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1979 (11) TMI 275
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the interception and search of the motor trucks.
2. Validity of the prosecution under sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.
3. Jurisdiction and authority of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) to transfer cases under section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
4. Grounds for transfer of the case from the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM) to the CMM.
5. The impact of remarks made by the trial Magistrate on the investigation conducted by Customs Officers.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Interception and Search of the Motor Trucks:
The Customs Officers, acting on prior information and intelligence, intercepted two motor trucks suspected of carrying smuggled goods. The interception occurred near the New Bombay Bridge and the Golf Club within Chembur limits. Both trucks were found to contain contraband items such as wristwatches, sarees, and textiles valued at Rs. 18,43,898/- and Rs. 16,42,713/- respectively. The search was conducted in the presence of panch-witnesses and followed proper procedures, leading to the apprehension of four individuals.
2. Validity of the Prosecution:
The accused were prosecuted under sections 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) read with section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962. Two separate complaints were lodged for each truck, and the cases were assigned to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM). The accused in one of the cases admitted to traveling in the truck but denied knowledge of the contraband goods. The trial Magistrate acquitted the accused, criticizing the investigation for not apprehending the main culprits and only prosecuting the carriers.
3. Jurisdiction and Authority of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) to Transfer Cases:
The CMM has the authority under section 410 of the CrPC to withdraw or recall any case made over to any Magistrate subordinate to him and may inquire into or try such case himself or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other competent Magistrate. The CMM's power to transfer cases is not limited to administrative grounds but extends to judicial grounds as well.
4. Grounds for Transfer of the Case:
The Customs Officers requested the transfer of the second case from the ACMM to the CMM due to the remarks made by the trial Magistrate in the first case, which criticized the investigation. The CMM agreed to the transfer, recognizing that the identical nature of the evidence and the remarks made by the trial Magistrate could prejudice the second trial. The CMM's decision was based on the need to ensure a fair trial and avoid any potential bias.
5. Impact of Remarks Made by the Trial Magistrate:
The trial Magistrate's remarks criticized the investigation for not apprehending the main culprits and only prosecuting the carriers. These remarks were considered significant enough to warrant the transfer of the second case to avoid any potential prejudice. The CMM's order to transfer the case was upheld, emphasizing that the remarks made by the trial Magistrate could impact the fairness of the second trial.
Conclusion:
The High Court upheld the CMM's order to transfer the second case from the ACMM to the CMM, recognizing the need for a fair trial and avoiding potential prejudice due to the remarks made by the trial Magistrate. The CMM's authority to transfer cases under section 410 of the CrPC was affirmed, and the decision was based on both administrative and judicial grounds. The stay of proceedings granted at the time of admission was vacated, and the order of the CMM was confirmed.
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1979 (11) TMI 274
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of a second police investigation without judicial knowledge.
2. Influence of political considerations on the withdrawal of prosecution.
3. Compliance with Section 494 Cr.P.C. regarding the District Magistrate's order to withdraw from prosecution.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of a Second Police Investigation Without Judicial Knowledge:
The judgment addresses whether a case that ends in court can be subject to a second police investigation without the judge's knowledge. The court emphasized that the administration of criminal justice is a judicial function and any deviation from the prescribed legal procedures constitutes a violation of the law. The court stated, "When a case is pending in a criminal court, its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statute. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law."
2. Influence of Political Considerations on the Withdrawal of Prosecution:
The court examined whether political considerations influenced the motion for withdrawal of the pending proceeding. It was alleged that the withdrawal was prompted by political influence, with the Assistant Public Prosecutor not applying an independent mind. The court noted, "The functionary clothed by the Code with the power to withdraw from the prosecution is the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor is not the executive, nor a flunkey of political power." The court found no evidence to support the allegations of political influence and emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must act independently, stating, "It is abundantly clear that the Assistant Public Prosecutor made an independent decision on the material before him and did not act in blind compliance with the instructions of the District Magistrate."
3. Compliance with Section 494 Cr.P.C. Regarding the District Magistrate's Order to Withdraw from Prosecution:
The court scrutinized whether the District Magistrate's order to withdraw from the case complied with Section 494 Cr.P.C. The court clarified that the decision to withdraw must be made by the Public Prosecutor and not by any executive authority. The court stated, "The Public Prosecutor-not any executive authority-is entrusted by the Code with a limited power to withdraw from a prosecution, with the court's consent whereupon the case comes to a close." The court found that the District Magistrate acted illegally in directing the Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw but determined that the Assistant Public Prosecutor had applied his mind independently. The court emphasized, "The decision to withdraw must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those whose displeasure may affect his continuance in office."
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Assistant Public Prosecutor's decision to withdraw from the prosecution was made independently and not under political influence. The trial court and the High Court's decisions were upheld, and the petition was rejected. The court also addressed the petitioner's grievance regarding the return of stolen goods, instructing the trial court to consider passing appropriate orders for their return if identified by the complainant. The judgment underscores the importance of judicial independence in the criminal justice process and the limited role of the executive in prosecutorial decisions.
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1979 (11) TMI 273
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of auction sale proceedings.
2. Interpretation of the term "immediately" under Order 21 Rule 84(1) Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
3. Compliance with mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rule 84(1) CPC.
4. Impact of local amendments to Rule 65 and Rule 85 CPC on the auction sale process.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Auction Sale Proceedings:
The judgment-debtor appealed against the auction sale of their house property, arguing that the sale was invalid due to non-compliance with Order 21 Rule 84(1) CPC. The property was initially put to sale multiple times, but no satisfactory bids were received. Eventually, the highest bid of Rs. 72,000 by respondent No. 2 was accepted by the Court on 22-11-1978, despite his absence during the declaration.
2. Interpretation of the Term "Immediately":
The core issue revolved around the interpretation of "immediately" in Order 21 Rule 84(1) CPC, which mandates that the purchaser must deposit 25% of the purchase money immediately after being declared the purchaser. The appellant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Manilal v. Sayed Ahmed, which held that non-compliance with these provisions renders the sale a nullity. However, the Court noted that the exact meaning of "immediately" was not determined in the Manilal case.
3. Compliance with Mandatory Provisions of Order 21 Rule 84(1) CPC:
The Court acknowledged that the term "immediately" presupposes the presence of the successful bidder and the authority of the officer conducting the sale to declare the purchaser. In this case, due to local amendments, the highest bid could only be accepted by the Court, and the officer could not declare the highest bidder without the Court's leave. Consequently, respondent No. 2 was informed of his successful bid on 23-11-1978 and deposited the required 25% on 24-11-1978.
4. Impact of Local Amendments to Rule 65 and Rule 85 CPC:
The local amendments to Rule 65 and Rule 85 CPC influenced the interpretation of "immediately." The amendments required the highest bid to be accepted by the Court and allowed for certain procedural delays. The Court held that these amendments must be considered when interpreting "immediately," allowing for a reasonable time to comply with the deposit requirement.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the deposit made by respondent No. 2 on 24-11-1978 was in accordance with the law, given the procedural delays and local amendments. The term "immediately" was interpreted to mean "within a reasonable time" under the circumstances. The appeal was dismissed, and the auction sale was upheld as valid. The costs of the appeal were to be borne by the appellant, with a hearing fee of Rs. 200.
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1979 (11) TMI 272
Issues:
1. Specific performance of agreement to sell a property.
2. Validity of direction to deposit money into court within a specified time.
3. Dispute over extension of time for deposit and adjustment of mortgage amount.
4. Equitable relief in the context of specific performance.
5. Nullification of mortgage decree obtained by the appellant.
6. Decision on allowing appellant to deposit the amount due with conditions.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute regarding the specific performance of an agreement to sell a property between the appellant-plaintiff, a woman, and the respondent-defendant, a wealthy man, with whom she had an intimate relationship. The respondent agreed to sell his mansion to the appellant, subject to an equitable mortgage. Litigation arose when the appellant failed to deposit the required amount into court within the specified time, leading to various legal proceedings.
2. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, directing the appellant to deposit the mortgage amount plus an additional sum within a specified time. The High Court affirmed the direction to make the deposit but vacated the default clause, which would result in dismissal of the suit for non-payment within the time limit, considering it a preliminary decree under the Specific Relief Act.
3. The appellant sought an extension of time for deposit through interlocutory applications, which were denied by the court. The court eventually passed a judgment for recession of the contract for sale and delivery of possession with mesne profits, emphasizing the equitable nature of specific performance and the need for equity in seeking such relief.
4. The court highlighted the appellant's actions regarding the assignment of the mortgage as inconsistent with the agreement to sell, leading to a nullification of the mortgage decree obtained by her. The court emphasized the importance of equity in specific performance cases and the need for parties to act in good faith to ensure justice.
5. The court directed the appellant to deposit the amount due under the agreement within a specified time, along with an undertaking to give up all rights under the mortgage decree obtained earlier. Failure to comply with these conditions would result in the dismissal of the appeal with costs, indicating the court's emphasis on fairness and adherence to the terms of the agreement.
6. The court's decision to pass a conditional decree reflected the balance between granting relief to the appellant and ensuring equity in the specific performance of the agreement. The court's approach aimed at achieving justice while maintaining a concise and efficient legal process, considering the complexities of the case and the need for a fair resolution.
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1979 (11) TMI 271
Issues:
Whether a motor vehicle passing through the territory of the State of Mysore on the way to another State is considered "kept" in Mysore under Section 3(1) of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957.
Analysis:
The case involved a dispute regarding the taxation of motor vehicles passing through the State of Mysore to reach their destination in another state. The appellant argued that such vehicles should be taxable under Section 3(2) of the Taxation Act as they use the roads of Mysore during their journey. However, the High Court held that vehicles merely passing through Mysore are not "kept" in the state and are not taxable. The Supreme Court analyzed the interpretation of the term "kept" in the context of the Taxation Act.
The Supreme Court interpreted the term "kept" in its ordinary sense, emphasizing that it implies a certain degree of stationariness or retention. The Court highlighted that the word "kept" in the context of the Act suggests more than a mere transient presence or a halt during transit. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that any vehicle capable of road use, even if briefly present in Mysore, should be taxable under Section 3(2), as it would lead to an unreasonable outcome.
Drawing parallels from English court decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized that the concept of "keeping" a vehicle involves a continuous process or a significant interval of time. Citing the cases of Dudley v. Holland and Biggs v. Mitchell, the Court concluded that a vehicle in transit through Mysore or making a necessary halt during the journey cannot be considered "kept" for road use in Mysore. Therefore, the Court upheld the High Court's interpretation of Section 3 of the Taxation Act and dismissed the appeal, with each party bearing their own costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified that motor vehicles merely passing through the State of Mysore without being stationed or retained for a significant period cannot be deemed "kept" in the state for the purpose of taxation under the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957.
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1979 (11) TMI 270
Issues Involved:
1. Proprietary right to the use of the trade mark.
2. Colorable imitation of plaintiff's marks.
3. Passing off goods as those of the plaintiff.
4. Commencement of defendant's use of marks.
5. Plaintiff's entitlement to damages.
6. Jurisdiction of the Court.
7. Plaintiff's acquisition of copyright to the trade mark.
8. Relief entitled to the plaintiff.
9. Impact of subsequent registration of the trade mark.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Proprietary Right to the Use of the Trade Mark:
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had been using his trade mark since 1959 and had registered it under the Indian Copyright Act in 1965. The plaintiff had also applied for registration under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, which was pending. The court found that the plaintiff had acquired a proprietary right to the use of the mark.
2. Colorable Imitation of Plaintiff's Marks:
The learned District Judge compared the marks used by the plaintiff and the defendant and concluded that "it is not possible to come to the conclusion that they are similar or deceptively similar enabling the plaintiff to seek an injunction or damages." The court found that the marks used by the defendant were not colorable imitations or similar to the trademarks used by the plaintiff.
3. Passing Off Goods as Those of the Plaintiff:
The court found that the defendant had not been passing off his goods as those of the plaintiff. The trial court observed that there was no similarity between the symbols and writings on the wrappers and labels used by the plaintiff and the defendant that could cause confusion among consumers.
4. Commencement of Defendant's Use of Marks:
The court examined whether the defendant had started using the marks in question from September 1972, as alleged by the plaintiff, or from 1952, as claimed by the defendant. The court found that the defendant's claim of using the marks since 1952 was not substantiated.
5. Plaintiff's Entitlement to Damages:
The court found no evidence of actual damage suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant's actions. Therefore, the claim for damages was disallowed.
6. Jurisdiction of the Court:
The court addressed the defendant's contention that the suit was not competent as the trade mark was not registered at the time of filing. The court clarified that under Section 23 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, the date of registration is deemed to be the date of application, making the suit competent. The court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
7. Plaintiff's Acquisition of Copyright to the Trade Mark:
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had registered the trade mark under the Indian Copyright Act in 1965, establishing his right to the trade mark.
8. Relief Entitled to the Plaintiff:
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to relief in the form of a declaration of his right to use the trade mark and an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the infringing trade mark. The claim for damages was disallowed due to lack of evidence.
9. Impact of Subsequent Registration of the Trade Mark:
The court noted that the plaintiff had amended the plaint to include a prayer for injunction after the trade mark was registered. The court held that the subsequent registration of the trade mark allowed the plaintiff to maintain an action for infringement.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside. The suit was decreed for the declaration and injunction prayed for by the plaintiff, with proportionate costs throughout. The claim for damages was disallowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 269
Issues:
1. Disallowance of additional interest amount in two appeals filed by the assessee.
2. Disallowance of interest on advances made to Directors for vehicle purchase in two Departmental appeals.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Disallowance of additional interest amount
In the appeals filed by the assessee, the contention was that the Assessing Officer was not justified in upholding the addition of additional interest during the assessment years 1976-77 and 1977-78. The Assessing Officer found that the company charged a lower interest rate to its Directors compared to the rate it paid to an allied concern from which it borrowed funds. The Appellate Tribunal held that the borrowing and lending transactions were independent, and there was no evidence to suggest diversion of borrowed funds to the Directors at a lower interest rate. The Tribunal also noted that the interest rate charged by the company was reasonable, considering the circumstances. Citing relevant case law, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, deleting the disallowed interest amounts.
Issue 2: Disallowance of interest on advances for vehicle purchase
In the Departmental appeals, the first contention was regarding depreciation on vehicles not registered in the company's name but in the names of Directors. The second contention was the disallowance of interest claimed by the company on advances made to Directors for vehicle purchase. The Tribunal noted that the vehicles were assets of the company, used for business purposes, and reflected in the company's balance sheet. The Tribunal referred to relevant decisions supporting the claim of depreciation despite registration in Directors' names. Regarding interest disallowance, the Tribunal agreed with the AAC that the advances were made for business purposes, and hence, upheld the deletion of interest disallowance. Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, and those filed by the Department were dismissed.
In conclusion, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee in both sets of appeals, emphasizing the independence of transactions, reasonableness of interest rates, and the business purpose of advances made to Directors for vehicle purchases.
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1979 (11) TMI 268
Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the State Government to direct further investigation.
2. Legality of the Magistrate postponing consideration of the final report.
3. High Court's interference with the investigation under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Competence of the State Government to Direct Further Investigation:
The Court examined whether the State Government was precluded from directing further investigation in a case where a report was submitted under s. 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held that the State Government, under its power of superintendence as provided by s. 3 of the Indian Police Act, 1861, has the authority to direct further investigation. The Inspector-General, Vigilance, being an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station, can exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station throughout the State. The Court clarified that s. 173(8) of the Code, which allows further investigation by an officer in charge of a police station, does not curtail the State Government's power to direct further investigation.
2. Legality of the Magistrate Postponing Consideration of the Final Report:
The Court addressed whether the Magistrate committed an illegality by postponing the consideration of the final report upon the request of the Assistant Public Prosecutor until the completion of further investigation directed by the State Government. It was concluded that the Magistrate did not commit any illegality. The power of the Magistrate under s. 156(3) to direct further investigation is independent and does not conflict with the power of the State Government. The Court emphasized that the State Government's direction for further investigation was within its competence.
3. High Court's Interference with the Investigation Under Art. 226 of the Constitution:
The Court examined whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the investigation and prohibiting further investigation while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was held that the High Court erred in interfering at the investigation stage, which is a domain reserved for the executive and police. The Court reiterated that the judiciary should not interfere with the statutory right of the police to investigate cognizable offences unless there is a gross abuse of power. The High Court's direction to the Magistrate on how to dispose of the case was deemed an overreach and an usurpation of the Magistrate's jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and restored the order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate dated February 24, 1979. The judgment clarified the scope of the State Government's power to direct further investigation, upheld the legality of the Magistrate's postponement of the final report consideration, and limited the judiciary's interference in the investigative process.
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1979 (11) TMI 267
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the discharge of workmen amounted to dismissal due to alleged misconduct.
2. Whether an arbitrator falls within the ambit of the term "tribunal" under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. Whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution while interfering with the arbitrator's finding.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the discharge of workmen amounted to dismissal due to alleged misconduct:
The court examined the distinction between discharge simpliciter and dismissal as punishment. The Model Standing Orders (M.S.O.s) under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, allow an employer to terminate the services of a workman either by discharge under M.S.O. 23 or by dismissal under M.S.O. 25, with the latter requiring an inquiry. The court held that if the termination was intended as punishment, it would be considered dismissal. However, if the discharge was motivated by reasons other than punishment, it would remain a discharge simpliciter. The court concluded that the management's action of recording reasons for discharge, which included allegations of misconduct, did not automatically convert the discharge into dismissal unless there was an intention to punish.
2. Whether an arbitrator falls within the ambit of the term "tribunal" under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act:
The court analyzed the language of Section 11-A and the definition of "tribunal" under Section 2(r) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that the term "tribunal" should include arbitrators, especially given the legislative intent to provide arbitrators with similar powers as tribunals. However, the court found that the language of Section 11-A was unambiguous and did not include arbitrators within the definition of "tribunal." The court emphasized that the omission of the term "arbitrator" in Section 11-A was deliberate, and thus, arbitrators did not have the same powers as tribunals under this section.
3. Whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution while interfering with the arbitrator's finding:
The court reiterated the limited scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, which is confined to ensuring that the arbitrator functions within the scope of legal authority. The High Court's interference with the arbitrator's finding on the appropriateness of the punishment was deemed to exceed its jurisdiction. The court held that the High Court cannot act as an appellate body over the arbitrator's decision unless there is a clear case of jurisdictional overreach or perversity in the arbitrator's findings.
Final Relief:
The court directed the reinstatement of 139 permanent workmen and 74 long-term casual workmen, with specified timelines for their re-employment. The court also ordered the payment of 50% back wages to the reinstated permanent workmen and 75% back wages to the 100 workmen who were not reinstated but deemed to be in service until August 3, 1979. The remaining 57 short-term casual workmen were awarded a token compensation of Rs. 1,000 each in lieu of reinstatement.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Koshal dissented on three key findings:
1. He argued that the discharge of workmen did not amount to dismissal as the intention to punish was absent.
2. He disagreed with the inclusion of arbitrators within the term "tribunal" under Section 11-A.
3. He contended that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 by interfering with the arbitrator's decision on punishment.
Justice Koshal concluded that the orders of discharge were properly passed under M.S.O. 23, the arbitrator could not exercise the powers under Section 11-A, and the High Court's interference was beyond its jurisdiction. He would have reversed the High Court's judgment and restored the arbitrator's award.
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1979 (11) TMI 266
The revision was filed against the rejection of a review application regarding exemption from purchase tax on split dal. The High Court held that whole and split dal are the same commodity and the assessee was not liable to pay tax. The court allowed the revision, set aside the previous order, and awarded costs to the assessee. (Case: R.M. Sahai, J., 1979 (11) TMI 266 - Allahabad High Court)
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1979 (11) TMI 265
Issues:
- Interpretation of the definition of "food" and "sale" under the Food Adulteration Act.
- Determining whether the sale of adulterated gingelly oil intended for external use constitutes a sale of an article of food.
- Clarification on the legal position regarding the sale of food products not intended for human consumption.
Analysis:
The case involved the sale of gingelly oil mixed with groundnut oil, represented as gingelly oil, by the respondent to the Food Inspector. The respondent claimed the oil was for external use, not human consumption. The Trial Magistrate convicted him under relevant sections of the Food Adulteration Act, but the Sessions Judge acquitted him. The State appealed to the High Court, which upheld the acquittal. The Supreme Court clarified the legal position, focusing on the definitions of "food" and "sale" under the Act.
The Court emphasized that an article need not be intended for human consumption to be considered "food" under the Act. Even if an article is commonly used for human consumption, it falls under the definition of "food." The Act aims to protect vulnerable populations who may consume unfit products due to poverty. The Court rejected the argument that sale for external use exempts an article from being considered food, stating that the definition of "sale" under the Act is broad and covers various types of sales, including for analysis.
The Court addressed previous confusion in interpreting the Act, emphasizing that the sale of adulterated gingelly oil, regardless of its intended use, constitutes a sale of an article of food. The judgment clarified that the Act's scope includes articles commonly used for human consumption, irrespective of labeling or intended use. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sale of adulterated food products, even if labeled for external use, violates the Food Adulteration Act.
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1979 (11) TMI 264
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant belonged to the 'Mana' community specified in the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.
2. Whether the appellant was qualified to contest the election from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes.
3. Interpretation of the amendments made to the Schedule to the Order by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976.
Summary:
Issue 1: Whether the appellant belonged to the 'Mana' community specified in the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.
The appellant declared that he belonged to the 'Mana' community in his nomination paper. Respondent No. 1 contended that the appellant belonged to the 'Kshatriya Bidwaik Mana' community, which was not listed in the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The High Court upheld this contention, stating that the appellant did not belong to any of the Scheduled Tribes specified in Part IX of the Schedule to the Order.
Issue 2: Whether the appellant was qualified to contest the election from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes.
The appellant's election was challenged on the grounds that he did not belong to any Scheduled Tribe as specified in the Order. The High Court found that the appellant did not belong to the 'Mana' community referred to in Entry No. 18 of Part IX of the Schedule to the Order and thus was not qualified to contest the election from a reserved constituency. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, noting that the appellant's community had no affinity with the 'Gond' tribe, which was a requirement for being considered part of the 'Mana' community listed in the Schedule.
Issue 3: Interpretation of the amendments made to the Schedule to the Order by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976.
The appellant argued that the amendments made by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976, which substituted the old Schedule with a new one, intended to include all 'Mana' communities, regardless of their affinity with the 'Gond' tribe. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the inclusion of 'Mana' in Entry No. 18 of Part IX of the new Schedule still referred to the 'Mana' community having affinity with the 'Gond' tribe. The Court held that the Parliament did not intend to treat the 'Kshatriya Bidwaik Mana' community as a Scheduled Tribe by the amendment.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe and was not qualified to contest the election from a reserved constituency. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 263
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932.
2. Validity of the High Court's decision on unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
3. Examination of the Henry VIII clause in the context of delegated legislation.
Summary:
1. Constitutionality of Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932:
The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932, which allows the State Government to exempt any registered society from any provisions of the Act or to apply such provisions with modifications. The Court noted that the provision is a near Henry VIII clause but emphasized that the mere naming of the clause does not invalidate it. The Court found that the preamble and the scheme of the Act provide clear policy and guidelines, stating that the Act aims to facilitate the formation and working of cooperative societies for the promotion of thrift, self-help, and mutual aid among agriculturists and other persons with common economic needs to bring about better living, better business, and better methods of production.
2. Validity of the High Court's Decision on Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power:
The High Court of Kerala had struck down Section 60 and a related notification on the grounds of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court disagreed with this view, stating that the power to legislate includes the power to delegate, provided that the delegation does not amount to abdication. The Court emphasized that the legislature must lay down policy and principle and may delegate the authority to fill in details and carry out the policy. The Court found that Section 60 is within permissible limits of delegation as it is guided by the policy and objectives stated in the preamble and other provisions of the Act.
3. Examination of the Henry VIII Clause in the Context of Delegated Legislation:
The Court discussed the theory of delegated legislation, noting that modern legislative bodies are not equipped to handle every technical and situational intricacy, which necessitates delegation to expert executive bodies. The Court referred to several precedents, including Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, and others, to illustrate that delegation is permissible when the legislature provides clear policy and guidelines. The Court concluded that Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act is not void for excessive delegation as it is designed to advance the policy and objectives of the Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared that Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932, is not void on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power and dismissed the appeal. The Court upheld the validity of the provision, emphasizing that it is guided by clear policy and objectives aimed at facilitating the formation and working of cooperative societies.
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1979 (11) TMI 262
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction u/s 302 I.P.C.
2. Recovery of the deceased's wrist-watch.
3. Handwriting evidence on prescription pad Ex. P. 9.
Summary:
1. Conviction u/s 302 I.P.C.:
Murari Lal, initially convicted u/s 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, had his conviction altered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to u/s 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C., substituting the death sentence with life imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, dismissing Murari Lal's appeal.
2. Recovery of the deceased's wrist-watch:
The wrist-watch belonging to the deceased, H. D. Sonawala, was recovered at the instance of Murari Lal. The appellant's explanation that he purchased the watch from Roop Chand was not substantiated by any evidence. The Court found the recovery significant despite the time-lag, linking it with the robbery and murder due to the absence of any acceptable explanation.
3. Handwriting evidence on prescription pad Ex. P. 9:
The handwriting in Hindi on page G of Ex. P. 9 was identified as Murari Lal's by a handwriting expert, P.W. 15. The Court rejected the argument that the opinion of a handwriting expert requires substantial corroboration, emphasizing that the expert's opinion should be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given. Both the Sessions Court and the High Court compared the disputed writing with admitted writings and found them to be by the same person. The Supreme Court agreed with this finding, dismissing the appellant's argument that the internal evidence of the document showed he was not its author.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and life sentence of Murari Lal based on the recovery of the deceased's wrist-watch and the handwriting evidence linking him to the crime scene.
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1979 (11) TMI 261
Issues involved: Refund of excess market fees paid u/s Haryana Act No. 32 of 1977, applicability of limitation period and Art. 226, redistribution of amounts collected in excess, discretionary powers u/s Article 226, equitable relief, procedure for refund and redistribution.
Refund of excess market fees: The appellants and writ petitioners had paid market fees at an increased rate of 3 per cent under Haryana Act No. 32 of 1977, which was later ruled as ultra vires by the Court. The market committees were found liable to refund the illegal portion of the fees collected. The petitioners demanded a direction for refund, supported by the fact that the market committees had accounts of collections and were willing to disgorge the excess sums. The Court emphasized the obligation to return wrongly recovered moneys, especially for public bodies, without any limitation period hindrance.
Applicability of limitation period and Art. 226: The Court refrained from pronouncing on the period of limitation or the application of Art. 226, as the High Court's judgment did not necessitate a ruling on these points. The principle of ubi jus ibi remedium was highlighted, emphasizing the importance of providing remedies for enforcing rights and averting wrongs, especially in cases involving public bodies and erroneous levies.
Redistribution of excess amounts: The Court considered the issue of traders having recovered excess percentages from next purchasers and proposed a scheme for refund by the market committees and redistribution of small amounts to the original payers. Drawing on the Newabganj Sugar Mills case, the Court suggested adapting a similar procedure to deal with the situation, ensuring that unwarranted collections are returned to the rightful recipients.
Discretionary powers u/s Article 226: Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy founded on legal injury, allowing the Court to pass orders based on public interest and equity. The Court exercised its flexible power to make directions for the refund and redistribution of excess amounts collected by the market committees, emphasizing the importance of considering public interest in such matters.
Equitable relief and procedure for refund: The Court directed all sums collected in excess to be paid into the High Court, with a statement of excess amounts to be submitted by dealers within a specified period. A mechanism for claims and payments was outlined, with the Registrar overseeing the process and ensuring timely refunds with interest. The Court stressed the need for equitable relief and efficient processing of claims to ensure justice for all parties involved.
Conclusion: The appeals and writ petitions were disposed of with directions for refund and redistribution, aiming to benefit both the traders and consumers. The Court emphasized the importance of justice, equity, and good conscience in resolving the issue, with parties instructed to bear their own costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 260
Issues:
Interpretation of sections 6 and 16 of the Gold (Control) Act with respect to pawnbrokers' obligations to make declarations of gold possessions.
Analysis:
The petitioners, pawnbrokers lending money on ornaments and gold articles, challenged a notice requiring them to make declarations under the Gold (Control) Act. The petitioners argued that as pawnbrokers, they were not owners of the gold items pawned to them, and thus, section 16 did not apply to them. They contended that they held the items as bailees and did not have actual possession, custody, or control as required by section 16(1). However, the court rejected this argument, stating that section 16 clearly includes persons having possession, custody, or control of gold items, irrespective of ownership. The court emphasized that pawnbrokers fall within the scope of section 16 of the Act.
The petitioners further argued that they could not accurately provide the required details in the declaration forms due to their lack of knowledge about the gold items' fineness and weight, which could lead to prosecution for making false declarations. However, the court disagreed, citing a Supreme Court decision (Badri Prasad v. Collector of Central Excise) that held pawnbrokers are obligated to submit declarations under Form No. GS 3, regardless of their knowledge about the gold items. The court clarified that Form GS 3A only required gross weight details of the items, not the fineness or exact gold quantity.
Based on the Supreme Court precedent and the clear language of the Gold (Control) Act, the court ruled in favor of the respondents, discharging the Rule and vacating interim orders. The petitioners were directed to file necessary returns within two months and comply with the Act's provisions moving forward. The court concluded that the petitioners' arguments were not tenable in light of the legal obligations imposed by the Act, as clarified by the Supreme Court precedent.
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1979 (11) TMI 259
The judgment in the case of Government of India v. Shri D.N. Mehta (1979) held that the Appellate Collector should have given the applicant an opportunity of personal hearing or verified the petitioners' contention before confirming the demand. The Government set aside the Appellate Collector's order and directed a new disposal of the appeal after complying with the principles of natural justice.
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1979 (11) TMI 258
Issues:
1. Whether certain in-process materials used in the manufacturing process are liable to excise duty.
2. Whether the demands for excise duty were valid and timely.
3. Whether the materials in question can be classified as "goods" under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a representation by a company against demands of excise duty on Jute Batching Oil, Sizing paste, and Steam used for captive consumption during a specific period. The company argued that these materials were in-process substances and not marketable goods, thus not liable for duty. The company had followed prescribed procedures for denaturing the Jute Batching Oil and using the sizing paste immediately after preparation. The company contended that the demands were raised incorrectly by the Central Excise Inspector, and they had challenged the demands through representations to the Assistant Collector, seeking a refund of the duty paid under protest.
2. Subsequently, additional demand letters were issued to the company based on an increase in the duty rate, which the company opposed citing Notification No. 118/75 and the time limitation under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The company requested the set aside of the demands and a refund of the duty paid, emphasizing the procedural irregularities in the issuance of demands without proper orders and hearings.
3. After a personal hearing and review of the case records, the Commissioner held that the emulsified R.D.O. and sizing paste, due to their short shelf life and non-marketable nature, did not qualify as goods under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Therefore, these materials were considered in-process substances and not subject to excise duty. However, the steam, being a commercially known and marketed product to a limited extent, was liable for duty as per government orders, but the duty already paid was remitted. Consequently, the demand letters were set aside, and the duty paid on the three products was ordered to be refunded, while the demands not honored were to be vacated.
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1979 (11) TMI 257
Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility for assessment under heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act.
2. Requirement of contract registration before clearance for home consumption.
3. Interpretation of sub-regulations (2) and (4) of Regulation 3 of Notification No. 183-Cus., dated 18-11-1965.
4. Custom House practice regarding endorsement on the Import Trade Control (ITC) Licence.
5. Procedural delays and the role of various governmental agencies in obtaining necessary endorsements.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility for assessment under heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act:
The appellant, M/s. Modern Nets Limited, requested that certain machinery capital assets imported for their factory be assessed under heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act. The goods were initially assessed under 84.37(2). The benefit under heading 84.66 is permissible if the goods are imported against specific contracts registered with the appropriate Custom House before clearance for home consumption.
2. Requirement of contract registration before clearance for home consumption:
The Assistant Collector rejected the appellant's request for reassessment under 84.66 because the contracts were not registered with the Customs House before the clearance of the goods. The appellant argued that they were misinformed by the Customs House that registration could not be done without a specific endorsement from the ITC Licence Issuing Authority.
3. Interpretation of sub-regulations (2) and (4) of Regulation 3 of Notification No. 183-Cus., dated 18-11-1965:
Sub-regulation (2) requires the importer to apply for registration as soon as they obtain the ITC Licence. Sub-regulation (4) requires the application to be accompanied by the original contract deed, the ITC Licence, and a statement describing the articles licensed to be imported, duly attested by the issuing authority. The Custom House practice of requiring an endorsement on the ITC Licence that the goods are eligible for assessment under 84.66 was found to be unwarranted by the appellate authority. The attestation mentioned is only for the statement describing the articles licensed to be imported.
4. Custom House practice regarding endorsement on the ITC Licence:
The appellate authority held that the Custom House's practice of treating the endorsement by the ITC Authorities as a statutory condition for registration of contracts was incorrect. The Custom House should grant provisional registration to importers who possess an ITC Licence without the endorsement and make it contingent upon later scrutiny of the requisite Project Reports, Technical feasibility reports, and other relevant documents.
5. Procedural delays and the role of various governmental agencies in obtaining necessary endorsements:
The appellant faced delays and refusals from various governmental agencies, including the Textile Commissioner and the Ministry of Industry, in obtaining the necessary endorsement on the ITC Licence. The appellate authority noted that the refusal of the Textile Commissioner to grant the endorsement was unwarranted and that the appellants had taken every possible step to obtain it. The delays were attributed to the interconnected functioning of various governmental agencies, which was not the fault of the appellant.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed because the Custom House's interpretation of sub-regulations (2) and (4) of Regulation 3 was unwarranted. The appellant had done everything within their power to secure the benefit of Project Import Regulations. The contracts should be registered, and the benefit of Project Import Regulations should be extended to the appellant. The Custom House's practice of requiring an endorsement on the ITC Licence was deemed incorrect, and provisional registration should be granted based on the possession of an ITC Licence.
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1979 (11) TMI 256
Issues Involved:
1. Possession of the disputed land.
2. Definition and scope of "public utility" under Article 226(6) of the Constitution.
3. Legitimacy of the acquisition for public utility.
4. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury.
5. Timeliness and procedural aspects of the stay application.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Possession of the Disputed Land:
The petitioner, Bharat Bhawan Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., filed a stay petition to restrain the State of Rajasthan, Urban Improvement Trust (UIT), the Land Acquisition Officer, and the Rajasthan Housing Board from interfering with its possession over Khasra Nos. 87 and 88 in Jaipur. The respondents asserted that the land was already in possession of the Housing Board, making the stay application misconceived. The court found that the possession had been taken by the respondents on 7-2-1977, as substantiated by documents from the UIT, and thus, the petitioner was not in possession of the land.
2. Definition and Scope of "Public Utility" under Article 226(6):
The petitioner argued that the acquisition was not for "public utility" but merely for a public purpose, citing the Andhra Pradesh High Court's interpretation in Talasani China Gang! Reddy v. Dist. Collector, Anantpur. The respondents contended that the housing activity of the Housing Board, a state-owned corporation, is a project of great public utility. The court disagreed with the Andhra Pradesh High Court's narrow interpretation and held that "public utility" should be understood in a broader sense, encompassing any work or project beneficial to the public, even if it serves only a section of the community.
3. Legitimacy of the Acquisition for Public Utility:
The court examined the notification of acquisition, which stated that the land was required for the planned development of Jaipur City. The court found that the housing scheme, which includes the construction of houses, roads, and amenities like parks, serves the public at large. The court cited various precedents, including State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, to support the view that providing housing to the homeless is a public purpose and, by extension, a public utility.
4. Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Injury:
The court noted that no houses had been constructed on the disputed land, and thus, the petitioner could not claim any substantial or irreparable injury. The balance of convenience favored the respondents, as staying the housing scheme would cause inordinate delays and potentially force the Housing Board to abandon the project, which had already seen significant financial investment.
5. Timeliness and Procedural Aspects of the Stay Application:
The court observed that the petitioner had filed the writ application challenging the acquisition notification after a delay of about two years. The court found it inexpedient to stay the implementation of the Housing Board Schemes during the pendency of the writ application, especially given the technical nature of the alleged violations. The court emphasized that even if the petitioner's technical pleas succeeded, the respondents could still take fresh proceedings to address any procedural lacunae.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the stay application, emphasizing that the acquisition of land for the Housing Board project constitutes a public utility under Article 226(6) of the Constitution. The court vacated the interim stay, noting that the petitioner was not in possession of the land, the balance of convenience favored the respondents, and the stay application was procedurally delayed.
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