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2000 (10) TMI 988
The Supreme Court of India granted leave in a case where the petitioner sought a refund from Doordarshan. The Court held that the High Court should not have delved into the merits of the dispute under Article 226, as contractual disputes are best resolved in civil litigation. The Court vacated the findings against the appellant and allowed the appellant to file a civil suit for the claim. The Court also addressed potential issues of limitation under the Limitation Act, leaving it to the civil court to decide. The appeal was disposed of with these observations.
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2000 (10) TMI 987
Issues:
1. Legality of quashing charge under Section 304 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the CrPC.
Detailed Analysis:
The case involved a question of whether the High Court erred in quashing the charge framed under Section 304 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents by the Sessions Judge. The police investigation led to charges being framed against the respondents under Section 498-A/34 IPC and Section 304/34 IPC. The High Court, in response to a revision petition, directed the Sessions Judge to first record medical evidence and exempted the accused from personal appearance until then. Subsequently, the accused sought discharge, which was denied, leading to an application under Section 482 CrPC to quash the charge, which was granted by the High Court. The State appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court emphasized that at the stage of framing a charge, the Court is not required to assess the sufficiency of evidence but only to ascertain if a prima facie case exists. Quashing a charge under Section 482 CrPC should only be done in exceptional cases to prevent abuse of process. Referring to legal precedents, the Court highlighted that the High Court's detailed examination of evidence and premature assessment were unwarranted. The Court reiterated that the trial must proceed without interference unless exceptional circumstances exist.
The Court referred to previous cases to emphasize that the High Court should not delve into detailed evidence or usurp the trial court's functions during the stage of framing charges. The Court held that the High Court's approach in evaluating medical evidence prematurely was erroneous and unsustainable. The High Court's decision to quash the charge against the respondents was deemed illegal, and the appeal was allowed. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with the law.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach and premature assessment of evidence, emphasizing that the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the trial court to continue with the case as per legal procedures.
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2000 (10) TMI 986
Issues:
1. Whether properties should be forfeited under SAFEMA Act based on the connection between the detenu and the appellant.
2. Validity of the acquisition of properties including a flat, credit balance in the bank, shares of public companies, and National Savings Certificates.
3. Application of section 9 of the SAFEMA Act regarding fine in lieu of forfeiture.
4. Comparison of section 9 of SAFEMA Act with section 68K of the NDPS Act.
5. Determination of the value of the property for the purpose of imposing a fine in lieu of forfeiture under section 9.
Analysis:
1. The appellant, being the son of a detenu under COFEPOSA, received a notice under SAFEMA Act to show cause why certain properties should not be forfeited. The appellant contended that there was no nexus between him and the detenu, and the proceedings should be dropped. However, the Competent Authority directed the forfeiture of certain properties, leading to this appeal. The appellant argued that none of the properties were illegally acquired and sought the benefit of section 9 of SAFEMA Act.
2. The appellant explained the acquisition of the flat through loans and sale of assets, but the Competent Authority found discrepancies in the timing of payments and loans, concluding that the flat was not purchased with the loan obtained from HDFC. However, the loan from the employer was accepted as a source for the flat's purchase. The appellant's claim of using proceeds from the sale of shares to buy the flat was supported by evidence not considered by the Competent Authority, which was acknowledged by the appellate tribunal.
3. The tribunal analyzed the provisions of section 9 of the SAFEMA Act, which allows for a fine in lieu of forfeiture if the source of only a part of the property's acquisition is unexplained. The appellant was given the option to pay a fine equal to one and one-fifth times the value of the unexplained portion. The tribunal clarified the valuation criteria and provided the appellant with a deadline to pay the fine to avoid forfeiture of the properties.
4. A comparison was drawn between section 9 of the SAFEMA Act and section 68K of the NDPS Act, highlighting the difference in valuation criteria for imposing fines in lieu of forfeiture. The tribunal noted that while the NDPS Act considers market value for fines, the SAFEMA Act bases it on the value of assets at the time of acquisition. The tribunal suggested that the Parliament may consider amending the SAFEMA Act to align with the NDPS Act regarding valuation for fines.
5. The tribunal determined the value of the property for imposing the fine in lieu of forfeiture under section 9. It considered the unexplained portion of the property's acquisition and provided a specific amount for the appellant to pay as a fine within a stipulated timeframe. Additionally, the tribunal decided against the forfeiture of the balance in Dena Bank due to its negligible amount and upheld the Competent Authority's decision regarding the acquisition of shares with the appellant's salary.
In conclusion, the appeal was partly allowed based on the directions provided under section 9 of the SAFEMA Act, with specific instructions for the appellant to pay a fine to avoid forfeiture of the properties.
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2000 (10) TMI 985
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the State enactment, Act XXX of 1976, can override the Central enactment, Act XXX of 1956.
2. Whether the Act XXX of 1976 can override Section 6 of Act XXX of 1956 under the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India.
3. Whether a Hindu converted into Muslim can claim any right under Central Act XXX of 1956 or Kerala Act XXX of 1976.
4. Whether the disrupted members can claim a right over the property of one of the disrupted members after his disruption as it has become joint family property by birth of a male member.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the State enactment, Act XXX of 1976, can override the Central enactment, Act XXX of 1956:
The court analyzed the provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution of India to determine the precedence of laws. Article 254(1) states that if any provision of a State law is repugnant to a Union law, the Union law shall prevail. However, Article 254(2) provides an exception where a State law, if reserved for the President's consideration and receiving his assent, will prevail in that State. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976 (Act XXX of 1976) received the President's assent on 10-8-1976. Therefore, the court held that the State enactment can override the Central enactment within the State of Kerala.
2. Whether the Act XXX of 1976 can override Section 6 of Act XXX of 1956 under the provisions of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India:
The court found that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act XXX of 1956) relates to the devolution of interest in coparcenary property. However, the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976, abolished the concept of coparcenary and replaced it with tenancy in common. As the Act XXX of 1976 received the President's assent, it prevails over the provisions of Section 6 of Act XXX of 1956 in Kerala. Thus, the court ruled that the succession should be governed by Section 8 of Act XXX of 1956, which deals with intestate succession, rather than survivorship under Section 6.
3. Whether a Hindu converted into Muslim can claim any right under Central Act XXX of 1956 or Kerala Act XXX of 1976:
The court addressed the issue of the second plaintiff, who converted to Islam, and whether he could claim rights under the Hindu Succession Act. The court noted that this issue was not pressed during the hearing. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's finding that the converted individual is still entitled to a share of the property.
4. Whether the disrupted members can claim a right over the property of one of the disrupted members after his disruption as it has become joint family property by birth of a male member:
The court examined the historical context of the property, noting that a partition in 1958 disrupted the joint family status, and the property was held as separate property by Jinachandra Gowder. After the birth of another son (5th defendant), the property became joint family property again. However, with the enactment of Act XXX of 1976, the property was held as tenants in common. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs and defendants are entitled to their respective shares as per the intestate succession under Section 8 of Act XXX of 1956.
Separate Judgments:
S.A. 469/1992:
The appellants filed a suit for damages against the respondent for plucking coffee and pepper from the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court confirmed the dismissal, holding that the defendant, being a co-owner, could not be restrained from utilizing the property. The second appeal was also dismissed.
S.A. 958/1989-E:
The appellants sought eviction of tenants, but the trial court found that the property was leased by a co-owner (DW2). The appellate court confirmed the dismissal of the eviction suit. The second appeal was dismissed.
S.A. 327/1992-E:
The appellants sought a permanent injunction against the defendant from trespassing. The trial court dismissed the suit, recognizing the defendant as a co-sharer. The appellate court confirmed the dismissal. The second appeal was dismissed.
Conclusion:
All the appeals were dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The court upheld the interpretation of the relevant laws and confirmed the rights of the parties as tenants in common under the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
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2000 (10) TMI 984
Issues:
1. Single complaint for multiple causes of action
2. Compliance with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
3. Participation of Directors in the offense
4. Application of Section 219 of the Cr. P.C.
Analysis:
1. Single complaint for multiple causes of action:
The respondent initiated criminal action under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioners for issuing 10 cheques with insufficient funds. The petitioners challenged the single complaint on the grounds of two causes of action and non-compliance with Section 219 of the Cr. P.C. However, the Court found that since the cheques gave rise to a single cause of action, the provisions of Section 219 were not applicable, and the complaint was justified.
2. Compliance with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The complaint and sworn statement did not satisfy Section 141, which requires averment that all individuals responsible for the conduct of the company were involved in the offense. As the Directors were not alleged to have participated, they were not deemed guilty under Section 138. The cognizance against petitioners 2 to 4 was quashed due to lack of active involvement.
3. Participation of Directors in the offense:
The absence of allegations of Directors' participation in the transactions led to the conclusion that they did not commit the offense under Section 138. Since the cheques were signed by the Chairman and Managing Director, cognizance against the other Directors was deemed unjustifiable and was quashed.
4. Application of Section 219 of the Cr. P.C.:
The Court considered the application of Section 219 to the case, emphasizing that the cause of action arose only after the service of notice to the accused. It was clarified that the complainant's action under Section 138 was well within time and that a single complaint against the accused was advantageous. The Court accepted that the provisions of Section 219 of the Cr. P.C. were not applicable to the proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Conclusion:
The petition was partially allowed, quashing the complaint and cognizance against petitioners 2 to 4 but dismissing the petition against the Chairman and Managing Director. The judgment clarified the application of various legal provisions and highlighted the importance of active participation and compliance with statutory requirements in criminal proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
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2000 (10) TMI 983
Issues:
1. Application under Order 13, Rule 2, CPC after final arguments and case reserved for judgment.
Analysis:
The Rajasthan Financial Corporation filed a civil suit, and after the trial was complete and the case was reserved for judgment, the plaintiff moved an application under Order 13, Rule 2, CPC. The trial Court rejected the application, stating that after arguments were heard and the case was closed for judgment, no further applications could be accepted. The revision petition was filed challenging this decision.
The main issue to be decided was whether a party could file an application after final arguments and when the case was reserved for judgment. Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, it was highlighted that once the hearing is completed, the parties have no further rights or privileges, and there is no stage between the reservation of judgment and pronouncement. The Court discussed various citations brought up, emphasizing that applications cannot be entertained after the case is closed for judgment.
Different decisions were cited, including a single Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court, a case from the Supreme Court, and a decision from the M.P. High Court. The Court disagreed with the views presented in these cases, stressing that no application could be moved after the arguments were heard and the case was closed for judgment. The Court also discussed a decision from the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where an application under Order 13, Rule 2, CPC was accepted after arguments but before judgment. However, it was clarified that the trial Court has the jurisdiction to delay pronouncing judgment if necessary, but parties cannot move applications in between closure for judgment and pronouncement.
In conclusion, the Court held that the principles established in the Supreme Court decision of Arjun Singh's case should be applied to the present case. The revision petition was dismissed, emphasizing that no applications could be entertained after the case was closed for judgment.
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2000 (10) TMI 982
Issues: Dismissal of complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Judicial Magistrate without proper procedure and considerations.
In this judgment, the appellant filed a private complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the Judicial Magistrate, Bhavani, against the respondent. The complaint was taken on file but later dismissed by the Magistrate due to the complainant's absence. The appellant argued that since the complaint was dismissed before summons were issued to the accused, the respondent did not attain the status of an accused, and notice need not be sent. The court referred to the purpose of Section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing that the provision aims to deter complainants from dilatory tactics while protecting the accused from unnecessary harassment. The court highlighted that the Magistrate must consider the necessity of the complainant's presence for the case's progress before dismissing the complaint.
The court cited a previous case where it was observed that the Magistrate misused Section 256 by dismissing a case without proper considerations. The judgment emphasized that the power to dismiss a complaint must be exercised judiciously to advance the cause of justice. The court found that the defects in the Magistrate's order in the present case mirrored those in the previous case, indicating an arbitrary exercise of discretion. The court also referenced another judgment reiterating the importance of judicial restraint in exercising such powers. Consequently, the court set aside the Magistrate's order, directing the Magistrate to restore the case and proceed further in accordance with the law. The criminal appeal was allowed in favor of the appellant.
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2000 (10) TMI 981
Issues:
1. Availability of Modvat Credit on inputs used in the manufacture of final products cleared without duty payment under Chapter X.
2. Invocation of longer period of limitation for demand raised beyond six months from relevant date.
3. Interpretation of statutory documents like C/List and RT-12 returns.
4. Application of Tribunal judgments on Modvat Credit availability and limitation period.
5. Double demands for the same goods and period.
Issue 1: The appeals involved the availability of Modvat Credit on inputs used in manufacturing final products cleared without duty payment under Chapter X. The appellant argued that the demand was barred by limitation as the show-cause notice was issued beyond six months from the relevant date. The appellant relied on conflicting judgments regarding Modvat Credit availability and reasonable belief formed based on those judgments. The respondent contended that the non-mention of clearance in statutory declarations justified the invocation of a longer limitation period.
Issue 2: The invocation of a longer period of limitation for demands raised beyond six months from the relevant date was contested. The appellant argued that the demand was time-barred due to the delay in issuing the show-cause notice. The respondent emphasized the importance of statutory documents like C/List and RT-12 returns in justifying the longer limitation period.
Issue 3: The interpretation of statutory documents like C/List and RT-12 returns played a crucial role in determining the applicability of the longer limitation period. The appellant highlighted the significance of conflicting judgments and reasonable belief formed based on those judgments. The respondent, however, stressed the importance of accurate declarations in statutory documents to justify the invocation of a longer limitation period.
Issue 4: The application of Tribunal judgments on Modvat Credit availability and limitation period was central to the decision. The appellant referenced conflicting judgments to support their argument for a reasonable belief regarding Modvat Credit availability. The Tribunal considered the fluid state of the law before a decisive judgment and ruled in favor of the appellant based on the limitation period and Modvat Credit availability.
Issue 5: The presence of double demands for the same goods and period raised concerns. The Tribunal noted that demands for the same period were confirmed in subsequent orders, leading to double demands. The Tribunal concluded that the demands were barred by limitation based on the relevant dates for taking credit and settled law by the Larger Bench decision, ultimately allowing the appeals with consequential reliefs to the appellants.
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2000 (10) TMI 980
Issues:
1. Challenge to orders allowing restoration of suit for partition and transposition of defendant as plaintiff.
2. Interpretation of O. XXIII R. 1-A of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding transposition of defendants as plaintiffs.
3. Application of O. IX R. 9 of the CPC for restoration of the suit.
4. Consideration of substantial questions in a suit for partition.
5. Definition of abandonment in legal context and its application to the case.
6. Possibility of restoration of suit under O. XXIII R. 1-A and S. 151 of the CPC.
7. Transposition of parties with rival interests in the suit.
Analysis:
1. The revision petitioners challenged the orders allowing the restoration of the suit for partition and the transposition of the 6th defendant as a plaintiff. The respondents relied on O. XXIII R. 1-A of the CPC, arguing that a defendant can be transposed as a plaintiff after the plaintiff abandons the case. The revision petitioners contended that O. XXIII R. 1-A cannot be invoked post-suit disposal and that O. IX R. 9 of the CPC does not apply for suit restoration.
2. O. XXIII R. 1-A of the CPC permits the transposition of defendants as plaintiffs when a plaintiff abandons a suit. The court must consider if there is a substantial question to be decided against other defendants. The timing of the application is crucial, as seen in this case where the suit was dismissed on the same day the application was filed, making the abandonment significant despite the suit's disposal.
3. While a plaintiff can abandon a suit at any stage, if substantial questions remain, transposition of defendants as plaintiffs can be allowed to pursue the suit. In a partition suit, all parties involved, whether plaintiff or defendant, have an interest in the partition relief. Allowing transposition avoids unnecessary delays and expenses, especially when a party has already incurred costs for separate allotment.
4. The concept of abandonment was debated, with the court clarifying that abandonment can occur through positive submission or silence leading to lapse. Here, stating "not pressed" amounted to abandonment, making O. XXIII R. 1-A applicable. Abandonment does not require the plaintiff's failure to appear in court; it can result from various actions or inactions.
5. The court highlighted that technicalities should not hinder the restoration of a suit under O. XXIII R. 1-A. Even if the suit is considered not alive, if restoration is essential for realizing rights under the provision, the court can order restoration under S. 151 of the CPC. The rights of the petitioners should not be defeated by technical arguments.
6. The court decided to transpose the 6th defendant as a plaintiff and the plaintiffs who abandoned the suit as defendants to align with the new developments and conflicting interests. The suit was restored, allowing necessary amendments to the plaint and giving the original plaintiffs turned defendants the right to contest the suit if they choose to do so. The judgment allowed the prayer in I.A. 3993/97 with modifications to ensure fair proceedings for all parties involved.
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2000 (10) TMI 979
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaintiff in O.S. No. 36 of 1986 is entitled to be trustee and whether he can administer the properties mentioned in the settlement deed.
2. Whether the plaintiff in O.S. No. 36 of 1986 can ask for recovery of possession from the defendants.
3. Whether the second defendant in O.S. No. 36 of 1986 is fit to be trustee and maintain the properties.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Entitlement of the Plaintiff to be Trustee and Administer Properties
The properties in question were owned by late Sheik Ismail Maracaiar, who executed a registered settlement deed on 16.2.1931. According to the deed, the income from the properties was to be used for specified charities, with the remainder divided among the heirs. The male heirs were to administer the properties as trustees in succession. The plaintiff claimed to be the only living son of Sheik Ismail Maracaiar and had been managing the properties since 1971. However, the defendants argued that the plaintiff could not continue as trustee because he was no longer an Indian citizen and resided in London, thus failing to personally perform the charities and distribute income as required by the deed.
The court noted that under Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, a non-citizen cannot hold immovable property in India without Reserve Bank of India's permission. The plaintiff admitted he was a British citizen, and there was no evidence he had obtained such permission. Furthermore, the deed required the trustee to personally perform the charities and maintain accounts, which the plaintiff, residing in London, did not do. Consequently, the court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to be trustee and could not administer the properties.
Issue 2: Recovery of Possession from the Defendants
The plaintiff sought to recover possession of the house property from the defendants, claiming they had initially vacated their residence and requested temporary accommodation in the suit house in May 1978, but later refused to vacate. The defendants contended they had been residing in the suit house for a long time, with the first defendant's husband born there.
Evidence, including letters, birth and death certificates, voter lists, and marriage invitations, indicated the defendants had been residing at 12, Mohaideen School Street and moved to the suit house in 1978. The court determined that since the plaintiff was not entitled to be trustee, he could not seek recovery of the house property from the defendants.
Issue 3: Fitness of the Second Defendant to be Trustee
The second defendant claimed his father had performed the trustee duties until his death, after which the plaintiff failed to perform the charities or render accounts. The second and third defendants in O.S. No. 112 of 1986 were citizens of Singapore and thus ineligible to be trustees. The fourth defendant, younger and residing in Saudi Arabia, was also ineligible. The plaintiff admitted the second defendant was the only male heir residing permanently in India, making him the most suitable candidate for trustee. The court concluded that the second defendant was fit to be trustee and could maintain the properties as per the settlement deed.
Judgment:
The appeals resulted in the following outcomes:
- A.S. No. 45 of 1988: Allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 36 of 1986, and dismissing the suit.
- A.S. No. 191 of 1988: Allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 112 of 1986, and decreeing the suit as prayed for.
To avoid further bitterness among family members, the court ordered no costs in the appeals.
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2000 (10) TMI 978
Issues Involved:
1. Stage at which the accused can raise the plea of applicability of Section 197 of the CrPC.
2. Whether the appellant was discharging his official duty when he ordered the opening of fire, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC.
Summary:
Issue 1: Stage for Raising Plea of Section 197 CrPC Applicability
The Court examined whether the plea regarding the applicability of Section 197 of the CrPC can be raised immediately after cognizance is taken and process is issued or only at the stage of framing of charge. The Court clarified that the legislative mandate in Section 197(1) CrPC prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of an offence without the previous sanction of the competent authority if the offence is alleged to have been committed by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty. This prohibition touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in taking cognizance, and thus, there is no requirement for the accused to wait until the charges are framed to raise this plea. The Court referred to several precedents, including Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan and Ors. and Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia and Anr., to support this view. Consequently, the decision in Birendra K. Singh's case was overruled, as it incorrectly stated that the objection regarding sanction could only be raised at the stage of framing of charge.
Issue 2: Discharge of Official Duty and Applicability of Section 197 CrPC
The Court considered whether the appellant was discharging his official duty when he ordered the opening of fire to control the mob, resulting in a death and injuries. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, which established that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty for Section 197 CrPC to apply. The Court found that the appellant, acting under the orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, was present with the police force to remove the encroachment and ordered the firing in the course of his duty to control the mob. Thus, the act had a reasonable nexus with his official duty. The Court concluded that the provisions of Section 197(1) CrPC applied to the facts of the case, and since there was no prior sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was invalid.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings against the appellant were quashed, as the cognizance taken without the required sanction was deemed an abuse of the process of the Court.
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2000 (10) TMI 977
Issues Involved:
1. Environmental Clearance
2. Relief and Rehabilitation
3. Seismicity
4. Cost Effectiveness
Environmental Clearance:
The Supreme Court examined whether the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) had complied with environmental clearance norms. The Planning Commission had given provisional sanction subject to environmental clearance. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) issued guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in January 1985. The MoEF's guidelines emphasized the need for rigorous assessment of environmental impacts, including effects on health, flora, fauna, and socio-economic conditions. Despite the guidelines, the requisite data for assessing the environmental impact of the SSP was not available when clearance was granted in June 1987. The clearance was conditional upon the completion of detailed surveys and studies, which were not fully carried out. The Court noted that the environmental clearance was granted without adequate data, contrary to the Union of India's policy, and thus, no clearance at all.
Relief and Rehabilitation:
The Court scrutinized the relief and rehabilitation (R&R) measures for those ousted by the SSP. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) Award provided detailed directions for R&R, including land allotment, house plots, and civic amenities. The Court observed that the States were lagging in identifying and acquiring land for resettlement. The Grievance Redressal Authorities (GRAs) were tasked with ensuring that oustees were satisfactorily rehabilitated. The Court emphasized that further construction of the dam would only proceed pari passu with the implementation of R&R measures. The States were directed to obtain suitable land for resettlement and certify the rehabilitation status before increasing the dam height.
Seismicity:
The seismicity aspect of the SSP was examined, and it was found that the issue had been sufficiently addressed. The Court did not find any need for further consideration of this aspect.
Cost Effectiveness:
The Court held that the cost-effectiveness of the SSP did not require re-examination. The decision to proceed with the project was based on its potential benefits, including power generation and increased agricultural production. The abandonment of the project would mean a loss of these benefits, and no effective alternatives were available.
Conclusion:
The Court issued several directions to ensure compliance with environmental and R&R conditions. Construction of the dam was allowed to continue, subject to clearances from the R&R Sub-group and the Environment Sub-group. The Narmada Control Authority (NCA) was directed to prepare an action plan for further construction and R&R work. The GRAs were given the responsibility to certify the rehabilitation status before any increase in the dam height. The Court emphasized the need for the project to be completed expeditiously while ensuring the protection of the environment and the rights of the oustees.
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2000 (10) TMI 976
Issues Involved:
1. Review of the judgment and order dated 27-6-2000 in CWJC No. 6694 of 1999.
2. Maintainability of the writ petition filed by non-parties to the main case.
3. Legitimacy of the construction on National Highway 31 by Rotary Club, Begusarai.
4. Allegations against the previous set of lawyers representing Rotary Club, Begusarai.
5. Conduct of lawyers and litigants in the proceedings.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Review of the Judgment and Order Dated 27-6-2000:
The petitions sought a review of the judgment and order dated 27-6-2000, which directed the removal of a double-storied pucca building constructed by the Rotary Club, Begusarai on plots of land forming part of National Highway 31. The Court had determined that the construction was on public land reserved for the highway, based on a survey map and the unequivocal statements of the District Magistrate, Begusarai.
2. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The writ petition was filed by individuals who were neither parties to the main case nor had any concern with the issues therein. The Court found this writ petition to be frivolous and an act of irresponsibility, as it was intended to support the civil review petition. The petitioners claimed their locus standi based on monetary contributions to the construction of the building, which the Court rejected as insufficient grounds.
3. Legitimacy of the Construction on National Highway 31:
The Rotary Club, Begusarai had constructed a building on land forming part of National Highway 31, which was undisputed. The primary question was whether the land was part of the highway. The Court relied on a survey map certified by the Collector, Begusarai, and the District Magistrate's statements, which conclusively showed that the plots were within the highway's boundaries. The Court dismissed the review petition's claim that new material (an enquiry report dated 3-5-2000) justified the construction, noting that the report did not present any new facts and was based on a misconceived idea of the road's boundaries.
4. Allegations Against Previous Set of Lawyers:
The review petition alleged that the previous lawyers representing the Rotary Club made unauthorized and incorrect concessions. The Court found these allegations to be incorrect and false. The previous lawyers, Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Mr. R.B. Mahto, filed a detailed affidavit refuting the allegations and describing the proceedings. They had informed the Rotary Club's representatives about the likely adverse outcome based on the survey map, and the representatives had accepted the situation and requested time to vacate the premises.
5. Conduct of Lawyers and Litigants:
The Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners, particularly in the civil review petition, and highlighted the need for regulatory mechanisms for lawyers. The Court suggested framing rules similar to the Supreme Court's Advocates-on-record system to prevent such issues in the future. The Court emphasized the importance of verifying facts with previous lawyers before filing review petitions and proposed that a certificate from the previous counsel or verification by the new lawyer should be appended to review petitions.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed both the writ petition and the civil review petition, finding them devoid of substance. The allegations against the previous set of lawyers were found to be false, and the Court upheld the original order directing the removal of the building constructed by the Rotary Club on National Highway 31. The judgment also called for regulatory measures to address the conduct of lawyers and litigants in such proceedings.
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2000 (10) TMI 975
... ...
... ... ..... After hearing the learned counsel for the department, we do not find any substnatial question of law involved in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (10) TMI 974
Issues involved:
Quashing of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 413 of 1997 on the file of Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Tuticorin.
Analysis:
1. The issue arose when Accused No. 2 filed a petition to quash the proceedings on the grounds that statutory notice was not served on him, he had resigned before the institution of proceedings, and the cheque was issued by a different entity. The petitioner argued that without notice, no demand was made, citing a relevant case law. However, the respondent contended that notice to the company sufficed, citing a judgment from the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Delhi High Court's decision was also referenced, stating that notice to individual directors is not necessary if served on the companies. The court emphasized that evasion of notice would amount to constructive notice and should be considered during trial.
2. Regarding the resignation issue, the petitioner produced documents to show his resignation, citing a Karnataka High Court judgment emphasizing specific allegations and strict interpretation of penal provisions. However, the Supreme Court held that such matters should be decided during trial, not in quashing proceedings. The Andhra Pradesh High Court concurred, stating that detailed analysis should be avoided during quashing proceedings.
3. The last contention was that the cheque was issued by a different entity, thus not for a legally enforceable debt. The court referred to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, explaining that the debt or liability need not be from the drawer himself but can be from another person. Citing a Madras High Court case, the court rejected the argument that the cheque was not for a legally enforceable debt. The court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish grounds for quashing the proceedings, leading to the dismissal of the Criminal Original Petition and the connected Miscellaneous Petition.
This detailed analysis of the judgment highlights the legal arguments, case laws, and statutory provisions considered by the court in deciding to dismiss the petition to quash the proceedings in the criminal case.
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2000 (10) TMI 973
The Supreme Court condoned delay, admitted the appeal, and did not grant a stay. The case was tagged with C.A. Nos. 5862-63/1999.
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2000 (10) TMI 972
Issues:
- Dismissal of appeal by Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in arbitration proceeding
- Acceptance of final bill without objection by respondent
- Appointment of arbitrator by Chief Engineer
- Objection by Union of India under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act
- Challenge to the impugned award by Union of India
- Existence of arbitrable dispute
Analysis:
The Supreme Court heard an appeal by the Union of India against the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court's judgment in an arbitration proceeding. The respondent had entered into an agreement with the appellant for construction work, which included an arbitration clause. After completion of the work, the final bill was accepted by the respondent without objection. Subsequently, the respondent raised claims for additional works not included in the final bill, leading to the appointment of an arbitrator by the Chief Engineer. The Union of India objected to the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, primarily on the grounds of limitation and the absence of an arbitrable dispute.
The Union of India contended that since the respondent accepted the final bill without protest, there was no arbitrable dispute to refer to arbitration. The respondent argued that this objection was not raised specifically in the objections filed under the Arbitration Act and that the Union Government actively participated in the arbitration proceedings without contesting the existence of a dispute. The Court noted the participation of the Union Government in the arbitration process and the subsequent rectification application challenging only the quantum, not the arbitrability of the dispute.
Upon careful consideration, the Court acknowledged the Union's argument but emphasized the condition precedent of the existence of a dispute for arbitration. It was observed that the arbitrator had rejected the Union's plea regarding claim item No. 2 despite the acceptance of the final bill by the respondent. The Court held that claim item No. 2 could not have been a subject of arbitrable dispute and set aside the award in that regard. However, the rest of the award amount was affirmed since objections were not specific on other claim items. The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the award only for claim item No. 2 while upholding the remaining award amount.
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2000 (10) TMI 971
Issues Involved:
1. Change in ownership of shares.
2. Likely change in the Board of Directors.
3. Prejudicial impact on the company's interest.
4. Maintainability of the petition under section 409 of the Companies Act, 1956.
5. Jurisdiction and capacity of the petitioner.
6. Locus standi of the company's representative.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Change in Ownership of Shares:
The petitioner, claiming to be the Managing Director of the company, filed a petition under section 409 of the Companies Act, 1956, citing a change in the ownership of shares. The company was initially promoted by four shareholders with specific shareholdings. CGL transferred its 40.5% shares to Bharti, which was approved by the Board and other stakeholders. Despite initial consents, some promoters later opposed the transfer, leading to disputes.
2. Likely Change in the Board of Directors:
The petitioner expressed concerns that the change in share ownership might lead to a change in the Board of Directors, potentially prejudicial to the company's interests. The AGM scheduled for 23-8-2000 was crucial as it involved the reappointment of directors. The petitioner feared that the majority shareholders might act to exclude certain directors, thereby altering the Board's composition.
3. Prejudicial Impact on the Company's Interest:
The petitioner argued that the potential change in the Board could jeopardize the company's license and lead to lenders recalling their loans. The petitioner sought orders to prevent any resolutions or actions that might affect the Board's composition without confirmation from the Company Law Board (CLB).
4. Maintainability of the Petition Under Section 409:
The second respondent challenged the petition's maintainability, arguing that the conditions of section 409 were not met. They contended that for section 409 to apply, the change in share ownership must lead to a Board change, which should be prejudicial to the company. The respondents argued that the petitioner, aligned with Bharti, filed the petition with an ulterior motive to facilitate Bharti's control over the company, despite being a minority shareholder.
5. Jurisdiction and Capacity of the Petitioner:
The CLB examined whether the petition should be considered as a preliminary issue or along with the merits of the case. It was noted that the CLB had jurisdiction and the petitioner, being the managing director at the time of filing, had the capacity to file the petition. The CLB decided to consider the maintainability based on admitted facts without delving into disputed issues.
6. Locus Standi of the Company's Representative:
The second respondent questioned the locus standi of Shri Dave, appearing for the company, citing the absence of a valid Board resolution authorizing his appearance. The CLB noted that the company's Board had not authorized anyone to represent it in the proceedings.
Conclusion:
The CLB concluded that for a petition under section 409 to be maintainable, there must be a causal relationship between the change in share ownership and the change in the Board. The acquirer of shares should be in a position to alter the Board by the strength of the shares acquired. In this case, Bharti, the acquirer, did not have sufficient shares to influence the Board's composition. The petition sought to prevent existing majority shareholders from exercising their rights, contrary to the objective of section 409. The CLB dismissed the petition as not maintainable and vacated all interim orders, emphasizing that section 409 aims to prevent takeovers by incoming shareholders rather than restricting existing majority shareholders.
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2000 (10) TMI 970
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction of A-2 Manish Dixit.
2. Conviction of A-1 Sharad Dhakar.
3. Admissibility and reliability of evidence, including the absence of the key eyewitness.
4. Legality of the search and seizure operations.
5. Disparaging remarks against PW. 30 Devendra Kumar Sharma.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction of A-2 Manish Dixit:
The court examined several circumstances to establish the guilt of A-2 Manish Dixit. These included:
- Hotel Stay Under Pseudonym: Manish Dixit stayed at Hotel Sanjay under the pseudonym "Ramesh Chander Sharma" on 24.2.1994, the day after the murder. This was proven through the hotel register and handwriting expert testimony.
- Absconding: Dixit absconded after A-1 Sharad Dhakar was apprehended, which was considered a significant link in the chain of evidence.
- Recovery of Revolver: A revolver was recovered from Dixit on 12.7.1994, which was confirmed by ballistic expert PW. 41 to be the weapon used in the murder.
- Recovery of Ornaments: Three bags of ornaments were recovered from the basement of a co-accused's house based on Dixit's information.
The court found these circumstances collectively sufficient to uphold Dixit's conviction for the murder of Gulshan Makhija.
2. Conviction of A-1 Sharad Dhakar:
The evidence against A-1 Sharad Dhakar was deemed insufficient for a conviction on the charges of abduction and murder. The key points included:
- Blood Stain on Motorcycle: A blood stain of "O" group was found on the motorcycle seized from Dhakar, but this alone was not decisive enough to establish his involvement in the murder.
- Recovery of Jewellery: Jewellery belonging to the deceased was recovered from Dhakar, but this was not enough to overturn his acquittal on the major counts of offences.
The court dismissed the state's appeal against Dhakar's acquittal on the charges of murder and abduction.
3. Admissibility and Reliability of Evidence:
The prosecution's failure to examine the key eyewitness, Michael Hens, who had left the country, transformed the case into one based on circumstantial evidence. The court criticized the prosecution for not securing an undertaking from Hens to return for the trial. The trial court's attempt to admit Hens' statements under Section 6 of the Evidence Act was rightly repudiated by the High Court.
4. Legality of the Search and Seizure Operations:
The defense argued that the recovery of the revolver from Dixit was illegal and that the revolver was planted. The court examined:
- Compliance with Sections 165 and 166 of CrPC: The search at Alka Hotel was conducted without independent witnesses due to unwillingness from the public. The court found no merit in the contention that the search was not in conformity with legal requirements.
- Testimonies on Revolver Recovery: The court dismissed the defense's claim that the revolver was found in the Gypsy on 24.2.1994, noting that the police would not have suppressed such a crucial piece of evidence.
5. Disparaging Remarks Against PW. 30 Devendra Kumar Sharma:
The trial court and the High Court made harsh remarks against PW. 30 Devendra Kumar Sharma, a Tehsildar, for inconsistencies in his testimony. The Supreme Court found these remarks unfair and uncharitable, noting:
- Failure to Re-examine: The Public Prosecutor did not re-examine Sharma to clarify inconsistencies.
- Judicial Powers Under Section 165 of Evidence Act: The trial judge did not use his plenary powers to question Sharma further.
- Violation of Natural Justice: Sharma was not given an opportunity to defend himself against the disparaging remarks, violating principles of natural justice.
The Supreme Court ordered the expunction of all disparaging remarks against Sharma and the deletion of the direction to initiate departmental action against him.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of A-2 Manish Dixit based on circumstantial evidence and dismissed the state's appeal against A-1 Sharad Dhakar's acquittal on major charges. The court also criticized the prosecution's handling of the key eyewitness and the trial court's failure to re-examine PW. 30. The disparaging remarks against Sharma were expunged, emphasizing the importance of fair treatment of witnesses and adherence to natural justice principles.
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2000 (10) TMI 969
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the stay of the Ludhiana suit was appropriate given the pendency of the Delhi suit.
2. Whether the matters in issue in both suits are directly and substantially the same.
3. Whether the trial of both suits can proceed separately without conflicting judgments.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the stay of the Ludhiana suit was appropriate given the pendency of the Delhi suit:
The court examined whether the Ludhiana suit should be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The Ludhiana suit was filed by M/s Sehgal Knitwears for the recovery of Rs. 15,61,000/- against M/s Shreshth International, while the Delhi suit was filed by Smt. Kamini Sadh, sole proprietor of M/s Shreshth International, against M/s Sehgal Knitwears for Rs. 14,39,610/-. The Ludhiana suit was filed later in point of time compared to the Delhi suit. The court determined that the stay of the Ludhiana suit was appropriate to avoid conflicting judgments and to ensure that the findings of the Delhi court would operate as res judicata for the Ludhiana suit.
2. Whether the matters in issue in both suits are directly and substantially the same:
The court analyzed the claims and defenses in both suits and found that the matters in issue were directly and substantially the same. Both suits involved the same parties and arose from the same set of transactions concerning the supply of knitwears. The core issues, such as the breach of contract, the agreed terms and conditions, and the performance of contractual obligations, were common to both suits. The court emphasized that the substratum of the disputes in both suits was substantially identical, making Section 10 CPC applicable.
3. Whether the trial of both suits can proceed separately without conflicting judgments:
The court considered the potential for conflicting judgments if both suits were tried separately. It was noted that the defenses raised by M/s Sehgal Knitwears in the Delhi suit were essentially the same as the claims made in the Ludhiana suit. The court cited precedents, including British Indian Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Rashtraco Freight Carriers and M/s C. Roman & Co., Bombay & others v. M/s. Modern Motor Works, Ludhiana, to support the view that the trial of both suits should not proceed simultaneously to avoid the risk of contradictory findings. The court concluded that staying the Ludhiana suit was necessary to prevent such conflicts and to ensure that the decision in the Delhi suit would resolve the core issues for both parties.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the revision petition filed by M/s Sehgal Knitwears and upheld the stay of the Ludhiana suit. The judgment emphasized the importance of avoiding conflicting judgments and ensuring that the findings of the Delhi court would operate as res judicata for the Ludhiana suit. The revision was dismissed, and the stay order was maintained.
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