellants. Appeal dismissed.

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