|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 16 of 16 Records
-
1951 (12) TMI 20
Issues Involved:
1. Charges under section 302 read with section 149, section 148, sections 325 and 326 read with section 149, and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Possession and ownership dispute over the "teesa" field.
3. Credibility and reliability of prosecution witnesses.
4. Right of private defence.
5. Evaluation of evidence by the Sessions Judge versus the High Court.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Charges under section 302 read with section 149, section 148, sections 325 and 326 read with section 149, and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code:
The appellants were initially acquitted by the Sessions Judge but were later convicted by the High Court. The High Court sentenced the appellants to transportation for life under section 302 read with section 149, five years' rigorous imprisonment under sections 325 and 326 read with section 149, and five years' rigorous imprisonment under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code, with all sentences running concurrently.
2. Possession and ownership dispute over the "teesa" field:
The plot in question, known as the "teesa" field, was the subject of a dispute between the co-sharers, including Mst. Bhagwati Kuer and Ratan Singh. The Sessions Judge found that Surajpal Singh had taken possession on behalf of all co-sharers, while Ratan Singh's statements did not fully support this. The High Court, however, concluded that both parties had equal rights to the field and were attempting to take exclusive possession, making the question of private defence immaterial.
3. Credibility and reliability of prosecution witnesses:
The Sessions Judge meticulously examined the credibility of each prosecution witness, finding the evidence unsatisfactory and unreliable. The High Court, however, accepted the testimony of four witnesses-Deo Sukh, Rori Singh, Ram Singh, and Ratan Singh-deeming it worthy of credence. The Supreme Court found substantial reasons to agree with the Sessions Judge's assessment, particularly regarding the suspicious nature of Deva Sukh's injuries and the delayed examination of certain witnesses.
4. Right of private defence:
The Sessions Judge concluded that the accused acted in self-defence, as Ratan Singh's men were the aggressors. The High Court dismissed the plea of private defence, stating that both parties were prepared for contingencies to enforce their rights. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Sessions Judge's view-that the gun was fired in self-defence after the appellants' party was assaulted with lathis-was reasonable.
5. Evaluation of evidence by the Sessions Judge versus the High Court:
The Sessions Judge provided a detailed analysis of the evidence, while the High Court's summary treatment did not address the substantial reasons given by the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court noted the importance of the trial court's findings, especially given the trial court's advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should only reverse the trial court's findings for very substantial and compelling reasons, which were not present in this case.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences of the appellants, and acquitted them of all charges. The Court found that the Sessions Judge had taken a reasonable view of the facts, and there were no good reasons for the High Court to reverse that view. The presumption of innocence was further reinforced by the trial court's acquittal, and the State Government's appeal against only five of the 25 accused was not justified.
-
1951 (12) TMI 19
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, and the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.
2. Jurisdiction and powers of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and the Commissioner.
3. Rights and duties of the Mathadhipathi and the Podu Dikshitars.
4. Infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, 27, and 30 of the Constitution.
5. Legality of the notification procedure under the Acts.
6. Validity of Section 76 of the new Act concerning contributions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Acts:
The petitions questioned the validity of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, and the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The Court allowed the petitioners to amend their petitions to challenge the new Act. The Court found that certain provisions of the new Act were ultra vires the State Legislature as they infringed upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
2. Jurisdiction and Powers:
The Court examined the jurisdiction and powers of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and the Commissioner. It was noted that the Board issued notifications under Section 62 of the earlier Act and Section 103 of the new Act to frame schemes for the administration of mutts. The Court found that the Board acted with bias and did not provide a reasonable opportunity for the petitioner to show cause, thus exceeding its jurisdiction.
3. Rights and Duties of the Mathadhipathi and Podu Dikshitars:
The Court discussed the juristic relationship of the Mathadhipathi to the properties of the Mutt, concluding that the Mathadhipathi is not a trustee in the strict sense but has beneficial ownership of the properties and income. The Court also recognized the Podu Dikshitars as having a substantial beneficial interest in the income of the temple, thus their rights were protected under the Constitution.
4. Infringement of Fundamental Rights:
The Court found that the provisions of the new Act infringed upon the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, and 27 of the Constitution. The Court held that the restrictions imposed by the new Act were unreasonable and not justified in the interests of the general public. The Court also found that the contribution levied under Section 76 of the new Act was a tax and violated Article 27, making it unconstitutional.
5. Legality of the Notification Procedure:
The Court found that the notification procedure under the earlier and new Acts was drastic and encroached upon the rights of the Podu Dikshitars to manage the property belonging to the denomination. The Court held that the notification procedure was an unreasonable restriction on their rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 26 of the Constitution.
6. Validity of Section 76:
The Court held that the contribution levied under Section 76 of the new Act was a tax and violated Article 27 of the Constitution. The Court found that the tax was specifically appropriated for the maintenance of Hindu religious institutions, making it unconstitutional.
Conclusion:
The Court declared several sections of the new Act ultra vires the State Legislature and quashed the notification issued under the Act. The Court also held that the Mathadhipathi and the Podu Dikshitars had their fundamental rights infringed by the provisions of the new Act. The rule nisi was made absolute, and the petitioners were granted costs. The case was certified as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 132 of the Constitution.
-
1951 (12) TMI 18
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the oral transfer of the suit house by Khasim Peeran to his wife in consideration of her dower debt.
2. Whether the transaction is a sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.
3. The applicability of Order 21, Rule 97 or Order 21, Rule 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding possession and redelivery of property.
4. The plaintiff's right to possessory lien until the dower debt is discharged.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Oral Transfer:
The main question in this second appeal is the validity of the oral transfer of the suit house by Khasim Peeran to his wife in consideration of her dower debt. The preponderance of authority supports the view that such a transaction is a sale within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and will not be valid unless it is accompanied by a registered document.
2. Whether the Transaction is a Sale:
The leading case on the subject, 'Abbas Ali v. Karim Baksh', established that such transactions are sales governed by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. This view is supported by various High Courts, including Calcutta, Patna, Lahore, and Nagpur. The transaction, termed "hiba-bil-ewaz" in India, is essentially a sale and requires a registered document to be valid. The Allahabad High Court's earlier decisions aligned with this view, but later decisions like 'Mt. Kulsum Bibi v. Shiam Sunder Lal' diverged, considering it a gift. However, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 'Ghulam Abbas v. Razia Begum' reaffirmed that such a transaction is a sale requiring registration.
3. Applicability of Order 21, Rule 97 or Order 21, Rule 100 of CPC:
The court found that the defendants could not maintain an application under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 100 of the CPC, as they were never in possession of the suit property. Therefore, the summary order directing the removal of the obstruction and redelivery of the property was unsustainable.
4. Plaintiff's Right to Possessory Lien:
The court did not find it necessary to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to possess the property until the vendor's dower debt is discharged or whether the plaintiff has a possessory lien. This issue may be relevant in other proceedings when the defendants seek to dispossess the plaintiff.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the oral transfer of immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 to the wife by a Muhammadan husband is not valid unless made by a written instrument duly registered. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit for a declaration of title based on the oral sale was unsustainable. However, the order in E.A. No. 617 of 1943 was vacated, allowing the plaintiff to retain possession of the property until dispossessed through appropriate proceedings. The decrees of the lower courts were confirmed, subject to the deletion of Clause 1 of the trial court's decree. Each party was ordered to bear their respective costs throughout.
-
1951 (12) TMI 17
The High Court of Allahabad ruled that Amarnath and Dina Nath, as members of a Hindu undivided family, could represent and bind the family in a partnership with an outsider. The Tribunal found that the funds for the partnership were supplied by the joint family business, and therefore, the profits belonged to the joint family. The Court affirmed this decision.
-
1951 (12) TMI 16
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to the Zamindari.
2. Status of Boothipuram village.
3. Status of Pannai lands and buildings.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to the Zamindari:
The main contention revolved around whether the Zamindari of Bodinaickanur became the separate property of Kandasami and subsequently his son Kamaraja II, or if it retained its character as joint family property. The High Court disallowed the widow's claim that the Zamindari became separate property by the 1890 arrangement, stating that the documents (Exhibits P-17 and P-18) did not change the estate's character from an impartible estate of a joint family to an estate owned individually by Kandasami. The High Court and the Supreme Court concurred that Kandasami could not unilaterally convert the estate into his private property. The argument that the family separated in 1890 and divided the properties was also rejected. The Supreme Court emphasized that for an impartible estate to cease being joint family property, there must be a clear intention to renounce the right of succession, which was not evident here. The statements made in 1889 and 1890 indicated no intention to renounce heirship. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the Zamindari remained joint family property, and Rajaya of the third branch was entitled to it under the rule of succession.
2. Status of Boothipuram Village:
The High Court and the Supreme Court considered whether Boothipuram village remained part of the Zamindari or became Kandasami's self-acquired property by the 1890 compromise (Exhibit P-18). The High Court found that all family branches agreed to Kandasami having Boothipuram as his private property, thus separating it from the Zamindari estate. This decision was based on the family's common consent, and it was concluded that Boothipuram became Kandasami's separate property. Consequently, on Kandasami's death, it devolved on his son by succession, and Chinnathayi, his widow, had a widow's estate in it after her husband's death. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, noting that the family arrangement was accepted and acted upon by all members.
3. Status of Pannai Lands and Buildings:
Both lower courts held that under the 1890 family arrangement, the Pannai lands became the stridhanam of Kamuluammal, the widow, and passed on to her grand-daughters, Chinnathayi and Periathayi, as stridhanam heirs. The deed of release executed by the two sisters in 1934 was found to be vitiated by fraud and not binding. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that Kamuluammal accepted Kandasami's title to the estate in exchange for the Zamindari for her lifetime and the Pannai lands and buildings absolutely. Kandasami's inheritance allowed him to alienate these lands to Kamuluammal, making her the absolute owner. The lands thus ceased to be part of the joint family estate. The Supreme Court affirmed that the widow, Chinnathayi, was entitled to possession of these lands, and no other person had any right to them.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, affirming the High Court's judgment that Rajaya of the third branch was entitled to the Zamindari, Boothipuram village became Kandasami's separate property, and the Pannai lands and buildings were the stridhanam of Kamuluammal and passed to her grand-daughters. The appeals were dismissed with costs.
-
1951 (12) TMI 15
Issues:
1. Validity of the injunction order passed by the Subordinate Judge under inherent jurisdiction.
2. Interpretation of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code regarding the Court's power to grant injunction.
3. Consideration of the Court's inherent jurisdiction in granting injunctions despite provisions in Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code.
4. Assessment of the circumstances justifying the injunction order based on the plaintiff's claim and defendant's assets.
5. Evaluation of the evidence regarding ownership of the land and building in question.
6. Decision on the application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the injunction order.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Calcutta involved a dispute between the plaintiff, a building contractor, and multiple defendants, including the Chinese Tannery Owners' Association. The plaintiff sought a temporary injunction to prevent the defendants from withdrawing funds from their bank account. The Subordinate Judge initially granted the injunction, limiting withdrawals to a specific amount. The defendants contested the injunction, arguing that the provisions of Order 39, Civil P. C. did not apply to the case. The Judge's decision was based on inherent jurisdiction rather than Order 39, Rule 1, Civil P. C., making it non-appealable, but subject to revision under Section 115, Civil P. C.
The Court deliberated on the scope of Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code in granting injunctions, considering conflicting precedents. The judgment referenced cases like 'HEMENDRALAL ROY v. INDO SWISS TRADING CO. LTD.' and 'NAGABHUSHAN REDDY v. NARASAMMA,' highlighting differing views on the matter. Additionally, observations from the case of 'NIRODE BARANI DEBI v. CHAMATKARINI DEVYA' were noted, indicating the Court's authority to issue injunctions under Section 151, even in the absence of explicit provisions in Order 39, Civil P. C.
The Court cited the Full Bench case of 'ABDUD KARIM ABU AHMAD KHAN GHAUZNAVI v. ALLAHABAD BANK LTD' to establish the principle that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised unless the legislature explicitly restricts it. Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the existence of provisions in Order 39, Civil P. C. did not preclude the Court from granting temporary injunctions under Section 151, Civil P. C. The judgment emphasized the importance of ensuring justice in each case.
The judgment then focused on the circumstances justifying the injunction, analyzing the plaintiff's claim regarding the political situation in China and the defendants' assets. The Court assessed evidence regarding the ownership of the land and building involved in the dispute, ultimately determining that the defendants' assets were sufficient to meet any potential decree. Consequently, the Court set aside the injunction order under its revisional jurisdiction, dismissing the appeal as incompetent and directing the parties to bear their own costs.
In conclusion, the Court's decision highlighted the importance of balancing legal provisions with the pursuit of justice, ultimately setting aside the injunction order based on a thorough evaluation of the facts and legal principles involved in the case.
-
1951 (12) TMI 14
Issues:
1. Legitimacy of a payment of Rs. 10,000 to a former director as a legitimate business expense.
Analysis:
The case involved a reference under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act regarding the legitimacy of a payment of Rs. 10,000 to a former director of a private registered company. The company had gone into voluntary liquidation, and a new public company took over its business. The payment in question was approved by the Board of Directors as a recognition of past services. The Income-tax Officer disallowed this amount as a deduction, leading to the question of whether it was a legitimate business expense. The Tribunal considered three key factors: the absence of obligation to make such payments, no prior practice of such payments, and the company's decision to liquidate. Based on these factors, the Tribunal concluded that the payment was not wholly and exclusively for the business purposes of the company.
The assessee argued that the payment should be considered under Section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, which allows deductions for bonus or commission to employees if reasonable. However, as the payment was not claimed as such, the Tribunal did not assess its reasonableness. The assessee relied on clause (xv) of Section 10(2) in the application for reference, emphasizing that the payment was made when the company decided to close down, and the recipient had retired earlier. The court noted that the payment must be wholly and exclusively for business purposes, a factual determination. While the assessee contended that exceptional service justifies gratuity payments, the court found that without further justification, the payment made years after the service did not qualify as a legitimate business expense.
Ultimately, the court held that the payment of Rs. 10,000 to the former director was not proven to be a legitimate business expense as it was not wholly and exclusively for the business purposes of the assessee. The opposite party was awarded costs amounting to Rs. 200. The reference was answered accordingly.
-
1951 (12) TMI 13
Issues Involved
1. Liability for Contribution
2. Basis for Computing Contribution
3. Applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act
4. Applicability of Sections 82 and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act
5. Existence of Special Agreement
6. Relief and Remedies
Detailed Analysis
1. Liability for Contribution
The plaintiff, the son of a mortgagor, brought a suit for contribution against the co-mortgagors. The plaintiff claimed that he paid a total of Rs. 1,19,116-11-0 in satisfaction of the mortgage and sought to recover the balance from the defendants, asserting that each co-mortgagor should contribute equally. The defendants did not deny their liability to contribute but challenged the basis on which it was to be computed.
2. Basis for Computing Contribution
The defendants argued that their liabilities should be calculated based on a special agreement, which stipulated that their respective liabilities should be proportionate to the benefit derived by each from the mortgage. The trial court initially held that this agreement was proved, but the appellate court disagreed.
3. Applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act
The plaintiff contended that Section 43 of the Contract Act applied, which states that joint promisors must contribute equally unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. The court noted that while this would be the clear conclusion if no other provisions of law were considered, the matter also involved the Transfer of Property Act, which has specific provisions regarding mortgages.
4. Applicability of Sections 82 and 92 of the Transfer of Property Act
Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act states that properties subject to a mortgage must contribute rateably to the debt secured by the mortgage in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Section 92 provides that any co-mortgagor redeeming the property has the same rights as the mortgagee against the other mortgagors. The court held that these sections must apply over Section 43 of the Contract Act, as they specifically deal with mortgages.
5. Existence of Special Agreement
The court examined the evidence regarding the special agreement alleged by the defendants. The only evidence was the testimony of the first defendant, Kedar, who claimed the agreement was oral and had not been put in writing due to the death of Tarak. The court found this testimony unreliable, noting the absence of the second defendant, Naku, from the witness box and the fact that Tarak had previously sued his brothers for partition, indicating a lack of trust. The court concluded that the special agreement was not proved.
6. Relief and Remedies
The plaintiff sought a declaration of charge and a decree under Order XXXIV of the Civil Procedure Code. The court interpreted this as a request for a mortgage decree up to a limit of Rs. 40,253-11-10 with interest against each defendant. The court decided to remand the case to the High Court for an enquiry regarding the sums paid by the plaintiff's father for satisfaction of the mortgage, the interest due, and the values of the various properties mortgaged at the date of the mortgage. The liability of each defendant would be ascertained separately according to Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the liability exceeded Rs. 40,253-11-10 with interest, it would be reduced to this amount. A mortgage decree for sale would then be drawn up, allowing either defendant to redeem the whole of the balance of the property.
Costs
The court directed each side to bear its own costs in the appeal, noting that the plaintiff had repudiated Section 82 and relied on Section 43 of the Contract Act, while the defendants' case had failed on the facts. The costs incurred in the lower courts and any further enquiry would be determined according to the final result of the litigation.
Separate Judgment
FAZL ALI J. concurred with the judgment.
-
1951 (12) TMI 12
Issues:
1. Validity of detention order under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.
2. Interpretation of the amended provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1951.
3. Consideration of the period of detention in light of the Advisory Board's role.
4. Compliance with the legal procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty.
Detailed Analysis:
The judgment by the Supreme Court involves a petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the detention of the petitioner under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The petitioner was initially detained under an order dated 1st March, 1950, which was later followed by a second detention order dated 30th July, 1951. The key contention was whether the second order, directing detention until 31st March, 1952, was a fresh order or merely a limitation of the period of detention. The Court noted that the second order, accompanied by fresh grounds of detention, was indeed a fresh order, as evidenced by the unnecessary service of new grounds if it was not intended as such. The Court emphasized that the Act as amended in 1951 required cases of detention to be reviewed by an Advisory Board, which would then inform the appropriate Government to determine the period of detention. The Court held that fixing the period of detention in the initial order was against the Act's scheme and stressed the importance of following the legal procedure strictly before depriving an individual of personal liberty.
The judgment highlighted the significance of the Advisory Board's role in determining the period of detention post the amendment to the Preventive Detention Act. The Court rejected the argument that the direction in the order specifying the detention until the Act's expiry date was insignificant, emphasizing that such a provision could prejudice the fair consideration of the petitioner's case by the Advisory Board. The Court reiterated the principle that the established legal procedure must be strictly adhered to without any deviation to safeguard the rights of individuals facing deprivation of personal liberty. Ultimately, the Court allowed the petition, ruling in favor of the petitioner and ordering their release from detention.
-
1951 (12) TMI 11
Issues:
1. Determination of whether the expenditure incurred in replacing old roofs with new khaprails constitutes capital expenditure or revenue expenditure under Section 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an assessee with a sugar factory and oil mill business who re-roofed some quarters with concrete and others with new khaprails. The Tribunal raised a question regarding the nature of this expenditure, specifically whether it qualifies as capital or revenue expenditure under Section 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act. The assessee argued that the re-roofing with new khaprails should be considered current repairs, not capital expenditure. The reference made by the Tribunal to Section 10 (2) (xv) was deemed incorrect, as the relevant provision for current repairs is Section 10 (2) (v).
The counsel for the assessee contended that due to the inability to conduct annual repairs during war years, the re-roofing should be treated as current repairs. Reference was made to a judicial decision involving a railway company to support the argument that such expenditure, aimed at maintaining existing assets, should not be classified as capital expenditure. The judgment emphasized that the replacement of roofs with new khaprails enhanced the value of the quarters, indicating a capital asset addition. It was noted that depreciation rates vary based on the building's nature, and the re-roofing would lead to an increase in the company's capital assets.
The court highlighted the distinction between capital and revenue expenditure, citing previous cases for context. It was concluded that the replacement of old roofs with new ones using new khaprails did not qualify as current repairs or revenue expenditure. The judgment clarified that while annual repairs may be necessary, complete replacement is not typically required for several years. Therefore, the expenditure in question was deemed to be capital in nature, enhancing the company's capital assets. The Department was awarded costs amounting to &8377;300, and the reference was answered accordingly.
-
1951 (12) TMI 10
Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of the evidence of a child witness.
2. Requirement and nature of corroboration in rape cases.
3. Admissibility of previous statements as corroboration.
4. Independence of witnesses providing corroboration.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Admissibility of the Evidence of a Child Witness:
The appellant was charged with rape, and the primary witness was the victim, a young girl aged seven or eight. The Assistant Sessions Judge did not administer an oath to the child, as she did not understand its sanctity, but still recorded her testimony. The legal question was whether the evidence was admissible without a formal certification that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth.
The Court referred to the proviso to section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, and section 118 of the Evidence Act. The proviso allows a child under twelve to testify without an oath if they understand the duty of speaking the truth. Section 118 states that every witness is competent unless the court considers otherwise due to reasons like tender age. The Court concluded that the omission to administer an oath affects credibility, not competency. The evidence was deemed admissible as the judge implicitly considered the child competent by recording her testimony.
2. Requirement and Nature of Corroboration in Rape Cases:
The Sessions Judge initially acquitted the accused, citing insufficient legal proof despite moral conviction, as he believed corroboration was necessary. The High Court, however, found the girl's statement to her mother admissible as corroboration and convicted the accused. The Supreme Court clarified that the Evidence Act does not mandate corroboration for conviction. The rule about corroboration is a matter of prudence, not law. The necessity for corroboration should be present in the judge's mind, but it can be dispensed with if the judge finds it safe to do so based on the case's facts. The Court cited Lord Reading's exposition in The King v. Baskerville, emphasizing that corroboration is not legally essential but advisable as a matter of prudence.
3. Admissibility of Previous Statements as Corroboration:
The Court examined whether the girl's statement to her mother could serve as corroboration. Section 157 of the Evidence Act allows former statements made by a witness at or about the time of the fact to be used for corroboration. The girl's statement to her mother, made about four hours after the incident, was considered timely and thus admissible. The Court noted that while the evidentiary value of such statements may vary, their legal admissibility as corroboration is unquestionable.
4. Independence of Witnesses Providing Corroboration:
The Court addressed whether the mother could be considered an independent witness. Independence means being free from sources likely to be tainted. The Court found no reason to doubt the mother's independence, as there was no enmity against the accused, and the suggestion of bad terms was not believed by any court. The corroboration provided by the mother's testimony was deemed sufficient.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's conviction. The appellant was directed to surrender to his bail and serve out his sentence and pay the fine. The judgment emphasized that while corroboration is a rule of prudence, it is not a legal necessity, and the admissibility of a child's testimony without an oath depends on the judge's implicit or explicit consideration of the child's understanding of the duty to speak the truth.
-
1951 (12) TMI 9
The petition was filed under Section 32(6) of the Assam Sales Tax Act against an order of the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, which was held time-barred under Section 32(4). The Commissioner's decision was upheld as the period of limitation for filing the petition from an appellate order is 60 days from the date of the order, not from the date of service. The petition was dismissed with costs.
-
1951 (12) TMI 8
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the list prepared in July 1947 by the Sales Tax Officer and its applicability to the assessment in question.
2. Entitlement to exemption under the original certificates of registration for ropeways and their parts as "colliery stores directly used in the raising of coal."
3. Authority of the Sales Tax Officer to determine exempted goods and the preparation of the list in the prescribed manner.
4. Interpretation of the specified items in the registration certificates to include ropeways and their parts.
5. Obligation of the Sales Tax Officer to make deductions under Rule 4 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules.
6. Legality of the Board of Revenue's refusal to address point (f) in its revision powers.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the List Prepared in July 1947:
The first issue concerns whether the list prepared in July 1947 by the Sales Tax Officer and incorporated in the registration certificates of the purchasing dealers can govern the assessment in question. The judgment concluded that the list prepared in July 1947 could not govern the assessment for the period in question, as it was prepared after the assessment period. The Sales Tax Authorities used this list only to understand the term "colliery stores directly used in the raising of coal" and not to affect the legality of the assessment.
2. Entitlement to Exemption:
The second issue was whether the assessee could claim an exemption for ropeways and their parts under the terms of the original certificates of registration, which stated "colliery stores directly used in the raising of coal." The court held that the determination of whether ropeways and their parts fall under this category is a question of fact. The Sales Tax Authorities, after considering evidence including the opinion of the Chief Inspector of Mines, concluded that ropeways and their parts were not directly used in raising coal. The court found no reason to interfere with this factual determination.
3. Authority of the Sales Tax Officer:
The third issue questioned whether the Sales Tax Officer had the power to determine the goods exempted from taxation and whether the list was prepared in the prescribed manner. The court found that the Sales Tax Officer did not prepare a list to determine exempted goods but held that ropeways and their parts did not fall within the exemption provided in the registration certificates. Consequently, the question of whether the list was prepared in the prescribed manner was deemed irrelevant.
4. Interpretation of Specified Items:
The fourth issue involved whether the items listed in the registration certificates, such as "ropes and strings, bolts, nuts, rivets, rods, angles, electric fittings and appliances," covered ropeways and their parts. The court found that the Sales Tax Authorities had considered whether the components of ropeways could be included under "colliery stores directly used in the raising of coal" but concluded that they did not. The court agreed with this interpretation, emphasizing that the items must be directly used in raising coal.
5. Obligation to Make Deductions:
The fifth issue was whether the Sales Tax Officer was bound to make deductions under Rule 4 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules for labor charges involved in installing the ropeways. The court noted that the assessee did not claim this deduction in its return and did not provide materials to support such a claim. The court held that the Sales Tax Officer was not bound to make the deduction, and the Board of Revenue was justified in not considering this point in its revision powers.
6. Legality of the Board's Refusal:
The sixth issue addressed whether the Board of Revenue was warranted in law to refuse to consider point (f) in its revision powers. The court found that the Board of Revenue was within its rights to refuse to consider a claim that was not made earlier and for which full materials were not available. The refusal was deemed lawful.
Conclusion:
The court answered the reference questions accordingly, with the assessee failing on all substantial questions. The assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the hearing to the Sales Tax Authorities.
-
1951 (12) TMI 7
Issues:
Challenge to sales tax demand under Notification dated 8th November, 1950.
Analysis:
The petitioner entered into contracts with the Government of India to supply hessian cloth, with prices exclusive of sales tax. The Commercial Tax Officer demanded sales tax from the petitioner under Notification No. 6767 dated 8th November, 1950, amounting to Rs. 9,401-10-6. The petitioner challenged this demand as illegal, seeking relief through Article 226 of the Constitution.
The Sales Tax Act, Section 5(2)(iii), defines "taxable turnover" and provides an exemption for sales to specific government departments. The petitioner claimed exemption under this provision for supplies to the Department of Supply. An affidavit affirmed by a Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Production, and Supply supported this claim, detailing the historical evolution of the relevant government departments.
The respondents argued that the Indian Stores Department and the Supply Department had merged into the Department of Industries and Supplies, rendering the exemption under Section 5(2)(iii) unavailable to the petitioner. Despite a subsequent amendment by West Bengal Act X of 1949 withdrawing the exemption, the supplies in question predated this amendment, maintaining the petitioner's entitlement to the exemption.
The court held that the petitioner could not be deprived of the exemption merely due to a change in departmental designations and functions. Notably, although the newly created department assumed the functions of the previous departments, there was no corresponding amendment to Section 5(2)(iii). Consequently, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, canceling the Notification dated 8th November, 1950, and directing the respondents to refrain from enforcing it. The West Bengal Government was ordered to pay costs, divided between the petitioner and the Union of India.
-
1951 (12) TMI 6
The High Court of West Bengal allowed four review petitions against an order of the Board of Revenue, stating that the assessment for the year ending December 31, 1945, should be redone by a Commercial Tax Officer. The court found the previous assessment to be without jurisdiction and ordered fresh assessments in each case.
-
1951 (12) TMI 5
Issues Involved:
1. Insolvency of the company.
2. Just and equitable grounds for winding up.
3. Disputes and unfair conduct among directors.
4. Improper transfer of shares.
5. Hypothecation of company property.
6. Removal of petitioner as managing director.
7. Allegation of rival business.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Insolvency of the Company:
The petitioner alleged that the company was insolvent and unable to pay its debts. The balance sheet showed negligible yearly profits, and the company owed Rs. 2,35,000 to Kristo, with only Rs. 50,000 paid. The company had very little money in hand, overdrawn bank accounts, and an inflated goodwill valuation. The court concluded that the company could not pay its debts if pressed to do so, supporting the insolvency claim.
2. Just and Equitable Grounds for Winding Up:
The court applied the rules applicable to winding up a partnership, noting that the company was essentially a partnership in a different guise. The court found that Kristo and Kartick were acting unfairly towards the petitioner, depriving him of power and influence. The court deemed it just and equitable to wind up the company, as it would be impossible for the company to carry on business fairly and honestly in the future.
3. Disputes and Unfair Conduct Among Directors:
Disputes arose between the petitioner and the directors, Kristo and Kartick. The court observed that the directors were acting dishonestly, with Kristo using his majority to benefit himself rather than the company. The court highlighted instances where the directors' conduct was unfair and engineered for Kristo's benefit, leading to the conclusion that the company was not being run fairly and properly.
4. Improper Transfer of Shares:
Kristo attempted to transfer 105 shares to his three sons, which was objected to by the petitioner as it violated the articles of association. Kartick, as chairman, ruled that the transfer was not in the nature of a sale but a transmission to Kristo's heirs, sanctioning the transfer despite opposition. The court found this ruling to be a deliberate act to increase Kristo's voting power and deprive the petitioner of influence, deeming it an illegal and unfair transaction.
5. Hypothecation of Company Property:
Kristo demanded payment of the Rs. 2,35,000 owed to him or suggested hypothecating the company's property to secure the amount. The petitioner objected to the hypothecation terms, which would put Kristo in sole command of the company's assets. The court found that the hypothecation was conducted entirely for Kristo's benefit, with no attempt to protect the company's interests, highlighting the directors' unfair conduct.
6. Removal of Petitioner as Managing Director:
At a directors' meeting, Kristo was reappointed as managing director with the petitioner's support. However, when the petitioner proposed his own reappointment, he failed to find a seconder, resulting in his removal. The court found this lack of candour and frankness to be a deliberate trick to deprive the petitioner of remuneration, further evidencing the unfair conduct of the directors.
7. Allegation of Rival Business:
The allegation that the petitioner was involved in a rival business was based on his son's small motor-repairing business. The court found no evidence that the petitioner was concerned in that business, concluding that the allegation was made as a counterblast to the petitioner's opposition to the hypothecation transaction. The court deemed this allegation as another ground for attacking the petitioner and removing him from company affairs.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the petitioner established the grounds for winding up the company, finding it just and equitable to do so. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the costs of the company were ordered to be paid out of the assets.
|
9911796707
