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1975 (11) TMI 182
Issues:
Complaint of professional misconduct against an Advocate transferred to Bar Council of India for disposal under Advocates Act, 1961. Allegations of fraud, breach of trust, and dishonesty by the Advocate. All India Bar Council's finding of gross professional misconduct leading to disbarment. Appeal against the disbarment order based on doubts raised regarding the credibility of the complainant and the evidence presented.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around a complaint of professional misconduct against an Advocate, initially brought before the Bar Council of Maharashtra and later transferred to the Bar Council of India for resolution under Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961. The complaint alleged fraudulent behavior by the Advocate, involving misleading the client regarding the filing of a lawsuit and misappropriating funds. The Advocate denied the allegations, claiming the complainant lacked seriousness about litigation and failed to provide necessary details or expenses for filing the suit.
The All India Bar Council, after examining the evidence, found the Advocate guilty of gross professional misconduct, emphasizing the seriousness of deceiving a client and bringing disrepute to the legal profession. The Council highlighted past complaints against the Advocate, indicating a pattern of similar behavior. The Advocate's attempt to conceal previous disciplinary proceedings further undermined his credibility.
However, the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the case, raised doubts about the complainant's credibility. The Court pointed out inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, such as discrepancies in the amount paid for court fees and the filing of the suit, as well as alterations in documents presented as evidence. The Court also noted the complainant's lack of awareness regarding the legal procedures, casting doubt on the authenticity of the allegations.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted the Advocate the benefit of the doubt, overturning the disbarment order. The Court acknowledged the Advocate's poor conduct but emphasized the necessity of clear and convincing evidence in cases involving potential disbarment. The judgment highlighted the importance of maintaining integrity in legal proceedings and cautioned against relying solely on past complaints to determine guilt.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the significance of upholding professional standards in the legal profession while emphasizing the need for robust evidence to establish guilt in cases of alleged misconduct. The decision to overturn the disbarment order reflects the Court's commitment to ensuring fair treatment and due process in disciplinary proceedings involving legal practitioners.
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1975 (11) TMI 181
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Government should have given an opportunity to the respondent when granting exemption to the appellant from paying additional price.
2. Whether the High Court was correct in directing the Government to consider giving an opportunity to the respondent.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Opportunity to Respondent During Exemption Granting
The primary issue revolves around whether the Central Government should have provided an opportunity to the sugarcane growers (respondents) to be heard before granting exemptions to the sugar factory (appellant) from paying the additional price under Clause 5(3) of the Sugar Cane Control Order, 1966.
The 1966 Control Order regulates the use and supply of sugarcane under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Clause 5(3) allows the Central Government to exempt a sugar producer from paying the additional price if the factory has made no profit or inadequate profit. The appellant, a sugar factory, was exempted from paying the additional price for the seasons 1960-61 and 1961-62 based on inadequate profits.
The respondents, co-operative societies of sugarcane growers, challenged this exemption on the grounds of natural justice, asserting that they were not given an opportunity to be heard. The High Court upheld this contention, stating that the impugned order violated principles of natural justice.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, emphasizing that the power to grant exemption is not independent but part of the procedure under Clause 5 of the 1966 Control Order. The Court noted that the objective of the Control Order is to ensure a fair balance between sugarcane growers and sugar producers, and the power conferred on the Government must consider both viewpoints. Therefore, it is necessary to provide an opportunity for the growers to be heard when the Government exercises its powers to determine additional price and grant exemptions.
Issue 2: High Court's Direction to Government
The second issue concerns whether the High Court was correct in directing the Government to consider giving an opportunity to the respondents.
The High Court directed the Government to consider the growers' viewpoints before granting exemptions. The appellant contended that the growers did not have a right to be heard in exemption matters, arguing that determining additional price and granting exemptions are separate and independent processes. Additionally, they claimed that the right to additional price does not vest in the growers until the manner of payment is decided by the Central Government under Clause 5(6).
The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, stating that the exemption process is inherently linked to the right of the growers to receive additional price. The Court highlighted that the Control Order's provisions aim to maintain harmony between growers and producers, ensuring both share profits reasonably. Therefore, the Government must invite objections from the growers and consider their viewpoints when deciding on exemption applications.
The Court concluded that the duty to act judicially arises when exercising a power that affects a person's legitimate interest or expectation. Given the purpose of the 1966 Control Order and the scheme of reserved sugarcane growing areas, it is imperative that growers are heard not only during the determination of additional price but also when exemptions are granted.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissing the appeals. The Court held that the Government must provide an opportunity for sugarcane growers to be heard when granting exemptions from paying additional price under the 1966 Control Order. The decision ensures that the principles of natural justice are upheld, maintaining a fair balance between the interests of sugarcane growers and sugar producers. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 180
Issues Involved:
1. Application under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, for rectification of the share register.
2. Bar of limitation.
3. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board.
4. Validity of transfer deeds due to uncancelled stamps.
5. Application of the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974.
6. Res judicata and alternative remedies.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Application under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, for rectification of the share register:
The petitioners applied under Section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking rectification of the share register of the respondent company, Luxminarayan Cotton Mills Ltd., to register the shares in their names. They had acquired the shares for valuable consideration, lodged the transfer deeds with the respondent company, and paid the relevant transfer fees. However, the company failed to register the transfers or communicate any refusal within the stipulated period, leading the petitioners to seek redress through the Company Law Board and subsequently through the court.
2. Bar of limitation:
The petitioners contended that their application was not barred by limitation, citing a Supreme Court decision in Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar, which held that the title to shares could be complete even if the transfer was not registered due to technical defects. The court agreed, stating that the power under Section 155 should be liberally exercised to do justice, and the petitioners' application was timely given their diligent pursuit of remedies.
3. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board:
The respondent company argued that the Company Law Board had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. However, the court noted that the Company Law Board had indeed condoned the delay and that the petitioners' application under Section 155 was valid. The court emphasized that the Company Law Board's jurisdiction was limited to examining the reasons for rejecting the transfer, not determining the title to the shares.
4. Validity of transfer deeds due to uncancelled stamps:
The Company Law Board had dismissed the petitioners' appeal on the ground that the transfer deeds were not duly stamped, as the stamps were not cancelled. The court acknowledged this formal defect but deemed it insufficient to bar the petitioners' application under Section 155. The court referred to several precedents, including In re Coronation Tea Co. Ltd., to support its decision that the petitioners' title to the shares was not in dispute and that the defect was merely technical.
5. Application of the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974:
The respondent company argued that the petitioners had no locus standi due to the Nationalisation Act, which vested the company's assets in the National Textile Corporation. The court rejected this argument, clarifying that the corporate existence of the company was unaffected by the Act, and the petitioners were entitled to seek rectification of the share register under Section 155.
6. Res judicata and alternative remedies:
The respondent company contended that the petitioners' application was barred by res judicata and that they had already availed of an alternative remedy under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. The court dismissed these arguments, citing the decision in Mani Mohan Mukherjee v. Jalpaiguri Cinema Co. Ltd., which held that an application under Section 155 was not barred by limitation or res judicata. The court emphasized that the petitioners' diligent pursuit of remedies and the formal defect in the transfer deeds did not preclude their right to seek rectification.
Judgment:
The court ordered the rectification of the share register as requested by the petitioners, subject to the return and re-submission of the transfer deeds and share scripts within specified timeframes. The court did not award costs, noting the petitioners' failure to cancel the stamps on the transfer deeds.
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1975 (11) TMI 178
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the civil court.
2. Legal right of the tenant to install machinery.
3. Potential damage caused by running a mill.
4. Relief sought by the plaintiffs.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court:
The trial court held that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit. This finding was in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
2. Legal Right of the Tenant to Install Machinery:
The trial court found that the premises were let out for commercial purposes, and therefore, no permission from the owners was required for installing machinery and running a mill, as it was also a commercial purpose. The tenant had obtained a license according to the rules of the Municipal Corporation, entitling them to install machinery in the premises to run the factory. The lower appellate court upheld this finding, stating that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the premises were let out only for running a business of food grains. It was held that the premises were let out for commercial purposes, and a commercial purpose includes an industrial purpose. Therefore, the tenant could use the premises for running a flour mill.
3. Potential Damage Caused by Running a Mill:
The trial court, after considering the evidence, held that no damage would be caused by the installation of an electric motor and machinery in the premises. The lower appellate court agreed with this view. Both courts found that the setting up of a flour mill would not cause damage to the shop. The plaintiffs' counsel conceded that this concurrent finding of fact could not be challenged in the Second Appeal.
4. Relief Sought by the Plaintiffs:
The plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the tenant from installing an electric motor and machinery in the shop. However, both the trial court and the lower appellate court dismissed the suit. The appellate court emphasized that the premises were not leased for any specific purpose but for commercial purposes. The proposed user of the shop for a flour mill was partly commercial and partly industrial. Since the original letting was not for any specific purpose, the mere change in the user of the shop did not amount to a violation under the first part of clause (O) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The concurrent findings of the lower courts that the installation would not cause any damage were upheld.
Conclusion:
The second appeal was dismissed with costs. The court held that the dismissal of the suit by the lower courts was correct, not because the flour mill was entirely commercial in nature, but because the owners had no cause of action under either part of clause (O) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The premises were not let out for any specific purpose, and the proposed new user would not cause damage. Therefore, the plaintiffs' request for an injunction was denied.
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1975 (11) TMI 177
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University is entitled to prefer an appeal against the compensation fixed by the court.
2. Whether the University could seek leave of the appellate court to prefer an appeal.
3. Whether the petition for transposition of the Special Tahsildar as the second appellant could be granted.
4. Whether the quantum of compensation fixed by the lower court was at the proper market rate.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement of the University to Prefer an Appeal:
The primary issue was whether the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, for whose benefit the land was acquired, could prefer an appeal against the compensation fixed by the court. It was conceded that the University could not prefer an appeal as of right since it was not a party to the proceedings in the lower court. The court held that the University, as the beneficiary of the land acquisition, was not entitled to prefer an appeal as a matter of right.
2. Seeking Leave to Appeal:
The court examined whether the University could seek leave to appeal. The University argued that it was aggrieved by the high compensation rate as it had to pay the compensation from its funds. The court analyzed the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and concluded that the person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not a "person interested" and cannot seek a reference under Section 18 or prefer an appeal. The court emphasized that the Land Acquisition Act specifically excludes such persons from being parties to the proceedings and limits their participation to adducing evidence. Therefore, the University could not seek leave to appeal, and the ex parte leave granted to it was unsustainable.
3. Petition for Transposition:
The Special Tahsildar, who was the Land Acquisition Officer, filed a petition for transposition as the second appellant. The court considered whether this petition could be granted. It noted that the petition was filed with gross negligence, as it was delayed by 13 months after the decision in a similar case. The court found the explanation for the delay unsatisfactory and inaccurate. Consequently, the petition for transposition was dismissed.
4. Quantum of Compensation:
Since the appeal was dismissed on the grounds of non-maintainability and the petition for transposition was denied, the court did not address the merits of the quantum of compensation fixed by the lower court.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University had no locus standi to prefer an appeal against the compensation fixed by the lower court. The ex parte leave granted to the University was revoked, and the appeal was dismissed. The petition for transposition of the Special Tahsildar as the second appellant was also dismissed due to gross negligence. The court did not consider the merits of the compensation amount.
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1975 (11) TMI 176
Issues:
1. Seizure of currency under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
3. Violation of Articles 14, 19, and 31 of the Constitution.
4. Commencement of proceedings under Section 23 for retention of seized documents.
5. Interpretation of service of notice under Rule 11 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The petitioner's currency was seized under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act based on information that he received unauthorized payment. The petitioner sought the return of the seized amount through a writ petition, initially challenging the Act's applicability and constitutional violations. However, during arguments, new grounds were raised concerning the lack of notice for commencing proceedings under Section 3 within a year. The petitioner voluntarily admitted to receiving the money from an unknown person for property purchase as per his uncle's instructions.
2. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner for violating Section 5(1)(a) of the Act, but it was returned unserved. The petitioner's request for money return after one year was denied by the respondent, citing the attempted notice delivery. The issue arose whether proceedings under Section 23 had commenced within a year to extend the retention period of seized documents.
3. Section 19-G allows retention of seized documents for a year unless proceedings under Section 23 are initiated. The petitioner argued that proper notice service is crucial for proceedings to commence. The respondent contended that sending a notice by registered post to the last known address was sufficient. However, the petitioner emphasized the necessity of actual notice service as per Rule 11 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules.
4. The interpretation of service of notice under Rule 11 was crucial in determining the commencement of proceedings under Section 23 for retaining seized documents. The court held that mere sending of notice by registered post was not enough, and actual service or affixing the notice as prescribed in the rules was mandatory. Since the notice was returned unserved and not affixed as required, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, allowing the petition and making the rule absolute without costs. The judgment emphasized the mandatory nature of compliance with prescribed conditions for retaining seized amounts beyond the initial period.
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1975 (11) TMI 175
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (objectionable Advertisements) Act.
2. Whether the advertisement published by the appellant falls under the definition of "drug" as per the Act.
3. Analysis of the advertisement content and its compliance with the Act.
4. Consideration of the implications of the advertisement on public health and the intention behind the Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court analyzed the Drugs and Magic Remedies (objectionable Advertisements) Act, focusing on Section 3, which prohibits advertisements related to drugs for specific purposes. The Act also outlines penalties for contravening its provisions under Section 7.
2. The key contention was whether the advertisement published by the appellant, a homeopathic practitioner, referred to a "drug" as defined in the Act. The appellant argued that the advertisement did not mention any drug, thus not falling under the Act's purview.
3. The Court examined the advertisement's language, which claimed to treat various ailments using "new methods, new machines of science, and electric treatment." The Court interpreted the term "drug" broadly as per the Act's definition, which includes substances intended for the diagnosis, cure, or treatment of diseases in humans. The Court held that the machines and treatments advertised by the appellant could be considered as articles intended to influence the body's organic functions, thus falling within the Act's definition of a drug.
4. Considering the Act's objective to prevent misleading advertisements that could harm public health by leading individuals to unqualified practitioners, the Court emphasized the importance of bringing such advertisements within the Act's scope. The Court noted that even if the appellant was not a quack, the advertisement's claims could mislead the ignorant and unwary. Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming the appellant's conviction under the Act.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the High Court's decision based on the interpretation of the advertisement's content and its alignment with the provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (objectionable Advertisements) Act.
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1975 (11) TMI 174
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Hiba-bil-Ewaz due to alleged fraud and misrepresentation.
2. Whether the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was executed under undue influence.
Summary:
Issue 1: Validity of the Hiba-bil-Ewaz due to alleged fraud and misrepresentation
The plaintiff, an illiterate and elderly villager, claimed that the Hiba-bil-Ewaz executed on February 9, 1959, was void due to fraud and misrepresentation by the donee, Afsar Sheikh. The trial court found no fraud or misrepresentation and dismissed the suit. The District Judge affirmed this decision. However, the High Court, in second appeal, remanded the case to determine if undue influence was exercised by Afsar. The Additional District Judge, upon remand, reaffirmed the trial court's findings, stating there was no undue influence or fraud.
Issue 2: Whether the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was executed under undue influence
The High Court, in second appeal, reversed the lower courts' judgments, suggesting that the intimate relationship between the parties indicated a "possibility" of undue influence. The Supreme Court found this approach erroneous, noting that undue influence was neither adequately pleaded nor put in issue. The Court emphasized that undue influence, fraud, and misrepresentation are distinct legal categories requiring specific pleadings as per Order 6, Rule 4, read with Order 6, r.2, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court's attempt to infer undue influence from the defendant's written statement was deemed incorrect.
The Supreme Court highlighted that the first appellate court had found no evidence of undue influence, and the High Court was not competent to reverse this factual finding in second appeal. The Court reiterated that the burden of proving undue influence lies with the party alleging it, and the plaintiff had failed to establish the necessary elements under s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act. The evidence showed that the plaintiff executed the Hiba-bil-Ewaz voluntarily and understood its contents.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove undue influence, and the High Court erred in its approach. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.
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1975 (11) TMI 173
Issues: Competency of appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the order of acquittal under section 465 read with section 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
In this judgment, the Supreme Court considered the appeal by special leave regarding the competency of the State of Madhya Pradesh's appeal against the order of acquittal of the appellant under section 465 read with section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant had secured a job at the Bhilai Steel Project by submitting forged certificates, falsely claiming to be a Science Graduate meeting the educational qualifications for the position. The prosecution alleged that the appellant had not passed his B.Sc. examination and had procured employment through forged documents. The trial court acquitted the appellant under section 465 read with section 471 but convicted him under section 420 IPC. The High Court dismissed the appellant's revision application and allowed the State's appeal, convicting the appellant under section 465 read with section 471. The appellant contended that the appeal to the High Court was not competent, citing section 417(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The Court analyzed the provisions of section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, emphasizing the significance of the 1955 Amendment and the inclusion of subsection (2) to provide for appeals in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment. The Establishment, a central police force, is constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and its investigation is central, under the superintendence of the Central Government. The Court explained that the word 'also' in subsection (2) of section 417 does not bar the State government's jurisdiction to direct appeals even in cases investigated by the Establishment. The State government can direct the public prosecutor to appeal, whether directly or through the Central Government, as a matter of procedure. The Court noted that the appeal in this case was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh following a request from the Superintendent of the Establishment, and thus, the objection to the competency of the appeal was deemed devoid of substance.
Ultimately, the Court held that the objection raised by the appellant was without merit, as the appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh was competent. The Court highlighted that no such objection was raised in the High Court, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. The judgment reaffirmed the procedural aspects and the jurisdiction of the State government and the Central Government in directing appeals in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, providing clarity on the competency of appeals in such circumstances.
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1975 (11) TMI 172
Issues:
1. Validity of notices issued by the Endowment Department under Andhra Pradesh Act 17 of 1966.
2. Constitutionality of Sections 15, 17, 27, 36, and 97 of the Andhra Act 17 of 1966.
3. Applicability of the Act to private institutions or religious denominations.
4. Determination of whether institutions or endowments are private or public in character.
5. Whether the Arya Vyasa community or Lingayat community and their institutions are religious denominations within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution.
Analysis:
1. The appellants, registered under the Registration of Societies Act, challenged notices by the Endowment Department under Andhra Pradesh Act 17 of 1966. The High Court considered various constitutional provisions and the nature of the hereditary trusteeship as 'Property' under Article 19(1)(f). It held that the impugned provisions of the Act did not violate constitutional articles. However, the determination of whether the appellants are religious denominations under Article 26 was left for a competent civil court.
2. The High Court dismissed all writ petitions, leading to appeals in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in an earlier judgment, had dismissed similar appeals and left questions regarding the religious denomination status open for further adjudication. In the current batch of appeals, the Court reiterated that such questions of fact should be resolved in a competent civil court, not through writ remedies. The Court declined to delve into the disputed questions and upheld the High Court's decision to leave the matter for determination in a proper forum.
3. The appellants contended that the High Court's observation questioning their religious denomination status could prejudice them in future proceedings. However, the Court clarified that these questions were not conclusively decided due to being disputed questions of fact. The High Court's stance to allow the appellants to establish their claim in a civil court was upheld, emphasizing that such matters should be resolved in a suitable forum. The Court reiterated the correctness of leaving certain issues open for determination in the appropriate legal setting.
4. The Supreme Court found no merit in the arguments presented and upheld the High Court's decision. It emphasized that the questions regarding the nature of institutions as religious denominations should be addressed in a proper forum, reinforcing the need for factual determinations in civil court proceedings. The judgment concluded by dismissing the appeals and ordering each party to bear their own costs, thereby affirming the decision of the High Court and maintaining the status quo regarding the unresolved issues.
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1975 (11) TMI 171
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of surplus area under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953.
2. Validity of tenancy claims by Jagga and Meet Singh.
3. Jurisdiction and scope of interference by the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
Summary:
1. Determination of Surplus Area:
The Special Collector, Chandigarh, initially declared 132 standard acres and 11.5 units of land as surplus area of Mahant Gurnarain u/s Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. This included 13 standard acres and 1.5 units allotted to the appellants. Later, the Special Collector excluded this area from the surplus pool, assigning it to Jagga and Meet Singh as their permissible area, claiming they were tenants on the crucial date, 15.4.1953.
2. Validity of Tenancy Claims:
The appellants contended that Jagga and Meet Singh were not tenants on the crucial date. The Special Collector, after rehearing and further evidence, found that Rattan Singh, father of Jagga, was a tenant from 1948 to 1952, and the entry of Rattan Singh son of Dalip Singh in 1952-53 was a clerical error. The Collector's finding was based on oral and documentary evidence, including Khasra Girdawaries and receipts. The Commissioner and Financial Commissioner upheld this finding, dismissing the appellants' appeals and revisions.
3. Jurisdiction and Scope of Interference by High Court:
The High Court, in writ proceedings u/Articles 226/227, held that it could not interfere with findings of fact unless there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Supreme Court reiterated that Certiorari jurisdiction is for correcting jurisdictional errors, not for reappraising evidence. The Special Collector's finding was based on evidence and did not suffer from jurisdictional error. The Commissioner and Financial Commissioner's orders, despite some irrelevant references, were upheld as they did not affect the ultimate decision.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that there was no justification for interference in Certiorari jurisdiction. The Court also observed that if the appellants are landless tillers or ex-servicemen, their claims for allotment of land from the surplus pool should be given due consideration by the authorities.
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1975 (11) TMI 170
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction under Section 302, Penal Code for murder.
2. Conviction under Section 411, Penal Code for receiving stolen property.
3. Conviction under Section 201, Penal Code for causing disappearance of evidence.
4. Identification and credibility of circumstantial evidence.
5. Validity of the discovery of the skeleton and its identification.
6. Ownership and theft of the recovered ornaments and valuables.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction under Section 302, Penal Code for murder:
The first charge against Chandmal was committing the murder of Mst. Nazar Bai. The prosecution relied wholly on circumstantial evidence, which included: (i) Chandmal being seen following Nazar Bai when she left her house, (ii) recovery of ornaments belonging to the deceased from Chandmal, and (iii) discovery of a skeleton identified as Nazar Bai's from a house occupied by Chandmal. The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must satisfy three tests: the circumstances must be firmly established, unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused, and form a complete chain leading to the conclusion that the crime was committed by the accused. The court found that the evidence did not meet these criteria. The witness testimonies were inconsistent, and there was no clear proof that Chandmal followed Nazar Bai to her death. Thus, the conviction under Section 302 was not upheld.
2. Conviction under Section 411, Penal Code for receiving stolen property:
The prosecution alleged that Chandmal and Ranglal were dishonest receivers of stolen property belonging to Mst. Nazar Bai. However, the court noted that there was no evidence of theft reported by Shankarlal or anyone else. The valuables found in the deceased's house during the investigation were still intact, and no case of theft was registered. The court highlighted that for an offense under Section 411, the property must be proven to be stolen, which was not established in this case. The recovered ornaments were not conclusively proven to belong to the deceased, and the delay in recovery (two years after the disappearance) further weakened the prosecution's case. Consequently, the conviction under Section 411 was not sustained.
3. Conviction under Section 201, Penal Code for causing disappearance of evidence:
Chandmal was also convicted under Section 201 for causing the disappearance of evidence. However, no separate sentence was passed on this count. The court's analysis of the circumstantial evidence and the inconsistencies in witness testimonies led to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that Chandmal was guilty of this charge. The court found that the evidence did not support the claim that Chandmal had caused the disappearance of evidence related to the alleged murder.
4. Identification and credibility of circumstantial evidence:
The court scrutinized the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. The testimonies of key witnesses, such as Madan Bai and Naini Bai, were found to be inconsistent and unreliable. The court noted that the presence of Chandmal at the deceased's house and his departure following her were not unusual, given their regular knitting and embroidery work together. The court also questioned the credibility of the identification of the skeleton and the recovered ornaments, noting several suspicious features and procedural lapses in the investigation. The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence did not form a complete and unbroken chain pointing to Chandmal's guilt.
5. Validity of the discovery of the skeleton and its identification:
The prosecution claimed that the skeleton discovered in a house occupied by Chandmal was that of Mst. Nazar Bai. The identification was based on the clothes and ornaments found on the skeleton. However, the court found several issues with this claim. The skeleton and ornaments were not sealed immediately upon discovery, and there were discrepancies in the preparation of the recovery memo. The court also noted that the skeleton was discovered in a house belonging to Ranglal, not Chandmal, and that the keys used to unlock the house were in the possession of the investigating officer for several days. These factors led the court to doubt the authenticity of the discovery and the identification of the skeleton as that of Mst. Nazar Bai.
6. Ownership and theft of the recovered ornaments and valuables:
The prosecution failed to prove that the recovered ornaments and valuables belonged to Mst. Nazar Bai and were stolen from her. The court noted that there was no mention of missing ornaments in the initial police report, and Shankarlal did not report any theft even after the investigation began. The court also highlighted that the deceased was not known to possess substantial wealth or valuable ornaments. The identification of the ornaments by Shankarlal and other witnesses was found to be unreliable. As a result, the court concluded that the prosecution did not establish that the recovered items were stolen property, which was essential for a conviction under Section 411.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal of Chandmal and Ranglal, set aside their convictions, and acquitted them of all charges. The court ordered their immediate release, noting that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The inconsistencies in witness testimonies, procedural lapses in the investigation, and lack of conclusive evidence led to the acquittal of the appellants.
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1975 (11) TMI 169
Issues:
1. Violation of rule 7 of the Haryana Agricultural Service Class II Rules, 1947 in promotion.
2. Termination of appellant's lien on the post of Agricultural Inspector.
Issue 1:
The appellant challenged an order promoting him as District Agricultural officer, alleging violation of rule 7 of the Haryana Agricultural Service Class II Rules, 1947. The single Judge quashed the order on grounds of non-compliance with the rule requiring promotion by selection on the advice of the Haryana Public Service Commission. However, the Full Bench disagreed, stating the rule was not breached. The Supreme Court upheld the Full Bench's decision, emphasizing the lack of violation of rule 7 in the promotion process.
Issue 2:
The dispute also involved the termination of the appellant's lien on the post of Agricultural Inspector. The Full Bench, by a majority decision, held that the appellant's lien had been terminated, based on rule 3.12 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, citing rule 3.14(a)(2), which mandates the suspension of the lien when a government servant is appointed to a post outside their cadre. As the competent authority failed to suspend the appellant's lien, the Court ruled in favor of the appellant, reinstating his lien on the post of Agricultural Inspector. Consequently, the promotion of the appellant to District Agricultural officer was deemed legally valid.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, overturning the judgments of the single Judge and the Full Bench. The writ petitions filed by the respondents were dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 167
Issues Involved:
1. Cancellation of candidature due to criminal case involvement.
2. Shortage of attendance and its impact on examination eligibility.
3. Requirement of permission from superior officers for attending evening law classes.
4. Alleged fraud by the appellant in suppressing information about attendance.
Summary:
Issue 1: Cancellation of candidature due to criminal case involvement
The appellant, a teacher, was initially refused permission to reappear in failed subjects and later denied admission to LL.B. Part III due to involvement in a criminal case. The appellant was acquitted and reinstated, removing the stigma of the criminal case. The respondent argued that the appellant's involvement in the criminal case prevented the Head of Institution from certifying good moral character.
Issue 2: Shortage of attendance and its impact on examination eligibility
The appellant was short of the requisite attendance in Part I and Part II, as notified by the University. Despite this, the appellant was allowed to appear in the Part II Examination provisionally. The University later canceled his candidature due to the shortage of attendance, which was displayed on the notice board. The appellant argued that once allowed to appear in the examination, his candidature could not be withdrawn as per clause 2(b) of the Kurukshetra University Calendar Vol. I, ordinance X.
Issue 3: Requirement of permission from superior officers for attending evening law classes
The respondent contended that the appellant needed permission from his superior officers to attend evening law classes, which he did not obtain. The appellant argued that there was no provision in the University statutes requiring such permission. The Court found no justification in the statutes for canceling the candidature based on the lack of permission from superior officers.
Issue 4: Alleged fraud by the appellant in suppressing information about attendance
The respondent accused the appellant of fraudulently suppressing the fact that he was short of attendance. The Court held that it was the duty of the University and the Head of the Department to scrutinize the admission form for compliance. The appellant did not commit fraud as he did not misrepresent his attendance, and the University had ample opportunity to detect any defects.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court found that the University had no jurisdiction to cancel the appellant's candidature after allowing him to appear in the examination. The impugned order was quashed, and the University was directed to declare the appellant's LL.B. Part II Examination results and allow him to reappear in the failed subjects of Part I. The appeal was allowed, and each party was directed to bear their own costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 166
Issues Involved:
1. Finality of the original order dated February 17, 1958.
2. Applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Permissibility of successive applications under section 3 of the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951.
Summary:
1. Finality of the Original Order:
The Supreme Court examined whether the order dated February 17, 1958, which granted three annual instalments for payment, was final or interlocutory. The Court concluded that the order was final, stating, "The original order dated February 17, 1958, granting three annual instalments to the first respondent stated clearly that if he failed to pay the first instalment within the period mentioned therein, he would 'lose the benefit of the order of restoration.' This no doubt was a conditional order, but a conditional order is not necessarily an interlocutory order." The Court emphasized that the order had finality as it explicitly mentioned the loss of benefit upon failure to pay the first instalment within the specified period.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The Court addressed whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, could be invoked for the application made on October 15, 1965. The Court held, "We do not see how section 5 could be invoked in connection with the application made on October 15, 1965, by the first respondent. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act, an appeal or application 'may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.' The Collector to whom the application was made was not a court, though section 15 of the Act vested him with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure." The Court concluded that section 5 was inapplicable as the application had no prescribed time limit and the Collector was not a court.
3. Permissibility of Successive Applications under Section 3:
The Court examined whether successive applications under section 3 of the Act were permissible. It stated, "The question that arises therefore is, whether the Act permits successive applications to be made under section 3 giving rise to a fresh proceeding every time in respect of the same subject matter. Section 13 provides that every order passed by the Collector under the Act, subject to an order passed in appeal under section 16 would be final." The Court emphasized that allowing successive applications would undermine the finality of the Collector's orders and lead to uncertainty and confusion. The Court cited the principles of finality in litigation and the prohibition against vexing a person twice for the same cause, referencing Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors. and Burn & Co. v. Their Employee. The Court concluded that the Additional Collector was correct in dismissing the application made on October 17, 1965, and allowed the appeal with costs.
Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 165
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Thirty-ninth Amendment.
2. Validity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974, and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975.
3. Whether the Parliament can validate an election retrospectively.
4. Whether judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
5. Whether the principle of separation of powers was violated.
6. Whether the amendments affect the democratic structure of the government.
7. Whether the amendments violate the principle of equality under Article 14.
8. Whether the amendments were validly passed despite the detention of certain members of Parliament.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of the Thirty-ninth Amendment:
The Thirty-ninth Amendment introduced Article 329A, which provided that the election of the Prime Minister and Speaker cannot be challenged except before a body set up by Parliament. The Court held that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A were unconstitutional as they violated the basic structure of the Constitution. These clauses deprived the courts of their power to adjudicate election disputes, which is an essential feature of democracy. The amendment was seen as an attempt to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny, thus violating the rule of law and equality before the law.
2. Validity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974, and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975:
The Court held that these Acts were valid. They were within the legislative competence of Parliament and did not violate any provisions of the Constitution. The amendments were intended to clarify the law and remove uncertainties regarding the election expenses and the definition of a candidate. The retrospective operation of these amendments was upheld as it was within the power of Parliament to legislate retrospectively.
3. Whether the Parliament can validate an election retrospectively:
The Court acknowledged that retrospective validation of elections is a well-known legislative process. However, it held that the manner in which the Thirty-ninth Amendment sought to validate the Prime Minister's election was unconstitutional. The amendment not only validated the election but also declared the judgment of the Allahabad High Court void, which was seen as an encroachment on judicial power.
4. Whether judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution:
The Court held that judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The exclusion of judicial review by clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A was, therefore, unconstitutional. Judicial review is essential to ensure that the rule of law is maintained and that the actions of the government are subject to scrutiny by the judiciary.
5. Whether the principle of separation of powers was violated:
The Court held that the principle of separation of powers was violated by the Thirty-ninth Amendment. By taking over the function of adjudicating election disputes, Parliament encroached upon the judicial domain. The Constitution does not permit the Legislature to exercise judicial powers, and such an encroachment undermines the checks and balances inherent in the constitutional framework.
6. Whether the amendments affect the democratic structure of the government:
The Court held that the amendments did not destroy the democratic structure of the government. The rule of the majority and the electoral process were still intact. However, the specific provisions of the Thirty-ninth Amendment that sought to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial scrutiny were unconstitutional as they violated the principles of equality and the rule of law.
7. Whether the amendments violate the principle of equality under Article 14:
The Court held that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A violated the principle of equality under Article 14. These provisions created a special class for the Prime Minister and the Speaker, placing their elections beyond the reach of the law. Such a classification was arbitrary and had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The amendments were, therefore, struck down as they violated the fundamental right to equality.
8. Whether the amendments were validly passed despite the detention of certain members of Parliament:
The Court held that the amendments were validly passed despite the detention of certain members of Parliament. The legality of the detention orders could not be challenged collaterally in these appeals. The presence of the detained members would not have made a difference to the passing of the amendment, and therefore, the validity of the amendments was upheld on this ground.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 filed by Smt. Indira Gandhi, setting aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court that had declared her election void. Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975 filed by Shri Raj Narain was dismissed. The Court held that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A were unconstitutional as they violated the basic structure of the Constitution by excluding judicial review and violating the principle of equality. The amendments to the Representation of the People Act, 1951, were upheld as valid.
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1975 (11) TMI 163
The Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi accepted the appeal by the appellants regarding reprocessing Sodium Silicate due to deterioration during storage. The appellants made necessary entries in relevant records and were found to have properly accounted for the goods, so no duty was charged. The order of the Assistant Collector was quashed. (Case Citation: 1975 (11) TMI 163)
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1975 (11) TMI 162
The judgment in the case of Collector, Central Excise, New Delhi v. Shri K.K. Kapoor (1975) involved the appellants claiming they were reconditioning old shock absorbers, not manufacturing new ones. The Assistant Collector argued that the reconditioned shock absorbers were new goods, but the appellate authority disagreed, stating that reconditioning does not make them new manufactured goods. The appeal was accepted, and the Assistant Collector's order was set aside.
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1975 (11) TMI 161
The Appellate Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi allowed appeals filed by appellants regarding demand of duty on lipstick containers. The Collector found that the containers were predominantly made of plastic material and the metal sleeve was non-essential for holding contents. The demand of duty was withdrawn as the containers did not classify as metal containers under the Central Excise Tariff. (Case Citation: 1975 (11) TMI 161)
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1975 (11) TMI 160
Whether the provisions of the Luxury Tax on Tobacco (Validation) Act, 1964 (Act 9 of 1964) enacted by the State Legislature of Kerala are void on the grounds that (1) the State Legislature lacked the legislative competence to enac that Act, and (2) the provisions of the Act contravened article 301 of the Constitution and were not protected by article 304?
Held that:- The fact that the levy of excise duty is in the form of licence fee would not detract from the fact that the levy relates to excise duty. It is, however, essential that such levy should be linked with production or manufacture of the excisable article. The recovery of licence fee in such an event would be one of the modes of levy of the excise duty. Where, however, the levy imposed or tax has no nexus with the manufacture or production of an article, the impost or tax cannot be regarded to be one in the nature of excise duty.
The charging section 3 of this Act creates a liability for payment of luxury tax on the stocking and vending of tobacco. There is no provision of this Act which is concerned with production or manufacture of tobacco or which links the tax under its provisions with the manufacture or production of tobacco. The same is the position of the rules issued on August 3, 1950 and January 25, 1951 and Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer on behalf of the appellants has frankly conceded that those rules are in no way concerned with the production or manufacture of tobacco. It would, therefore follow that the levy of tax contemplated by the provisions of section 3 of the Act has nothing to do with the manufacture or production of tobacco and, as such, cannot be deemed to be in the nature of excise duty. Argument that the provisions of the Act fall under entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must, therefore, be held to be bereft of force.
We agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that such levy directly impedes the free flow of trade and as such is violative of article 301 of the Constitution. The requirement of the proviso regarding the sanction of the President has been satisfied. It is no doubt true that the assent of the President was given subsequent to the passing of the Bill by the legislature but that fact would not affect the validity of the impugned Act in view of the provisions of article 255 of the Constitution. section 6 of the impugned Act is invalid because it provides for payment of an amount which had been refunded in pursuance of the order of this Court is bereft of force. Appeal dismissed.
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