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1975 (10) TMI 119
Issues Involved:
1. Excessive election expenditure.
2. Threats and intimidation of voters.
3. Non-joinder of a necessary party.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Excessive Election Expenditure:
The appellant challenged the respondent's election on the ground that the respondent, or his election agent, incurred or authorized expenditure exceeding the Rs. 35,000 limit prescribed under Section 77(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, read with Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. The appellant alleged that the respondent's use of helicopters and motor vehicles was not fully accounted for in the election expenses submitted to the Election Commission. The court, however, found against the appellant on this issue, as the evidence presented did not substantiate the claims of excessive expenditure.
2. Threats and Intimidation of Voters:
The appellant alleged that the respondent's workers, with his consent, threatened and intimidated voters to prevent them from voting for the Congress candidate, Shri Deorao Krishnarao Jadhav. Specific instances were cited, including an allegation that Congress worker Shri Mohan Prasad Ojha was threatened at pistol point. The respondent denied these allegations, claiming they were vague and lacked material particulars. The court found the allegations unsubstantiated and ruled against the appellant on this issue as well.
3. Non-joinder of a Necessary Party:
The respondent filed an application arguing that the election petition should be dismissed due to the non-joinder of Shri Shiv Pratap Singh, a candidate against whom corrupt practice was alleged. The court considered whether the allegations in Para 11(iv) of the petition constituted a charge of corrupt practice against Shiv Pratap Singh. The court concluded that the allegations did indeed amount to a charge of corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the Act. Since Shiv Pratap Singh was not joined as a respondent, the petition was deemed fatally defective under Section 82(b) and Section 86 of the Act, leading to its dismissal.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the dismissal of the election petition on the ground of non-joinder of a necessary party, as well as on the merits of the issues of excessive expenditure and threats and intimidation. The appeal was disallowed with costs, affirming the High Court's decision to dismiss the election petition.
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1975 (10) TMI 118
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Validity of the domestic enquiry and principles of natural justice.
3. Concept and plea of victimisation.
4. Tribunal's role in reappreciating evidence.
5. Extraneous factors influencing the Tribunal's decision.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The judgment clarifies that when an application under Section 33 is made, the Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to see whether a prima facie case is made out in respect of the misconduct charged. If the domestic enquiry is free from defects, the Tribunal's role is confined to checking for a prima facie case or perverse findings. However, if there is a violation of natural justice, the Tribunal can independently evaluate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusions on the merits.
2. Validity of the domestic enquiry and principles of natural justice:
The Tribunal must ensure that the domestic enquiry preceding the dismissal order is free from defects and adheres to the principles of natural justice. If the enquiry is found to be defective, the Tribunal can allow the employer to produce evidence and the workman to rebut it. In such cases, the Tribunal can make independent findings on the merits.
3. Concept and plea of victimisation:
Victimisation is defined as persecution, prosecution, or punishment for no real fault or guilt of the employee, often related to trade union activities. The Tribunal must exercise judicial discretion to determine if victimisation is proven. The onus of establishing victimisation lies on the employee, and it must be supported by safe and sure evidence. Mere allegations or vague suggestions are insufficient. The Tribunal must consider whether the punishment is due to gross misconduct or trade union activities.
4. Tribunal's role in reappreciating evidence:
The Tribunal does not sit as a court of appeal to reappreciate or reappraise the evidence. Its role is limited to examining whether a prima facie case is established or if the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and concluding that no prima facie case was made out against the workmen.
5. Extraneous factors influencing the Tribunal's decision:
The Tribunal erred by considering the justifiability of the layoff, which was beyond the scope of the enquiry under Section 33. This extraneous factor influenced the Tribunal's decision to hold the management guilty of victimisation. The Tribunal's incorrect finding on victimisation led to a jurisdictional error in not allowing the applications under Section 33.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal committed serious errors by holding that no prima facie case was made out and by being influenced by extraneous factors. The Tribunal's decision was set aside, and it was directed to record appropriate orders allowing the applications under Section 33. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to pay the costs of the respondent.
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1975 (10) TMI 117
Issues Involved:
1. Withdrawal of the cash assistance scheme by the Government of India.
2. Application of the doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel against the Government.
3. Whether the withdrawal of the scheme was arbitrary and violated the rules of natural justice.
4. Determination of actual loss suffered by the petitioners due to the withdrawal of the scheme.
5. Preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the writ petition.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Withdrawal of the Cash Assistance Scheme by the Government of India:
The petitioners, engaged in the export of walnuts, challenged the withdrawal of the cash assistance scheme by the Government of India, which was initially introduced to incentivize exports and augment foreign exchange earnings. The scheme promised cash assistance of 5% of the f.o.b value on exports, with an additional 2.5% under certain conditions. The petitioners argued that they had relied on this scheme, invested significantly, and expanded their business, only for the scheme to be unilaterally withdrawn, causing them prejudice.
2. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable or Promissory Estoppel Against the Government:
The petitioners contended that the Government was estopped from withdrawing the scheme under the doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel, as they had altered their position based on the Government's promise. They cited precedents such as Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 718, where the Supreme Court held that the Government is bound by its promises if a citizen has acted upon them to their detriment. However, recent judgments have narrowed the scope of this doctrine, especially when applied to the Government's sovereign functions. The court noted that the doctrine would not apply to the Government when acting in its public, governmental, or sovereign capacity unless necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice.
3. Whether the Withdrawal of the Scheme was Arbitrary and Violated the Rules of Natural Justice:
The petitioners argued that the withdrawal was arbitrary and violated natural justice principles. The Government, however, justified the withdrawal by stating that the international market conditions had changed, with walnut prices rising significantly, eliminating the need for the scheme. The court found that the withdrawal was not arbitrary and was justified in light of the changed economic conditions. Notice had been given to the exporters' association, and the petitioners were aware of and had opposed the withdrawal, satisfying the requirements of natural justice.
4. Determination of Actual Loss Suffered by the Petitioners Due to the Withdrawal of the Scheme:
The petitioners claimed that they had suffered losses due to the withdrawal. However, the Government's affidavit stated that no actual loss was incurred by the petitioners, as the international market prices for walnuts had increased, ensuring profitability without the cash assistance. The court observed that the petitioners failed to provide concrete evidence of actual losses, and the alleged loss was essentially a loss of additional profit rather than an incurred detriment.
5. Preliminary Objections Regarding the Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The Government raised preliminary objections, arguing that the cash assistance scheme was a concession and not enforceable by a writ petition. The court noted that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could not be applied against the Government in its sovereign capacity unless to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. Additionally, the court emphasized that disputed questions of fact, such as the actual loss suffered, are not suitable for determination in writ jurisdiction and should be addressed through a civil suit for damages if necessary.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel does not apply to the Government when acting in its public, governmental, or sovereign capacity, except to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The withdrawal of the cash assistance scheme was justified due to changed economic conditions, and the petitioners failed to prove any actual loss suffered. The preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the writ petition were also upheld to the extent discussed in the merits of the case. No costs were awarded.
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1975 (10) TMI 116
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the repudiation of liability by the appellant under clause 13 of the Insurance Policy raised a dispute that could be referred to arbitration.
2. Whether the claim of respondent no. 1 and the proceeding commenced by him were barred by clause 19 of the policy.
Summary:
Issue 1: Arbitrability of the Dispute under Clause 13
The core issue was whether the repudiation of liability by the appellant under clause 13 of the Insurance Policy raised a dispute that could be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court held that the dispute raised by the appellant company was not covered by the arbitration clause. The Court observed that the arbitration clause (Clause 18) was restricted to differences as to the amount of any loss or damage. Since the appellant repudiated its liability to pay any amount of loss or damage, the dispute was not about the amount but about the liability itself. Therefore, the arbitration clause did not apply. The Court emphasized that on rejection of the claim by the company, the insured must commence a legal proceeding within three months to establish the company's liability, as per clause 13. The Court cited various precedents, including *Scott v. Avery* and *Jureidini v. National British and Irish Millers Insurance Company, Limited*, to support its conclusion that the arbitration clause did not cover disputes regarding the insurer's liability to pay.
Issue 2: Bar under Clause 19
The Court did not find it necessary to decide whether the action commenced by respondent no. 1 under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was barred under clause 19 of the policy. However, it noted that clause 19, which prescribes a period of twelve months for filing a claim, is not hit by section 28 of the Contract Act and is valid. The Court also mentioned that the period of three years prescribed in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, may apply to an application under section 20. The Court observed that the High Court was incorrect in its view that respondent no. 1's claim was not barred under clause 19 due to section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the difference which arose between the parties on the company's repudiation of the claim was not one to which the arbitration clause applied, and hence the arbitration agreement could not be filed, and no arbitrator could be appointed under section 20 of the Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments and orders of the lower courts, and dismissed respondent no. 1's application filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The Court directed the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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1975 (10) TMI 115
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of reversion orders dated October 28, 1966.
2. Applicability of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Buildings and Roads Branch (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1942.
3. Compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
4. Effect of the Punjab Re-organization Act, 1966 on the reversion orders.
5. Communication and effectiveness of the reversion orders.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Reversion Orders Dated October 28, 1966:
The appellants, the State of Punjab and Union of India, challenged the High Court's decision that had set aside the reversion orders of certain government servants. The Supreme Court held that the reversion orders were valid. The High Court had misinterpreted the applicability of the 1942 Rules and the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The reversion orders were not punitive but administrative in nature and thus did not require compliance with Article 311(2).
2. Applicability of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Buildings and Roads Branch (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1942:
The respondents argued that they were governed by the 1942 Rules and had become automatically confirmed in their posts. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the Division Bench of the High Court, concluded that the 1942 Rules did not apply to the respondents as they were not Assistant Executive Engineers. The respondents were governed by the 1960 Rules and the Class II 1965 Rules, which required the approval of the Public Service Commission for their appointments. Since the Commission did not find them suitable, they were rightly reverted.
3. Compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India:
The respondents claimed that their reversion without following the due process under Article 311(2) was illegal. The Supreme Court, citing the decision in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, held that the reversion was not by way of punishment and thus did not attract Article 311(2). The High Court's conclusion that the reversion was not punitive was upheld.
4. Effect of the Punjab Re-organization Act, 1966 on the Reversion Orders:
The High Court had held that the reversion orders were ineffective as they were communicated after the re-organization of the State of Punjab on November 1, 1966. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that administrative orders of the erstwhile State of Punjab continued to be effective in the successor States until modified or repudiated. The Court emphasized that the re-organization did not automatically nullify administrative orders.
5. Communication and Effectiveness of the Reversion Orders:
The High Court had found the reversion orders ineffective because they were communicated to the respondents after November 1, 1966. The Supreme Court, however, held that the orders were communicated on October 30, 1966, when they were sent out of the control of the issuing authority. The orders were thus effective before the re-organization date. The Court applied the principle that once an order is issued and sent out, it is considered communicated, regardless of when it is actually received.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments and orders of the High Court, both of the single Judge and the Division Bench. The reversion orders dated October 28, 1966, were held valid. The Court directed that the government should not claim any refund of the salary paid to the respondents up to the date of the judgment. Civil Appeal No. 521/1970 was dismissed as abated due to the death of the respondent, and Civil Appeal No. 519/1970 was dismissed as infructuous since the respondent was no longer in service. There was no order as to costs in any of the appeals.
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1975 (10) TMI 114
Issues Involved:
1. Standing of the State Bar Council to appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
2. Alleged professional misconduct by advocates.
3. Procedural fairness of the State Disciplinary Tribunal.
4. Interpretation of Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India on Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette.
5. Individual cases of alleged misconduct.
6. Broader implications for professional ethics and conduct in the legal profession.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Standing of the State Bar Council to Appeal:
The Supreme Court upheld the competence of the State Bar Council to appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, against an appellate decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal appointed by the Bar Council of India. This ruling enabled the Court to proceed with disposing of the eight cases on their merits.
2. Alleged Professional Misconduct:
The advocates involved were accused of soliciting clients in an unprofessional manner at the entrance of the Magistrates' Courts in Bombay City. The misconduct included physically fighting to snatch briefs, undercutting fees, and soliciting work in an undignified manner. The State Disciplinary Tribunal found the respondents guilty of conduct that "seriously lowers the reputation of the Bar in the eyes of the public" and suspended them from practicing as advocates for three years. However, the Appellate Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India absolved them of professional misconduct, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.
3. Procedural Fairness of the State Disciplinary Tribunal:
The Supreme Court criticized the State Disciplinary Tribunal for procedural lapses, including:
- Clubbing together the cases of 16 advocates into one common trial, leading to confusion and prejudice.
- Omnibus testimony and lack of specific evidence against individual respondents.
- Taking eight years to conclude the trial with only four witnesses.
- Failing to maintain a record of each day's proceedings.
- Examining witnesses in the absence of some respondents.
- Not considering the evidence against each alleged delinquent individually.
4. Interpretation of Rule 36:
The Appellate Disciplinary Tribunal's interpretation of Rule 36 was found to be flawed. The Tribunal argued that to be amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction, advocates must have solicited work from a particular person with respect to a specific case. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Tribunal's narrow interpretation failed to capture the broader ethical standards expected of the legal profession. The Court emphasized that professional ethics existed even before Rule 36 and should be understood in the context of the high moral standards traditionally associated with the legal profession.
5. Individual Cases of Alleged Misconduct:
- Dabholkar (C.A. 1461/74): Exonerated due to weak and mixed evidence, and his assurance to retire from practice.
- Bhagthani (C.A. 1462/74): No substantial evidence against him; charge extinguished.
- Talati (C.A. 1463/74): Found guilty but punishment reduced to suspension until December 31, 1975, considering his poor circumstances and expression of regret.
- Kelawala (C.A. 1464/74): Evidence against him was not serious; given his age and near blindness, he was allowed to retire without the stigma of gross misconduct.
- Dixit (C.A. 1465/74): Evidence inadequate; absolved from professional misconduct.
- Mandalia (C.A. 1466/74): Evidence insufficient; exculpation upheld.
- Doshi (C.A. 1467/74): Evidence against him was vague; exculpation upheld with a caution to refine his professional conduct.
- Raisinghani (C.A. 1468/74): Found guilty of misconduct but given a reduced suspension until December 31, 1975, considering his age and difficult circumstances.
6. Broader Implications for Professional Ethics and Conduct:
The Supreme Court underscored the importance of high ethical standards in the legal profession, emphasizing that:
- The legal profession is a public utility with a monopoly granted by the nation, obligating lawyers to maintain public confidence.
- Professional conduct should be guided by a moral code that rejects self-interest and promotes the fair administration of justice.
- The disciplinary bodies must understand their role in preserving the integrity of the profession and should not narrow their interpretation of ethical rules.
- The profession must avoid practices such as solicitation, advertising, and other forms of unprofessional conduct.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the Appellate Disciplinary Tribunal's decision, reinstated the findings of the State Disciplinary Tribunal with modifications, and emphasized the need for maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession. The Court's judgment serves as a reminder of the responsibilities of legal practitioners and the importance of procedural fairness in disciplinary proceedings.
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1975 (10) TMI 113
Issues Involved:
1. Application of Section 303 IPC in the case of Rohitsingh.
2. Sentences of Dilip Kumar and Bharatsingh.
Summary:
1. Application of Section 303 IPC in the case of Rohitsingh:
The main question for consideration was whether Rohitsingh's conviction u/s 303 IPC was legal. Section 303 IPC mandates a death sentence for a person who commits murder while under a sentence of life imprisonment. Rohitsingh was initially sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Prabhu on May 18, 1972. However, his conviction was set aside by the High Court on February 27, 1974, the same day the High Court pronounced its judgment in the instant case. The High Court convicted Rohitsingh u/s 303 IPC, reasoning that the relevant date for applying Section 303 is the date of the subsequent murder, not the date of the judgment. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that an acquittal wipes out the previous conviction, and thus, Section 303 IPC would not apply if the life sentence is set aside before the final judgment in the subsequent murder case. Consequently, Rohitsingh's death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment.
2. Sentences of Dilip Kumar and Bharatsingh:
The appeal for Dilip Kumar and Bharatsingh was limited to the question of sentence. Dilip Kumar was convicted u/s 302 IPC and sentenced to death, which was confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court saw no reason to reduce his death sentence, given the gravity of the crime. Bharatsingh was convicted u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that there was no scope for challenging Bharatsingh's sentence as the minimum sentence for murder u/s 302 IPC is life imprisonment.
Separate Judgment by R.S. Sarkaria, J.:
Justice R.S. Sarkaria agreed with the conclusions of Justice Chandrachud but provided additional reasoning. He emphasized that Section 303 IPC should be strictly construed and that the term "sentence" should be interpreted to mean a final and conclusive sentence. He argued that a sentence under appeal or subject to judicial review should not be considered for the application of Section 303 IPC. He highlighted the potential for inconsistent and unjust results if a broader interpretation were adopted. Consequently, he concurred with reducing Rohitsingh's death sentence to life imprisonment.
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1975 (10) TMI 112
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and relevant Rules.
2. Impact of the deletion of rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 on existing rights.
3. Determination of substantive rights of displaced persons in pending actions.
4. Application of procedural rules in the settlement of disputes involving displaced persons.
Analysis:
The judgment by the Supreme Court of India revolves around a dispute arising under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The primary issue at hand is the impact of the deletion of rule 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 on the rights of the parties involved in the case. The case involves an allotment of a government-built property to two individuals, with a subsequent dispute over the allocation of shares in the property. The deletion of rule 30, which governed the allocation of properties occupied by multiple persons, led to a disagreement regarding the rightful allottee of the property.
The central argument in the appeal was whether the deletion of rule 30, considered a procedural rule by the appellants, affected the substantive rights of the parties involved. The appellants contended that the deletion of the rule merely altered the procedural aspect of the proceedings and should not impact the underlying rights of the parties. However, the Court disagreed with this interpretation, emphasizing that rule 30 conferred a substantive right on displaced persons regarding the payment of compensation and allocation of properties. The Court highlighted that the manner in which compensation is payable forms an integral part of the right to receive compensation, and rule 30 was not merely a procedural mechanism but a substantive provision.
The Court further referenced a previous judgment by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, affirming that a displaced person has a substantive right to the determination of their compensation claim in the prescribed manner. The Court held that unless expressly stated, the amendment deleting rule 30 should not retroactively affect existing rights of displaced persons. Therefore, the rights of the parties involved in the case should be governed by the rule in force at the time of the dispute, which was rule 30. The Court concluded that the deletion of rule 30 in 1963 did not impact pending actions and upheld the decision of the Punjab High Court to quash the order made under sec. 33.
In summary, the judgment clarifies that the deletion of rule 30 did not alter the substantive rights of displaced persons and emphasizes the importance of adhering to the rules in force at the time of the dispute for the resolution of compensation-related issues. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Punjab High Court without any order as to costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 111
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the transaction (pledge vs. sale vs. mortgage)
2. Interpretation of the agreement dated 6th July 1965
3. Right to sue on the original debt
4. Limitation period for filing the suit
5. Right to private sale of shares
Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of the Transaction:
The plaintiffs argued that the transaction was a pledge, while the defendants contended it was an outright sale with an option to repurchase. The court held that the transaction was neither a simple pledge nor a sale but constituted a mortgage. The agreement allowed the plaintiffs to enjoy certain rights over the shares, including voting rights and the ability to transfer shares to their names, which is consistent with a mortgage rather than a pledge. The court concluded that the transaction was a mortgage because it involved more than just a bailment of goods as security; it also included the right to enjoy and dispose of the shares under specific conditions.
2. Interpretation of the Agreement:
The agreement dated 6th July 1965 outlined several terms, including:
- The shares shall be lodged for transfer in the plaintiffs' names.
- Sri A.K. Babu Khan could redeem the shares within two years without interest.
- If not redeemed within two years, a 9% interest would be charged for one year.
- If still not redeemed, the plaintiffs could dispose of the shares at the risk of Sri A.K. Babu Khan.
The court emphasized that the interpretation of the agreement must depend on its terms and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement's terms indicated that it was not an outright sale but a mortgage, as it allowed Sri A.K. Babu Khan to redeem the shares under specific conditions.
3. Right to Sue on the Original Debt:
The court held that even if the transaction was not a pledge, the plaintiffs had the right to sue on the original debt. The plaintiffs had paid Rs. 54,000 to redeem the shares and were entitled to recover this amount along with interest. The court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for the recovery of the amount based on the principle of money had and received.
4. Limitation Period for Filing the Suit:
The defendants argued that the suit was barred by limitation, as it was filed beyond three years from the date of the agreement. The court held that the right to sue accrued at the end of the three-year period given for repayment under the agreement. The suit was filed within three years from the expiry of this period, making it within the limitation period. The court applied Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which provides a three-year period from the date when the right to sue accrues.
5. Right to Private Sale of Shares:
The plaintiffs sold the shares through a public auction after giving notice to the defendants. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs had no right to sell the shares privately if the transaction was a mortgage. The court held that the right to sell the shares was conferred by the express terms of the agreement and did not make the transaction a pledge. Even in the case of a mortgage of moveables, the parties could stipulate a right of private sale. The court cited precedents to support the view that a mortgagee of moveable property has the right to sell the property without the intervention of the court if the debtor fails to repay the amount after proper notice.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the transaction was a mortgage, not a pledge or sale. The plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount due along with interest, and the suit was within the limitation period. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1975 (10) TMI 110
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the conviction under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
2. Reliability of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
3. Involvement and complicity of the appellant in the demand and acceptance of the bribe.
4. Conduct and credibility of the raiding party and the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Conviction:
The appellant, a clerk in the Land Record office, and a peon named Ram Narain were convicted by the Sessions Judge, Kotal, for offences under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. They were accused of obtaining a bribe of Rs. 10 from Dhanna Lal for issuing an early copy of land records. The High Court of Rajasthan upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
2. Reliability of the Evidence:
The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimonies of Dhanna Lal and Ram Nath, who claimed that Ram Narain demanded a bribe on behalf of the appellant. However, the Court noted several inconsistencies and discrepancies in their statements. For instance, Dhanna Lal initially stated he gave the application for a certified copy to the appellant but later retracted, admitting he did not know the clerk's name. Additionally, the copying fee paid was Rs. 1 for an ordinary copy, not Rs. 2 for an urgent copy, contradicting Dhanna Lal's claim.
3. Involvement and Complicity of the Appellant:
The Court found no direct evidence linking the appellant to the bribe demand. On both days when the bribe was allegedly demanded (29th and 30th March 1967), there was no direct communication between the appellant and Dhanna Lal or Ram Nath. The demand was made solely by Ram Narain. The Court considered the possibility that Ram Narain acted independently to extract money without the appellant's knowledge. The evidence suggested that the appellant was unaware of Ram Narain's actions.
4. Conduct and Credibility of the Raiding Party and the Deputy Superintendent of Police:
The raiding party's actions and the Deputy Superintendent of Police's conduct raised doubts about the prosecution's case. The Deputy Superintendent claimed he could not see the verandah where the alleged transaction took place, contradicting his earlier statement that the verandah was clearly visible from his position. Head Constable Uma Shanker's testimony also conflicted with the Deputy Superintendent's account. The Court found it suspicious that the Deputy Superintendent did not arrest or question the appellant despite Ram Narain's immediate statement implicating the appellant.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded or accepted a bribe. The evidence was insufficient and unreliable, leading to the acquittal of the appellant. The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant's bail bonds were canceled.
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1975 (10) TMI 109
Issues:
Whether an apprentice is considered an "employee" under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.
Analysis:
The case involved the interpretation of whether an apprentice can be classified as an "employee" under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The respondent, a public limited company, had graduate and trade apprentices working at its factory. The apprentices received stipends but no other emoluments apart from daily allowances. The apprenticeship agreement highlighted the training aspect and the apprentice's commitment to serve the company post-training. The company was not legally obligated to offer employment to the apprentice after training. The central question was whether the apprentice could be considered an employee based on the apprenticeship agreement.
The Supreme Court analyzed the nature of apprenticeship, emphasizing the primary objective of imparting training rather than establishing an employer-employee relationship. The court referred to legal definitions and historical legislative perspectives on apprenticeship. The Apprentices Act, 1961, defined an "apprentice" as a trainee undergoing apprenticeship training, indicating the absence of an employment element. The court noted that legislative acts explicitly included apprentices in certain definitions, highlighting the deliberate omission of apprentices in the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The court concluded that the legislative intent was to recognize apprenticeship as a distinct training arrangement separate from regular employment.
Examining the definition of "employee" under section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, the court emphasized that an employee must be employed for wages in connection with the work of a factory or establishment. The apprentices, being trainees under a specific scheme for training purposes, were not considered employees as they were not engaged in the company's work in a regular capacity. The apprentices did not receive wages as defined under the Act, and their engagement was solely for training under specified terms and conditions. The court also referenced section 18 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, which categorically distinguished apprentices as trainees, not workers.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that apprentices could not be classified as employees under the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The court highlighted the distinct nature of apprenticeship agreements focused on training rather than establishing an employer-employee relationship. The judgment underscored the legislative recognition of apprenticeship as a separate category from regular employment, leading to the rejection of the appellants' claim for charging the company with liability for special contributions under the Act.
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1975 (10) TMI 108
Issues:
Assessment of net profit for the contract work
Charging of interest under different sections
Opportunity to show cause against levy of interest
Application of rules for reduction or waiver of interest
Assessment of net profit for the contract work:
The petitioner, a firm of contractors, was assessed for the years 1970-71 and 1971-72 by the Income Tax Officer, who estimated the net profit from a construction contract at 12 1/2% instead of the 9.5% reported by the petitioner. The Commissioner of Income Tax upheld the assessments, dismissing the revisions filed by the petitioner. The court held that it would not question the Income Tax Officer's estimation but only examine if the Commissioner applied his mind to the case. As the Commissioner had considered the facts, the court found no grounds for interference.
Charging of interest under different sections:
The petitioner was charged interest under various sections for the assessment years. The court noted that the Income Tax Officer had the authority to levy interest under the relevant sections, and the petitioner's argument that they were not given an opportunity to show cause against the interest levy was deemed meritless. The court highlighted that the burden was on the assessee to prove sufficient cause for delayed returns to seek reduction or waiver of interest, which the petitioner failed to do.
Opportunity to show cause against levy of interest:
The court emphasized that the Income Tax Officer was not obligated to provide an opportunity to show cause against interest levy when returns were filed late. The petitioner's contention that they should have been given a chance to present their case was rejected as the liability for interest is automatic in cases of delayed returns unless sufficient cause is proven.
Application of rules for reduction or waiver of interest:
Regarding the rules for reduction or waiver of interest, the court found that the petitioner's case did not fall within the specified categories that would allow for a reduction or waiver of interest. The court reiterated that the Income Tax Officer had the discretion to reduce or waive interest only under prescribed circumstances, which the petitioner failed to demonstrate. Consequently, the court dismissed the petitioner's contentions as untenable and upheld the assessment orders passed by the Income Tax Officer.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the writ petition, stating that all contentions raised by the petitioner were found to be without merit, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances.
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1975 (10) TMI 107
Issues:
1. Reversion of the appellant from the post of Legal Assistant.
2. Allegations of conspiracy and poor performance leading to reversion.
3. Legal protection under Article 311 for temporary government servants.
4. Examination of the motive behind reversion orders.
5. Judicial interpretations regarding reversion and discharge of government servants.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant filed an appeal against the Punjab & Haryana High Court's judgment dismissing his writ petition challenging his reversion from the post of Legal Assistant. He was initially appointed on an ad hoc basis in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal, but was later reverted to his parent office. The appellant alleged a conspiracy involving various parties leading to his reversion.
2. The reversion was based on the appellant's poor performance as a Legal Assistant. The Secretary of the Law Department denied the conspiracy allegations made by the appellant. The Deputy Advocate General highlighted the appellant's inadequate legal knowledge and inappropriate behavior, such as making reckless allegations and overreaching his authority. The Deputy Commissioner also expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant's work.
3. The appellant contended that even temporary government servants are entitled to the protection of Article 311 if reversion is considered a form of punishment. However, the court found that the reversion was due to the appellant's unsuitability for the post, not as a punitive measure. The court emphasized that temporary appointments do not confer a right to the position.
4. The judgment discussed the complexities of examining the motive behind reversion orders for government servants. Different judicial opinions exist on whether such actions should be considered punitive or administrative. The court suggested a need for a comprehensive review of the legal framework to avoid unnecessary litigation and confusion regarding reversion and discharge of government employees.
5. Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal without costs, emphasizing that reversion of a probationer or temporary servant cannot be questioned unless mala fides are proven in making the decision. The judgment highlighted the need for clarity in legal interpretations to streamline the process of handling cases related to the discharge or reversion of government employees.
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1975 (10) TMI 106
Issues Involved:
1. Power of the Board to levy a surcharge under the provisions of the Act.
2. Applicability of Clause 13 of the agreement to the levy of surcharge and its reference to arbitration under Clause 23.
3. Allegation of discrimination by the Board in exempting certain categories from the surcharge.
Summary:
Issue 1: Power of the Board to Levy a Surcharge
Mr. Gupte argued that the Board has no power to levy a surcharge under the Act. The Court rejected this argument, stating that although the term "surcharge" is not defined in the Act, it is essentially an additional charge over the usual tariff. The Court held that the Board has the authority to enhance rates by way of surcharge under the Act.
Issue 2: Applicability of Clause 13 and Arbitration under Clause 23
Mr. Gupte contended that Clause 13 of the agreement does not cover the levy of a surcharge and thus should not be referred to arbitration under Clause 23. The Court referred to its previous decision in M/s Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. v. Orissa State Electricity Board, which held that the Board cannot unilaterally enhance rates fixed under a special agreement unless the agreement itself provides for such revision. The Court found that Clause 13 allows for the revision of tariff rates, including surcharges, and thus the matter falls within the scope of arbitration under Clause 23.
Issue 3: Allegation of Discrimination
Mr. Gupte argued that the Board's exemption of certain categories from the surcharge constitutes discrimination, violating section 49 of the Act and Clause (2) of Schedule I to the agreement. The Court noted that the industries exempted were governed by special agreements, which could not be overridden by the Board. The Court held that the plea of discrimination loses significance in light of Clause 13 and the statutory framework of section 49, especially given the suspension of Article 14 during the emergency.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ application. The Court found no merit in the arguments against the Board's power to levy a surcharge, the applicability of Clause 13, and the allegations of discrimination. The matter was deemed appropriate for arbitration under Clause 23 of the agreement. No order as to costs was made.
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1975 (10) TMI 105
Issues involved: Interpretation of rule 3 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules regarding filing of Letters Patent Appeals, denial of benefits to a Government servant for failure to pass departmental tests, and exercise of discretion by the High Court in condoning delay.
Interpretation of rule 3 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court Rules: The judgment addressed the contention that rule 3, which mandates the submission of three typed copies of specific documents for filing an appeal, is not necessarily mandatory. The Full Bench decision in Bikram Das case held that compliance with this rule is obligatory for entertaining an appeal. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the notion that minor deviations in fulfilling the requirements of rule 3 should lead to dismissal of the appeal. The Court analyzed the language and purpose of the rule, emphasizing that the core requirement is the presence of the necessary documents rather than the exact number of copies. The judgment highlighted that procedural rules should serve as aids to justice and not as obstacles, and deviations can be rectified without prejudicing the fair hearing. Ultimately, the Court overruled the Bikram Das decision, stating that the essence of rule 3 is the production of all three important documents rather than the exact number of copies.
Denial of benefits to a Government servant: The case involved a Government servant who had served for 22 years but failed to pass departmental tests despite being granted exemption. The High Court had not entertained the appeal on procedural grounds, thereby avoiding a decision on whether the failure to pass the test should bar the servant from receiving benefits. The Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the State's argument that the failure to pass the test should prevent the servant from enjoying benefits after such a long period of service. The Court upheld the single Judge's finding that the failure to pass the test should not hinder the servant from receiving increments and other benefits, especially considering the exemption granted. The judgment emphasized that passing tests after a prolonged period of service should not be an absolute requirement, particularly for lower-level work.
Exercise of discretion by the High Court: The judgment also discussed the High Court's exercise of discretion in condoning the delay in filing the required copies as per rule 3. The Court acknowledged that interfering with the discretionary power of a lower court should be done cautiously, especially when there is no irrationality or perversity in the exercise of discretion. In this case, the High Court's decision not to grant condonation of delay was deemed reasonable, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order in this regard, resulting in the appellant losing the case.
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1975 (10) TMI 104
Issues involved: Appeal by State against reinstatement of a suspended employee, legality of re-opening disciplinary proceedings after exoneration and reinstatement.
Summary:
The Supreme Court considered an appeal by the State against the reinstatement of a veterinary assistant who had been suspended and then reinstated following disciplinary proceedings. The Court noted the lack of reasoned findings in the reinstatement order and the subsequent attempt to re-open the case after the retirement of the officer who had handled the initial proceedings. The High Court had granted relief to the employee, holding that there was no power to re-open a case after exoneration and reinstatement. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of following legal provisions and rules in disciplinary matters, stating that a second inquiry cannot be initiated without specific authority or provision. The Court dismissed the appeal, highlighting that once a disciplinary case is closed and the employee is reinstated, a government cannot restart the process without the necessary legal authority.
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1975 (10) TMI 103
Issues:
1. Validity of the State Government's revocation of mining lease.
2. Legality of the premium realization by the State Government.
3. Compliance with Mineral Concession Rules.
4. Entitlement to refund of illegally realized premium.
Validity of State Government's Revocation of Mining Lease:
The appellant submitted a tender for mining rights for mica in response to a notification by the State of Rajasthan. The lease was granted for 20 years with an option for renewal. However, the lease was not executed within the required period, leading to the Director of Mines and Geology revoking the lease. The appellant filed a review application against the revocation, but the State Government proposed a new lease, which the appellant did not contest. The State Government later ordered the appellant to vacate the mining area, citing that the license was not governed by Mineral Concession Rules but by general law. The appellant challenged this order through a writ petition, seeking various reliefs, including compensation and lease grant. The single Judge dismissed the petition as infructuous due to the State's compensation offer.
Legality of Premium Realization:
The State Government demanded a premium of Rs. 1,55,000 from the appellant for the mining lease. However, the Government of India set aside an order demanding dead rent, stating that the premium acceptance was illegal as it lacked prior approval from the Central Government. The Rules only authorized royalty, dead rent, and surface rent, not premium. The Court held that the State Government acted unlawfully by realizing the premium without prior approval, entitling the appellant to a refund of Rs. 1,21,930.71 out of the total premium.
Compliance with Mineral Concession Rules:
The Court emphasized that the State Government, in granting mining leases, must adhere to the Mineral Concession Rules made under the Mines & Minerals Act, 1948. Any deviation from these statutory rules is impermissible. The State cannot impose terms at its discretion, disregarding the binding statutory rules. The appellant's entitlement to a refund was based on the State Government's failure to comply with the Rules in realizing the premium.
Entitlement to Refund of Illegally Realized Premium:
The Court directed the State Government to refund Rs. 1,21,930.71 to the appellant, representing the amount illegally realized as premium. The appellant, having vacated the mining area, waived further compensation claims but reserved the right to defend against any future State actions related to the mining grant. The appeal was partly allowed, and the appellant was awarded costs.
This judgment highlights the importance of adherence to statutory rules in the grant of mining leases, emphasizing the illegality of premium realization without proper approval. The appellant's entitlement to a refund underscores the significance of legal compliance in administrative actions.
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1975 (10) TMI 102
Issues Involved:
1. Adulteration of food samples.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the time limit prescribed in Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
Summary:
1. Adulteration of Food Samples:
The petitioner, Mangu Ram, a partner in the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal, was involved in selling adulterated samples of Phool Gulab. The Food Inspector of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi purchased two samples from the firm's shop, which were found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. Consequently, the Municipal Corporation filed complaints against Mangu Ram and the firm for an offence u/s 7 read with s. 15 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Judicial Magistrate acquitted them, granting the benefit of s. 19(2) of the Act, as the firm had purchased the samples from a presumably licensed manufacturer, M/s Venkateshwara & Co.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi appealed against the acquittal, but the application for special leave was filed two days late. The High Court condoned the delay, invoking s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and granted special leave. The High Court later convicted Mangu Ram and the firm, as there was no evidence that M/s Venkateshwara & Co. was a licensed manufacturer, nor was there a written warranty obtained.
The petitioners argued that the sixty-day time limit in s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was mandatory and excluded the applicability of s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case from the precedent set in Kaushalya Rani's case, noting that the Limitation Act, 1963, unlike the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, does not expressly exclude the applicability of s. 5. Therefore, s. 5 can be invoked to extend the period of limitation if sufficient cause is shown.
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for special leave despite the expiration of the sixty-day limit, as the Municipal Corporation had sufficient cause for the delay. Consequently, the petitions for special leave filed by Mangu Ram and the firm were dismissed.
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1975 (10) TMI 101
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
2. Applicability of limitation period u/s 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
3. Retrospective operation of procedural law changes.
Summary:
Jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal:
The primary issue was whether an application for compensation filed u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, arising from an accident occurring more than 60 days before the constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, could be entertained by the Tribunal or if the remedy was to institute a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted, and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant.
Applicability of Limitation Period u/s 110A(3):
The Court examined the limitation period of 60 days for filing an application u/s 110A(3) and concluded that the bar of limitation does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. The Court reasoned that time for filing the application did not start running before the constitution of the Tribunal. The delay in filing the application due to the non-existence of the Tribunal could not be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110A. However, the Court held that the time taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution could be considered reasonable or the delay could be condoned under the proviso.
Retrospective Operation of Procedural Law Changes:
The Court emphasized that the change in law was merely a change of forum, i.e., a change of procedural law and not substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change operates retrospectively. The Court stated that the expressions "arising out of an accident" and "over the area in which the accident occurred" in section 110A indicate that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively, irrespective of when the accident occurred. The Court also noted that the underlying principle of the change was to provide a cheaper remedy to claimants by approaching the Claims Tribunal.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents' remedy was to go before the Claims Tribunal. The time taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution was either reasonable or the delay could be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110A. The appeal was dismissed with costs to respondents 1, 2, and 3.
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1975 (10) TMI 100
The judgment in the case of Commissioner v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi (1975) held that lids are integral parts of metal containers, justifying duty on lids even if supplied separately. The demand under Rule 10A was confirmed as the lids had escaped assessment, and Rule 10A was deemed applicable. The appeal was rejected, upholding the duty demand of Rs. 1890.13.
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