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Showing 61 to 64 of 64 Records

• 1960 (4) TMI 4
  

  Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and on a true construction of the agreement between the Central Bank of India and Sheel Chandra the salary and other emoluments received by Sheel Chandra as treasurer of the said bank are assessable under the head ' Salary ' or under the head ' Profits and gains of business?

  Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, Sheel Chandra's emoluments as treasurer of the Central Bank of India Ltd. were rightly assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of which he is the karta?

  Held that:- The emoluments received by Sheel Chandra, were in the nature of salary and therefore assessable under section 7 of the Income-tax Act and not under section 10 of the Act as profits and gains of business and the salary was the income of the individual, i.e., Sheel Chandra, and not the income of the Hindu undivided family.

  The High Court was erroneous on both questions which were referred to it and they should both have been decided in favour of the appellant.

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• 1960 (4) TMI 3
  

  Whether the firm of Amulakh Amichand & Co. is one of the affairs of the Hindu undivided family of Gandalal because that is the only affair which has relation to the income sought to be taxed and on which the appellant relies for determining the residence of the family?

  Whether the control and management of the said affair, looked at from the point of view of the Hindu undivided family, is situate?

  Held that:- Residence under section 4A(b) of a Hindu undivided family is determined by the seat of control and management of its affairs, and in the matter of partnership businesses in British India the Hindu undivided family as such had no connexion whatsoever with its control and management. If the seat of control is divided, the family may have more than one place of residence ; and unless it is wholly outside the taxable territories, the family will be taken to be resident in such territories for the purposes of the Act. But where as in this case in respect of the partnership business, the family as such has nothing to do with its control and management, we fail to see how the existence of such a partnership will determine residence of the family within the meaning of section 4A(b). Appeal dismissed.

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• 1960 (4) TMI 2
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of customs to seize or confiscate goods cleared for home consumption.
  2. Failure to provide reasons for seizure as per Section 181 of the Sea Customs Act.
  3. Validity of seizure based on warrants issued on alleged false statements.
  4. Constitutionality of Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act in relation to Articles 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), and 31 of the Constitution.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of customs to seize or confiscate goods cleared for home consumption:
  
  The petitioners contended that customs had no jurisdiction to seize or confiscate goods once they had been granted clearance for home consumption under the Sea Customs Act. They argued that the terms "smuggling" and "secreted" in Chapter XVII of the Act implied that only clandestinely imported goods could be seized. However, the court found that Section 178 allowed for the seizure of any goods liable to confiscation, regardless of whether they had been cleared for home consumption. The court also referenced Section 167(8), which provides for the confiscation of goods imported in violation of prohibitions or restrictions. The court concluded that the customs authorities had the power to seize goods even after clearance if they were liable to confiscation.
  
  2. Failure to provide reasons for seizure as per Section 181 of the Sea Customs Act:
  
  The petitioners argued that the seizure was invalid due to the customs authorities' failure to provide reasons for the seizure promptly, as required by Section 181. The court noted that Section 181 required a statement of reasons to be given "on demand." The petitioners had made an oral demand on March 1, 1959, and a written demand on March 6, 1959, but the customs authorities provided reasons only on March 21, 1959. The court found that while there was a delay, it did not invalidate the seizure. The court emphasized that the customs authorities had the power to seize goods under Sections 178 and 179 and that the delay in providing reasons did not necessarily result in the invalidation of the seizure.
  
  3. Validity of seizure based on warrants issued on alleged false statements:
  
  The petitioners contended that the warrants for seizure were issued based on false statements that the goods and documents were "secreted." The court found that even if the warrants were issued on false statements, the seizure and detention of the goods were valid under Sections 178 and 179, which allowed customs officers to seize goods liable to confiscation without a warrant. The court also noted that the documents seized were produced before the Magistrate and were in the possession of the customs authorities as per the Magistrate's directions.
  
  4. Constitutionality of Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act in relation to Articles 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g), and 31 of the Constitution:
  
  The petitioners argued that Section 167(8) violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) by allowing the confiscation of goods from bona fide purchasers without notice. They contended that the provision was unreasonable and excessive. The court, however, held that the legislation was punitive and aimed at enforcing restrictions on imports for the public interest. The court referenced previous judgments, including the Supreme Court's decision in Shewpujanrai v. Collector of Customs, which upheld the validity of Section 167(8). The court concluded that the provision was reasonable and necessary for the enforcement of import restrictions and did not violate the petitioners' fundamental rights. The court also dismissed the argument that Section 167(8) violated Article 31, stating that confiscation was a penalty and not an acquisition or requisition of property.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court dismissed the petition, holding that the customs authorities had the jurisdiction to seize the goods, the delay in providing reasons for the seizure did not invalidate it, the seizure was valid even if based on false statements, and Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act did not violate the petitioners' fundamental rights. The petitioners were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings.

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• 1960 (4) TMI 1
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the confiscation of gold.
  2. Imposition of personal penalties on the petitioners under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.
  3. Evidence required to prove involvement in the act of smuggling.
  4. Maintainability of the petitions due to non-exhaustion of alternative remedies.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Confiscation of Gold:
  The Collector ordered the confiscation of 171-7/32 tolas of gold seized from the petitioners, asserting it was smuggled gold. The petitioners contested the confiscation, arguing that only 70 tolas of gold were admitted by Bijraj to be smuggled. The Court examined whether there was material evidence for the Collector to conclude that the entire quantity seized was smuggled gold. The Court found that there was material evidence, including Bijraj's admission and the transactions with Bangalore firms, to support the Collector's conclusion. The Court noted that the petitioners failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the possession of the remaining gold, thereby justifying the confiscation order.
  
  2. Imposition of Personal Penalties on the Petitioners under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act:
  The Collector imposed personal penalties of Rs. 15,000 on Bijraj, and Rs. 10,000 each on Vanechand and Sampathraj. The Court highlighted that Section 167(8) requires proof that the person was "concerned in such offence" of smuggling. The Court referenced previous decisions, emphasizing that mere knowledge of the gold being smuggled does not constitute involvement in the act of smuggling. The Court found no specific finding by the Collector that the petitioners were involved in the act of smuggling itself. Consequently, the imposition of personal penalties was deemed unjustified and was set aside.
  
  3. Evidence Required to Prove Involvement in the Act of Smuggling:
  The Court reiterated that to impose penalties under Section 167(8), it must be shown that the accused either imported the gold or was concerned in its importation. This includes arranging for, abetting, or receiving the gold immediately after importation. The Court found that the Collector's basis for penalties was the purchase of smuggled gold from Bangalore dealers, without evidence of direct involvement in smuggling. The Court concluded that purchasing smuggled gold, even with knowledge of its origin, does not suffice to prove involvement in the smuggling act.
  
  4. Maintainability of the Petitions Due to Non-exhaustion of Alternative Remedies:
  The Additional Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions, citing the availability of an alternative remedy of appeal under the Sea Customs Act. The Court acknowledged this but noted that the imposition of penalties without jurisdiction, due to lack of evidence of involvement in smuggling, warranted judicial interference. The Court decided to exercise its discretion in favor of issuing a writ of certiorari, setting aside the personal penalties despite the petitioners not availing themselves of the alternative remedy.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court confirmed the rule nisi to the extent of setting aside the orders imposing personal penalties on the petitioners, while allowing the confiscation order to stand. A writ of certiorari was issued to annul the personal penalties, with no order as to costs.

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