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1972 (1) TMI 120
Issues Involved:
1. Custom governing succession to Mahantship of Turki Math.
2. Right of the incumbent Mahant to nominate a junior Chela over a senior Chela.
3. Necessity of an installation ceremony for Mahantship.
4. Validity of the deeds of nomination and surrender.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Custom Governing Succession to Mahantship of Turki Math:
The appellant claimed that the custom of the asthal and Bhagataha sect of Kabirpanthies dictated that the Mahantship devolved from a Guru to the senior celibate Chela either upon the death of the Mahant or by the Mahant nominating his successor and retiring. The trial court found that from 1899 onwards, only senior Chelas had succeeded their Gurus, and the Mahant had the right to nominate his successor, usually the senior Chela unless disqualified. However, the High Court rejected this custom, finding that the evidence did not establish an invariable custom of nominating the senior Chela. It was noted that the Mahant in office had the right to nominate a successor based on ability and character, not just seniority. The High Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to substantiate the custom as pleaded.
2. Right of the Incumbent Mahant to Nominate a Junior Chela Over a Senior Chela:
The trial court acknowledged that the Mahant had the right to nominate his successor, generally the senior Chela unless found unfit. However, the High Court found that the nomination was based on the nominee's ability, character, and adherence to religious principles, not solely on seniority. The documentary evidence, including past deeds of nomination, supported the view that the Mahant's choice considered multiple factors. The High Court held that the nomination of the first defendant by the second defendant was valid and justified based on the first defendant's superior qualifications.
3. Necessity of an Installation Ceremony for Mahantship:
The trial court found that an installation ceremony was not essential to complete the title of the Mahant, although it had been performed for the plaintiff in 1956. The High Court did not examine this question in detail due to the plaintiff's counsel's concession. The High Court differed from the trial court, holding that no installation ceremony had been performed for the plaintiff in 1956. The court noted the absence of the Surat Hall document in earlier litigations and the denial of its authenticity by a key witness.
4. Validity of the Deeds of Nomination and Surrender:
The High Court upheld the validity of the deeds of nomination and surrender executed in 1951 and 1952, finding them binding. The court noted that the nomination of the first defendant was consistent with the custom and practice of the Math, as described in the documentary evidence.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the custom of succession as pleaded and did not establish that he had been installed as the Mahant. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 119
Issues:
1. Conviction under Section 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act
2. Interpretation of Section 83 of the Act regarding prosecution for offences under the Act
3. Whether a private person can initiate a prosecution without permission under Section 83
Analysis:
The judgment in question pertains to an appeal against a conviction under Section 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act. The appellant was convicted by the High Court for abetment of an offence under Section 82 of the Act, following a complaint filed by Ramnagina Rai alleging forgery of a Zerpeshgi deed. The High Court overturned the acquittal by the Sessions Judge, citing clear evidence of the appellant's involvement in the forgery. The appellant argued that the complaint was invalid due to lack of permission under Section 83 of the Act. Section 83 allows prosecution for offences under the Act with the permission of specified officers when the offence is known to the Registering Officer in his official capacity. The appellant contended that this permission was necessary for a valid complaint. The Supreme Court analyzed Section 83 and held that it does not prohibit private individuals from initiating a prosecution without the mentioned permission. The Court emphasized that the section is permissive and enabling, not mandatory, and applies only when the offence is known to the Registering Officer in his official capacity.
The Court referenced various precedents to support its interpretation of Section 83. Cases from Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Patna, Jammu and Kashmir, and Allahabad High Courts were cited to establish that the section does not restrict private individuals from initiating prosecutions under the Act without the specified permission. The Court rejected the restrictive interpretations given by the Rangoon High Court and the Allahabad High Court, emphasizing that such interpretations would unduly limit the ability of private individuals to seek redress for offences under the Act. The judgment highlighted that the language of Section 83 is permissive and does not intend to prohibit private prosecutions.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction under Section 82(d) of the Act. The Court held that the interpretation of Section 83 allowing private individuals to initiate prosecutions without specific permission was in line with the legislative intent and previous judicial decisions. The judgment clarified that Section 83 is enabling rather than prohibitory, ensuring that private individuals have the right to seek legal recourse for offences under the Indian Registration Act without unnecessary restrictions.
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1972 (1) TMI 118
Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of the unstamped and unregistered arbitration award.
2. Severability of the award's provisions regarding immovable properties and personal liabilities.
3. Effect of non-registration under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act.
4. Applicability of Section 35 of the Stamp Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Admissibility of the unstamped and unregistered arbitration award:
The defendants contested the admissibility of the arbitration award dated 10-11-1955, arguing that it was unstamped and unregistered, rendering it inadmissible in evidence. The Subordinate Judge agreed, ruling that the award embodied a partition of immovable properties worth more than Rs. 100 and was thus compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. Additionally, the award was not duly stamped, further supporting its inadmissibility. Consequently, the suit was dismissed.
2. Severability of the award's provisions regarding immovable properties and personal liabilities:
Upon appeal, the High Court held that the award was not inadmissible on the ground that it embodied a partition. The court opined that the award was admissible in evidence as far as it did not affect immovable property. It further ruled that a decree could be passed in terms of the severable part of the award, which was valid. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's view, stating that the award, in referring to the partition of immovable properties, did not purport to create or declare any interest or title in immovable property. The partition had already been effected between 26-5-52 and 30-5-52, and the award merely referenced this fact, thus not requiring registration.
3. Effect of non-registration under Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act:
Section 49 of the Registration Act states that a document required to be registered shall not affect any immovable property or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property unless registered. The Supreme Court noted that while the charge created by the award on the immovable properties required registration and could not be received as evidence of the charge, the personal liability to pay a sum of money was distinct and severable. The court emphasized that the document could be received in evidence for a collateral purpose, as permitted by the proviso added by the Amending Act 21 of 1929.
4. Applicability of Section 35 of the Stamp Act:
The defendants argued that the award was inadmissible under Section 35 of the Stamp Act due to it not being engrossed on stamp paper. However, the High Court found that the arbitrators had filed the original award with a true copy engrossed on a stamp of Rs. 2,865, indicating that the required stamp duty and penalty had been paid. The Supreme Court upheld this view, confirming that the award was admissible in evidence since the proper duty and penalty had been paid.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, as the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the award, despite its references to immovable properties, was admissible in evidence for the severable part concerning personal liabilities. The charge on immovable properties was invalid for want of registration, but the personal liability to pay the sum of money was enforceable. The award was also admissible under the Stamp Act, as the required duty and penalty had been paid.
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1972 (1) TMI 117
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the grounds for detention under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970.
2. Delay in consideration of the detenu's representation by the State Government.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Grounds for Detention:
The District Magistrate of Jalpaiguri passed an order on May 7, 1971, under Section 3(3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, directing the detention of the petitioner to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order. The grounds for detention included two incidents: on December 1, 1970, the petitioner and others set fire to the Headmaster's room in Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, causing significant damage and placing a bomb in the premises; on April 5, 1971, the petitioner again set fire to parts of the same school and threatened the staff with death if they resisted or disclosed his identity.
The petitioner denied involvement in these incidents, claiming the allegations were false, baseless, and motivated. The State Government, however, asserted that there was reliable material justifying the detention order. The Court found the petitioner's allegations vague and unsupported by any material evidence. The Advisory Board also reported sufficient cause for detention, thereby justifying the order.
The petitioner's counsel argued that the acts alleged did not constitute a breach of public order, but merely offenses under the Penal Code. The Court referred to previous decisions distinguishing between "law and order" and "public order," emphasizing that public order affects the community or public at large. The Court concluded that the acts alleged against the petitioner, involving arson and bomb threats in an educational institution, disturbed or were likely to disturb public order, thus validating the detention order under Section 3(2)(b) of the Act.
2. Delay in Consideration of the Detenu's Representation:
The petitioner's representation, received by the State Government on May 27, 1971, was not considered and disposed of until July 1, 1971, a lapse of 34 days. The petitioner argued that this delay violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution, rendering the detention order invalid. The Court referred to principles laid down in Jayanarayan Sukul v. West Bengal, emphasizing the need for the Government to consider representations as early as possible and independently of the Advisory Board.
The Court noted that the delay was partly due to the representation and records being with the Advisory Board. The records showed that the Government sent the files to the Board on June 7, 1971, and considered the representation upon their return, before the Board made its report. The Court found that the Government might need time to make inquiries, especially when the detention order was passed by another authority, in this case, the District Magistrate.
The Court concluded that the delay in deciding the representation was not so inordinate as to affect the validity of the detention, given the circumstances and the need for thorough consideration. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and no hard and fast rule regarding the time for consideration could be laid down.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed as the grounds for detention were valid under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, and the delay in considering the representation did not invalidate the detention order.
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1972 (1) TMI 116
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Clause 2 of the Dissolution Deed
2. Nature of the Transaction: Sale vs. License
3. Characterization of Payments: Capital vs. Revenue Expenditure
4. Applicability of Precedents and Legal Tests
Issue-wise Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Clause 2 of the Dissolution Deed
The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of Clause 2 of the dissolution deed. The clause states that "there is an agreement to sell and sale of the goodwill of the partnership which belonged to Padanisi alone to Amratlal." The Chief Justice emphasized that the wording "As consideration for and in full satisfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill" should not be diluted by subsequent clauses. The Chief Justice found it difficult to reinterpret these words to suggest anything other than an outright sale.
2. Nature of the Transaction: Sale vs. License
The Chief Justice rejected the argument that the transaction was a license rather than a sale. He stated that the mode of payment does not convert a capital payment into a revenue payment. He emphasized that the absence of a clause specifying what happens if the vendee ceases to carry on the business further reinforces the conclusion that it was an outright sale. On the other hand, Shelat J. argued that the transaction was not an outright sale but a license. He pointed out that the deed did not specify a lump sum purchase price and that payments were tied to the profits of the business, making the transaction more akin to a license.
3. Characterization of Payments: Capital vs. Revenue Expenditure
The Chief Justice held that the payments made by Amratlal were capital expenditures, citing that the payments were for the purchase of a capital asset (goodwill). He rejected the notion that the mode of payment could convert what is obviously a capital payment into a revenue payment. Conversely, Shelat J. argued that the payments were revenue expenditures. He cited precedents like Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T. to support his view, emphasizing that the payments were indefinite, related to profits, and not tied to any fixed sum agreed upon as the purchase price.
4. Applicability of Precedents and Legal Tests
The Chief Justice referred to the case of Travancore Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T. but found it inapplicable to the present case. He stated that the grounds (indefinite period, absence of a lump sum, and payment relating to profits) were not conclusive in a case where the capital asset has been sold. Shelat J., however, found the precedent applicable and argued that the transaction lacked a fixed purchase price and had an indefinite period of payment, making the payments revenue in nature. He also referred to various other cases like Ogden v. Medway Cinemas Ltd. and Jones v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue to support his view that the payments were revenue expenditures.
Conclusion:
The judgment concluded with a majority view that the transaction was a license and not an outright sale of goodwill. Consequently, the payments were characterized as revenue expenditures and were deemed admissible deductions. The appeals were allowed with costs, both in the Supreme Court and the High Court, with one set of costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 115
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the penalty order by the Collector of Customs.
2. Procedural irregularities and breach of natural justice.
3. Jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs and Excise.
4. Appropriateness and reasonableness of the penalties imposed.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Penalty Order by the Collector of Customs:
The appellant contested the validity of the Rs. 25,000 penalty imposed by the Collector of Customs. The seizure of ten slabs of gold, which were concealed on the person of Sare Veerayya, led to the confiscation of the gold and penalties on multiple individuals. The Collector's decision was based on the reasonable belief that the gold was smuggled, and the penalties were imposed following an adjudication process. The appellant's subsequent appeals to the Central Board of Excise and Customs and the Government of India were rejected due to non-compliance with the deposit requirement under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Procedural Irregularities and Breach of Natural Justice:
The appellants argued that the inquiry by the Collector of Central Excise violated principles of natural justice, particularly because Veerayya and Lakshminarayana were not called for cross-examination. The court noted that the statements of these individuals were furnished to the appellant, and no request was made for their cross-examination during the inquiry. The court held that the rules of natural justice were not breached as adequate opportunity was given to the appellants to explain adverse features. The tribunal's acceptance of the statements without cross-examination was deemed appropriate since the appellant did not request it.
3. Jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs and Excise:
The appellant raised a jurisdictional issue, arguing that the Collector of Central Excise lacked jurisdiction to decide on the alleged violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The court found this plea unconvincing, noting that the point was not argued before the lower court. The court affirmed that the Collector had the competence to initiate proceedings under the Customs Act, and the gold was rightly confiscated under Section 111, attracting penalties under Section 112.
4. Appropriateness and Reasonableness of the Penalties Imposed:
The court scrutinized the penalties imposed on the four individuals, totaling Rs. 50,000. It found the penalties arbitrary and lacking a rational basis. The court emphasized that the penalties should be deterrent, not retributive, and should consider the past conduct of the individuals involved. The court noted that the firm had not been engaged in similar activities previously, making the penalties excessive. The court quashed the penalties and directed the Collector of Customs to reconsider and levy appropriate penalties in light of the observations made.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the writ appeals, quashing the penalties imposed by the Collector of Customs and directing a reconsideration of appropriate penalties. The court emphasized the need for judicial discretion in penalty imposition and highlighted the importance of adhering to principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 114
Issues:
1. Applicability of the amended provision of Section 21(2) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 to pending eviction proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
The revision petition under Section 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 was referred to a Bench of two Judges to determine the applicability of the amended provision of Section 21(2) as introduced by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969 to the ongoing eviction case. The landlord had filed for eviction of the tenant citing arrears of rent under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The original order for eviction was made by the Munsiff under the provision that existed before the amendment by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969. The amendment introduced conditions for relief against eviction, including compliance with Section 29 and payment of determined amounts within a specified period.
The tenant appealed the eviction order, arguing that the amended Section 21(2) should apply retroactively to their case as the proceedings were ongoing when the amendment came into effect. The tenant's counsel contended that the lower courts erred by not considering the amended provision in their decisions. Conversely, the landlord's counsel argued that the amendment did not have retrospective effect on pending proceedings as it affected substantive rights.
The central question for decision was whether the amended Section 21(2) should govern cases where eviction proceedings were initiated before the enactment of the amending statute. The Court delved into the rules of statutory construction and the impact of amendments on existing laws. It was established that when a section of a statute is amended, the original provision is replaced entirely by the new provision, which becomes part of the law as if it had always been there.
Citing legal principles and precedents, including the Supreme Court's stance on statutory interpretation, the Court emphasized that an amending act integrates itself into the original statute, effectively replacing the old provision with the new one. As no inconsistencies were found between the old and new sub-sections, the Court concluded that the amended provision must be applied to pending proceedings, superseding the original provision that ceased to exist post-amendment.
Given that both parties and the lower courts overlooked the amended provision during the proceedings, the Court set aside the previous orders and remitted the case to the Munsiff for reconsideration in light of the amended Section 21(2) of the Act. The judgment highlighted the importance of applying amended provisions to ongoing cases and directed the lower court to adjudicate the matter according to law.
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1972 (1) TMI 113
Issues:
1. Interpretation of contract terms for the supply of groundnut seeds.
2. Compliance with the Oil Seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order 1943.
3. Assessment of damages in breach of contract.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute over two contracts for the supply of groundnut seeds. The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of contract by the defendants. The first contract was for delivery by 31st January 1951, while the second contract was for delivery by 28th February 1951. The defendants argued that the contracts were void under Section 30 of the Contract Act and the Oil Seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order 1943. The District Judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages of &8377; 18,759.8.0 with interest. The High Court upheld this decision, emphasizing the genuine intent of the contracts for actual delivery of goods.
2. The High Court examined whether the contracts violated the Oil Seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order 1943. The Order prohibited forward contracts for oil seeds unless non-transferable. The contracts in question specified the quality, quantity, and price of groundnut seeds for delivery, indicating a genuine intent for supply. The High Court found no evidence of rates prevailing on the breach dates but determined a minimum rate of &8377; 210/- per candy based on admissions in the defendants' evidence. The damages were computed accordingly, and the District Judge's decree was modified.
3. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing the non-transferable nature of the contracts based on surrounding circumstances and evidence. The Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent conclusions of the lower courts regarding the contracts' validity. Regarding damages, the Court accepted the computation method based on prevailing rates and dismissed the appeal. The parties were left to bear their own costs in the Supreme Court proceedings.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings on the interpretation of the contracts, compliance with the relevant order, and the assessment of damages. The judgment highlighted the importance of genuine intent for delivery in contract disputes and the significance of surrounding circumstances in determining contract validity.
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1972 (1) TMI 112
Issues:
1. Whether the appellants were given a reasonable opportunity to be heard before their acquittal was converted into a conviction.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal by special leave where the appellants, accused of an offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, were initially acquitted by the Munsif-Magistrate but later convicted by the High Court. The main issue was whether the appellants were provided with a fair opportunity to be heard before the conversion of their acquittal into a conviction.
The appellants were not heard during the appeal process as their names and their advocate's name were not included in the cause list on multiple occasions. Despite notice being issued to the appellants, the cause list's failure to mention their names or their advocate's name led to a lack of actual notice to them. The advocate's absence from the cause list hindered their ability to be informed about the hearing dates, resulting in a denial of a fair opportunity to be heard.
The appellants, upon learning about their conviction through village rumors, filed an application stating their prejudice due to the absence of their names in the cause list. The advocate's Vakalatnama filing was not reflected in the cause list, raising doubts about whether proper notice was given. The court failed to investigate this matter thoroughly, leading to a potential oversight in notifying the appellants about the hearing dates.
The Supreme Court concluded that a fair hearing was not conducted during the appeal process, primarily due to the appellants not being adequately informed about the hearing dates. As a result, the order of conviction and sentence by the High Court was set aside. The case was directed to be reheard by the High Court after ensuring necessary notice to all parties involved.
In summary, the judgment focused on the fundamental principle of providing a fair opportunity to be heard in legal proceedings, emphasizing the importance of proper notice to parties and their advocates. The failure to include the names of the appellants and their advocate in the cause list resulted in a lack of actual notice, leading to a violation of the appellants' right to be heard.
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1972 (1) TMI 111
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaintiff is a bhumidhar of the land in suit.
2. Whether the suit is within time.
3. Whether the defendants are trespassers of the land in suit.
4. Whether the court-fee stamps are sufficient.
5. Whether the suit is cognizable by this court.
6. Whether the suit is bad for want of valid notice.
7. To what relief and damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled.
8. Whether the land in suit vested in Gram Samaj after the passing of Act I of 1951.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the plaintiff is a bhumidhar of the land in suit:
The Judicial Officer remitted this issue to the Munsif Gonda, who found that the plaintiff is not the bhumidhar of the suit land. Consequently, the Judicial Officer concluded that the plaintiff is not proved to be the bhumidhar of the land in suit. This finding was pivotal, as it led to the dismissal of the suit without addressing other issues. The appeal argued that the Judicial Officer lacked jurisdiction to remit this issue to the Civil Court after the amendment of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by Act No. 37 of 1958, which came into force on 7-11-1958. The court agreed, noting that after the amendment, there was no provision requiring the Revenue Court to refer the question of bhumidhari right to the Civil Court.
2. Whether the suit is within time:
The Judicial Officer did not record any findings on this issue due to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not a bhumidhar. This issue remains unresolved and will need to be addressed upon remand.
3. Whether the defendants are trespassers of the land in suit:
Similarly, this issue was not addressed by the Judicial Officer because of the primary finding on the bhumidhari right. It will need to be reconsidered upon remand.
4. Whether the court-fee stamps are sufficient:
The Judicial Officer found in favor of the plaintiff on this issue, determining that the court-fee stamps were sufficient.
5. Whether the suit is cognizable by this court:
The Judicial Officer ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the suit was cognizable by the court.
6. Whether the suit is bad for want of valid notice:
The Judicial Officer also found in favor of the plaintiff on this issue, determining that the suit was not bad for want of valid notice.
7. To what relief and damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled:
Given the finding that the plaintiff is not a bhumidhar, the Judicial Officer did not address the issue of relief and damages. This will need to be reconsidered upon remand.
8. Whether the land in suit vested in Gram Samaj after the passing of Act I of 1951:
This issue was also left unresolved by the Judicial Officer due to the primary finding on the bhumidhari right. It will need to be addressed upon remand.
Additional Analysis:
The court discussed the procedural changes brought by various amendments to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, emphasizing that procedural laws operate retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise. The court referred to the Full Bench decision in Kallu Khan v. Kamrunisa, which established that the jurisdiction of the court for deciding issues is governed by the law applicable on the date of the decision, not the date of institution.
Refund of Court-Fee:
The court addressed the appellant's request for a certificate under Section 13 of the Court-Fees Act, authorizing the refund of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. The court concluded that the appellant is entitled to such a certificate, as the remand will be due to the case being decided on a preliminary point.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower court were set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision according to law. The appellant was granted a certificate for the refund of the court-fee.
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1972 (1) TMI 110
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the termination of the appellant's services by the Managing Committee.
2. Applicability of principles of natural justice.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Nature of the relationship between the appellant and the college (master and servant or statutory status).
5. Breach of statutory provisions under the Lucknow University Act, 1920.
6. Availability of remedies for wrongful termination.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the termination of the appellant's services by the Managing Committee:
The appellant's services were terminated by a resolution passed on 12-11-1967 by the Managing Committee of the Jai Narain College, Lucknow. The appellant challenged this resolution, claiming it violated principles of natural justice. The High Court initially quashed the resolution, but a Division Bench later reversed this decision, stating the relationship between the College and the appellant was that of master and servant.
2. Applicability of principles of natural justice:
The Division Bench of the High Court found that the principles of natural justice were not violated as the appellant was given an opportunity to submit his explanation to the charges. The Supreme Court upheld this view, emphasizing that in a pure master and servant relationship, the question of natural justice does not arise unless there is a statutory or other restriction.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The appellant argued that the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the termination. The Supreme Court, however, held that the High Court was correct in its view that the writ petition was incompetent because the relationship was purely contractual and did not involve any statutory obligation.
4. Nature of the relationship between the appellant and the college (master and servant or statutory status):
The Supreme Court reiterated that the relationship between the appellant and the college was that of master and servant. It referenced several cases, including Ridge v. Baldwin and Vidyodaya University v. Silva, to support the principle that specific performance of a contract of service is not enforceable in the absence of special circumstances.
5. Breach of statutory provisions under the Lucknow University Act, 1920:
The appellant contended that his termination violated statutes under the Lucknow University Act, 1920. The Supreme Court examined statutes 151, 152, and 153, concluding that these statutes did not have the force of law unless incorporated into a contract. The appellant's contract did not incorporate any statutory procedure for dismissal, thus no statutory breach occurred.
6. Availability of remedies for wrongful termination:
The Supreme Court affirmed that the appellant's remedy for wrongful termination lay in a claim for damages rather than reinstatement or a writ under Article 226. The Court cited previous judgments, including Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, to support this position.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the writ petition was incompetent and the appellant's remedy lay in a claim for damages. The Court made no order as to costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 109
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Madras Act 13 of 1960.
2. Retrospective application of Madras Act 13 of 1960.
3. Validity of lease stipulations under Section 12 of the Act.
4. Relief to the Municipality regarding the leased site and superstructure.
5. Quantum of mesne profits or damages for use and occupation.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Madras Act 13 of 1960:
The tenant argued that Madras Act 13 of 1960, which exempted lands owned by municipal councils from the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, was unconstitutional, violating Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31 of the Constitution. The court rejected this argument, stating there was no evidence to prove the exemption was arbitrary or discriminatory. The court emphasized that the Legislature had ample justification for the amendment, as public bodies experienced considerable hardship and inconvenience under the Act. The court cited several Supreme Court decisions, including S.M. Transports (P) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamigal Mutt, to support the view that government and public authorities could be treated differently from private individuals for public welfare reasons.
2. Retrospective application of Madras Act 13 of 1960:
The tenant contended that the Act should not have retrospective effect on tenancies that were current and subsisting before the amendment. The court held that the amendment was intended to have retrospective operation, as indicated by the language and context of the statute. The court noted that the Act applied retrospectively to tenancies created before its commencement and extended to new areas by government notifications. The court referenced several decisions, including the Privy Council's ruling in Abbott v. The Minister for Lands, to support the principle that a statute could interfere with existing rights if it was intended to do so.
3. Validity of lease stipulations under Section 12 of the Act:
The court examined whether the stipulation in the lease deed, requiring the tenant to remove the superstructure and hand over vacant possession, was saved by the proviso to Section 12 of the Act. The court reviewed several Supreme Court decisions, including Vajrapani Naidu's case and Mylapore Permanent Fund's case, to determine the scope of the proviso. The court concluded that the stipulation was valid and saved by the proviso, as it related to the erection of buildings and was agreed upon by both parties in a registered lease deed.
4. Relief to the Municipality regarding the leased site and superstructure:
The court held that the Municipality was entitled to recover possession of the land and the superstructure. The court noted that the tenant had not applied for compensation under Section 3 or for the conveyance of the land under Section 9 of the Act. The court allowed the Municipality to amend the plaint to include a claim for possession of the superstructure, subject to the condition that the tenant should remove the superstructure and hand over vacant possession by a specified date. If the tenant failed to do so, the Municipality would be entitled to recover the land along with the superstructure.
5. Quantum of mesne profits or damages for use and occupation:
The court fixed the mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from 11th August 1958 until 30th June 1972. The court stated that the plaintiff (Municipality) was entitled to mesne profits for both the land and the superstructure until delivery of possession. The court also noted that the plaintiff's omission to ask for possession of the superstructure was inadvertent and allowed the amendment of the plaint to include this relief. The court imposed conditions to avoid imposing a huge burden on the tenant, who had not been well-advised in pursuing protracted proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the validity and retrospective application of Madras Act 13 of 1960, validated the lease stipulations under Section 12, granted relief to the Municipality for possession of the land and superstructure, and determined the quantum of mesne profits. The tenant's appeals were dismissed, and the Municipality's claims were largely upheld.
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1972 (1) TMI 108
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notification dated 29th January, 1970, issued by the Union of India amending item No. 8 in the Second Schedule of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.
2. Whether the Central Government violated the proviso to Section 9(3) of the Act by enhancing the rate of royalty on limestone within a period of four years.
3. Preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions filed by unauthorized persons.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Notification Dated 29th January, 1970:
The petitioner companies challenged the notification dated 29th January, 1970, which amended item No. 8 in the Second Schedule of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The amendment abolished the two grades of limestone (superior and inferior) and set a uniform royalty rate of Rs. 1.25 per tonne. The petitioners argued that the limestone they quarried was of inferior grade with less than 45% calcium oxide, and the notification effectively increased the royalty on this inferior grade from Rs. 0.75 to Rs. 1.25 per tonne. They contended that this enhancement was not permissible before the expiry of four years from the last notification issued on 29th June, 1968.
2. Violation of the Proviso to Section 9(3) of the Act:
Section 9(3) of the Act empowers the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule to enhance or reduce the rate of royalty. However, the proviso to this section stipulates that the Central Government cannot enhance the rate of royalty more than once during any period of four years. The petitioners argued that the 1970 notification violated this proviso as it was issued within four years of the 1968 notification. The respondents countered that the petitioners had been paying royalty at the rate of Rs. 0.75 per tonne since 1962, and the 1968 notification only enhanced the rate for superior grade limestone. Therefore, they argued that the 1970 notification did not violate the proviso.
The court found that the 1968 notification had indeed enhanced the royalty rate for superior grade limestone, thus exercising the Central Government's power under Section 9(3). Consequently, any further enhancement within four years was precluded by the proviso. The court held that the 1970 notification, which abolished the two grades and increased the rate for inferior grade limestone, violated the proviso to Section 9(3).
3. Preliminary Objection Regarding Maintainability:
The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petitions were filed by unauthorized persons, as they were not signed by the Secretary or the Director of the companies concerned. The court referred to Rule 1 of Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows any principal officer of a corporation who can depose to the facts of the case to sign and verify pleadings. The court found that the petitions were signed by principal officers who were fully conversant with the facts of the cases and were competent to swear affidavits. Therefore, the preliminary objection was rejected.
Conclusion:
The court allowed all three writ petitions and quashed the impugned notification dated 29th January, 1970. The court held that the notification violated the proviso to Section 9(3) of the Act by enhancing the rate of royalty on limestone within four years of the previous enhancement. The preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions was also rejected. No order as to costs was made.
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1972 (1) TMI 107
Issues Involved:
1. Ownership of the business carried on by U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu.
2. Justification for treating the business as belonging to Ramaswami Naidu.
3. Cancellation of assessment on U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu.
4. Burden of proof in benami transactions.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Ownership of the Business:
The primary issue was whether the business carried on by U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu was his own or whether it was the business of Ramaswami Naidu. The Tribunal found that Ramaswami Naidu had a proprietary interest in the business, and U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu was merely a representative. This conclusion was based on several factors, including Ramaswami Naidu's involvement in signing day books, cash receipts, and contracts, as well as his instructions regarding business operations. Additionally, advances made by the mills to cotton growers were transferred to U. G. Krishnaswami's account without security, and Ramaswami Naidu stood as a surety for overdrafts.
2. Justification for Treating the Business as Belonging to Ramaswami Naidu:
The Tribunal upheld the Income-tax Officer's and Appellate Assistant Commissioner's findings that the business in question was that of Ramaswami Naidu. The Tribunal noted that Ramaswami Naidu had a proprietary interest in the business, as evidenced by his signing of business documents and his financial involvement. The Tribunal also considered the fact that U. G. Krishnaswami had no experience in business and was brought in by Ramaswami Naidu to circumvent a technical difficulty. The Tribunal's conclusion was supported by the fact that Ramaswami Naidu had issued instructions regarding business operations and had arranged for insurance and overdrafts.
3. Cancellation of Assessment on U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu:
The Tribunal canceled the protective assessments made against U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu, concluding that the business in question belonged to Ramaswami Naidu. The Tribunal found that the circumstances pointed out by the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were sufficient to connect Ramaswami Naidu with the business. The Tribunal's decision was based on the materials on record, which showed a close and intimate nexus between Ramaswami Naidu and the business.
4. Burden of Proof in Benami Transactions:
The Tribunal did not shift the burden of proof onto Ramaswami Naidu to prove that the business was not his. Instead, the Tribunal decided the case based on the materials on record. The Tribunal found that there was sufficient evidence to infer that Ramaswami Naidu carried on the business in the name of U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu. The Tribunal's finding was based on the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances, rather than on the basis that the assessee had not discharged the onus of proving that the business was not his.
Conclusion:
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's findings, concluding that the business carried on by U. G. Krishnaswami Naidu did indeed belong to Ramaswami Naidu. The Court noted that the Tribunal's finding was based on sufficient materials and did not involve the application of any principle of law. The Court also emphasized that the question of benami was a finding of fact and could not be attacked in the reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act. The Court answered the reference in T. C. No. 66 of 1965 in favor of the revenue and against the assessees, and sustained the cancellation of the protective assessments in T. C. No. 17 of 1965. The revenue was entitled to its costs in T. C. No. 66 of 1965.
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1972 (1) TMI 106
Issues Involved:
1. Contempt of Court by the appellant.
2. Publication of allegations in the official gazette.
3. Distinction between the inquiry by the Commission and the criminal revision petitions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Contempt of Court by the appellant:
The appellant was found guilty of contempt of Court by the Patna High Court for handing over the notification, including the schedule of allegations, to the press for publication while criminal revision petitions were pending. The High Court observed that this act interfered with the course of justice and prejudiced the mankind against the two applicants. However, the Supreme Court, after considering the matter, concluded that this was not a fit case for contempt of Court. The Court emphasized that the law of contempt is well-settled and includes acts or writings that bring a Court or judge into contempt, lower their authority, or interfere with the due course of justice. The Supreme Court noted that intention to cause these consequences is not necessary; it is sufficient if the act is calculated to obstruct or interfere with justice. Despite this, the Court held that in cases of technical contempt, judicial restraint and circumspection should be exercised.
2. Publication of allegations in the official gazette:
The High Court's decision was based on the assumption that there was no statutory provision requiring the allegations to be printed in the official gazette. The Supreme Court found this assumption incorrect. Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act mandates that the notification appointing a commission of inquiry must be published in the official gazette. This requirement is imperative and cannot be dispensed with. The publication serves to give publicity to the notification and provide authenticity to its contents. The Supreme Court noted that the entire notification, including the schedule of allegations, was given to the press, not just parts of it, which was in compliance with the statutory requirement.
3. Distinction between the inquiry by the Commission and the criminal revision petitions:
The subject matter of the inquiry before the Commission was whether there was misuse of official position by Shri Hasibur Rahman in directing the withdrawal of prosecution against Kedar Prasad and Arjun Pandey, against the recommendations of the Law Secretary and the District Magistrate. The criminal revision petitions pending in the High Court concerned whether the magistrate's order dismissing the application for withdrawal of prosecution was contrary to law. The Supreme Court held that these matters were distinct and separate. The Court referred to the case of Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, where it was held that the setting up of a commission of inquiry or its continuation does not amount to contempt of Court, as the scope of the trial by Courts and the inquiry by the Commission is different. The Supreme Court concluded that the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained, and thus, the appeal was accepted, and the rule against the appellant for contempt of Court was discharged.
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1972 (1) TMI 105
Issues:
Competency of the Government of Bihar to withdraw from land acquisition process under specific sections of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Allegations of unlawful possession by the Forest Department. Interpretation of sections 16, 17(1), and 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Analysis:
The Supreme Court of India addressed the issue of the competency of the Government of Bihar to withdraw from the land acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The case involved lands in Telaiya and Debipur villages, initially notified for acquisition in 1959 under various sections of the Act. The appellant contended that the Forest Department unlawfully took possession of the lands, making the withdrawal by the Government invalid. The High Court rejected the appellant's claims, leading to the appeals before the Supreme Court.
The appellant argued that the Government became the owner of the lands upon issuance of notifications under section 6 or notices under section 9(1) of the Act. However, the Government denied these allegations. The High Court found insufficient evidence to prove the Government's possession of the lands in 1954, dismissing the appellant's contentions. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's decision, emphasizing the lack of conclusive evidence regarding possession in 1953 or 1954.
Regarding the interpretation of sections 16, 17(1), and 48(1) of the Act, the Court clarified that the Government only becomes the owner of the lands upon possession by the Collector under these provisions. The appellant's argument that possession was taken under section 17(1) was refuted due to the absence of evidence showing the Government's direction to the Collector for possession. The Court rejected the appellant's contention that possession automatically vested in the Government after the expiration of 15 days from the notice under section 9(1), emphasizing the need for explicit direction and possession under the Act.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, directing each party to bear its own costs. The Court noted the assurance by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State Government of Bihar regarding the waiver of interest on loans advanced for land development in the acquisition cases. The judgment clarified the legal requirements for land acquisition and highlighted the necessity of explicit possession under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
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1972 (1) TMI 104
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of the market value of the property as on the date of Section 4 notification.
2. Appropriateness of the compensation awarded for severance.
3. Justification for the addition of potential value to the market value.
4. Validity of the 15% solatium under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
5. Interest on the enhanced compensation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of the Market Value of the Property:
The primary issue was the determination of the market value of the property as on the date of the Section 4 notification. The High Court adopted the price in the sale deed Ex-C-1 executed by the Ranchi Club Ltd., in favor of the President of India, as the basis for determining the market value. The objections against this method were rejected, and the High Court adopted twice the price charged for the land in Ex-C-1, adding Rs. 7,060 per acre as the difference between tenure rights and leasehold rights, ultimately awarding Rs. 90,000 per acre. However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in adopting Ex-C-1 as it was farther away from the land acquired and recognized that there was no definite data for the additions made. The Supreme Court instead considered Ex-10 and Ex-11, which were in respect of lands situated in the vicinity. The annual rental value of the land acquired was not considered a proper method of computation as the rent was fixed in 1944 and did not reflect the value at the time of the Section 4 notification. The Supreme Court concluded that Rs. 1,35,000 per acre was a reasonable rate for compensation.
2. Appropriateness of the Compensation Awarded for Severance:
The Judicial Commissioner had awarded 5% compensation for severance of the land from the claimant's other portion that remained after acquisition. The High Court disallowed this compensation, reasoning that there was an entrance to the back portion of the land left with the owners and no evidence of depreciation in value. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that when a portion of the land is left out, there is a diminution in value for which compensation must be allowed. The 5% severance compensation awarded by the Judicial Commissioner was deemed reasonable.
3. Justification for the Addition of Potential Value to the Market Value:
The High Court had added 10% on the market value of the land awarded by the Land Acquisition Court for the increase in the potentialities of the land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in giving 10% towards potential value because this element is inherent in the fixation of the market value and could not be assessed separately.
4. Validity of the 15% Solatium under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act:
The High Court had awarded 15% solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) of the Act. This aspect was not contested, and the Supreme Court upheld the 15% solatium as per the statutory provision.
5. Interest on the Enhanced Compensation:
The High Court had decreed interest at 6% per annum on the amount of enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession. The Supreme Court upheld this interest rate and directed that the claimants be entitled to interest at 6% from the date of taking possession.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals of the claimants to the extent of the variation and dismissed those by the Government with costs. The claimants were entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,35,000 per acre for 4.65 acres, 5% severance, 15% solatium on the market value, and interest at 6% from the date of taking possession. The claimants were also entitled to proportionate costs on the difference between the amounts decreed and those now awarded.
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1972 (1) TMI 103
Issues:
- Appeal against judgment of Madras High Court setting aside judgment and decree of Principal Subordinate Judge on grounds of limitation and Section 14 of Indian Limitation Act 1908.
Analysis:
1. Background of the Case: The properties in question were situated in the erstwhile State of Travancore and were subject to revenue sales. The plaintiff claimed ownership and possession of these properties, alleging that the sales were set aside without notice to the purchasers. A suit was filed against defendants 1-5 for a declaration regarding the jurisdiction of setting aside the sales without conforming to the law.
2. Government as a Necessary Party: Initially, the District Munsiff's Court held that the Government was not a necessary party in the suit. However, the High Court of Travancore Cochin later held that the Government was essential, and the suit was dismissed for failure to implead the Government. The plaintiff then filed a similar suit after giving a notice to the Government under Section 80 of the CPC.
3. Limitation Issue: The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not barred by limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the time spent in prosecuting the earlier suit. However, the Madras High Court disagreed, stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to exclude the time as the auction purchasers never took possession of the properties, and the plaintiff did not act in good faith in prosecuting the previous suit.
4. Section 14 of the Limitation Act: The High Court found that the plaintiff did not act in good faith in prosecuting the previous suit and appeal. It was noted that the plaintiff persisted in proceeding with the suit without impleading the Government, despite objections raised by the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff's actions were deliberate and not based on ignorance of the law or a bona fide mistake, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
5. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that there was no justification for the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in this case. The court upheld the decision of the Madras High Court, emphasizing that the plaintiff's actions did not meet the criteria for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the earlier suit, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the appeal with costs.
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1972 (1) TMI 102
Issues Involved:
1. Production before Magistrate within 24 hours.
2. Information of grounds for arrest and detention.
3. Validity of custody warrant.
4. Legality of remand orders exceeding 15 days.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Production before Magistrate within 24 hours:
The appellant argued that he was not produced before any magistrate within 24 hours after his arrest on February 18, 1968, as mandated by Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was contested by the State. The order-sheet of Laheriasarai Police Station Case No. 1/1968 indicated that the appellant was produced before the Magistrate on February 18, 1968, and remanded to police custody until March 5, 1968. However, the High Court observed that subsequent remand orders dated March 5, 1968, March 20, 1968, and April 4, 1968, were falsely recorded as being made in the appellant's presence when he had actually refused to appear due to fear of being seen by witnesses. Despite the incorrect entries, the remand orders were lawfully passed in his absence, as per the precedent set in Rai Narain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi.
2. Information of grounds for arrest and detention:
The appellant claimed he was never informed of the grounds for his arrest and detention, constituting a breach of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. However, the Court found this allegation to be without foundation. The appellant's own applications from jail indicated that he was aware of the charges, as he mentioned being asked to admit to certain offences and refused to be produced for fear of being identified by witnesses. The Court concluded that the appellant was sufficiently informed of the reasons for his arrest.
3. Validity of custody warrant:
The appellant contended that no valid custody warrant was issued by the Magistrate, rendering his detention in Darbhanga jail illegal. The custody warrant dated February 18, 1968, was allegedly cancelled when the appellant was remanded to police custody. However, the Court presumed that a fresh custody warrant must have been issued on February 21, 1968, when the appellant was ordered to jail custody. The Court found no reason to believe that the Magistrate or jail authorities would have neglected the issuance of a necessary custody warrant.
4. Legality of remand orders exceeding 15 days:
The appellant argued that the remand orders were under Section 167, which limits custody to 15 days in total, and that Section 344 did not apply at that stage. The Court clarified that Section 167 applies during the initial stages of arrest and investigation, while Section 344 applies during inquiries and trials, allowing for remand to jail custody for periods not exceeding 15 days at a time. The Magistrate's orders were under Section 344, as the investigation had progressed sufficiently to raise suspicion and the need for further evidence. The Court held that the Magistrate had complied with the conditions of Section 344 and was competent to pass the remand orders.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition and application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant's contentions regarding the illegality of his arrest, detention, and remand orders were found to be without merit. The appeal was dismissed.
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1972 (1) TMI 101
grant of import licence to units engaged in the manufacture of hospital equipment" - classification of medical and surgical equipment and appliances".
whether the application for the import licence in question should be considered in accordance with the policy in force when the licence is granted or when the application is made.
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