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Showing 1 to 20 of 2066 Records
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2017 (11) TMI 2069
Commission income in business of accommodation entries and laundering of black money - AO accordingly rejected the books of account of the assessee and estimated the net profit rate of the commission @ 2%, which according to the assessee was 0.15% - HELD THAT:- As per consistent with the view taken in various similar matters, we also uphold the rate of commission / net profit rate from such activity at 0.15%. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Expenses allowed as deductions - The assessee has stated before us that 50% of the expenses should be allowed. We find that the Ld. CIT (A) has allowed 20% of the expenses on estimated basis and the addition remains of Rs. 8,440/-. Hence, we further allow 25% of expenses which comes to Rs. 2,637/-.
Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2068
Disallowance of interest - as per AO payment of interest cannot be set off against the interest income - HELD THAT:- Any expenditure which is laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of earning of interest income is allowable u/s 57(iii). In the case under appeal before us, we find that the borrowed money has been utilized for the purpose of giving advances to others. There is a direct nexus between the money borrowed by the assessee and money advanced by the assessee.
The assessee paid interest on the money borrowed by it and has received the interest on the money advanced by it. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the interest paid by the assessee was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning of interest income and therefore, the same was rightly claimed u/s 57(iii) and CIT (A) rightly directed for allowing the same.
After considering the decision of Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd [1997 (7) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] was given by the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court. The facts of the assessee’s case are identical. Therefore, the above decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court would be squarely applicable.
Considering the facts of the case and respectfully following the above decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, we hold that learned CIT (A) was fully justified in directing the AO to allow deduction of interest paid by the assessee against the interest received by the assessee.
AO has disallowed the interest mainly by following the decision in the case of Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. [supra] which we have already dealt with - Disallowance of interest while computing the assessee’s income from other sources and alternatively observed that interest paid by the assessee is also disallowable u/s 14A because borrowed money is utilized for investment in shares. Therefore, the limited issue open for our examination is whether the borrowed money has been utilized for the purpose of investment in shares. CIT (A) has recorded the finding that no borrowed money was utilized for investment in shares. After considering the facts of the case and submissions of both the parties, we concur with the finding of the CIT(A). In the above circumstances, the wider question whether disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D is required to be made or not is not before us.
Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2067
Constitution of Special Investigation Team (SIT), headed by retired Chief Justice of India, to investigate the offences arising out of FIR - criminal conspiracy - taking illegal gratification - offence punishable under section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and section 120B of the IPC - HELD THAT:- The entire judicial system has been unnecessarily brought into disrepute for no good cause whatsoever. It passes comprehension how it was, that the petitioner presumed, that there is an FIR lodged against any public functionary. There is an averment made in the writ petition that it is against the highest judicial functionaries; that FIR has been recorded. There are no reflection of any name of the Judge of this Court in the FIR. There is no question of registering any FIR against any sitting Judge of the High Court or of this Court as it is not permissible as per the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of 5 Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [1991 (7) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT] wherein this Court observed that in order to ensure the independence of the judiciary the apprehension that the Executive being largest litigant, it is likely to misuse the power to prosecute the Judges. Any complaint against a Judge and investigation by the CBI if given publicity, will have a far reaching effect on the Judge and the litigant public. The need, therefore, is of judicious use of action taken under the Act. There cannot be registration of any FIR against a High Court Judge or Chief Justice of the High Court or the Supreme Court Judge without the consultation of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and, in case there is an allegation against Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, the decision has to be taken by the Hon’ble President, in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the said decision.
The instant petitions, as filed, are a misconceived venture inasmuch, as the petition wrongly presupposes that investigation involves higher judiciary, i.e. this Court’s functionaries are under the scanner in the aforesaid case; that independence of judiciary cannot be left at the mercy of the CBI or that of the police is a red herring. There cannot be any FIR even against the Civil Judge/Munsif without permission of the Chief Justice of the concerned court; and rightly, FIR has not been registered against any sitting Judge. Otherwise, on unfounded allegations, any honest Judge to the core, can be defamed, and reputation can be jeopardized. No Judge can be held responsible for what may, or has happened in the corridors, or for ‘who purports to sell whom’ - As is apparent from the narration of facts, there was no favourable order granted by this Court in favour of the medical college for the current academic session 2017-18, rather its inspection for considering confirmation of letter of permission for the next year 2018-19 had been ordered.
In R. K. Anand v. Delhi High Court [2009 (7) TMI 1231 - SUPREME COURT], this Court observed that there could be ways in which conduct and action of malefactor was professional misconduct. The purity of the court proceedings has to be maintained. The Court does not only have the right but also an obligation to protect itself and can bar the malefactor from appearing before the Court for an appropriate period of time. There is a duty cast upon an Advocate to protect the dignity of this Court not to scandalize the very institution as observed in the said decision.
Reference has also been made to the decision in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India [2015 (10) TMI 2687 - SUPREME COURT] in which maxim nemo judex in causa sua has been considered, that no man is to be judge in his own cause, should be held sacred and that maxim is not to be confined to a case in which he is a party but applies to a cause in which he has an interest. It is far fetched and too tenuous to submit that any Judge of this Court much less Hon’ble A.M. Khanwilkar, J. has any interest in the subject matter and for that reason in spite of there being no allegation in the writ petition, Shri Justice A. M. Khanwilkar should recuse. There is no room for reasonable suspicion even in remote and argument is simply too derogatory to be made, probably that has been made anyhow or somehow to protect the case and to bring disrepute to this Court.
The petition is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2066
Exemption under N/N. 30/2004- CE dated 09.04.2004 on imported non-textured Polyester Lining Cloth - denial of exemption on the ground that one of the conditions mentioned therein was not fulfilled by the appellant - non-availment of credit of duty on the inputs or capital goods under the provisions of Cenvat Credits Rules, 2002 - HELD THAT:- In appellants own case, this Tribunal allowed the exemption vide Final Order No. 55993-56023 of 2016 dated 17.11.2016 [2016 (11) TMI 1456 - CESTAT NEW DELHI].
It is also noted that the Apex Court affirmed their decision in SRF Ltd. [2015 (4) TMI 561 - SUPREME COURT] by dismissing the review petition of Revenue [2016 (7) TMI 1381 - SC ORDER].
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2065
Refund claim rejected as time-barred - delay due to choice of jurisdiction to entertain the refund claim - HELD THAT:- As after a gap of almost nine months, the refund claim filed by the appellant was returned on the premise that the same is not having the jurisdiction to entertain the refund claim and is required to be filed before the proper forum - On this intimation, the appellant immediately filed the refund claim within 7 days. Therefore, the period of limitation is required to be counted from October, 2010 to February 2011 till 3-5-2011 plus 7 days for which the appellant taken time to file refund claims before the proper office/officer after receipt the intimation from the office of the Central Excise & Customs, Rajkot - Refund claim filed by the appellant is within time. Therefore refund claim is within time and the same cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation.
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2017 (11) TMI 2064
Suit for recovery together with pendente lite and future interest - prayer for discharge of its bank guarantees - Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - HELD THAT:- The plaintiff states that he has no objection to the matter being referred to the Arbitration provided the Court-fees paid in the present suit is refunded.
Consequently, with consent of parties, this Court refers the parties to the Arbitration. Accordingly, present suit stands disposed of.
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2017 (11) TMI 2063
Disallowance made on account of interest u/s 36(1)(iii) - Whether assessee had sufficient interest free funds of his own during the year? - HELD THAT:- We have perused the balance sheet regarding the share capital and reserves and surpluses and find that the share capital and reserves and surplus far exceeds the advances given. Since the assessee has sufficient own funds no disallowance is called for.
Similar issue has been dealt in the case of Gurudas Garg [2015 (8) TMI 569 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] In the case of Kissan Foods Ltd. [2017 (2) TMI 696 - ITAT CHANDIGARH] wherein it was held that if there were funds available interest free and overdraft and loans taken then presumption would arise that investments would be out of interest free funds.
We hold that the disallowance of interest made under section 36(1)(iii) of the Act is uncalled for and the order of the CIT(A) is, therefore, set aside. The disallowance made of interest is, therefore, deleted. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2062
Addition u/s 56(1) - assets of the assessee company don’t commensurate to premium charged and neither any business activity was performed nor any business income has been shown by the assessee - Applicability of Section 68 - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- It is pertinent to mention that the similar issue has been dealt with and decided by this Bench of ITAT [2017 (10) TMI 1445 - ITAT JAIPUR] in the case of ACIT, Central Circle-2, Jaipur vs Motisons Buildtech Pvt. Ltd as held To tax the income under the Act, it must come under the definition of income as provided u/s 2(24) of the I.T. Act, 1961. There were amendments in sec 2(24) of the Act and in section 56(2) of the Act w.e.f. 01-04-2013 are not applicable to A.Y. under consideration. By these amended provisions, any consideration received for issue of shares that exceeds the face market value of such shares the aggregate consideration received for such shares as exceeds the fair market value of the shares shall be taxable as per clause (viib) of sub-section 2 of section 56 of the Act. The CBDT vide Circular No. 3 of 2012 dated 12-06-2012 has also mentioned that provision of section 56(2)(viib) will be applicable for A.Y. 2013-14.
The provisions of sec 56(2)(viib) of Income-tax Act, 1961 are applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 and will accordingly apply in relation to Assessment Year 2013-14 and subsequent Assessment Years. The income as mentioned in section 56(2)(viib) is included in definition of section 2(24) of the Act w.e.f. 01-04-2013. Therefore, the provisions of these sections cannot be made applicable prior to that A.Y. 2013-14. It is pertinent to note that the ld. CIT (A) had issued the show cause notice to the assessee to tax the share capital under section 68 of the I.T. Act, 1961 as against section 56(1) applied by the AO. However, he had not made any addition under section 68 of the Act.
Revenue has not preferred appeal against this findings the ld. CIT(A). It is also pertinent to note that AO has made whole addition by invoking section 56 of the Act, hence the amended provision w.e.f. 01-04-2013 are applicable only on shares premium received on fair market value. In view of these facts, it is clear that share premium received cannot be considered as income for the year under consideration by invoking provisions of section 56(1) of the Act. Therefore, in our considered view, the ld. CIT (A) has rightly deleted the addition - Thus the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
Unexplained cash deposits - HELD THAT:- All the share capital/share application was received through a/c payee cheques and verifiable from bank statement of assessee as well as bank statement of the party. The onus u/s 68 of the assessee is to prove the identity, capacity and genuineness of the transactions has been discharged.
Section 68 of the Act does not empower the ld. CIT (A) to make addition under this Act. Thus the addition u/s 68 can only be made by the Assessing Officer - CIT (A) is not the Assessing Officer as per Income-Tax Act. Therefore, the ld. CIT (A) does not have any legal sanction to make the addition u/s 68 of the Act.
CIT (A) in his order had clearly held that the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of transactions of these companies cannot be held doubtful and addition by applying the provision of sec 68 cannot be upheld.
CIT (A) has sustained the addition without specifying any provision of Income tax Act. No such addition can be sustained without invoking the relevant provisions of the Act. Moreover, the addition has been sustained in the hands of that assessee where cash /DD was deposited at 4th Channel. Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court and other Hon'ble Courts held that assessee cannot be asked to explain the source of the source.
Addition u/s 56(1) - Scope of amended law - Assessment Year 2013-14 - HELD THAT:- Rule 11UA (2) of Income Tax Rules, 1962 provides the method of calculation of fair market value of unquoted shares in term of explanation (a) (i) to section 56(2)(viib). In the assessee’s case, the company has issued 1,10,250/- equity shares at the premium of Rs. 390/-per share. In view of the amended provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of Income Tax Act, the AO should have calculated the fair market value of the shares as mentioned in explanation (a) of section 56(viib) of the Act and excess amount of fair market value of the shares received if any could have been taxed u/s 56(2) of Income Tax Act. However, the AO has not done any exercise in this regard and the entire amount received against share capital during this year amounting to Rs. 4,41,00,000/- was taxed u/s 56(1) of Income Tax Act. For the year under consideration, the amended law is applicable. The share premium/ capital received in excess of fair market value of the shares shall be taxed. The ld. CIT (A) deleted the addition. However, in the interest of equity and justice, the AO is directed to calculate the fair market value of the share in accordance with the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of I.Tax Act and if the amount received against share capital during the year is found in excess of fair market value of shares, then the addition to that extent the excess of fair market value of shares shall be made in the hands of the assessee company. Thus the appeal of the Revenue is allowed for Statistical purposes.
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2017 (11) TMI 2061
Challenge to arbitration award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act - borrowers would dispute the rate of interest arguing that only simple interest at the rate of 12 % per annum was payable and not 24% per annum as claimed by the company in arbitration - whether the agreed rate of interest being 24% is liable to be substituted with the rate of interest at 12%, which, according to the borrowers, is more acceptable? - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the award reveals that all factual aspects of the matter as raised by the parties have been adverted to and adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator prior to arriving at the conclusion that the borrowers are liable to pay the outstanding dues to the company along with the contracted rate of interest at 24% from the date of claim till the date of realization. The sole dispute raised by the borrowers and canvassed is with regard to the rate of interest, being usurious. The allegations of fraud on the part of the company have been noted and adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator and it is not proposed to re-visit the same. The thrust of the appeal is solely on the rate of interest that has been found by the Arbitrator to be the agreed contracted rate warranting no interference at this juncture. The view taken is based on an appreciation of the relevant facts and the terms of the agreements between the parties and, is liable to be confirmed as regards the levy of interest for the period from date of claim till date of award, being 27.12.2014.
The grounds of challenge under Section 34(2) are narrow in scope and do not permit a re-appreciation of evidence. The proper course of action for the petitioner, if it was really aggrieved by the order of the tribunal rejecting the interim application, was to have challenged the same. This was however not done and the facts have thus attained finality.
The Original Petition stands dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2060
Duty drawback - overvaluation of goods - whether the appellants have resorted to overvaluation of the goods proposed to be exported to U.S.A. for availing drawback, by mis-declaration? - HELD THAT:- It is held that no valuation of the goods proposed to be exported have been done as a result of the purported inspection. Thus, the allegation of overvaluation is without any basis. Thus, the show cause notice is held to be not maintainable as it does not disclose the gist of allegation, the appellants were required to meet. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2059
Jurisdiction to enhance the penalty - export of prohibited goods - red sanders - liability of the appellant as a consolidator for dispatching goods without proper inquiry - HELD THAT:- It appears that as a consolidator, it is the duty of the appellant to dispatch the goods after making a proper inquiry. Same was not done in the instant case or was ignored. As per circumstantial evidence, he was aware about the prohibited goods. The activity is against the Nation. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has no power to enhance the penalty. Therefore, there is no occasion except to confirm the impugned order.
The impugned order is hereby confirmed for the reasons mentioned therein - the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2058
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Existence and amount of financial debt and default - HELD THAT:- As per Part-V of the application the total estimated value of the security held by all the lenders of the Company as per estimate made by AARC is Rs. 271.85 Crores. Copies of Certificates of Registration of Mortgage and of Modification of Mortgages issued by Registrar of Companies, New Delhi have also been enclosed with the Application as Annexure 5 - The financial creditor Applicant has also placed the copies of the financial contracts with respect to the facilities given by the consortium lenders including State Bank of Hyderabad (now merged with State Bank of India), now held by AARC are as Annexure 6 to 54 with the Application as Proof of Existence of Debt.
The 'financial creditor' has placed on record an overwhelming amount of evidence to prove the amount advanced to the Corporate Debtor.
Petition admitted.
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2017 (11) TMI 2057
Additions made u/s 68 - excessive loan, cash credit entries, and advances received - Onus to prove - HELD THAT:- We find that in the first place the onus was on the assessee to establish the genuineness of cash credit entries found recorded in his account books. It was for the assessee to have led evidence before the assessing officer in that regard. Admittedly, the assessee did not lead such evidence and the assessing officer, therefore, proceeded to make the additions u/s 68 of the Act.
Then, in appeal also the assessee did not file any additional evidence, which was the duty of the assessee alone. Inasmuch as, the assessee has not raised this ground even before the Tribunal - Decided against assessee.
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2017 (11) TMI 2056
Reversal of CENVAT Credit - Availment of suo moto credit - not providing proper opportunity to the appellant to defend themselves inasmuch as they were not allowed to cross examine the jurisdictional Superintendent - HELD THAT:- It is seen that the issue on merits does not stand discussed by the Lower Authorities, i.e. as to whether the appellants was liable to pay the Cenvat credit or not. If such debit entry was not in fact, required to be made, the facts taking suo-moto credit under intimation to the Revenue would be a correction of the accounts. There are many decisions of the Tribunal lying down that such accounting correction will not require filing of refund claims. In as much the credit entry was made under intimation to the Revenue, the same will have the effect of seeking, Revenues permission.
It is deemed fit to set aside the impugned order and remand the same to the Original Adjudicating Authority for examining the issue afresh, first on merits and then on the issue of Suo-moto taking of credit.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2017 (11) TMI 2055
Second appeal - Illegal possession of suit shop - possession of the suit shop without any right, title and interest of any nature - whether the Trial Court and First appellate Court decided the case contrary to the pleadings and evidence and especially contrary to the recitals of EX-P. 15? - HELD THAT:- The approach of the High Court in deciding the second appeal, which resulted in allowing the Respondent's appeal, is wholly perverse and against the well settled principle of law applicable to second appeals.
In the absence of any question of law framed on any of the adverse findings recorded by the two Courts below against the Respondent, those findings attained finality. In other words, since no error was noticed in any of the findings of the two Courts below, the High Court did not frame any substantial question in relation to such findings, which became final for want of any challenge.
The High Court, however, framed one general question of law as to whether the findings of the two Courts below were contrary to the pleadings and evidence and especially to Ex-P-15 and held, by placing reliance on Ex. P-15, that the Respondent was occupying the suit shop as tenant and, therefore, the remedy of the Appellant was in filing a tenancy suit against the Respondent and to claim his eviction from the suit shop under the State tenancy laws or/and Transfer of Property Act in such suit but not in the present suit which is based on the strength of his title. The High Court, with this finding, accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the Appellant's suit as being misconceived.
The defense of the Respondent was that he had denied the Appellant's title over the suit shop and then set up a plea of adverse possession contending that he has become the owner of the suit shop by virtue of adverse possession, which according to him, was from time immemorial - It was clear that the Respondent never claimed that he was in possession of the suit shop as tenant of the Appellant's predecessor-in-title. On the other hand, the Respondent had asserted his ownership right over the suit shop on the strength of his long adverse possession.
The High Court was not right in holding that the Respondent was in occupation of the suit shop as tenant and that the remedy of the Appellant was to file a civil suit to claim eviction under the Rent Laws. This finding is contrary to the pleadings and evidence. It is also otherwise not legally sustainable for want of any evidence adduced by the Respondent in support thereof.
The Trial Court and First Appellate Court were justified in holding the Appellant to be the owner of the suit shop, having purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 20.09.1997 from its previous owner. It was also rightly held that the Respondent was in possession of the suit shop as an encroacher and failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit shop - Appeal allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2054
Assessment u/s 153A - Validity of Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(b) - The following questions of law arise for consideration:-
(i) Did the ITAT fell into error in setting aside the sums brought to tax by the AO under Section 153A in the circumstances of the case?
(ii) Was the Tribunal correct in holding that penalty could not have been levied under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act in the circumstances of the case?
List on 28.02.2018 for hearing
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2017 (11) TMI 2053
Enhancement of compensation - seeking refund of the decretal amount by the private respondents - appellant submits that the decretal amount has been deposited by respondent No. 2 before the Reference Court and the same has been released to the private respondents - HELD THAT:- The learned Reference Court shall not permit the private respondents to lead additional evidence till the undertaking and the security in terms of this order is furnished by the private respondents before the Reference Court. In the event of the failure of the private respondents to file an undertaking and the security within six months, the appellant would be at liberty to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of the decretal amount from the private respondents in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before the Reference Court on 14th December, 2017. Learned counsels for the parties submit that they have noted down the next date of hearing and no fresh notice for their appearance would be required for appearance before the Reference Court.
Application disposed off.
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2017 (11) TMI 2052
Release of sanctioned capital subsidy/Investment Incentive - Petitioner(s) has submitted that the petitioner(s) in all writ petitions are closed units but they are eligible for grant of subsidy - HELD THAT:- The capital subsidy/Investment Incentive of Rs.50 lacs was sanctioned to the petitioner as far as back on 31.3.1997 on 18.3.1999. Since then the petitioner is waiting for the release of the capital subsidy/Investment Incentive.
During this interregnum due to financial sickness, the petitioner Company was closed in the year 2006 but the subsidy is still not released and the only reason assigned is that since there are so many similar closed units, which are claiming subsidy, therefore the Guidelines are in pipelines on the basis of which the seniority will be determined and amount would be released.
This argument is not at all impressive because earlier the petitioner, who was at Seniority No.640 has now reduced to Sr.No.230 and therefore the petitioner(s) are entitled and eligible to get the subsidy. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances the present petitions are allowed and a direction is issued to the respondents to release/grant the capital subsidy/Investment Incentive, as claimed by the petitioner(s), within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
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2017 (11) TMI 2051
Reopening of assessment - Estimation of income - bogus purchases - CIT(A) confirmed addition being 17.5% of the total bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- We find that the reopening has been done on the basis of information from the Sales Tax Department, GOM that the assessee has availed hawala entries for purchase of goods from the hawala operators - In our opinion, the said information was not available before the AO at the time of framing of the assessment and therefore was constituted valid reason for reopening the assessment u/s 148 of the Act. We are in agreement with the conclusion drawn by the CIT(A) on the issue of reopening of the assessment and accordingly the cross objection raised against re-opening is dismissed.
Addition at the rate of 17.5% of bogus purchases - We find that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of purchases by producing the relevant documentary and circumstances evidences before the lower authorities as desired by them whereas the consumption of the materials is not disputed. Therefore, reasonable addition should be made to cover the various types of savings which the assessee might have made by purchasing the goods from the gray market. Accordingly, we feel reasonable if the addition is sustained to the tune of 5% of the amount of bogus purchases. Accordingly, the CO of the assessee is partly allowed and appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
As the addition made by the ld. CIT(A) at the rate of 17.5% of the bogus purchase is on higher side, it should be made on reasonable account which brings the tax and savings which the assessee might have made. Resultantly, the appeal of the revenue stands dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2050
Rectification u/s 154 - period of limitation - validity of action of the CIT(A) in holding that order passed by the AO u/s. 154 was time barred - HELD THAT:- While framing the assessment order, AO has not computed income of assessee u/s. 115JB. This omission was identified at a subsequent date accordingly AO has passed the order to rectify the same. The impugned order so passed by the AO was dated 21/01/2014, which is much beyond the limitation period to be reckoned from the end of the Financial Year 2007-08.
Even though AO has mentioned in his order that the order is passed to give the effect to the order of CIT(A)’s order. However, in fact the rectification has been made in respect of mistake committed by him in the order passed u/s. 143(3) dated 28/15/2007. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A) for holding that the order passed u/s. 154 was time barred under the provisions of Section 154(7) of the Act.
The issue under consideration is also squarely covered by the decision Sakseria Cotton Mills Limited [1979 (2) TMI 17 - BOMBAY High Court] wherein it was held that rectification of mistake- period of limitation u/s. 154(7) will apply from the date of original order of the ITO and not from the date of ITO’s order giving effect to the AAC’s order in respect of points not the subject matter of the order u/s. 154. No infirmity in the order of CIT(A).
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