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1992 (11) TMI 297
The Supreme Court of India adjudicated on two civil appeals concerning the same building: Civil Appeal No. 4212 of 1982 filed by the tenant and Civil Appeal No. 4213 of 1982 filed by the landlord. The tenant's appeal involved the upstairs portion leased for residential purposes but used as a godown, while the landlord's appeal involved the lower portion leased for business purposes.The trial court and the first appellate court both found that the landlord had a "bona fide requirement" for both premises for residence and business. However, the High Court, on revision, acknowledged the landlord's bona fide requirement but ruled in favor of the tenant regarding the lower portion due to "comparative hardship."Mr. P.S. Poti, representing the landlord, argued that the High Court unjustifiably interfered with the factual findings of the lower courts, citing principles from K.A. Anthappai v. C. Ahammed. Conversely, Mr. Harish Salve, representing the tenant, contended the tenant's long-term occupation and the landlord's current tenancy elsewhere undermined her bona fide claim.The Supreme Court held that "bona fide requirement" and "comparative hardship" are factual questions, and the High Court erred in re-evaluating evidence, which is beyond its revisional power. Consequently, the Court allowed the landlord's appeal, dismissed the tenant's appeal, and decreed eviction for both premises, without orders as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 296
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appeal was filed within the prescribed time limit.
2. Interpretation of "time requisite" under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act.
3. Applicability of Rule 242 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice in computing the limitation period.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the appeal was filed within the prescribed time limit:
The judgment of the trial court was pronounced on 21-12-1991. The application for a copy was made on 24-12-1991, copying sheets were called for on 27-1-1992, and produced on 30-1-1992. The certified copy was ready and delivered on 31-3-1992. The appeal was filed on 27-6-1992, making it the 92nd day, thus indicating a delay in filing the appeal.
2. Interpretation of "time requisite" under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act:
Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act states, "In computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the day on which the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree shall be excluded." The term "time requisite" has been subject to judicial interpretation. The Privy Council in Pramath Nath Roy v. Lee emphasized that no period can be regarded as requisite if it need not have elapsed had the appellant taken reasonable steps to obtain the copy.
3. Applicability of Rule 242 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice in computing the limitation period:
Rule 242 states that a list showing the applications in which records have been received and the number of stamp papers required shall be affixed to the notice board and remain for three clear working days. The appellant contended that these three days should be excluded as "time requisite" for obtaining the certified copy.
The court referred to the Division Bench decision in Kurian Antony v. Chacko Happen, which held that the time requisite for obtaining copies is the time taken using all possible diligence. The applicant should deposit the required charges not later than the first working day after notification. Any delay beyond this is due to the applicant's negligence and cannot be excluded in computing the time requisite.
Further, the court noted that the consistent practice in the High Courts integrated into the Kerala High Court was not to exclude the period availed by the party in supplying the printing charges after notification. The court also referred to the decision in Mohammed v. Kunhammad Haji, which stated that holidays intervening between the date of calling for copying sheets and their production can be excluded but not the entire three days automatically.
The appellant also cited Sreevalsan Pillai v. Thankamoni Amma, arguing that the period between dismissal and restoration of an application for non-production of copying sheets should be excluded. However, the court found that this reasoning did not apply to the present case.
The court also examined the decision in Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Ball, which emphasized that a party cannot take advantage of ministerial delay in preparing the decree unless there is a legal impediment.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in In re Javvaji Venkateshwarlu was also considered, which suggested that the time stipulated for calling for stamp papers should be treated as time requisite. However, the Kerala High Court disagreed, stating that Rule 242 operates to save the application from dismissal, not to create a fiction that the sheets were produced the day after they were called.
The Orissa High Court's decision in Smt. Aparajita Dibya v. Binod Behari Patra supported the view that the time taken by the applicant to comply with the court's direction is not to be excluded as time requisite.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the appellant is not entitled to automatically exclude the three days provided by Rule 242 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice. Consequently, the appeal was deemed to be filed beyond the prescribed time limit. The appellant was granted time to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of the delay in filing the appeal.
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1992 (11) TMI 295
Issues:
1. Legality of issuing a proclamation under Section 82 of the CrPC and a writ of attachment of property.
2. Locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the order.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment questions the legality of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's action in issuing a proclamation under Section 82 of the CrPC and a writ of attachment of property concerning a specific individual. The petitioner challenges the order based on the application filed under the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. The court provides a detailed background of the case, mentioning the dismissal of a previous application related to the same issue. The petitioner raises various legal infirmities in the impugned order, leading to a detailed examination of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the proclamation and attachment.
2. The issue of locus standi is raised during the proceedings, questioning the petitioner's legal standing to challenge the order. The court delves into the concept of locus standi, emphasizing the mandatory requirement for a party to have suffered a legal injury or violation of a legally protected right to seek judicial redress. The judgment discusses the traditional syntax of law regarding locus standi in private and public actions, highlighting the need for a party to have a direct interest in the litigation. The court distinguishes between private and public interest litigation, outlining the criteria for standing in each scenario. Ultimately, the court concludes that the petitioner lacks locus standi to file the application, leading to the rejection of the plea.
In conclusion, the judgment thoroughly examines the legality of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's actions in issuing a proclamation and attachment, while also delving into the concept of locus standi and its application in challenging legal orders. The detailed analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved and the court's reasoning behind the decision to reject the petitioner's application.
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1992 (11) TMI 294
Issues Involved:
1. Right to legal assistance and representation before the Advisory Board.
2. Admissibility of confession made before the police in forming the basis of subjective satisfaction.
3. Independent material about terror strike mental condition of the residents.
4. Delay in framing the order of detention.
5. Incidents pertaining to the maintenance of "public order."
Detailed Analysis:
Point No. 1: Right to Legal Assistance and Representation Before the Advisory Board
The detenu argued that he was not informed of his right to legal assistance or to adduce evidence in rebuttal before the Advisory Board, and that the Board did not adjourn the hearing to enable him to have his next friend present for legal assistance. The court noted that the detenu was informed twice about his right of representation, first by the detaining authority on 17-5-1992 and second by the Secretary of the Board on 22-5-1992. The detenu did not respond until the actual meeting on 26-6-1992, when he made a detailed seven-page representation. The court found that there was no mandatory requirement to permit the assistance of a next friend or to adjourn the hearing suo motu. The court referenced the Supreme Court decision in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 CriLJ 340, which indicated that such opportunities should be granted if requested by the detenu. However, the court found no substance in the detenu's claim as he did not request an adjournment during the meeting, and the Advisory Board was within its rights not to adjourn the matter without a request.
Point No. 2: Admissibility of Confession Made Before the Police
The detenu contended that his confession made before the police, which is inadmissible in evidence as per the Evidence Act or Criminal Procedure Code, cannot legally form the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The court clarified that detention is based not on facts proved as per the Evidence Act or Cr.P.C., but on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that detention is necessary to prevent prejudicial activities in the future. The court emphasized that detention proceedings are administrative in nature and not bound by strict rules of evidence. The court also noted that even "in camera" statements can be relied upon for reaching subjective satisfaction, as per Section 8(2) of the National Security Act.
Point No. 3: Independent Material About Terror Strike Mental Condition of Residents
The detenu argued that there was no independent material about the terror strike mental condition of the residents of the locality, leading to an inference of disturbance of even tempo. The court stated that the grounds of detention include both the factual inferences and the material on which those inferences are drawn. The court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned on the ground of insufficiency of factual material. The court referenced the case of Parkash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, 1986 CriLJ 786, to emphasize that commonsense should not be disregarded when considering constitutional safeguards against misuse of powers by authorities.
Point No. 4: Delay in Framing the Order of Detention
The detenu claimed that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in framing the order of detention. The court noted that the range of incidents was between July 1991 and December 1991, and the detenu was last arrested on 22nd December 1991 and released on bail on 18th March 1992. The Sponsoring Authority prepared the proposal on 27th March 1992, which reached the detaining authority on 8th April 1992. The order was passed on the same day but could not be served until 17th May 1992 because the detenu could not be traced. The court found that the delay was properly explained and did not result in snapping the live link between the activities and the purpose of detention.
Point No. 5: Incidents Pertaining to the Maintenance of "Public Order"
The detenu argued that the three incidents mentioned in the grounds pertain only to individual disputes and relate to "law and order" rather than "public order." The court distinguished between "law and order" and "public order," noting that activities creating terror in the minds of peace-loving people and disturbing the even tempo of society are prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order." The court found enough material to conclude that the detenu's activities disturbed the even tempo of the locality and had the potential for recurrence in the future.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged. The court found no merit in the detenu's arguments on all the points raised. The detention order was upheld as valid.
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1992 (11) TMI 293
Issues:
Claim for storage and unloading charges, Limitation of the claim, Effect of acknowledgment in writing on limitation, Interest on storage charges.
Analysis:
The plaintiff appealed against the dismissal of a suit claiming storage and unloading charges plus interest totaling &8377; 54,957. The plaintiff, a firm registered under the Partnership Act, transported goods for a Corporation from Uttar Pradesh to Thane. The Corporation failed to pay storage and unloading charges, leading to the suit. The Corporation argued the claim was barred by limitation, which was the main issue in the appeal.
The court analyzed Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which deals with acknowledgment in writing affecting expired liabilities. The plaintiff provided storage beyond the free period mentioned in the consignment notes, justifying the claim for storage charges. The court found that the consignment notes governed the contract of carriage, rejecting the argument that the rate and amount payable were not proved. However, the plaintiff failed to prove expenses for unloading charges, creating a discrepancy.
Regarding the limitation issue, the court examined Ex. 35, a communication from the Corporation acknowledging the liability. The court held that Ex. 35, when correlated with Ex. 37, constituted an acknowledgment of liability, bringing the claim within limitation. Even if Ex. 35 did not qualify as an acknowledgment, the court invoked S. 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act to uphold the claim within limitation.
The plaintiff also claimed past interest on storage charges at 12% per annum. The court noted that the suit was not frivolous and commercial in nature, justifying the interest claimed. The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the dismissal of the suit, and awarded the plaintiff a sum of &8377; 51,732 along with interest at 12% per annum on part of the amount. The remaining claims were disallowed, with costs apportioned accordingly.
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1992 (11) TMI 292
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the transfer order of the appellant.
2. Allegations of mala fide intent behind the transfer.
3. Compliance with procedural formalities under Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954.
4. Equivalence of the post of Secretary, High Power Committee to the post of Chief Secretary.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the transfer order of the appellant:
The appellant contested the transfer order dated January 4, 1991, which reassigned him from the post of Chief Secretary to the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, claiming it was not made bona fide for administrative exigencies but was instead motivated by the Chief Minister's displeasure. The Central Administrative Tribunal upheld the transfer, stating that the prerogative to appoint a Chief Secretary lies with the Chief Minister and the Cabinet, provided the decision is bona fide and follows statutory formalities. The Tribunal found that the appellant had no subsisting right to remain as Chief Secretary and that the transfer was not made with the ulterior motive of demoting him.
2. Allegations of mala fide intent behind the transfer:
The appellant argued that his transfer was driven by the Chief Minister's displeasure with his resistance to certain proposals and his stance on anti-corruption measures. The Tribunal found no firm foundation for these allegations, considering them vague and indefinite. The Tribunal noted that differences of opinion between the appellant and the Chief Minister existed, but this alone did not substantiate claims of mala fide intent. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that reasonable inferences of mala fide must be based on a factual matrix, not on insinuations or conjecture. The Court concluded that the appellant had not established a prima facie case of mala fide intent.
3. Compliance with procedural formalities under Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954:
The appellant contended that the transfer was invalid due to non-compliance with Rule 9(1) of IAS (Pay) Rules, which requires a declaration of equivalence between the posts. The Tribunal found that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, had been declared equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary, and the posts of Chief Secretary and Additional Chief Secretary were interchangeable. The Tribunal accepted that a declaration of equivalence was made on January 4, 1991, before the transfer order, although the formal authenticated order was issued on January 5, 1991. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that the decision to declare equivalence was taken before the transfer, and the formal publication was a statutory requirement to give effect to the decision. The Court deemed any delay in publication as a technical violation that did not invalidate the transfer.
4. Equivalence of the post of Secretary, High Power Committee to the post of Chief Secretary:
The appellant argued that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, was inferior to the post of Chief Secretary and that the declaration of equivalence was invalid. The respondents maintained that the posts were equivalent, with the Tribunal noting that the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, was declared equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary, which in turn was equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary. The Supreme Court found that a decision to declare the post of Secretary, High Power Committee, equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary was made prior to the transfer order. The Court held that the formal publication of this decision on January 5, 1991, did not invalidate the transfer, as the decision had already been taken on January 4, 1991.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the Central Administrative Tribunal's decision, finding no mala fide intent or procedural violations that would invalidate the transfer order. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 291
Issues:
1. Taxability of amount received as CCS due to retrospective amendment in the law.
2. Claim of deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I.
Analysis:
1. The appeal addressed two specific issues, with the counsel deciding not to press certain grounds related to the taxability of CCS amount due to retrospective law amendment. These grounds were consequently rejected.
2. The primary issue remaining was the claim for deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I by the assessee, a firm engaged in exporting brass art-wares and handicrafts. The Assessing Officer initially rejected the deductions, stating the firm was not a small-scale industrial unit or a manufacturer. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) initially upheld the claim but later rejected it due to non-compliance with conditions in sections 80HH(2)(iv) and 80-I(2)(iv), specifically related to the employment of a minimum number of workers as per the sections.
3. The contention revolved around the requirement of employing a certain number of workers as per the sections, which the assessee did not fulfill as it did not operate with power and employed fewer than 20 workers. The argument that artisans engaged on a contract basis should be considered workers was dismissed, emphasizing the need for direct employment as per the sections.
4. The appeal before the Tribunal reiterated the argument that all types of workers, direct or indirect, should be counted for deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I. Legal interpretations of terms like "employ" and "employee" were presented, along with references to relevant case laws supporting the inclusion of casual workers for such deductions.
5. The Departmental Representative supported the Commissioner's decision, citing a relevant case law. After considering the submissions, the Tribunal concluded that the firm did not meet the requirements of sections 80HH and 80-I, emphasizing the need for direct employment of workers as stipulated by the sections.
6. Referring to a Supreme Court decision, the Tribunal highlighted the distinction between a contract for service and a contract of service, emphasizing the need for personal labor in an employment contract. The Tribunal found that the outside workers could not be considered casual employees of the assessee due to the absence of direct control over them.
7. The Tribunal distinguished the relied-upon cases, stating they were not applicable to the present situation. It upheld the Commissioner's decision to reject the claims, emphasizing the importance of direct employment of the stipulated number of workers for claiming deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I.
8. Ultimately, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Commissioner's decision to reject the claims for deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I due to the lack of direct employment of the required number of workers by the assessee.
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1992 (11) TMI 290
The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the revision application regarding the amendment of a registration certificate for khandsari sugar production, as the generator was not considered essential for the manufacturing process according to the Central Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Tribunal's decision was upheld. (1992 (11) TMI 290 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1992 (11) TMI 289
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court
2. Leave to Combine Causes of Action
3. Infringement of Copyright
4. Infringement of Trade Mark
5. Passing Off
6. Interim Injunction
Issue-Wise Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court
The court examined whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The learned single Judge concluded that the court had jurisdiction based on Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, which allows a suit to be instituted in a district court where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. The plaintiff carried on business within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, making it the appropriate forum for the suit.
2. Leave to Combine Causes of Action
The plaintiff sought leave under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent to combine the causes of action for infringement of trade mark, passing off, and infringement of copyright in one suit. The learned single Judge denied this leave, emphasizing that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient details about the ownership of the copyright, particularly who the author was and how the plaintiff claimed ownership. The Judge also considered the balance of convenience, noting that the defendant, being a small trader, would find it difficult to defend the action if dragged to Madras from Raipur.
3. Infringement of Copyright
The plaintiff claimed that its copyright in artistic work was infringed by the defendant. The court noted that the plaintiff had a valid copyright claim under Section 62(1) of the Copyright Act, as the plaintiff carried on business within the jurisdiction of the court. The court also discussed the definition of "owner of copyright" under Section 54 of the Copyright Act, clarifying that the plaintiff, as the publisher of the work, could claim ownership in the absence of the author's identity.
4. Infringement of Trade Mark
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's tea packets were deceptively similar to its own, thereby infringing its registered trade marks. The essential features of the plaintiff's trade marks included a unique color combination and specific design elements, which the defendant allegedly copied. However, the court did not delve deeply into this issue, focusing more on the jurisdiction and combination of causes of action.
5. Passing Off
The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant was passing off its goods as those of the plaintiff by using a similar label. The court noted the similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's packaging but did not provide a detailed analysis on this issue, as the primary focus was on the jurisdiction and combination of causes of action.
6. Interim Injunction
The plaintiff sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing its copyright, trade mark, and from passing off its goods. The learned single Judge denied the interim injunction, stating that prima facie no infringement of copyright was made out. However, the defendant later filed an affidavit stating that it was not using the impugned label and undertook to inform the court and the plaintiff if it decided to use the label in the future. This undertaking was deemed sufficient by the court for the time being.
Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed, and the suit was permitted to proceed for all the causes of action, including infringement of copyright, trade mark, and passing off. The court emphasized the need to avoid multiplicity of suits and found that the plaintiff's suit was maintainable in the Madras High Court. The defendant's undertaking not to use the impugned label was accepted, and no interim injunction was granted. The court did not impose any costs for the appeals.
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1992 (11) TMI 288
... ...
... ... ..... . Anand, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (11) TMI 287
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit was barred by time.
2. Whether the acknowledgment Exh. 39 and Exh. 40 extended the limitation period.
3. Whether the guarantors were bound to pay the time-barred claim.
4. Whether the plaintiff Bank was entitled to the contractual rate of interest.
5. Determination of the principal sum adjudged and future interest.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the suit was barred by time:
The principal issue was whether the suit was barred by time. The trial court held that the acknowledgment executed by the defendant No. 1 at Exh. 40 created a promise to pay the debt under section 25(3) of the Contract Act, thus the suit was not dismissed on the ground of limitation. The High Court further examined the construction of sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act and section 25(3) of the Contract Act. It was determined that the acknowledgment executed by the defendant No. 2 (Exh. 39) was within the limitation but not binding on the principal debtor. However, the acknowledgment by defendant No. 1 (Exh. 40) was beyond the period of 3 years from the execution of the pronote (Exh. 44), thus section 18 of the Limitation Act would not assist the plaintiff Bank in extending the limitation period.
2. Whether the acknowledgment Exh. 39 and Exh. 40 extended the limitation period:
The plaintiff Bank argued that the last repayment on 30.8.1984 extended the limitation period under section 19 of the Limitation Act. However, the court noted that for such an extension, the acknowledgment of repayment must be in the handwriting of or signed by the person making the payment. The Supreme Court's judgment in Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad established that mere admission of repayment in evidence does not extend the limitation period. Thus, the plaintiff Bank could not benefit from the admissions of defendant No. 1 about the repayment made for extending the limitation under section 19.
3. Whether the guarantors were bound to pay the time-barred claim:
The trial court held that there was a continuing guarantee, binding the guarantors to repay the loan. The High Court did not find any contention from the defendants challenging this finding, and thus, it was upheld that the guarantors were bound to repay the loan.
4. Whether the plaintiff Bank was entitled to the contractual rate of interest:
The plaintiff Bank contended it was entitled to the contractual rate of interest on the amount acknowledged by defendant No. 1 till the date of the suit and further interest until realization. The trial court granted interest at 6% P.A. from the date of the suit till realization. The High Court found that the acknowledgment (Exh. 40) by defendant No. 1 included an express promise to pay the debt with interest, thus constituting a fresh cause of action under section 25(3) of the Contract Act. Consequently, the plaintiff Bank was entitled to the contractual rate of interest of 12.5% P.A. from 14.10.1985 till the date of the suit.
5. Determination of the principal sum adjudged and future interest:
The High Court determined that the principal sum adjudged should be Rs. 1,53,000/- after deducting repayments made by defendant No. 1. The future interest from the date of the suit till realization was awarded at a simple interest rate of 8% P.A. on the principal sum of Rs. 1,53,000/-, considering the defendant's circumstances and the nature of the transaction.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed. The High Court passed a decree in the sum of Rs. 2,81,574.38 against the defendants jointly and severally. Future interest was decreed at 8% P.A. (Simple Interest) from the date of the suit till realization on the principal sum of Rs. 1,53,000/-. The rest of the trial court's decree was maintained, and costs of both courts were saddled upon the defendants.
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1992 (11) TMI 286
Issues Involved:
1. Permissiveness of the judicial system and abuse of court process.
2. Reduction in rank and subsequent dismissal from service.
3. Conviction for criminal offense and its impact on employment.
4. Repeated filing of petitions on the same issue.
5. Use of intemperate and abusive language against the court and its judges.
6. Initiation of contempt proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Permissiveness of the Judicial System and Abuse of Court Process
The judgment highlights the permissiveness of the judicial system that allowed the contemnor to file numerous petitions claiming the same relief arising out of the same cause of action. This permissiveness, coupled with the indulgence and sympathy shown by the Court, emboldened the contemnor to cast unfounded and unwarranted aspersions and make scurrilous and indecent attacks against the Court and its judges.
2. Reduction in Rank and Subsequent Dismissal from Service
The contemnor was initially appointed as a Draftsman Grade II and later reduced to Draftsman Grade III. He challenged this reduction in rank through various legal avenues, including a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, a Letters Patent Appeal, and a Special Leave Petition, all of which were dismissed. Despite these dismissals, the contemnor continued to file petitions challenging his reduction in rank and subsequent dismissal from service.
3. Conviction for Criminal Offense and Its Impact on Employment
The contemnor was convicted for attempting to commit murder by shooting at his wife, a conviction confirmed by the High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. Following his conviction, he was dismissed from service. The contemnor argued that observations made by the Court during the dismissal of his special leave petition in the criminal case absolved him of moral turpitude, but this argument was rejected by the Bench.
4. Repeated Filing of Petitions on the Same Issue
Despite multiple dismissals of his petitions, the contemnor continued to file writ petitions raising identical points and seeking similar reliefs. This repeated filing was seen as an abuse of the court process. The Bench noted that the contemnor's claims had been finally disposed of by the judgment dated 20th November 1986, and any fresh proceedings were not maintainable.
5. Use of Intemperate and Abusive Language Against the Court and Its Judges
The contemnor used intemperate and abusive language against the Court and its judges in his petitions and a representation addressed to the President of India. The language used was seen as scandalising the Court and interfering with the administration of justice. The contemnor's remarks were disparaging and derogatory, aimed at undermining the authority of the Court and creating distrust in the public mind.
6. Initiation of Contempt Proceedings
The Court initiated contempt proceedings against the contemnor after reviewing the offensive language used in his petitions and representation. Despite being given opportunities to express regret and withdraw his statements, the contemnor remained defiant and argumentative. His conduct, including the circulation of a "note for directions," further aggravated his offense. The Court found that the contemnor's actions constituted gross criminal contempt and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for four months and a fine of Rs. 1000, with an additional 15 days of imprisonment in case of default in payment of the fine.
Conclusion
The judgment underscores the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of the judicial system. It highlights the consequences of abusing the court process and using intemperate language against the judiciary. The contemnor's persistent and defiant behavior, despite multiple opportunities to express regret, led to a severe penalty to serve as a deterrent for similar actions in the future.
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1992 (11) TMI 285
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the State Government's power to replace the sole member of a Commission of Inquiry.
2. Validity of the notifications appointing new members to the Commission of Inquiry.
3. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
Summary:
1. Legality of the State Government's Power to Replace the Sole Member of a Commission of Inquiry:
The Supreme Court examined whether the State Government had the authority to replace Justice S.T. Ramalingam with another person during his tenure as the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry. The Court concluded that the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, does not confer any express power on the State Government to reconstitute the Commission by replacing its sole member. The power to fill any vacancy is provided under Section 3(3) of the Act, but this does not extend to replacing an existing member.
2. Validity of the Notifications Appointing New Members to the Commission of Inquiry:
The Court reviewed the notifications dated 10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992, which appointed Justice G.G. Sohani and Justice Kamlakar Choubey respectively, replacing Justice S.T. Ramalingam. It was held that these notifications were invalid as they were issued without any legal authority. The Court emphasized that the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act does not permit such reconstitution of the Commission.
3. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act:
The State Government argued that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which allows the power to "add to, amend, vary or rescind" notifications, could be invoked to reconstitute the Commission. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the context and scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act exclude the application of Section 21 for such purposes. The Act provides specific provisions for filling vacancies and discontinuing the Commission, and these provisions do not support the reconstitution of the Commission by replacing its existing member.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the notifications dated 10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992. The Court directed the State of Madhya Pradesh to finalize the terms and conditions for Justice S.T. Ramalingam's continuance as the sole member of the Commission in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government of India. The appeals were dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
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1992 (11) TMI 284
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Nyaya Panchayat in matrimonial matters.
2. Definition and scope of "judicially separated wife" under Section 3(7) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
3. Validity and implications of the consent order recorded by the Nyaya Panchayat.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Nyaya Panchayat in Matrimonial Matters:
The primary issue was whether the Nyaya Panchayat had jurisdiction to handle matrimonial matters and grant a judicial separation. The judgment clarified that the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 does not confer jurisdiction on the Nyaya Panchayat to decide matrimonial matters. The civil jurisdiction under Section 64 of the Act is limited to claims related to money, movable property, and damages caused by cattle trespass, with monetary limits. Section 82, which allows the Nyaya Panchayat to decide disputes based on settlements or compromises, does not extend its jurisdiction to matters outside these specified areas. Therefore, the Nyaya Panchayat's consent order regarding the separation of Jeet Singh and Maya Wati was beyond its jurisdiction.
2. Definition and Scope of "Judicially Separated Wife" under Section 3(7) of the Ceiling Act:
The judgment examined whether Maya Wati could be considered a "judicially separated wife" under Section 3(7) of the Ceiling Act. The term "judicially separated" was interpreted to mean separation sanctioned by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court referenced Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and similar provisions under other personal laws, which require a judicial decree for separation. The court emphasized that "judicially separated" implies a separation resulting from a legal proceeding and order by a competent court, not merely an agreement or settlement outside the judicial framework.
3. Validity and Implications of the Consent Order Recorded by the Nyaya Panchayat:
The court addressed whether the consent order recorded by the Nyaya Panchayat could be considered a judicial separation. It was concluded that the consent order did not qualify as a judicial separation because the Nyaya Panchayat lacked the jurisdiction to issue such an order. The court cited the definition of "judicial" from authoritative dictionaries, emphasizing that it pertains to acts done in pursuance of a court order. The consent order, being outside the judicial process, did not meet this criterion. Consequently, the properties given to Maya Wati under the consent order were still considered part of Jeet Singh's holding under the Ceiling Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Nyaya Panchayat lacked jurisdiction to grant judicial separation and that the consent order did not make Maya Wati a "judicially separated wife" under Section 3(7) of the Ceiling Act. The properties transferred to her were therefore includible in Jeet Singh's holding. The judgment affirmed the necessity of a judicial decree for recognizing a separation as "judicially separated" under the relevant legal provisions.
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1992 (11) TMI 283
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the security order for the winding-up petition.
2. Principles for ordering security in winding-up petitions.
3. Comparison of legal principles from previous judgments.
4. Application of legal principles to the facts of the case.
5. Final decision on the winding-up application and related orders.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Security Order for the Winding-up Petition:
The appeal challenges a receiving order in a winding-up petition where the petitioner was directed to advertise unless the company, M/s. Dunlop India Ltd., furnished security of Rs. 50 lakhs. The lower court's decision was based on doubts about the company's defense and followed a dictum from Ofu Lynx Ltd. v. Simon Carves India Ltd., AIR 1970 Cal. 418.
2. Principles for Ordering Security in Winding-up Petitions:
The court emphasized that if a debt is bona fide disputed, a winding-up application would not lie. Conversely, sham disputes do not make a debt disputed. The court discussed borderline cases where the defense might not appear sound but cannot be dismissed outright, necessitating a trial. The court opined that ordering security in such cases of doubtful defense would contradict the principle that disputed debts are not appropriate for winding-up applications. The court should not weigh the strength of the defense at the receiving stage but should dismiss the winding-up application if the defense might succeed at trial.
3. Comparison of Legal Principles from Previous Judgments:
The court reviewed the dicta in Ofu Lynx Ltd., which suggested that if the court doubted the bona fides of disputes, it could order security. However, the court disagreed with this test, stating it was not appropriate. Instead, the court referred to Machalec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577, which provided five tests for granting leave to defend in summary suits. The court highlighted that security should only be ordered when the defendant shows no issue that might resist the claim at trial, yet the court entertains some doubt and shows mercy.
4. Application of Legal Principles to the Facts of the Case:
The court noted that M/s. Dunlop India Ltd. made payments to the petitioning creditor after the contract period, leading to disputes about whether these were final payments or part payments. The statutory notice and subsequent responses raised doubts about both the claim and the defense. The court concluded that the lower court's reliance on post-contract payments to order security was incorrect. The principles from Machalec Engineers & Manufacturers should apply, where the court should not order security if the defense might succeed at trial.
5. Final Decision on the Winding-up Application and Related Orders:
The court set aside the lower court's order for furnishing security and admission, stating that M/s. Dunlop India Ltd. disclosed facts that could be a possible complete defense at trial. The winding-up application was permanently stayed, and the petitioning creditor was relegated to a suit. The court extended the injunction restraining the petitioning creditor from instituting a suit for three weeks and did not interfere with the order relegating the creditor to a suit. The appeal was allowed, and there was no separate order on the cross-objection filed by the respondent.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's order for security and admission of the winding-up application. The winding-up application was permanently stayed, with the petitioning creditor relegated to a suit. The court emphasized that security orders should not be based on doubtful defenses and reaffirmed the principles from Machalec Engineers & Manufacturers for granting leave to defend in summary suits.
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1992 (11) TMI 282
Issues:
Whether an indigent person can be permitted to prefer a claim as an indigent person under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
Analysis:
The appellant dispatched marble slabs by rail, which were damaged in an accident. The appellant sought compensation from the Railway Claims Tribunal but lacked the means to pay the prescribed fee. The Tribunal rejected the claim, stating that Order XXXIII of the CPC did not apply to claims under the Act. The Supreme Court analyzed the Act's provisions and highlighted that the Claims Tribunal was established to handle claims previously under civil court jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal, though not bound by CPC procedures, could invoke them for justice. Denying access to justice based on inability to pay fees would be unjust. The Court held that the Tribunal's narrow interpretation was incorrect and remitted the matter to the Tribunal, emphasizing the need to ensure access to justice for indigent persons under the Act.
The Act transfers pending suits to the Claims Tribunal if their cause of action falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Claims Tribunal is empowered to regulate its procedure, guided by principles of natural justice. While not bound by CPC procedures, it can invoke them for justice. The Court highlighted that denying access to justice based on inability to pay fees would be unjust. The Tribunal's narrow interpretation was deemed incorrect, and the Court emphasized the need to ensure access to justice for indigent persons under the Act. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in line with the principles enunciated by the Court.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and remitted the matter for reconsideration. The Court stressed the importance of ensuring access to justice for indigent persons under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, emphasizing that the Tribunal could invoke CPC procedures for justice despite not being bound by them. No costs were awarded in the circumstances of the case.
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1992 (11) TMI 281
Disparity in promotional avenues from State Civil Services to All India Administrative Service -equitable principles of comparable seniority - operation of the First Amendment Rules - prospective or retrospective - Word ‘consultation’ - HELD THAT:- The first Amendment Rules doubtless provided the weightage to a maximum of 9 years and would track back the year of allotment anterior to the date of inclusion in the select list under the Recruitment Rules read with Promotion Regulations. The proviso intended to protect the seniority of the officer promoted/appointed earlier than the appellants and its effect would be that till rule 3(3) (ii) fully becomes operational graded weightage was given to the promotees. In other words it prevented to get seniority earlier to the date of his/her appointment to the Indian Administrative service. Equally it intended not to let endless compulsive circumstances denied the benefits of full 9 years weightage to officers promoted during 1987 to 1992. The discrimination, though is prevented unequals to become equals. The contention of sri P.P Rao, therefore, that invidious discrimination was meted out to senior officers and that they are similarly circumstanced are devoid of force.
Admittedly, the draft of the First Amendment Rules, as circulated to the State Government did not contain the offending proviso. It is stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Govt. that some of the State Government had suggested to incorporate the proviso and after necessary consultation the proviso was added to the First Amendment Rule.
It is thereby clear that sec. 3(1) empowers the Central Govt. to make any rule regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of All India Service, which include amendment from time to time, but the rider it engrafted is that the power should be exercised "after consultation with the Governments of the State concerned". It is already held that by operation of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, the rules or regulations are statutory in character.
The proposal for amending the new Seniority Rules in the draft was only for inviting discussion and suggestions on the scope and ambit of the proposed law and the effect of the operation of the First Amendment Rules. Keeping the operational effect in view the proposed amendment could be modified or deleted or altered. The Central Govt. is not bound to accept all or every proposal or counter proposal.
Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the general consultation has by the Central Govt. with the State Govts. and Union Territories was sufficient and it was not necessary to have prior consultation again to bring the proviso on statutes as part of the First Amendment Rules.
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1992 (11) TMI 280
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the Commissioner's action u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act.
2. Tribunal's decision to cancel the Commissioner's order.
3. Fresh assessment by the ITO following the Commissioner's order.
4. Tribunal's refusal to refer a question of law regarding the fresh assessment.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Commissioner's action u/s 263:
The Commissioner initiated action u/s 263, considering the ITO's assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The Commissioner observed that the ITO failed to investigate and analyze transactions with three parties, which were found to be fictitious. The Commissioner set aside the assessment and directed a de novo assessment by the ITO.
2. Tribunal's decision to cancel the Commissioner's order:
The Tribunal quashed the Commissioner's order, stating that the Commissioner did not establish that the ITO's order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal emphasized that the Commissioner must be prima facie satisfied of the error and prejudice before setting aside the assessment.
3. Fresh assessment by the ITO following the Commissioner's order:
Following the Commissioner's directive, the ITO made a fresh assessment, adding Rs. 2,66,878 to the assessee's income. The Commissioner (Appeals) annulled this fresh assessment, as the Tribunal had set aside the Commissioner's order u/s 263. The Tribunal upheld this annulment.
4. Tribunal's refusal to refer a question of law regarding the fresh assessment:
The Commissioner moved an application u/s 256(2) to refer a question of law regarding the annulled fresh assessment. The Tribunal refused, leading to the present application before the High Court.
High Court's Judgment:
The High Court held that the Commissioner was correct in finding the ITO's assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The ITO's failure to discuss and record findings on substantial issues warranted the Commissioner's action. The Tribunal's view that the Commissioner should have recorded the findings himself was incorrect. The High Court answered the referred question in favor of the revenue, stating that the Tribunal's cancellation of the Commissioner's order was incorrect.
Regarding the fresh assessment annulment, the High Court noted the peculiar situation where the Tribunal's earlier order influenced subsequent decisions. The High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and refer the question of law concerning the annulment of the fresh assessment for its opinion.
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1992 (11) TMI 279
Issues:
Challenge to the rejection of review application for modification of eligibility certificate duration.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought to quash an order rejecting the review application and modify the eligibility certificate duration. The petitioner initially claimed exemption for six years but later challenged the order on the ground of unsustainable exemption granted for a specific period. The petitioner's investment increased after shifting the manufacturing unit, leading to a dispute over the entitlement for exemption duration.
2. The court considered whether the petitioner was entitled to exemption for four years based on the investment criteria. The starting date of production was not disputed, and the eligibility for exemption was to be determined from that date. The investment amount of the unit was crucial in deciding the exemption period, with the threshold being rupees three lacs for a four-year exemption.
3. The respondents argued that the unit's investment exceeded three lacs after shifting locations, disqualifying it from the exemption. However, the court analyzed the relevant provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, focusing on the conditions specified for granting exemption to new units. The court emphasized that the investment should be considered as of the date the unit becomes eligible for exemption.
4. The court examined a circular by the Commissioner and the language of the Act to determine the investment criteria for granting exemptions. The court rejected the argument that shifting the unit constituted an addition or extension, emphasizing that mere relocation does not necessarily amount to an increase in production capacity or investment.
5. Ultimately, the court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned order and directing the authority to modify the eligibility certificate for a four-year exemption from the starting date of production. The decision was based on the interpretation of the investment criteria and the conditions for granting exemptions under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
This detailed analysis outlines the key aspects of the judgment, including the dispute over exemption duration, investment criteria for eligibility, and the court's interpretation of relevant legal provisions to determine the petitioner's entitlement to exemption.
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1992 (11) TMI 278
Issues involved: Application for clarifications and directions by Union of India regarding the implementation of principles laid down in the main judgment.
Clarifications and Directions:
1. The Union of India sought clarifications and directions to address difficulties in applying the principles from the main judgment to cases beyond the specific petitioner's case.
2. The first aspect highlighted the challenges with pending similar petitions before the Supreme Court and various High Courts due to existing stay orders, hindering the immediate implementation of the judgment's directions.
3. The second aspect focused on pending matters before authorities that do not align with statutory limits, necessitating further guidance for proper implementation.
4. A clarification was made to adjust the time frame for cases pending before the Courts, stating that the period for affording an opportunity of being heard shall be calculated from the date of actual disposal of those matters.
5. Another clarification was provided for matters pending before authorities, stating that Form 37-I shall be considered filed as of the date of the main judgment for the completion of proceedings under section 269UD(1).
6. Certified copies of the main order and the clarification were to be provided to interested parties upon request.
This judgment addressed the practical challenges faced in implementing the main judgment's principles in cases beyond the specific petitioner, offering necessary clarifications and directions for pending petitions before the Courts and authorities to ensure a proper and consistent application of the law.
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