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1983 (11) TMI 344
ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe primary issues considered in this judgment were: 1. Whether the termination of the respondents' employment complied with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which mandates the conditions for valid retrenchment. 2. Whether the termination adhered to Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which prescribes the principle of 'last come, first go' in retrenchment scenarios. 3. Whether the two units of the petitioners' firm constituted a single industrial establishment for the purposes of applying Section 25G. 4. The appropriate remedy for the respondents if the termination was found to be in violation of the aforementioned provisions. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS 1. Compliance with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 25F requires that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched until the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the termination notices were served on May 20, 1974, with the termination being effective from May 10, 1974. The Labour Court found that the retrenchment compensation and wages were offered after the termination date, violating Section 25F. Application of law to facts: The Court determined that the retrenchment should be considered effective from May 20, 1974, when the termination notice was served. The tendering of compensation and wages on this date fulfilled the condition precedent required by Section 25F, thus the Labour Court's finding was incorrect. 2. Compliance with Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 25G enshrines the principle that retrenchment should follow the rule of 'last come, first go,' unless there are valid reasons to deviate from this rule. Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined whether the two units of the petitioners' firm were distinct or constituted a single establishment. The Labour Court found that both units were under the same supervision and had inter-unit employee transfers, indicating they were one establishment. Key evidence and findings: The Court noted the evidence of shared supervision, consolidated accounts, and employee transfers between units. It was undisputed that junior polishers were retained at Khotachi Wadi when the respondents were retrenched. Application of law to facts: The Court agreed with the Labour Court that the petitioners violated Section 25G by not following the 'last come, first go' principle, as the two units were indeed one establishment. 3. Appropriate Remedy Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court considered whether reinstatement was appropriate given the closure of both establishments. The Labour Court had ordered reinstatement until the closure of Khotachi Wadi. Application of law to facts: The Court found it more appropriate to award back wages from May 20, 1974, to August 30, 1976, instead of reinstatement, given the closure of the establishments. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS Core principles established: The Court clarified the application of Sections 25F and 25G, emphasizing the importance of the sequence and timing of retrenchment notices and compensation. It also reinforced the interpretation of what constitutes a single industrial establishment for the purposes of retrenchment rules. Final determinations on each issue: The Court held that the retrenchment complied with Section 25F but violated Section 25G. Consequently, the Court modified the Labour Court's award, directing the petitioners to pay back wages from May 20, 1974, to August 30, 1976, instead of reinstatement.
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1983 (11) TMI 343
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 126 of the Evidence Act in the context of summoning an advocate as a witness.
2. Review of a court order revoking the issuance of summons to an advocate witness.
Analysis:
1. The judgment dealt with the interpretation of Section 126 of the Evidence Act regarding the privilege of advocates not to disclose confidential communications with clients. The petitioner sought to summon an advocate as a witness in a case, but the advocate claimed privilege under Section 126, stating that he cannot be called upon to disclose privileged information. The court considered various precedents, such as P. Rajamma v. P. Chintaiah and Antony v. G. S. Naidu, to determine the scope of privilege under this section. The court emphasized that the privilege extends only to communications made in the course of professional employment and does not protect communications made for illegal purposes or fraud.
2. The review petition was filed challenging the court's order revoking the issuance of summons to the advocate witness. The petitioner argued that Section 126 should not apply in this case as the summons had already been issued initially. However, the court upheld its decision, stating that there was no error in applying Section 126 and that the advocate should not be compelled to give evidence that may breach client confidentiality. The court highlighted the importance of maintaining the privilege and confidentiality of communications between advocates and clients to ensure effective legal representation.
3. The judgment also referenced the decision in Moti bai v. State, emphasizing the importance of allowing accused individuals to consult with their legal advisors and maintain confidentiality in their communications. Section 126 was viewed as a safeguard to prevent intrusion into the confidential relationship between advocates and clients. The court underscored the necessity for clients to disclose all relevant information to their advocates without fear of disclosure, except in cases involving illegal activities or fraud.
4. Ultimately, the court dismissed the civil revision petition, upholding the order that the advocate witness should not be called upon to give evidence due to the privilege granted under Section 126 of the Evidence Act. The judgment reinforced the principle that the privilege of advocates to maintain client confidentiality is crucial for the effective functioning of the legal system and should be upheld unless there are compelling reasons to set it aside.
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1983 (11) TMI 342
The High Court held that effective hearing to objectors is mandatory. The report of the Land Acquisition Collector was non-speaking, and the Lt. Governor's order did not meet the mandatory requirements of Section 6. Orders for eleven villages were quashed due to lack of application of mind.
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1983 (11) TMI 341
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
2. Whether Kusum Dewan and Mohinder Advani can be treated as approvers in both the charge-sheet case and the complaint case.
3. Applicability of Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. to the complaint case.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
The petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was challenged based on the bar incorporated in sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code. The court acknowledged the bar provided in sub-section (3) of Section 397, which prevents a second revision application by the same person. However, it was clarified that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are not in conflict with the specific powers conferred by the Cr.P.C. and can be exercised to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The court referenced several Supreme Court decisions, including Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye, to illustrate that the inherent powers of the High Court are preserved and can be exercised in exceptional cases. Therefore, the petition was deemed maintainable.
2. Whether Kusum Dewan and Mohinder Advani Can Be Treated as Approvers in Both the Charge-Sheet Case and the Complaint Case
The court examined whether Kusum Dewan and Mohinder Advani, who were granted pardon, could be treated as approvers in both the charge-sheet case and the complaint case. It was argued that the two approvers were granted pardon in relation to composite allegations involving offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 IPC, and Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The court noted that the investigation, application for pardon, and orders granting pardon related to composite offences, including those forming the subject matter of the complaint case. The court rejected the contention that the approvers could only be treated as witnesses in the complaint case, emphasizing that the composite nature of the allegations and the investigation justified their status as approvers in both cases.
3. Applicability of Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. to the Complaint Case
The court addressed whether the procedure under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. could be applied to the complaint case. It was argued that since the complaint case involved offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, the provisions of Section 306, which allows for the tender of pardon to an accomplice, were applicable. The court referenced judicial precedents to support the view that where some offences are within the terms of Section 306 and others are not, but they arise out of the same transaction, the pardon would cover all offences. The court concluded that Kusum Dewan and Mohinder Advani, having been granted pardon in relation to composite allegations, could be treated as approvers in the complaint case, and the procedure under Section 306(5) could be followed.
Conclusion:
The petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed. The court held that Kusum Dewan and Mohinder Advani could be treated as approvers in both the charge-sheet case and the complaint case, and the procedure under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. was applicable to the complaint case. The trial of the complaint was directed to proceed with expedition to make up for the time lost due to the proceedings leading to the petition.
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1983 (11) TMI 340
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Memorandum dated 25th June 1975.
2. Validity of the order appointing Shri R. Banerjee as Enquiring Authority.
3. Validity of the order dated 25th June 1975 initiating departmental proceedings.
4. Refusal to provide inspection or copies of documents.
5. Legality of the transfer order dated 23rd May 1974.
6. Legality of the suspension order dated 4/6th November 1974.
7. Allegations of misconduct against the petitioner.
8. Violation of principles of natural justice.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Memorandum dated 25th June 1975
The petitioner challenged the Memorandum dated 25th June 1975, which proposed a common enquiry under Rules 9 and 10 of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The petitioner argued that the Governor was not the appropriate authority to issue the memorandum and claimed the initiation of common proceedings to be unauthorized. The court found that the issue of the charge sheet by or in the name of the Governor and the initiation of common proceedings under the said Rules were not void, irregular, unauthorized, or without jurisdiction.
2. Validity of the order appointing Shri R. Banerjee as Enquiring Authority
The petitioner contested the appointment of Shri R. Banerjee as the Enquiring Authority under Rule 10(4) of the said Rules. The court upheld the appointment, finding no irregularities or unauthorized actions in the appointment process.
3. Validity of the order dated 25th June 1975 initiating departmental proceedings
The petitioner argued that the departmental proceedings initiated by the order dated 25th June 1975 were based on stale and remote incidents from 1967, which lacked nexus and were biased. The court agreed, stating that the incident of 1967 was too stale and remote when the charge sheet was issued in 1975, thus vitiating the entire proceedings. The court also noted that the said Rules were not retrospective, and the petitioner could not be proceeded with under these Rules for offences that occurred before their enactment.
4. Refusal to provide inspection or copies of documents
The petitioner claimed that the refusal to provide inspection or copies of documents violated the principles of natural justice. The court agreed, stating that the refusal constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice, as it deprived the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
5. Legality of the transfer order dated 23rd May 1974
The petitioner alleged that the transfer order was a result of his detection of mischief in a modified ration shop and was not made in public interest. The respondents claimed the transfer was in public interest due to the petitioner's careless and irresponsible dealings. The court found no evidence of malice or improper motives behind the transfer order and upheld its legality.
6. Legality of the suspension order dated 4/6th November 1974
The petitioner challenged the suspension order as null, void, irregular, and passed in excess of power and jurisdiction. The court found that the suspension order was issued pending investigation into certain allegations against the petitioner and was in accordance with the rules, legal, bona fide, and proper.
7. Allegations of misconduct against the petitioner
The petitioner denied the allegations of misconduct, claiming they were baseless and contrary to the said Rules. The court found that the conduct of the petitioner in dealing with blank ration cards was suspicious and unbecoming of a government servant. However, the court noted that the charges were not duly framed or proceeded with at the relevant stage, and it would be unfair to allow such stale charges to be racked up after a long lapse of time.
8. Violation of principles of natural justice
The petitioner argued that the proceedings were vitiated due to the violation of principles of natural justice, including the non-supply of records and the delay in initiating proceedings. The court agreed, stating that the unexplained delay in initiating the proceedings constituted a violation of principles of natural justice. The court also emphasized that mere suspicion could not be the basis for initiating or concluding departmental proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court found that the initiation of departmental proceedings based on stale incidents, refusal to provide documents, and unexplained delay constituted violations of principles of natural justice. The Rule was made absolute to the extent indicated, with no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 339
Issues:
Conviction under Sections 408, 471, 467, and 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
Appeal against the High Court's decision to convict the appellant.
Allegations of criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.
Vicarious liability of the appellant as the Chairman of the Managing Committee.
Evidence and lack of proof regarding the charges against the appellant.
Analysis:
The appellant was initially convicted by the High Court under Sections 408, 471, 467, and 409 of the Indian Penal Code for criminal breach of trust and related offenses. The High Court sentenced the appellant to various terms of imprisonment and fines, totaling five years, with the sentences to run concurrently. The High Court's decision was based on allegations related to the mismanagement of a cooperative society known as 'Jasdan Taluka Sahkari Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd.' The appellant, as the Chairman of the Sangh, was accused of involvement in various irregularities, including the purchase of fertilizers, receipt of certain amounts, and the missing oil engines.
The Sessions Judge had initially acquitted the appellant, citing lack of proof for the charges. However, the High Court, upon an appeal by the State of Gujarat, reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant based on the prosecution's case. The prosecution alleged a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust, but the charge of conspiracy failed, leading to the focus solely on the appellant's role as the Chairman of the Managing Committee.
During the appeal process, the respondent's counsel conceded that except for three specific items, they would not press the case against the appellant. These items included the purchase of the truck, purchase of fertilizers, certain received amounts, and the missing oil engines. The High Court found no legal evidence connecting the appellant to the purchase of the truck. The conviction was primarily based on the other three items, which the respondent sought to prove against the appellant.
The Supreme Court, after a thorough review of the case, found that the High Court's conviction of the appellant was not justified. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to establish a direct link between the appellant and the alleged acts of misappropriation. The Court rejected the argument of vicarious liability solely based on the appellant's position as Chairman, highlighting the absence of evidence showing the appellant's knowledge or involvement in the specific irregularities. The Court concluded that the case against the appellant was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the acquittal of the appellant and the setting aside of the High Court's conviction and sentences.
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1983 (11) TMI 338
Issues Involved:
1. Provisional Admission Status
2. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
3. Determination of Scheduled Caste Status
Detailed Analysis:
1. Provisional Admission Status:
The petitioner was admitted to the Gajra Raja Medical College, Gwalior, for the M.B.B.S. Course as a Scheduled Caste candidate. The admission was stated to be provisional, subject to verification of the petitioner's Scheduled Caste status. The court examined whether the provisional admission had ripened into a full admission by the time the expulsion order (Annexure P-6) was passed. It was noted that the Dean had not conducted the necessary verification within a reasonable time. The petitioner had continued her studies, and the expulsion order itself acknowledged her admission, using terms like "PRAVESH DIYA GAYA THA" and "NISHKASIT KIYA JATA HAI." The court concluded that the petitioner's provisional admission had ripened into a full admission due to the Dean's failure to verify her documents in a timely manner.
2. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioner argued that the expulsion order (Annexure P-6) was passed without affording her an opportunity to be heard, violating the principles of natural justice. The court acknowledged that the petitioner was not given a chance to present her case either by the Collector, who conducted the inquiry, or by the Dean, who executed the expulsion. The court recognized that the expulsion led to civil consequences, depriving the petitioner of her right to study. However, the court found no justification to quash the order on this ground alone, as the foundational issue was whether the petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Caste 'Khatik,' which was crucial for her admission.
3. Determination of Scheduled Caste Status:
The core issue was whether the petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Caste 'Khatik.' The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, was cited, which lists 'Khatik' as a Scheduled Caste in Madhya Pradesh but does not include 'Sunri.' The petitioner claimed to be a 'Sunri,' arguing it was a sub-caste of 'Khatik.' The court rejected this claim, stating that the statutory order clearly distinguished 'Khatik' and 'Sunri' as separate castes. The court held that evidence to prove 'Sunri' as a sub-caste of 'Khatik' was unnecessary, as the statutory order was explicit. Additionally, the petitioner's documents and family background indicated that they were 'Sunri,' not 'Khatik.' The court concluded that the petitioner did not belong to the Scheduled Caste 'Khatik,' thus invalidating her claim for admission under this category.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to admission under the Scheduled Caste 'Khatik' category. The court found that the provisional admission had ripened into full admission due to the Dean's inaction. However, the expulsion order was upheld as the petitioner did not belong to the 'Khatik' caste, and thus her admission was invalid. The petition was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 337
Issues Involved:
1. Existence of an agreement for a ten-year lease.
2. Existence of a month-to-month tenancy by holding over after the expiry of the lease.
3. Validity of the notice to quit under Section 106, T.P. Act.
4. Permissibility of raising the ground of invalidity of the quit notice for the first time in appeal.
5. Consideration of subsequent events (expiration of the alleged ten-year lease) in affirming the decree of ejectment.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue (a): Existence of an Agreement for a Ten-Year Lease
The appellant contended that there was an agreement for a ten-year lease starting from 1972, and the lease deed (Ext. P.1) was only a partial effectuation of this agreement. The trial court found no substance in this contention. The written statement claimed a ten-year lease agreed upon before the execution of Ext. P.1. However, the evidence presented by D.W.1 (Assistant General Manager of the appellant Company) indicated negotiations for a lease extension occurred after the expiry of Ext. P.1, contradicting the written statement. The court concluded that there was no binding and concluded agreement for a ten-year lease, and thus, answered this issue against the appellant.
Issue (b): Existence of a Month-to-Month Tenancy by Holding Over
The court examined whether there was a tenancy by holding over after the expiry of the lease under Ext. P.1. The appellant's assertion of a larger right excluded the possibility of a consensual bilateral act necessary for a month-to-month tenancy by holding over. The court noted that a tenancy by holding over requires the consent of both parties, which was not present in this case. The appellant's possession after the expiry of Ext. P.1 was claimed to be in part performance of a ten-year lease, inconsistent with a tenancy by holding over. The court concluded that there was no month-to-month tenancy and no notice under Section 106 was necessary, answering this issue against the appellant.
Issue (c): Validity of the Notice to Quit
Assuming the existence of a month-to-month tenancy, the appellant argued that the notice (Ext. P.2) was invalid as it did not expire with the end of the tenancy month. The court noted that this contention was not raised in the trial court and Ext. P.2 was not replied to. The defense claimed a ten-year lease, not a month-to-month tenancy, and thus did not challenge the notice's validity on this ground. The court held that raising this contention at this stage would cause prejudice to the respondent, who could have corrected the error if raised earlier. The court answered this issue against the appellant.
Issue (d): Consideration of Subsequent Events
The respondent argued that even if a ten-year lease existed, it expired in July 1982, during the pendency of the suit. The court recognized the principle that subsequent events could be considered to grant relief to the plaintiff. The court concluded that the decree granting possession could be sustained on this basis, as the alleged ten-year lease expired during the trial. The court answered this issue in favor of the respondent.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's contentions. The court refused the certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court, as no substantial question of law of general importance was involved. The court stayed the operation of the judgment and further proceedings in ejectment for two months to allow the appellant to seek special leave from the Supreme Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 336
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Section 23-A of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act.
2. Bar against the claim of refund of excess market fee.
3. Onus of proof regarding the recovery of market fee from next purchasers.
4. Legislative power versus judicial power in barring legal remedies for refund.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutional Validity of Section 23-A:
The core question in this judgment is the constitutional validity of Section 23-A, inserted by the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (Amendment) Act, 1981. The petitioners challenged this section, arguing that it effectively validates the levy of market fees at Rs. 3/- per hundred, despite the Supreme Court's judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, which upheld the fee only up to Rs. 2/- per hundred. The court, however, held that Section 23-A is not a validation of the market fee at Rs. 3/- but merely a provision to prevent unjust enrichment by licensees who had already recovered the fee from next purchasers. The court emphasized that the provision does not retrospectively validate the excess collection but only bars the refund of such excess fees to licensees who have passed on the burden to next purchasers.
2. Bar Against the Claim of Refund of Excess Market Fee:
Section 23-A(1) allows Market Committees to retain excess fees collected if the burden was passed to the next purchaser. Sub-section (2) bars any legal proceedings for the refund of such fees, and sub-section (3) presumes the burden was passed on unless proven otherwise by the licensee. The court found this provision justifiable, stating it prevents unjust enrichment of licensees who have already recovered the fees from subsequent purchasers. The court noted that the legislative intent was to ensure that excess fees collected remain with public bodies rather than being refunded to middlemen.
3. Onus of Proof Regarding the Recovery of Market Fee from Next Purchasers:
The court upheld that the onus of proof lies on the licensees to show that they had not passed on the burden of the excess market fee to the next purchasers. This is in line with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which places the burden of proof on the person who has special knowledge of the fact. Since licensees have the records of their transactions, it is reasonable to place the burden on them to prove whether they had passed on the fee.
4. Legislative Power Versus Judicial Power in Barring Legal Remedies for Refund:
The petitioners argued that barring legal remedies for refund and rendering existing decrees or orders unenforceable infringes on judicial powers. The court disagreed, stating that the legislature has the power to amend laws retrospectively or prospectively to remove the basis of a judgment. By creating a bar against the refund of excess market fees, the legislature has validly taken away the substantive right of refund, and consequently, the procedural right to seek such a refund also falls. The court cited the precedent in State of Orissa v. Bhupindra Kumar, affirming that validly abrogating a substantive right does not constitute an intrusion into the judicial domain.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that Section 23-A and the Punjab Act No. 7 of 1981 do not suffer from constitutional invalidity. The provision is upheld as it prevents unjust enrichment by ensuring that excess market fees remain with Market Committees rather than being refunded to licensees who have already recovered these fees from next purchasers. The individual cases will be considered on their merits by a single Bench.
Order:
The judgment upholds the constitutional validity of Section 23-A and directs that individual cases be laid before a single Bench for further decision in accordance with this judgment.
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1983 (11) TMI 335
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of agrarian reforms.
2. Reduction of ceiling area for agricultural land.
3. Introduction and rights of bargardars.
4. Amendments affecting the rights of raiyats and bargardars.
5. Requirement for raiyats to reside in the village.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutional Validity of Agrarian Reforms:
The judgment emphasizes that the agrarian reforms introduced by the Government of West Bengal aimed to improve the condition of tillers by redistributing land from landlords to actual cultivators. Despite several attempts by landlords to challenge these reforms, the constitutional validity of these Acts was upheld by both the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The reforms were in line with the directive principles of State policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution, which are considered the heart and soul of the Constitution. The court noted that the attempts by landlords to challenge these reforms were largely unsuccessful.
2. Reduction of Ceiling Area for Agricultural Land:
The judgment discusses the reduction of the ceiling area for agricultural land as stipulated by the 1953 Act and subsequent amendments. The 1972 Amendment Act introduced Section 14M, which set the ceiling area for raiyats based on family size, with a minimum of 2.50 standard hectares and a maximum of 7.00 standard hectares. The petitioners argued that this reduction caused serious injustice to the tenants. However, the court dismissed this argument, noting that the reduction was necessary to ensure equitable distribution of land among the tillers.
3. Introduction and Rights of Bargardars:
The judgment addresses the introduction of bargardars (sharecroppers) and the rights conferred upon them. The 1955 Act and its amendments allowed raiyats to cultivate their lands on a 50:50 basis with bargardars. The 1972 Amendment Act further provided that the rights of bargardars were heritable and transferable. The petitioners argued that this caused serious detriment to the raiyats. However, the court upheld these provisions, stating that they were reasonable and aimed at protecting the rights of bargardars.
4. Amendments Affecting the Rights of Raiyats and Bargardars:
The judgment examines the amendments made by the 1972 and 1977 Amendment Acts, which affected the rights of raiyats and bargardars. The petitioners challenged the validity of Section 17 of the 1955 Act, particularly the substitution of Section 17(c) and the various provisos to that section. They argued that these provisions were confiscatory. The court, however, upheld these provisions, noting that they were in line with the objectives of Article 39(b) of the Constitution, which aims to distribute material resources to serve the common good.
5. Requirement for Raiyats to Reside in the Village:
The judgment addresses the provision that required raiyats to reside in the village for a large part of the year. The petitioners argued that this requirement was harsh and arbitrary. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the provision was both salutary and beneficial. It aimed to ensure that the raiyat gave full attention to the land, thereby maximizing agricultural production. The court noted that this requirement was reasonable and essential for the effective cultivation of land.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the constitutional validity of the agrarian reforms introduced by the Government of West Bengal. The court found that the reforms were in line with the directive principles of State policy and aimed at ensuring equitable distribution of land among the tillers. The amendments made by the 1972 and 1977 Acts were also upheld, as they were found to be reasonable and necessary for achieving the objectives of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The requirement for raiyats to reside in the village was deemed to be both reasonable and essential for effective land cultivation.
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1983 (11) TMI 334
Issues Involved:
1. Liability of directors for employer's contributions under the Employee's State Insurance Act, 1948.
2. Validity of notices issued by the Collector of Bombay for recovery of contributions as arrears of land revenue.
3. Definition and scope of "principal employer" under Section 2(17) of the Employee's State Insurance Act.
4. Jurisdiction of the Employees' Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Employee's State Insurance Act.
5. Interpretation of "occupier" under the Factories Act, 1948.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Liability of Directors for Employer's Contributions
The main question in the appeals was whether directors of a company can be held personally liable for the employer's contributions under the Employee's State Insurance Act, 1948. The court held that directors cannot be automatically considered as "principal employers" merely by virtue of their position as directors. The liability to pay contributions is fastened on the "principal employer," which can be the owner or occupier of the factory, but not necessarily the directors.
Issue 2: Validity of Notices Issued by the Collector of Bombay
The notices issued by the Collector of Bombay under Section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, read with Section 267 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, were challenged. The court found that these notices were invalid as they were issued on the incorrect assumption that directors are automatically liable as principal employers. The court quashed these notices.
Issue 3: Definition and Scope of "Principal Employer"
The court examined the definition of "principal employer" under Section 2(17) of the Employee's State Insurance Act. It concluded that the term "principal employer" refers to the owner or occupier of the factory, and does not automatically include directors. The court emphasized that the principal employer can either be the owner or the occupier, but not both simultaneously.
Issue 4: Jurisdiction of the Employees' Insurance Court
The court acknowledged that the question of whether a person is a principal employer falls within the jurisdiction of the Employees' Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Act. However, given the immediate threat of enforcing personal liability against the directors, the court decided to intervene under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Issue 5: Interpretation of "Occupier" under the Factories Act
The court analyzed the definition of "occupier" under Section 2(n) of the Factories Act, 1948, which refers to the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory. The court clarified that a director cannot be assumed to have ultimate control over the affairs of the factory merely by virtue of being a director. The court also referred to Section 100 of the Factories Act, which allows for the nomination of a specific director as the occupier, but such nomination must be explicit.
Conclusion:
The court allowed all three appeals, set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge, and quashed the notices issued to the directors for recovery of the amounts due on account of the employer's contributions. The court emphasized that directors cannot be held personally liable as principal employers unless explicitly designated as such. The court also rejected the oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
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1983 (11) TMI 333
Issues:
1. Dismissal of appeal by High Court on the ground of limitation.
2. Calculation of period of limitation for filing a suit challenging the order of discharge.
3. Interpretation of Rule 12 of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1935.
4. Applicability of principles of natural justice in the order of discharge.
5. Jurisdiction of State Government in departmental proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court heard the appeal where the appellant challenged the High Court's dismissal of his appeal on the ground of limitation. The appellant was discharged from service on 27-7-61, and subsequent appeals were rejected. The appellant filed a suit on 7-8-1968, claiming the order of discharge was illegal due to lack of natural justice. The trial court and first appellate court found the order void but dismissed the suit as time-barred. The High Court upheld the dismissal based on limitation, without addressing the merits of the discharge order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, stating the limitation period should start from 19-12-1965, the date of communication of the State Government's order, making the suit filed on 7-8-1968 within time.
2. The Supreme Court emphasized that the final order in the appellant's case was passed by the State Government in revision and communicated on 19-12-1965. Therefore, the period of limitation for filing the suit challenging the discharge order should be calculated from this date, not the original order date of 27-7-1961. By computing the limitation period from the communication date of the State Government's order, the appellant's suit was deemed timely filed on 7-8-1968.
3. Rule 12 of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1935 empowered the State Government and the Head of the Department to conduct departmental proceedings and pass appropriate orders. The appellant utilized this provision by filing a Revision Application before the State Government, which was rejected on 5-8-1965. The delay in communicating this rejection to the appellant until 19-12-1965 played a crucial role in determining the start of the limitation period for filing the suit challenging the discharge order.
4. The trial court and first appellate court found the order of discharge to be null and void due to a serious infirmity in not following the principles of natural justice. Despite this, they dismissed the suit as time-barred. The Supreme Court, while upholding the lower courts' decision on the illegality of the discharge order, focused on the correct calculation of the limitation period, allowing the appeal based on this ground.
5. The Supreme Court's decision to remit the case back to the High Court was to provide an opportunity for the respondents to support the first appellate court's decision on the ground previously decided against them. However, the Court clarified that the issue of limitation was conclusively settled by their decision, indicating that the calculation of the limitation period from the communication date of the State Government's order was the correct approach. The Court made no order as to the costs of the appeal.
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1983 (11) TMI 332
Issues:
1. Notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 served on the company.
2. Affidavit accompanying the petition not in proper form.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 served on the company
The petitioner served a notice dated January 9, 1980, under Section 434 of the Act on the director in-charge of the company. The respondents did not object to the service of this notice. The court deemed the notice to have been served upon the company based on the circumstances. The respondents contested the petition on the grounds of improper notice service, but the court found the notice to be validly served.
Issue 2: Affidavit accompanying the petition not in proper form
The affidavit accompanying the petition was challenged for not being in the proper form. The verification clause did not clearly delineate which paragraphs were true to the deponent's knowledge and which were based on belief. The rules require the affidavit to be in a specific form, with clear distinctions between knowledge and belief. The court referred to relevant rules and cases emphasizing the importance of proper verification in affidavits. It held that the affidavit was not in due form, rendering it valueless. Since a petition for winding-up must be accompanied by a proper affidavit, the court dismissed the petition on this ground alone, as the affidavit is considered substantive evidence and without it, the petition is not valid in the eyes of the law.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition on the preliminary objection of the improper affidavit, without delving into the merits of the case. The decision was based on the mandatory requirement of a validly sworn affidavit accompanying a petition for winding-up, as it serves as substantive evidence and relates back to the date of presentation of the petition. The court highlighted the significance of strict adherence to the rules governing affidavits in legal proceedings, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the petition due to the deficiency in the accompanying affidavit.
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1983 (11) TMI 331
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal challenging a government order dated November 30, 1982, stating that there were good reasons for the order but emphasizing the importance of providing detailed reasons in administrative decisions. The court highlighted the need for fairness in administrative tribunals and the importance of making relevant material available to objectors. The court referenced previous judgments on the need for giving reasons in support of government conclusions. The special leave petition and appeal were both dismissed.
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1983 (11) TMI 330
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the first proviso to s. 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act regarding deduction of machinery costs.
2. Appealability of the levy of interest under s. 217 of the Income Tax Act.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Interpretation of the first proviso to s. 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act regarding deduction of machinery costs:
The case involved a dispute over whether the entire sum spent on types used for composing newspapers should be allowed as a deduction under the first proviso to s. 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. The assessee argued that since the daily purchase of types did not exceed &8377; 750, the entire cost should be deductible. However, the Revenue contended that the limit should be based on purchases for the whole year, not daily purchases. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, allowing the deduction based on daily purchases. The High Court disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the proviso should not be applied based on daily purchases but should consider purchases made throughout the year. The court emphasized that the proviso does not specify a time frame for purchases and should be uniformly applied to all individuals, irrespective of the periodicity of their purchases. Therefore, the court held against the assessee on this issue.
Issue 2: Appealability of the levy of interest under s. 217 of the Income Tax Act:
The second question addressed whether the assessee could appeal against the levy of interest under s. 217 of the Income Tax Act. The High Court referred to previous judgments and held that an appeal against the levy of interest under s. 217 is maintainable if filed within the relevant assessment appeal. The court cited precedents where it was established that the levy of interest could be challenged in an appeal against the assessment itself. Therefore, the court answered this question in favor of the assessee, allowing them to challenge the levy of interest under s. 217 in the ongoing proceedings.
In conclusion, the High Court ruled against the assessee regarding the interpretation of the first proviso to s. 32(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Act but in favor of the assessee on the appealability of the levy of interest under s. 217.
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1983 (11) TMI 329
Issues:
1. Quashing of an industrial tribunal award by the Patna High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
2. Entitlement of workmen to payment of bonus for the year 1966-67 under the Payment of Bonus Act.
3. Interpretation of whether attendance bonus is payable along with statutory bonus under the Act.
4. Examination of previous cases regarding the payment of customary bonus in addition to statutory bonus.
5. Justification for restoring the tribunal award and awarding interest to the workmen.
Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the decision of the Patna High Court, which had quashed an industrial tribunal award under Article 227 of the Constitution. The workmen's union appealed against the High Court's decision.
2. The main issue in the appeal was whether the workmen were entitled to payment of bonus for the year 1966-67 under the Payment of Bonus Act, in addition to the 'attendance bonus' already being paid in the establishment. The Tribunal had found in favor of the workmen, granting them an attendance bonus over and above the statutory bonus.
3. The employer contended that no separate attendance bonus should be paid when bonus was already being provided under the Payment of Bonus Act. The High Court, concurring with the Tribunal, examined whether the attendance bonus was included in the statutory bonus or could be claimed in addition to it. The Court referred to previous cases to determine the scope of bonus payments under the Act.
4. The Supreme Court referred to previous judgments to clarify the distinction between profit-based bonus under the Bonus Act and other types of customary or contractual bonuses. It was emphasized that the Bonus Act dealt specifically with profit bonus and did not govern customary or traditional bonuses unless expressly stated.
5. Upon further analysis of the previous cases, the Court concluded that customary bonuses were not affected by the provisions of the Bonus Act. Therefore, the workmen were entitled to the attendance bonus as it was being paid outside the purview of the Act. The Court held that the High Court was incorrect in vacating the award and ordered the restoration of the award with interest for the delayed payment to the workmen. The appeal was allowed in favor of the workmen.
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1983 (11) TMI 328
Whether the appellant-company could be regarded as a "dealer" within the meaning of section 2(5) read with the explanation thereto of the Orissa Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road and Inland Waterways) Act, 1959?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-company was a dealer within the meaning of section 2(5) read with the explanation thereto of the Orissa Taxation Act, 1959 as both the principals (the jute companies) had their registered offices in Calcutta (West Bengal), that their principal businesses were carried on in Calcutta (West Bengal) and that the central management and control of the businesses was done from Calcutta. It is true that these two jute companies had storage equipment and godowns at Kendupatna in the State of Orissa but on their own showing (vide certificates of registration) at Kendupatna they had "additional places of businesses".
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1983 (11) TMI 327
Issues Involved:
1. Whether an Assistant Teacher employed in a Basic Primary School run by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education is disqualified under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution for being chosen as a member of the State Legislative Assembly.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Disqualification under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution
The primary issue in this case is whether an Assistant Teacher in a Basic Primary School run by the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education holds an "office of profit under the Government" and is thereby disqualified under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution from being chosen as a member of the State Legislative Assembly.
Background:
The appellant and the respondent were candidates in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly election. The respondent's nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer on the grounds that he held an office of profit under the State Government, disqualifying him under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. The High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of the respondent, declaring the rejection of his nomination improper and the appellant's election void. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Provisions:
Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution states that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or any State Government.
Tests for Office of Profit:
The Supreme Court considered several factors to determine if the position held by the respondent constituted an office of profit under the Government:
1. Appointment by the Government: The Government appoints the members of the Board and the teachers.
2. Right to Remove or Dismiss: The Government has the authority to remove or dismiss the office holder.
3. Payment of Remuneration: The remuneration is paid by the Government.
4. Control Over Duties: The Government has control over the duties and functions of the office holder.
Relevant Case Law:
1. Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand & Anr.: The Court ruled that the Manager of a school run by a religious institution was not holding an office of profit under the Central Government.
2. M. Ramappa v. Sangappa & Ors.: The Court held that Patels and Shanbhogs, who were appointed by the Government and received remuneration from it, held offices of profit under the Government.
3. Gurugobinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal & Ors.: The Court determined that a partner in a firm of auditors for government companies held an office of profit under the Government.
4. D. R. Gurushaniappa v. Abdul Khuddus Anwar & Ors.: The Court distinguished that an employee of a Government company was not holding an office of profit under the Government.
5. Divya Prakash v. Kultar Chand Rana & Anr.: The Court held that the Chairman of the Board of School Education, appointed without remuneration, did not hold an office of profit.
Analysis of the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972:
The Act was enacted to transfer the control of primary education from local bodies to the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education, a body established by the State Government. The Board is responsible for organizing, coordinating, and controlling basic education in the State. The Board's members are appointed by the State Government, and it operates under the Government's directives.
Provisions of the Act:
- Section 3: Establishes the Board with members appointed by the State Government.
- Section 4: Outlines the Board's functions, including supervising and controlling basic schools.
- Section 6: Allows the Board to appoint teachers and employees with the State Government's approval.
- Section 7: Specifies that the Board's funds come from the State Government.
- Section 9: Transfers employees from local bodies to the Board.
- Section 13: Ensures the Board operates under the State Government's control.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent, as an Assistant Teacher in a Basic Primary School, was holding an office of profit under the State Government. The Board, despite being a body corporate, functions as an extension of the Government, with its members and employees appointed and controlled by the State Government. The financial and administrative control exercised by the Government over the Board and its employees supports this conclusion.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the respondent was disqualified under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. The appeal was allowed, and the election petition filed by the respondent was dismissed. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
Final Order:
The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The election petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.
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1983 (11) TMI 326
Issues:
1. Maintainability of the suit
2. Cause of action
3. Jurisdiction of the Court
4. Petitioner's moral life
5. Entitlement to relief
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an appeal against a divorce decree passed by the District Judge in a Hindu Marriage Act case. The issues framed by the District Judge included the maintainability of the suit, cause of action, jurisdiction of the Court, petitioner's moral life, and entitlement to relief. Despite the defendant's plea of limitation, the District Judge did not frame an issue on it. The petitioner presented documentary evidence and testified, followed by a witness examination. The District Judge proceeded ex parte against the absent defendant and decreed divorce, which was contested on appeal.
The High Court found the District Judge's order to be perfunctory and not in accordance with the law. The Court noted that the order lacked a proper analysis of evidence, findings on issues, or discussion of facts. It emphasized the importance of a thorough examination in cases affecting individuals' status. The Court highlighted the need for the District Judge to apply the provisions of Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which require satisfaction on various matters before passing a decree. Specifically, the Court pointed out the requirement to assess delay in instituting the proceeding and attempt reconciliation before granting divorce, which the District Judge failed to do.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the District Judge's order and decree, and remanded the case for retrial. The Court directed the District Judge to provide the defendant with opportunities for cross-examination and presenting evidence. It also instructed the District Judge to make efforts for reconciliation between the parties as mandated by the Act before proceeding with the case. The High Court stressed the importance of a thorough and lawful trial in such sensitive matters, ensuring all legal procedures are duly followed.
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1983 (11) TMI 324
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are the granting of bail to an accused person facing a criminal trial, the approach of the High Court in setting aside the bail granted by the Sessions Judge, and the considerations to be taken into account when deciding on bail applications.
Granting of Bail by Sessions Judge:
The appellant was accused of giving blows with a knife to a person and was taken into custody under Sec. 307 I.P.C. An application for bail was initially dismissed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, but the Sessions Judge later granted bail after considering arguments from both sides. The High Court later entertained a plea seeking cancellation of the bail granted by the Sessions Judge.
High Court's Approach in Setting Aside Bail:
The High Court held that once a prima facie case is established, the nature and gravity of the circumstances of the offence should be considered. The High Court expressed concerns about the victim being a social and political worker, the location of the incident in a hospital, and the injuries caused. However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court misdirected itself by interfering with the discretionary order of the Sessions Judge without sufficient grounds for cancellation of bail.
Supreme Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's order, reinstating the bail granted by the Sessions Judge with modifications. The appellant was required to furnish fresh bail bonds, report monthly to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and comply with other conditions imposed by the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court emphasized that bail should be granted based on the accused's availability for trial and the risk of tampering with evidence, rather than as a form of pre-trial punishment.
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