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• 1977 (11) TMI 150
  
  The Supreme Court of India dismissed an appeal by a workman who was terminated by his employer, ruling that the suit lacked essential averments to establish a cause of action for illegal dismissal. The High Court had previously rejected the appeal on the basis that crucial facts, such as the consideration of the worker's past record in the dismissal decision, were not included in the plaint. The Court emphasized the absence of this material fact as sufficient to dismiss the suit, without delving into the question of the suit's maintainability. Additionally, the respondent agreed to make an ex gratia payment of Rs. 5,000 to the appellant, with each party bearing their own costs.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 149
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Maintainability of the suit under Section 45 of the Contract Act.
  2. Entitlement of defendants to stage plays other than "Katha Kao."
  3. Validity of the termination of the agreement.
  4. Impact of a subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff on the current proceedings.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Maintainability of the Suit under Section 45 of the Contract Act:
  The appellants argued that the suit was not maintainable under Section 45 of the Contract Act as it was filed by one of the joint promises without joining the other as a co-plaintiff. Section 45 specifies that the right to claim performance rests with all joint promises unless a contrary intention appears in the contract. The court noted that the section deals with the devolution of joint rights but does not preclude one joint promise from filing a suit by making the other a proforma-defendant. The court referenced Order 1 Rule 1 of the CPC, which allows all persons with a right to relief to be joined in one suit, even if one refuses to be a plaintiff. The court cited precedents, including Monghibai v. Cooverji Umersay and Prarnada Nath Roy v. Bameni Kanta Roy, which support the maintainability of such suits. The court dismissed the argument that indemnity against costs was necessary, referencing Burnside v. Harrison Marks Productions, Ltd., which clarified that such a rule protects the joint contractor, not the contesting defendant.
  
  2. Entitlement of Defendants to Stage Plays Other than "Katha Kao":
  The court examined whether the defendants were entitled to stage plays other than "Katha Kao," which was being staged during the week before the expiry of the one-year licence period. The agreement allowed the defendants to use the theatre for specific shows per week, and the proviso allowed the continuation of the drama being staged before the licence expiry. The court found that "Katha Kao" was the only play staged in the week preceding the licence expiry, and thus, the benefit of the proviso applied solely to "Katha Kao." The staging of other dramas like "Adarsh Hindu Hotel," "Nishkriti," and "Swikriti" after the licence period was deemed a violation of the agreement. The court upheld the finding that the "normal run" of "Katha Kao" ended when other plays were staged, reducing "Katha Kao" to one show a week.
  
  3. Validity of the Termination of the Agreement:
  Mr. Mazumdar argued that the agreement was not validly terminated as the plaintiff did not refund Rs. 10,000/- as required by paragraph 16 of the agreement. The court found this argument untenable as it was not pleaded in the written statement nor was it the subject of any issue during the trial.
  
  4. Impact of a Subsequent Suit Filed by the Plaintiff on the Current Proceedings:
  The legal representatives of Jahar Roy argued that a subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff in 1970 for the dissolution of the partnership and the appointment of joint Receivers affected the plaintiff's right to claim relief in the current suit. The court noted that these arguments were not raised in the High Court and thus could not be entertained in this second appeal. Additionally, the court found that these arguments had no bearing on the current appeal.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed with a modification that the compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,275/- per month should be equally divided between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3, as they were joint promises. There was no order as to the costs of the court.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 148
  
  Issues:
  1. Challenge to the validity of land acquisition notifications under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  2. Interpretation of whether the acquisition was for a public purpose.
  3. Error of law committed by the High Court in deciding the appeal based on a plea not taken at trial.
  4. Finding of abandonment of intention to pay compensation by the State Government.
  5. Misreading of evidence by the High Court in setting aside the Trial Court's finding in favor of the defendant.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  1. The case involved a challenge to the validity of notifications issued by the State of Gujarat under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring land for a housing society. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the notifications were illegal and void, leading to a perpetual injunction against the defendants. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the High Court overturned this decision, declaring the notification under Section 6 of the Act as void and restraining the defendants from further action, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.
  
  2. The key issue revolved around whether the acquisition was for a public purpose as required by the Act. The High Court's judgment was based on the view that the intention of the State Government to pay compensation was abandoned, leading to the appeal. The Supreme Court scrutinized the trial proceedings and found that the High Court erred in deciding the appeal on a plea not raised during the trial, violating legal principles of evidence and opportunity for parties to present their case.
  
  3. The Supreme Court further analyzed the evidence presented, highlighting that the High Court's finding of abandonment of the State Government's intention to contribute towards compensation was unfounded. The Court emphasized that the State had not withdrawn its decision to pay a part of the compensation, as evidenced by official documents and witness statements. The delay in actual payment was attributed to prolonged litigation rather than an abandonment of intent.
  
  4. Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed the High Court's reliance on an agreement executed by a cooperative society, clarifying that the acquisition was indeed for a public purpose, not for a company. The Court criticized the High Court's misinterpretation of the notifications and averments in the written statement, emphasizing that the acquiring body was the State Government, not a private entity.
  
  5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was flawed, as it misinterpreted the evidence and legal provisions, leading to an erroneous decision. The appeal was allowed, costs were awarded, and the Trial Court's decree in favor of the defendant was reinstated, highlighting the importance of adhering to legal procedures and evidence in judicial decisions.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 147
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi can fix the annual rateable value higher than the rent paid by the tenant by considering the rent paid by subtenants.
  2. Whether the landlord is entitled to recover the enhanced house tax from the tenant under Section 121 of the Corporation Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Fixing Annual Rateable Value Considering Subtenants' Rent
  
  The court did not permit this issue to be raised and decided in the present case. The suit was framed solely for the recovery of excess tax from the tenant. The tenant's challenge to the levy of the tax by the Corporation, which considered the rent paid by subtenants, was not entertained. The court noted that the validity of the levy concerns the Corporation and should be challenged in a separate proceeding with the Corporation as a party. Despite the Corporation's appearance in response to a notice issued by the learned single Judge, the court decided not to consider and decide this question.
  
  Issue 2: Recovery of Enhanced House Tax by Landlord
  
  Section 121 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act allows landlords to recover from tenants the difference between the property taxes levied and the amount that would be levied based on the rent payable to the landlord. This provision conflicts with Section 7(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which prohibits landlords from recovering any tax on the building or land from tenants.
  
  In Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman (1971), it was held that Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act prevails over Section 7(2) of the Rent Act. The court reasoned that Section 121 deals specifically with the contingency where the property tax exceeds the amount based on the rent payable by the tenant, thus having an overriding effect as a special provision.
  
  Contrarily, in Sunderdess Tola Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1973), a Division Bench opined that the Rent Control Act, being a later and special statute, prevails over the Corporation Act. This view was based on the principle that a later statute repeals earlier conflicting provisions.
  
  The present judgment disagreed with the Division Bench's opinion, considering it an obiter dictum and incorrect. The court highlighted that the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, was followed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, but the latter's Section 7(2) mirrored a provision from the earlier Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Hence, the Corporation Act's Section 121(1) is the later and special provision. The court affirmed that Section 121(1) has an overriding effect over Section 7(2) of the Rent Control Act, as it addresses a specific contingency not covered by the general provision in the Rent Act.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court held that the landlord is entitled to recover the enhanced amount of house tax from the tenant under Section 121(1) of the Corporation Act, notwithstanding the contract of tenancy and the provisions of Section 7(2) and Section 4 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed without costs.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 146
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Removal of the appellant from the post of Receiver.
  2. Validity of the expenses incurred by the appellant as Receiver.
  3. Powers and duties of a Receiver, particularly when the Receiver is also a Mutwalli.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Removal of the appellant from the post of Receiver:
  The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed an application for the removal of the appellant from the post of Receiver, alleging that the appellant had violated the court's order by mismanaging the property and misappropriating its income. The court below found that the appellant had not deposited any amount in court as directed and had spent the income for his own purposes, leading to his removal from the post of Receiver. However, the High Court set aside this order, emphasizing that the failure to obtain court permission before incurring expenses was not sufficient ground for removal. The case was remanded for fresh consideration of the appellant's accounts and the application for his removal.
  
  2. Validity of the expenses incurred by the appellant as Receiver:
  The appellant claimed that the expenses incurred were legitimate and related to his duties as Mutwalli. The court below did not properly scrutinize these accounts. The High Court acknowledged that while the appellant should have obtained prior court approval for these expenses, such actions were implicit in the order appointing him as Receiver. The court directed that the appellant's accounts be examined afresh to determine their validity.
  
  3. Powers and duties of a Receiver, particularly when the Receiver is also a Mutwalli:
  The High Court discussed the dual role of the appellant as both Mutwalli and Receiver. It noted that the appointment of a Receiver generally includes management and preservation of the property, even if not explicitly stated. The court held that the functions of the Mutwalli merged into those of the Receiver upon appointment. The Receiver was expected to manage the property and perform necessary duties, including repairs and maintenance, with prior court approval. The court clarified that the appellant was entitled to the remuneration fixed by the court for the Receiver's role, not additional amounts claimed as Mutwalli.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing a new Receiver, and remanded the case for fresh consideration of the appellant's accounts and the application for his removal. The court directed that the suit be disposed of expeditiously and that the parties bear their own costs.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 145
  
  Issues:
  1. Appeal against refusal to quash a proceeding pending before the Special Judge, Delhi.
  2. Interpretation of provisions regarding tender of pardon and examination of approver as a witness.
  3. Argument of discriminatory application of law under Article 14 of the Constitution.
  4. Examination of the impact of Sub-section (2B) of Section 337 of the CrPC on the jurisdiction of the Special Judge.
  5. Analysis of the procedures for examining the approver and the potential impact on the accused.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the order of the Delhi High Court that refused to quash a proceeding pending against the appellant before the Special Judge, Delhi. The appellant had applied for quashing the proceeding based on the lack of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and failure to examine a witness, Martin Joseph Fernandez, as required by the Code. The High Court upheld the Special Judge's decision, leading to the appeal.
  
  2. The main contention raised by the appellant's counsel was related to the interpretation of the provisions regarding the tender of pardon and examination of the approver as a witness. The argument focused on whether the Special Judge had the authority to take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed for trial, especially after a pardon had been tendered to a person during the investigation stage. The appellant argued that this provision could lead to discriminatory application of the law under Article 14 of the Constitution.
  
  3. The appellant's counsel contended that allowing the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence after a pardon had been accepted would deprive the accused of certain procedural safeguards, particularly the opportunity to have the evidence of the approver tested twice in different courts. The argument was based on the perceived disadvantage to the accused depending on whether the chargesheet was filed before a Magistrate or directly before the Special Judge, leaving the choice of forum to the prosecution.
  
  4. The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the CrPC, particularly Sub-section (2B) of Section 337, which mandated the Magistrate to send the case for trial to the Special Judge in certain specified offences after the approver had been examined. The Court concluded that the insertion of Sub-section (2B) in 1955 did not affect the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed for trial. The Court found no clear intention by the legislature to curb the Special Judge's powers under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952.
  
  5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the difference in procedures for examining the approver once or twice did not constitute a substantial and qualitative difference that would violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the Special Judge would still need to apply established tests for appreciating the accomplice's evidence, regardless of whether the approver was examined once or twice. The Court cited precedent to support the notion that the availability of two procedures does not necessarily indicate a violation of Article 14.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 144
  
  Issues:
  1. Application under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act filed by the defendants in an appeal case.
  2. Determination of whether the appellant could be deemed to have been prosecuting the appeal with due diligence.
  3. Analysis of the provisions of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act and their application in the case.
  4. Interpretation of "good faith" and "due diligence" in the context of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
  5. Examination of past legal precedents regarding condonation of delay in filing appeals due to negligence or oversight.
  6. Assessment of the appellant's conduct in presenting the appeal to the wrong court and subsequent actions.
  7. Consideration of whether sufficient cause has been established under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to justify condonation of delay.
  8. Direction to examine the efficiency of the Munsarim in reporting on the appeal's maintainability in the court of the District Judge.
  
  Analysis:
  
  The judgment pertains to an appeal filed by the defendants, along with an application under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, arising from a suit decreed by the trial court. The core issue revolves around whether the appellant diligently prosecuted the appeal in the District Judge's court, where it was initially filed, under the advice of their local lawyer. The court delves into the distinction between the provisions of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing the stringent requirements of Section 14, particularly the necessity of prosecuting other civil proceedings in good faith and with due diligence.
  
  The court underscores that for Section 14 to apply, the initial filing in the wrong court must be done with due diligence and subsequent proceedings must be in good faith. The judgment cites legal principles from a Jammu & Kashmir High Court case, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between negligence and honest mistakes in determining sufficient cause for condoning delays in appeals. Additionally, a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court is referenced, emphasizing that not every act of negligence warrants condonation.
  
  The court scrutinizes the conduct of the appellant and their legal representatives, noting the absence of a satisfactory explanation for filing the appeal in the District Judge's court instead of the High Court, given the appeal's valuation. Despite opportunities to clarify the error, the appellant fails to demonstrate due diligence or good faith in prosecuting the appeal. The court concludes that the appellant's conduct falls short of the standard of care and attention expected, rendering them ineligible for the benefits of Section 14 or Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  
  Ultimately, the court dismisses the application, rejecting the memo of appeal as beyond limitation with costs. Furthermore, the judgment directs the District Judge to investigate and take appropriate action against the Munsarim for failing to note the appeal's jurisdictional issue promptly.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 143
  
  Issues:
  1. Alleged contravention of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 by storing rice without a license.
  2. Prosecution's failure to establish storage by the petitioner within the legal definition.
  3. Conviction under the Essential Commodities Act and Orissa Order leading to sentencing and confiscation of rice.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The petitioner, a truck driver, was charged with contravening the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 by allegedly storing rice without a license. The prosecution's case revolved around the seizure of rice from the truck at a check-gate, leading to the charge against the petitioner. The charge was based on the quantity of rice found in the truck, exceeding the permissible limit without a license. The defense argued that the rice belonged to various consignors for transport, denying the charge of illegal storage.
  
  2. The prosecution presented witnesses and evidence to establish that the petitioner had stored rice in violation of the Orissa Order. However, the court analyzed the definition of "storage" within the Orissa Order and the Essential Commodities Act. The court highlighted that possession without a license was not an offense, and storage required elements of continued possession over time at a regular place. The court concluded that possession of rice within a moving vehicle did not constitute storage as per the legal definition, leading to the failure of the prosecution to establish the charge against the petitioner.
  
  3. Despite the trial court's conviction of the petitioner under the Essential Commodities Act and Orissa Order, the higher court overturned the decision. The court emphasized that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential element of storage by the petitioner. Consequently, the court allowed the revision application, acquitted the petitioner, set aside the conviction and sentences, and canceled the bail bond. The court also ordered the refund of any fines paid and quashed the confiscation of the seized rice, as the offense of storage had not been established.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment focused on the legal interpretation of "storage" within the Orissa Order and Essential Commodities Act, ultimately leading to the acquittal of the petitioner due to the prosecution's failure to prove the charge of illegal storage beyond a reasonable doubt.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 142
  
  Issues involved: Validity of trial under section 120B IPC in absence of sanction u/s 196A(2) Cr. P. C., 1898.
  
  In the present case, the appellant was charged under various sections including 120B IPC for being part of a criminal conspiracy to prepare spurious passports and cheat the Embarkation Authorities. The trial court rejected the objection raised by the accused regarding the sanction under section 196A(2) Cr. P. C., stating that no sanction was necessary. The High Court also dismissed the revision application, leading to the appellant seeking special leave from the Supreme Court. The main contention raised before the Supreme Court was the invalidity of the trial under section 120B IPC due to the absence of sanction under section 196A(2) Cr. P. C.
  
  The charges framed against the appellant and others involved in the conspiracy detailed the illegal acts committed, including forging passports and cheating authorities. The appellant's counsel argued that the charge only mentioned "cheating" under section 417 IPC, not specifying "cheating by personation" under section 419 IPC. However, the Supreme Court found that the recitals in the charge were clear, and the mention of section 419 IPC sufficed. The Court emphasized that the object of the conspiracy could be determined from the charge itself, and the decision in Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan was not applicable in this context.
  
  The Supreme Court explained that criminal conspiracy under section 120A IPC is a distinct offence where the agreement among conspirators to break the law is crucial. The Court highlighted that the main object of the conspiracy in this case was cheating by personation, with other illegal acts being steps towards achieving that goal. The Court agreed with previous judgments that the conspiracy charge stands even if not all conspirators are involved in every illegal act agreed upon.
  
  Regarding the requirement of sanction under section 196A(2) Cr. P. C., the Court noted that since the object of the conspiracy was cheating by personation under section 419 IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment up to three years, the absence of sanction did not invalidate the trial. The Court dismissed the appeal, directing the trial court to expedite the case proceedings.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 141
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Nature of the document: License vs. Lease
  2. Legal possession and rights of the petitioners
  3. Right of the Corporation to evict the petitioners
  4. Validity of the ad interim injunction
  5. Authority of the Corporation under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Nature of the Document: License vs. Lease
  The primary issue revolves around whether the document dated 11th December 1973, executed between the petitioners and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (the Corporation), constituted a lease or a license. The petitioners argued that the document, although styled as a license deed, was in fact a lease deed, granting them exclusive possession and creating an interest in the property. They contended that the intention of the parties was to create a lease, as evidenced by their exclusive control over the Kiosks for business purposes.
  
  The court, however, held that the document was a license. The terms and conditions of the auction and the deed indicated that the Corporation intended to grant only a license. The document gave the petitioners the liberty to occupy and use the Kiosks for a period of 11 months, with no right to alternative accommodation upon termination. The legal possession remained with the Corporation, and the petitioners' possession was lawful only due to the permission granted by the Corporation. The court emphasized that the intention of the parties is the real test for ascertaining the character of a document, and in this case, the intention was to grant a license.
  
  2. Legal Possession and Rights of the Petitioners
  The petitioners claimed that they were in settled possession of the Kiosks and could not be evicted without due process of law. They argued that their possession was protected under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and that the Corporation had acquiesced in their possession by accepting license fees even after the expiration of the initial license period.
  
  The court rejected this argument, stating that the petitioners' possession was not "settled possession" as they were licensees and not tenants. The legal possession of the Kiosks remained with the Corporation, and the petitioners' occupation was lawful only due to the license granted to them. Upon revocation of the license, the petitioners had no legal right to continue occupying the Kiosks.
  
  3. Right of the Corporation to Evict the Petitioners
  The Corporation argued that it had the right to evict the petitioners as the license had expired, and the petitioners were bound to vacate the Kiosks. The court upheld this argument, stating that the Corporation's right to re-enter and resume possession of the Kiosks was clear from the terms of the license deed. The court noted that the Corporation did not need to secure a decree of the court to enforce its right of re-entry, as the petitioners' possession was unlawful after the revocation of the license.
  
  4. Validity of the Ad Interim Injunction
  The petitioners sought an ad interim injunction to restrain the Corporation from interfering with their possession of the Kiosks. The trial court initially granted an ex parte injunction, but later vacated it, holding that the petitioners had failed to make out a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience was in favor of the Corporation. The appellate court upheld this decision.
  
  The High Court agreed with the lower courts, stating that the petitioners had not shown a legal right to continue occupying the Kiosks. The court emphasized that granting an injunction is a matter of discretion, and the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable loss or that the balance of convenience was in their favor.
  
  5. Authority of the Corporation under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
  The petitioners contended that the Corporation did not have the authority to grant a license under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and could only grant a lease. They argued that the Corporation, being an artificial person created by statute, could only exercise powers expressly or impliedly conferred by the Act.
  
  The court rejected this argument, stating that the power to hold immovable property inherently includes the power to grant a license to use the property. The court found no merit in the argument that the Corporation could not grant a license to fetch income from its property.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court dismissed the petitions, holding that the document in question was a license and not a lease. The petitioners had no legal right to continue occupying the Kiosks after the expiration of the license. The Corporation had the right to evict the petitioners without securing a decree from the court. The petitioners' request for an ad interim injunction was rightly denied by the lower courts. The court found no legal or factual infirmity in the impugned order and upheld the appellate court's decision. The petitions were dismissed with costs to be paid by the petitioners to the respondents.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 140
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether Section 19(c)(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 is ultra vires.
  2. Whether a Division Bench can dismiss a petition raising a constitutional validity question at the admission stage.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Ultra Vires of Section 19(c)(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960:
  The petition challenged the constitutional validity of Section 19(c)(2) on two grounds: it offends Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution and suffers from excessive delegation. The Court did not address the merits of these claims directly in this judgment but focused on procedural aspects related to the hearing of such petitions.
  
  2. Jurisdiction of Division Bench at Admission Stage:
  The primary issue addressed was whether a Division Bench can dismiss a petition challenging the constitutional validity of a State law at the admission stage, in light of Article 228A of the Constitution.
  
  Article 228A Interpretation:
  - Clause (3) of Article 228A: Requires that a minimum of five Judges must sit to determine any question as to the constitutional validity of any State law.
  - Clause (4) of Article 228A: States that a State law cannot be declared constitutionally invalid unless two-thirds of the Judges sitting for the purpose hold it to be so.
  - Clause (5) of Article 228A: Emphasizes that these provisions have an overriding effect.
  
  Court's Reasoning:
  - Enquiry at Admission Stage: The Court held that a Division Bench can undertake an enquiry to determine whether the petition raises an arguable question regarding the constitutional validity of a State law. If the question is found to be unarguable, the Division Bench can summarily dismiss the petition.
  - Definition of "Question": The term "question" under Article 228A must mean a real, arguable question. If the point raised is unsubstantial or self-evident, it does not constitute a "question" requiring determination by a Bench of five Judges.
  - Administrative Convenience: The Court acknowledged the administrative burden of requiring five Judges to hear every petition raising a constitutional question but emphasized that practical inconvenience cannot override express constitutional provisions.
  
  Precedents and Analogies:
  - Supreme Court Rulings: The Court referred to various Supreme Court rulings, including State of W.B. v. Manmal, AIR 1977 SC 1772, which held that if a question is not substantial or arguable, it need not be referred to a larger Bench.
  - Income-tax Act Analogies: The Court drew analogies from the practice under the Income-tax Act, where a Tribunal is not required to refer a question to the High Court if it is concluded by a higher court's decision.
  
  Majority Opinion:
  - Determination at Admission Stage: The majority held that a Division Bench can determine at the admission stage whether a petition raises an arguable question of constitutional validity. If it does not, the petition can be dismissed.
  - Exceptions: A Bench of less than five Judges can dismiss a petition at the admission stage if:
  - The question is irrelevant.
  - The question has already been determined by the Supreme Court.
  - The question has already been determined by a Bench of at least five Judges of the High Court, and no reconsideration is deemed necessary.
  
  Dissenting Opinion:
  - Strict Interpretation: Some judges opined that any question of constitutional validity, regardless of its substance, must be heard by a Bench of five Judges as per the express language of Article 228A.
  
  Conclusion:
  The majority concluded that a Division Bench can dismiss a petition at the admission stage if it does not raise a substantial or arguable question regarding the constitutional validity of a State law. However, if the petition raises an arguable point, it must be referred to a Bench of five Judges for determination.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 139
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Maintainability of the suit.
  2. Validity of the Central Government's notification under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
  3. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
  
  Issue-Wise Analysis:
  
  1. Maintainability of the Suit:
  The State of Karnataka contended that the Central Government's notification appointing a Commission of Inquiry infringed its legal rights, thereby making the suit maintainable under Article 131 of the Constitution. The Union of India argued that the notification was directed against individual ministers, not the State, and thus did not affect the State's legal rights. The Court held that the suit was maintainable under Article 131 because the dispute involved a question affecting the existence or extent of the State's legal rights. The Court emphasized that the State's legal interests were implicated, as the inquiry concerned the exercise of governmental powers by the State's Chief Minister and ministers.
  
  2. Validity of the Central Government's Notification:
  The Central Government's notification was challenged on the grounds that it was ultra vires Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. The Court examined whether the notification violated the proviso to Section 3(1), which prevents the Central Government from appointing a Commission to inquire into a matter already covered by a State-appointed Commission unless the scope extends to two or more States. The Court found that the State Government's notification did not explicitly cover the specific allegations against the Chief Minister and other ministers, and the Central Government's notification excluded matters already covered by the State's notification. Thus, the Court concluded that the Central Government's notification did not violate the proviso to Section 3(1) and was valid.
  
  3. Constitutionality of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act:
  The State argued that if Section 3 authorized the Central Government to issue the impugned notification, the section itself was unconstitutional as it infringed upon the federal structure and the exclusive domain of the State's executive powers. The Court held that the Commissions of Inquiry Act, including Section 3, was within the legislative competence of the Parliament under Entry 94 of List I and Entry 45 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the Act did not confer any disciplinary or supervisory control over the State executive but merely provided a mechanism for fact-finding inquiries into matters of public importance. The Act was intended to enable the government to gather information and was not an exercise of executive control over the State.
  
  Conclusion:
  The suit was dismissed with costs. The Court upheld the validity of the Central Government's notification and the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the balance of powers between the Union and the States as outlined in the Constitution while recognizing the necessity of fact-finding inquiries into matters of public importance.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 138
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the delivery orders.
  2. Compliance with the contract terms.
  3. Existence and applicability of trade customs and usage.
  4. Impact of statutory provisions on the contract.
  5. Estoppel and conduct of the parties.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Delivery Orders:
  The core issue was whether the delivery orders tendered by the plaintiff were valid as per the contract terms. The plaintiff argued that the delivery orders were proper tenders by virtue of trade customs and usage in the Calcutta jute market. The defendant contended that the delivery orders were not in terms of the contracts and did not constitute valid tenders. The Trial Judge and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court found that the delivery orders did not comply with the contract terms, as they contained conditions that the mills or suppliers could refuse delivery unless further conditions were met. These conditional delivery orders were not considered documents of title under section 2(4) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
  
  2. Compliance with the Contract Terms:
  The plaintiff alleged that the tenders made were in terms of the contracts between the parties. The defendant denied this, asserting that the delivery orders were not in accordance with the contracts and were not documents of title. The Trial Judge and the Division Bench held that the delivery orders issued by the mills required the transferees to register and accept the obligations of the original buyers, which were not identical to the obligations under the contracts between the parties. Thus, the delivery orders did not entitle the defendant to obtain delivery of the goods in terms of the contracts.
  
  3. Existence and Applicability of Trade Customs and Usage:
  The plaintiff claimed that the delivery orders were valid tenders by virtue of trade customs and usage in the Calcutta jute market. However, the defendant denied the existence of such customs or usage. The Trial Judge and the Division Bench found that no such custom or usage was proved on the evidence. They also held that even if such a custom existed, it could not override the express terms of the contracts or the statutory provisions.
  
  4. Impact of Statutory Provisions on the Contract:
  The courts considered whether the alleged trade customs could modify the legal requirements of a document of title or the terms of the contract. They concluded that a custom could not contravene express statutory provisions or the terms of an agreement. Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of an agreement, except for proving usage or custom annexed to contracts. The courts found that the delivery orders did not meet the statutory definition of a document of title under section 2(4) of the Sale of Goods Act.
  
  5. Estoppel and Conduct of the Parties:
  The plaintiff argued that the defendant was estopped from denying the validity of the delivery orders, as they had accepted similar orders in previous transactions. The Trial Judge noted that no case of estoppel was pleaded by the plaintiff and therefore could not be raised. However, the conduct of the parties indicated that the delivery orders were accepted in previous dealings, suggesting that the defendant was aware of the terms and conditions associated with such orders.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court, in agreement with the findings of the Calcutta High Court, held that the delivery orders tendered by the plaintiff did not fulfill the terms of the contract between the parties. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming that the delivery orders containing additional conditions did not constitute valid tenders as per the contract and statutory requirements.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 137
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the State Government's appellate power to set aside the Collector's order.
  2. Compliance with Rule 4(2) of the Maharashtra Minor Mineral Extraction (Vidarbha Region) Rules, 1966.
  3. Proper identification and registration of the respondent society.
  4. Applicability of the principle of priority in granting mining leases.
  5. Validity of the State Government's policy to prefer cooperative societies.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the State Government's appellate power to set aside the Collector's order:
  The petitioner contended that the State Government, acting as an appellate court, had no power to set aside the Collector's order unless it was shown to be contrary to law. The Court clarified that an appellate court is a "Court of error" with jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the trial court. It can scrutinize the material on record independently and is not limited to correcting errors of law alone. The appellate authority has the power to review or reassess the entire evidence and come to its own conclusion. Therefore, the State Government was within its rights to set aside the Collector's order if it found that the order was not in accordance with law.
  
  2. Compliance with Rule 4(2) of the Maharashtra Minor Mineral Extraction (Vidarbha Region) Rules, 1966:
  The petitioner argued that the respondent society's application was not accompanied by a certificate of financial standing from a competent Revenue Officer as required by Rule 4(2). The Court held that the provisions of Rule 4(2) are directory and not mandatory. The obligation to satisfy the competent authority about financial condition can be met at the stage of execution of the mining lease. The respondent society had submitted the necessary solvency certificate before the matter was considered by the Collector, thereby substantially complying with Rule 4(2).
  
  3. Proper identification and registration of the respondent society:
  The petitioner contended that the application filed by the society was in a different name, missing the words "Audyogic Utpadak," which indicated it was a different entity. The Court found this argument to be highly technical and devoid of substance. The omission of these words did not cause any prejudice or difficulty in identifying the applicant society, which was duly registered and bore the correct registration number. The Court held that such technicalities should not invalidate the application.
  
  4. Applicability of the principle of priority in granting mining leases:
  The petitioner argued that, based on the principle of priority, his earlier application should be preferred over the respondent society's application. The Court clarified that the principle of priority does not apply to minor minerals like clay. The provisions of Sections 4 to 13 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, do not apply to minor minerals. Therefore, the principle of priority was not relevant in this case.
  
  5. Validity of the State Government's policy to prefer cooperative societies:
  The petitioner contended that the State Government's policy to prefer cooperative societies lacked legal authority. The Court noted that the policy was in line with the directive principles of State Policy as incorporated in Part IV of the Constitution, which, although not enforceable by any court, are fundamental in the governance of the country. The Court held that the policy was not irrelevant or extraneous to the controversy involved. The State Government's preference for cooperative societies, if all other things were equal, was justified and in conformity with the directive principles.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the State Government acted within its appellate powers to set aside the Collector's order and remitted the matter back to the Collector for reconsideration. The Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding compliance with Rule 4(2), the identification of the respondent society, the principle of priority, and the validity of the State Government's policy. The petition was dismissed with costs.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 136
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the High Court's decision to sanction a complaint under section 193 IPC.
  2. Prima facie case against the appellant for perjury.
  3. Expediency in the interest of justice for laying a complaint.
  4. Distinction between different officials' knowledge and responsibility.
  5. Role of official channels of information.
  6. Applicability of Article 136 of the Constitution in this context.
  7. Impact of the High Court's judgment on the trial process.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the High Court's Decision:
  The High Court sanctioned a complaint against the appellant and two other officials for an offence under section 193 IPC after an enquiry under section 340(1) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had the legal justification to make this decision. The appellant argued that the High Court had no legal basis to distinguish between him and other officials who also lacked direct knowledge of the arrest.
  
  2. Prima Facie Case for Perjury:
  The High Court concluded that a prima facie case was made out under section 193 IPC against the appellant, based on his affidavit denying knowledge of Rajan's arrest. The appellant's first affidavit contained a false statement that he had no knowledge of Rajan being in police custody, which the High Court found to be deliberate.
  
  3. Expediency in the Interest of Justice:
  The High Court determined that it was expedient in the interest of justice to lay a complaint against the appellant. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court should independently evaluate whether the offence under section 193 IPC is established beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence presented during the trial.
  
  4. Distinction Between Different Officials' Knowledge:
  The High Court declined to take action against the Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police, as they had no direct knowledge of Rajan's arrest. The appellant argued that he, too, relied on official information channels and should not be singled out. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court must independently assess the appellant's knowledge and intent.
  
  5. Role of Official Channels of Information:
  The appellant contended that as Chief Minister, he relied on official reports, specifically the Inspector General of Police's report dated January 7, 1977. The Supreme Court acknowledged the appellant's reliance on official channels but emphasized that the trial court must determine whether the appellant intentionally made a false statement.
  
  6. Applicability of Article 136:
  The Supreme Court noted that under Article 136 of the Constitution, it would only interfere with the High Court's order if there was manifest injustice. The Court found that the High Court's decision to lay a complaint was not grossly erroneous or manifestly perverse, and thus, there was no justification to interfere.
  
  7. Impact of the High Court's Judgment on the Trial Process:
  The Supreme Court clarified that the reasons given in the High Court's judgment should not influence the trial court's independent conclusion. The trial court must base its decision solely on the evidence and materials produced during the trial, ensuring a fair and impartial process.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to sanction a complaint under section 193 IPC against the appellant. The Court emphasized the necessity for a fair trial where the appellant would have the opportunity to defend himself and present all relevant evidence. The trial court must independently determine the appellant's guilt based on the evidence presented, without being influenced by the High Court's preliminary findings.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 135
  
  The Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi allowed a refund claim for duty paid under protest by the appellants in March 1976, despite lack of evidence of an earlier refund claim. The refund claim filed on 23-11-1976 was considered timely as assessments had not been finalized. The order of the Asstt. Collector was set aside, and the refund claim was sanctioned if found in order. (Case: 1977 (11) TMI 135)

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• 1977 (11) TMI 134
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of interest demanded on provisional assessments made beyond the assessment year.
  2. Legality of interest demanded on provisional assessments within the assessment year but collected after the close of the year.
  3. Liability to pay interest during the period when stay orders were obtained from the High Court.
  4. Requirement of issuing show cause notices before levying interest on the assessed tax.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of Interest on Provisional Assessments Made Beyond the Assessment Year:
  The petitioners argued that provisional assessments made beyond the assessment year are unauthorized by law, and interest demanded in such cases is invalid. The court examined Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, which allows for provisional assessment of tax "during the year." The court interpreted "during the year" not as "within the year" but as referring to the tax for that specific year. It concluded that there is no legal prohibition against making provisional assessments after the year-end based on the returns submitted. The court emphasized that the assessing authority has the discretion to make provisional assessments even after the 31st of March, and the language of Section 15 does not mandate completion within the year.
  
  2. Legality of Interest on Provisional Assessments Within the Year but Collected After Year-End:
  The court found no distinction between provisional assessments made within the year and those made beyond the year for the purpose of collecting interest under Section 16(3) of the Act. The statute allows for the collection of interest on unpaid tax, and this provision applies uniformly regardless of when the provisional assessment is made, as long as it pertains to the tax for that year.
  
  3. Liability to Pay Interest During the Period of Stay Orders:
  The petitioners contended that they should not be liable to pay interest for the period during which they had obtained stay orders from the High Court. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works v. State of U.P., which held that liability to pay interest is automatic and arises by operation of law, even during the period of stay. The court found no significant difference in the language of Section 16(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and Section 8(1-A) of the U.P. Act, thus concluding that the petitioners are liable to pay interest despite the stay orders.
  
  4. Requirement of Issuing Show Cause Notices Before Levying Interest:
  The petitioners argued that the principles of natural justice required the Commercial Tax Officer to issue show cause notices before levying interest. The court rejected this argument, stating that the statutory provisions are clear and that the liability to pay interest arises automatically by operation of law upon default of payment within the prescribed time. The court distinguished the payment of interest from the levy of penalties, noting that interest is a statutory obligation and does not necessitate a show cause notice.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court confirmed the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and dismissed the revisions, holding that:
  - Provisional assessments made beyond the assessment year are valid, and interest can be demanded on such assessments.
  - Interest can be collected on provisional assessments made within the year but collected after the year-end.
  - Liability to pay interest persists even during the period of stay orders obtained from the High Court.
  - There is no requirement to issue show cause notices before levying interest on the assessed tax.
  
  The court also denied the oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, as no substantial question of law of general importance was found to arise in these cases. Petitions were dismissed with no costs, and an advocate's fee of Rs. 200 was set for each case.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 133
  
  The High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of the assessee for the assessment year 1966-67, stating that the rejection of the account books was not based on valid grounds and was merely suspicion. The court awarded costs of Rs. 100 to the assessee and counsel's fee of Rs. 200.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 132
  
  Issues: Compliance with directions of appellate forum for remand orders.
  
  The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, delivered by C.J. Obul Reddi, addressed the issue of compliance with directions of an appellate forum for remand orders. The case involved two revision cases where the main contention was whether the present Bench of the Tribunal could sit in judgment over an order made by an earlier Bench. The petitioner had preferred two appeals before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which remitted the matter back to the Assistant Commissioner for disposal afresh in accordance with its directions. However, the Assistant Commissioner did not comply with the directions given by the Tribunal, leading to a lack of reference to the report directed to be obtained from the Commercial Tax Officer. The Tribunal that heard the subsequent appeals observed that the Assistant Commissioner's order after remand did not address the Tribunal's directions adequately. The High Court emphasized that once a competent appellate forum remands a case with specific directions, those directions must be followed. The Court highlighted that the change in personnel of the Tribunal does not affect the decisions remanded by the Tribunal, and compliance with the directions is crucial regardless of individual opinions. The Court cited Section 21(9) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, which states that orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal shall be final, subject to certain provisions. Consequently, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and directed a rehearing of the appeals upon receipt of the report called for by the earlier Bench. The Court emphasized the importance of following appellate directions and ensuring a fair opportunity for the assessee to present their defense. The petitions were allowed, and no costs were awarded, except for the advocate's fee.

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• 1977 (11) TMI 131
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Entitlement to set-off under rule 11(1A) of the Bombay Sales Tax (Exemptions, Set-off and Composition) Rules, 1954.
  2. Compliance with the requirement of furnishing a statement in form (12) under rule 11(4) of the said Rules.
  3. Interpretation of mandatory versus directory nature of rule 11(4).
  4. Relevance of previous judgments and authorities on the issue of compliance with statutory requirements for set-off.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Entitlement to Set-off under Rule 11(1A):
  The respondents, registered as dealers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, claimed a set-off for the purchase tax paid on materials bought from unregistered dealers, used for manufacturing paper or packing goods. The Sales Tax Tribunal allowed this claim, although the sales tax authorities had initially rejected it due to non-compliance with the requirement of submitting details in form (12).
  
  2. Compliance with Requirement of Furnishing a Statement in Form (12):
  The core issue was whether the respondents were entitled to a set-off when they had not furnished the statement in form (12) as required by rule 11(4). The Tribunal found that although the details were not submitted in form (12), they were included in the returns. The Tribunal ruled this as sufficient compliance, despite the department's contention that the provisions were mandatory and any non-compliance would disqualify the dealer from receiving a set-off.
  
  3. Interpretation of Mandatory Versus Directory Nature of Rule 11(4):
  The court assumed rule 11(4) to be mandatory but still found that the respondents fulfilled all conditions and requirements of the rule, except for the submission in form (12). The court emphasized that minor deviations from the prescribed form, such as submitting required details within the body of the returns instead of a separate form, did not constitute non-compliance. The court rejected the department's hypertechnical stance, stating that such trivial non-compliance should not deprive the respondents of their entitlement to set-off.
  
  4. Relevance of Previous Judgments and Authorities:
  The court distinguished the present case from previous authorities cited by the department. In *Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay State v. Jamnadas Dharumal*, the issue was about an unregistered dealer claiming set-off, which was fundamentally different from the present case where the respondents were registered dealers. The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in *Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer*, noting that the context of preventing fraud and ensuring administrative efficiency did not apply here. The court instead relied on *Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, Bombay-10 v. Hindustan Silk Mills, Bombay-2*, where a similar hypertechnical contention was rejected.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the respondents had sufficiently complied with the requirements of rule 11(4) by providing all necessary details, albeit not in the exact prescribed form. The court answered both questions in the affirmative, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The court also noted the destruction of relevant evidence by the department and the lack of request for forwarding the returns or copies thereof by the applicant, which further supported the respondents' case. Consequently, the court ordered the applicant to pay the respondents an aggregate sum of Rs. 300 by way of costs.

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