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1968 (12) TMI 113
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Ordinance I of 1960 and Mysore Act XIII of 1960.
2. Non-compliance with the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945.
3. Discrimination between two classes of cases.
4. Estoppel in one specific petition.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Ordinance I of 1960 and Mysore Act XIII of 1960:
The High Court declared Ordinance I of 1960 and the Amending Act XIII of 1960 unconstitutional. The Ordinance violated Article 213(1) as it was promulgated without the instructions of the President. The Amending Act violated Article 254(2) because it was not reserved for the President's consideration nor assented to by him. These grounds were so clear that no counter-arguments were presented.
2. Non-compliance with the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945:
The High Court found that the provisions of Chapter III of the Improvement Act, which outlines the procedure for land acquisition, were not followed. This resulted in discrimination as the procedure was bypassed, violating the equality clause of the Constitution. The State argued that the Validating Act of 1962 (Act 19 of 1963), which received the President's assent, validated all acquisitions under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, notwithstanding any breach of the Improvement Act or other laws. The Validating Act effectively removed the Improvement Act from consideration, making the acquisitions valid under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act alone.
3. Discrimination between two classes of cases:
The High Court found discrimination between cases where the Improvement Act was followed and those where it was not. The State contended that the Validating Act eliminated this discrimination by retrospectively applying a single law for acquisitions. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the Legislature has the power to retrospectively remove one of the competing laws, thus eliminating discrimination. The Validating Act's non-obstante clause put the Improvement Act out of the way, and the acquisitions were to be continued under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act.
4. Estoppel in one specific petition:
In one petition, the petitioners argued estoppel, claiming they had incurred expenses based on the Board's sanction. The High Court did not decide on this issue. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded this particular writ petition (Writ Petition No. 1076 of 1959, C.A. No. 111 of 1966) to the High Court for consideration of the estoppel argument.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed all appeals except for the one involving estoppel, which was remanded to the High Court. The other writ petitions were dismissed, and no order as to costs was made. The Validating Act of 1962 was upheld, validating the acquisitions under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and removing any requirement to follow the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945.
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1968 (12) TMI 112
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Collector of Customs could extend the time under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, without hearing the petitioner.
2. Whether the order extending the period under the said proviso is valid or binding if it was not served upon the petitioners within six months of the seizure of the goods.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Extension of Time Without Hearing the Petitioner
The first issue addressed whether the Collector of Customs could extend the time for issuing a notice under clause (a) of section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, without providing a hearing to the petitioner. The court examined the nature of the Collector's function in extending the time, determining whether it was an administrative or quasi-judicial act.
The court referred to the case of Vasantlal Ranchhoddas Patel and others v. Union of India and others, AIR (1967) Bom. 138, which held that ex parte extension of the period before the expiry of six months under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Customs Act was valid, without addressing the principles of natural justice.
Conversely, in Charandas Malhotra v. Assistant Collector of Customs and Superintendent, Preventive Service and others, AIR 1968 Cal. 28, it was held that extending the period under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 after the expiry of six months without hearing the party was void. The court emphasized that the Collector must consider the sufficiency of the cause shown for the extension, which necessitates a judicial approach involving hearing all affected parties.
The court concluded that the right to reclaim the goods if no notice under section 124 is served within six months is a vested right. Any action to prevent the return of such goods or postpone the owner's right to reclaim them prejudices the owner's property rights. Thus, the Collector's function in extending the period under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 requires a judicial or quasi-judicial approach, mandating a hearing for the affected parties. The court held that the ex parte extension violated the principles of natural justice and was therefore invalid.
Issue 2: Validity of the Order if Not Served Within Six Months
The second issue considered whether the order extending the period under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 was valid if it was not served upon the petitioners within six months of the seizure of the goods.
The court referred to Nripendra Nath Mazumdar v. N. M. Bardhan and others, AIR 1959 Cal 219, which held that an order affecting a person's rights must be communicated to that person to be effective. The date of the order is the date on which it is made known to the affected party. In this case, the order extending the period was made on November 3, 1966, but was communicated to the petitioners only on December 16, 1966, after the six-month period had expired.
The court also cited Director of Supplies and Disposals, Calcutta v. Member, Board of Revenue, Government of West Bengal, 11 STC 589, which supported the principle that the effective date of an order is when it is communicated to the affected party. Additionally, Lala Shri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chand and another, AIR 1965 SC 1767, emphasized that statutory bodies dealing with citizens' rights must act judicially and in accordance with natural justice principles.
The court concluded that the order extending the period was not effective until communicated to the petitioners on December 16, 1966, by which time the right to reclaim the goods had already vested in the petitioners. Therefore, the order made on November 3, 1966, was invalid and must be quashed.
Conclusion
The court ruled that the extension of the period under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, without hearing the petitioners was invalid as it violated the principles of natural justice. Additionally, the order extending the period was invalid as it was not communicated to the petitioners within the six-month period, thus infringing on their vested right to reclaim the seized goods. The rule was made absolute, and the purported extension was quashed. No order as to costs was made due to the petitioners' involvement in smuggling activities. The operation of the order was stayed for eight weeks.
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1968 (12) TMI 111
Issues Involved:
1. Delay in presenting the accused before a Magistrate.
2. Voluntariness and truth of the confessions.
3. Corroboration of the extra-judicial confessions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in Presenting the Accused Before a Magistrate:
The first contention raised was that the accused were not presented before a Magistrate until the 23rd of March 1965, violating Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which requires that an arrested person be presented "without unnecessary delay." The court noted that Section 104(2) comes into operation only after a person is "arrested." The court found that the accused were presented within 24 hours of their formal arrest, aligning with Article 22(2) of the Constitution. The court also examined whether the accused were in custody from the time they were intercepted. It was determined that although there was some restriction on their movements, this did not equate to formal arrest. The court concluded that there was no unnecessary delay in presenting the accused before a Magistrate, and the confessions were not obtained under compulsion.
2. Voluntariness and Truth of the Confessions:
The second issue was whether the confessions were voluntary and true. The court examined the circumstances under which the confessions were made. It was argued that the accused were under some form of custody that could imply compulsion. However, the court found no evidence of inducement, threat, or promise that would render the confessions involuntary under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The court also rejected the argument that the confessions were not true, noting that minor discrepancies in the narratives did not undermine their overall credibility. The court found no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to suggest that the confessions were false.
3. Corroboration of the Extra-Judicial Confessions:
The third issue was whether the extra-judicial confessions required corroboration. The court acknowledged that it is prudent to seek corroboration for retracted confessions. It found abundant corroboration in the case, including the immediate admission by accused No. 2 that there was gold in the car's dicky and the suspicious movements of the car at night. The court also addressed the non-examination of the car driver, Bapu, who could have provided additional context. However, it declined to draw an adverse inference from his absence, noting that no objection was raised during the trial about his non-examination. The court concluded that the confessions, along with other evidence, established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions and sentences of both accused were confirmed. The accused were ordered to surrender to bail within two weeks.
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1968 (12) TMI 110
Issues:
1. Challenge to the settlement of fishery under Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules.
2. Violation of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
3. Interpretation of Rule 12 in light of previous judgments.
4. Lack of jurisdiction and acquiescence in the settlement process.
5. Similar points of law in two separate petitions.
Analysis:
1. The judgment involves a challenge to the settlement of a fishery under Rule 12 of the Assam Fishery Rules. The petitioner, a citizen of India and a member of the Scheduled Caste community, contests the settlement of the fishery with Respondent No. 4, claiming it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The main contention is that Rule 12 grants unguided power to the executive for arbitrary settlements, impacting the right to practice a profession.
2. The history of Rule 12 is examined, referencing past judgments. The Supreme Court previously held that Rule 12 allows the government discretion to settle fisheries directly based on special circumstances. The petitioner argues that this discretion is uncanalized and arbitrary, potentially leading to violations of Article 14. However, the court notes that the government's subjective satisfaction of special circumstances justifies direct settlements under Rule 12.
3. The judgment discusses the distinction between patent and latent lack of jurisdiction in settlement matters. Acquiescence to jurisdiction may disentitle a party to a writ if the lack of jurisdiction is latent. The court emphasizes the need for material to form an opinion on special circumstances under Rule 12, indicating that failure to object during the settlement process may waive the right to challenge jurisdiction.
4. The second petition involves a Co-operative Fishery Society challenging the settlement of a fishery with Respondent No. 4 under Rule 12. The points of law raised mirror those in the first petition, with the petitioner withdrawing the application before settlement. The court dismisses both petitions, highlighting that withdrawal does not question the government's right to settle under Rule 12.
5. The judgment concludes with all judges concurring on the dismissal of both petitions, emphasizing the lack of direct averments challenging the government's authority to settle under Rule 12. The rules are discharged with no order as to costs.
This detailed analysis covers the issues raised in the judgment, exploring the legal arguments, historical context, and the court's interpretation of Rule 12 in the context of constitutional provisions and previous judicial decisions.
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1968 (12) TMI 109
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954.
2. Adequacy of compensation provided under the Act.
3. Legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature to enact the impugned Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutional Validity of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954:
The primary issue in these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution was whether the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (Mysore Act 1 of 1955), was constitutionally valid. The Act was challenged on the grounds of its compliance with Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners contended that the Act did not provide "adequate compensation" for the property acquired, which violated the guarantee under Article 31(2). However, the Court held that the impugned Act was protected under Article 31A of the Constitution, which was introduced by the 1st and 4th Amendments. Article 31A provides that no law providing for the acquisition of any estate or rights therein shall be deemed void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 31. Therefore, the Act was constitutionally valid and protected from challenge under Article 31(2).
2. Adequacy of Compensation Provided Under the Act:
The petitioners argued that the compensation provided under the Act was not a "just equivalent" or market value of the property at the time of acquisition. They cited the decision in The State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee and others, where it was held that compensation must be a just equivalent of the property appropriated. However, the Court distinguished this case, noting that Article 31A, as amended, protected the impugned Act from such challenges. The impugned Act provided compensation based on various factors, including land revenue and income from the land, but the Court found that the principles of compensation laid down in the Act were sufficient and did not violate Article 31(2).
3. Legislative Competence of the Mysore Legislature:
The petitioners also questioned the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature to enact the impugned Act under Entry 36 of List II and Entry 42 of List III of the 7th Schedule, as they stood before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution. They argued that the power to acquire property implied the necessity of public purpose and payment of compensation. However, the Court held that the power to make laws regarding the acquisition of property did not inherently include the obligation to pay compensation or the necessity of public purpose, as these were separately provided for in Article 31(2). The Court further noted that the impugned Act was a part of agrarian reform, falling under the protection of Article 31A, and thus could not be challenged on the grounds of legislative competence or non-compliance with Article 31(2).
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, was constitutionally valid, provided adequate compensation, and was within the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature. The Act was protected under Article 31A, and the petitioners failed to make a case for relief under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitions were dismissed with costs, and one set of hearing fees was awarded.
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1968 (12) TMI 108
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the application under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code.
2. Whether the High Court can review or alter its previous judgment under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code.
3. Whether the revision filed by Mahboob Ilahi alone was maintainable without the other co-applicants.
4. Whether the learned Civil and Sessions Judge could interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
5. Whether the reference made on questions of fact was valid.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the application under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code:
The application under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, was filed praying for the review of the order dated 5th April 1968, which accepted the reference and set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The primary ground for the application was that the revision filed by Mahboob Ilahi alone, without the other co-applicants, was not maintainable. The High Court held that the application under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, is maintainable as it aims to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court.
2. Whether the High Court can review or alter its previous judgment under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code:
The High Court emphasized that Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make necessary orders to secure the ends of justice. The court referred to several precedents, including the Full Bench ruling in Raj Narain v. State, which held that the High Court has the power to revoke, review, recall, or alter its own earlier decision in a criminal revision under specific conditions. The court concluded that it has the inherent power to review its previous judgment to secure the ends of justice.
3. Whether the revision filed by Mahboob Ilahi alone was maintainable without the other co-applicants:
The court noted that the application under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was originally made by four persons, including Mahboob Ilahi. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order was against all four applicants, but only Mahboob Ilahi preferred a revision. The other three applicants did not challenge the order, making it final against them. The court held that the revision filed by Mahboob Ilahi alone could not be decided in his favor without the other co-applicants, as they were necessary and proper parties. Therefore, the revision was not maintainable in the absence of the other co-applicants.
4. Whether the learned Civil and Sessions Judge could interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate:
The court observed that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had recorded a specific finding that Chitawan and others were in possession of the land in dispute on the date of the preliminary order and within two months prior to it. This finding was based on the oral and documentary evidence on record. The court held that the learned Civil and Sessions Judge could not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, as the reference to the High Court should be made only on questions of law.
5. Whether the reference made on questions of fact was valid:
The court reiterated that a reference in a criminal case can only be made on a question of law. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge made the reference on the ground that the learned Magistrate had discarded certain documents filed by Mahboob Ilahi as inadmissible. However, the court clarified that the learned Magistrate had merely found the documentary evidence unreliable, not inadmissible. Therefore, the reference made on questions of fact was not valid.
Conclusion:
The High Court allowed the application under Section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, set aside its previous order dated 5th April 1968, and rejected the reference made by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge. The court upheld the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, releasing the land in favor of Chitawan and others. The court emphasized the importance of securing the ends of justice and preventing contradictory orders from remaining in existence.
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1968 (12) TMI 107
Issues: Validity of decree based on compromise under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
In this judgment, the Supreme Court dealt with an appeal arising from a case where the plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant, a tenant, on the grounds of bona fide requirement for residence, existing suitable accommodation for the defendant, and rent default. The parties reached a compromise where a decree for eviction was passed in favor of the plaintiff, with conditions related to possession, rent amount, and deposit adjustment. The defendant challenged the decree's validity under Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, alleging it was a nullity. The defendant's challenge was dismissed by the Sub-Judge and Senior Sub-Judge, leading to a revision in the High Court. The High Court held the decree as a nullity for not meeting the statutory grounds of Section 13. The Supreme Court referenced a previous case, Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass, where it was established that passing a decree without verifying eviction grounds is impermissible under Section 13, rendering the decree a nullity. The Court reiterated that the decree directing possession to the landlord was unenforceable and declared the present appeal governed by the same legal principle, resulting in dismissal without costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 106
Issues:
Interpretation of Item 4, Clauses (iv) and (v) of the First Schedule of the City Civil Court Act.
Detailed Analysis:
The judgment addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff was a mercantile agent as per the relevant provision of the City Civil Court Act. The trial judge had ruled that the plaintiff did not qualify as a mercantile agent under Clause (v) of Item 4 of the First Schedule due to the nature of his appointment as a commission agent. However, the High Court disagreed, emphasizing that the plaintiff's appointment as a commission agent did not exclude him from being considered a mercantile agent. The court cited English statutes to support the broader definition of a mercantile agent, stating that even a single transaction as a commission agent could qualify. The court concluded that the plaintiff met the criteria of a mercantile agent under Clause (v) of the Act.
Furthermore, the judgment discussed that both parties were merchants and traders, and the transactions involved the sale of goods. The court pointed out that the transactions could be considered as falling under Clause (iv) of Item 4 of the Act, in addition to Clause (v). As the claim exceeded the specified amount, the court ruled that the suit was beyond the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court under both clauses. Consequently, the court allowed the petition, overturned the trial judge's decision, and instructed the return of the plaint for presentation to the appropriate court.
The judgment highlighted the importance of interpreting the provisions of the City Civil Court Act accurately to determine jurisdictional matters. It clarified the definition of a mercantile agent and emphasized that even a single transaction as a commission agent could meet the criteria. The court's decision underscored the need for a comprehensive understanding of the legal framework to ensure proper adjudication of disputes falling within the purview of the Act.
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1968 (12) TMI 105
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act.
2. Jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to determine liability for retrenchment compensation.
3. Entitlement of employees to claim compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Application:
The first issue addressed was whether the application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act was maintainable given the revocation of the company's license. The Authority initially held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application. However, the High Court later ruled that Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act did not apply to such claims and that the proper forum was a Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This decision was challenged in the present appeal.
2. Jurisdiction of the Authority:
The core question was whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction to determine the liability for retrenchment compensation before the amount was ascertained under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant argued that the amended definition of 'wages' under the Payment of Wages Act included compensation payable under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, thus conferring jurisdiction on the Authority. Conversely, the respondents contended that the Authority had limited jurisdiction, confined to matters explicitly specified in the Payment of Wages Act, and that claims under the Industrial Disputes Act should be determined by the appropriate tribunal established under that Act.
3. Entitlement to Compensation:
The third issue involved the entitlement of employees to claim compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondents argued that since the employees' services were not interrupted by the transfer and the terms and conditions of their employment remained unchanged, they were not entitled to compensation. The Authority would have to determine whether there was any interruption in employment, whether the conditions of service were less favorable, and whether the new employer was liable for compensation in case of future retrenchment. The Supreme Court noted that such an inquiry would involve complex questions of fact and law, which were beyond the scope of the Authority's limited jurisdiction under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act did not have jurisdiction to entertain claims for retrenchment compensation under Section 25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, especially when such claims were disputed and required detailed inquiry into facts and law. The proper forum for such claims was the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which had the necessary jurisdiction and procedural mechanisms to handle such disputes. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's decision was upheld.
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1968 (12) TMI 104
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Allegations of professional misconduct against the petitioner.
3. Compliance with the Notaries Rules, 1956 and the Stamp Act, 1899.
4. Procedural fairness and principles of natural justice.
5. Allegations of mala fides by the State Government.
6. Implications of the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of practice.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Impugned Order:
The petitioner challenged the validity of the impugned order issued by the State Government under Section 10 of the Notaries Act, 1952, arguing that the order was based on charges that did not amount to professional misconduct. The court found that the charges framed did not explicitly allege professional misconduct, and the petitioner was not given an opportunity to defend against such an allegation. Consequently, the court concluded that the impugned order could not be sustained.
2. Allegations of Professional Misconduct:
The Competent Authority framed three charges against the petitioner: failure to make entries in his register, failure to affix notarial stamps, and failure to affix adhesive stamps. The court noted that none of these charges explicitly constituted professional misconduct. The court emphasized that the petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to defend against an allegation of professional misconduct, as the charges did not indicate such an accusation. The court referenced the special appeal decision reported in AIR 1967 All 173, which highlighted the need for explicit allegations of professional misconduct.
3. Compliance with the Notaries Rules, 1956 and the Stamp Act, 1899:
The court examined the charges in light of the Notaries Rules and the Stamp Act. It was found that the petitioner's failure to affix adhesive stamps was not his duty, as per the Competent Authority's own discussion. Regarding the notarial stamps, the court held that the petitioner's endorsement on affidavits constituted a notarial act requiring a notarial stamp under Article 42 of the Stamp Act. However, the charge of not making entries in the notarial register was found to be erroneous, as Rule 11(2) did not apply to affidavits, and the Competent Authority incorrectly relied on Rule 11(9).
4. Procedural Fairness and Principles of Natural Justice:
The court highlighted that the petitioner was not informed that the enquiry was to determine professional misconduct, thus denying him the opportunity to defend himself adequately. The court stated that the principles of natural justice were violated as the petitioner was not apprised of the nature of the allegations against him. The court emphasized that the charges should have explicitly mentioned professional misconduct to provide the petitioner a fair chance to defend himself.
5. Allegations of Mala Fides by the State Government:
The petitioner alleged mala fides on the part of the State Government, arguing that the delay in issuing the certificate after the special appeal judgment indicated bad faith. The court found no evidence to support the claim of mala fides, noting that the delay could be attributed to procedural requirements and did not necessarily indicate deliberate intent to harm the petitioner.
6. Implications of the Cancellation of the Petitioner's Certificate of Practice:
The petitioner argued that the cancellation of his certificate without specifying a period amounted to perpetual debarment. The court clarified that cancellation of the certificate did not imply perpetual debarment. The petitioner could apply for a new certificate if the State Government deemed him fit to practice as a Notary in the future. The court thus rejected the contention that the cancellation amounted to perpetual debarment.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashing the impugned order (Annexure 9) and awarding costs to the petitioner. The court clarified that the State Government could proceed against the petitioner according to law if it chose to do so. The judgment emphasized the need for explicit charges and adherence to principles of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings against professionals.
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1968 (12) TMI 103
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the term "renovation" under Section 13(1)(h) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, 1951.
2. Whether the landlord's requirement for renovation is bona fide and reasonable.
3. Applicability of Section 16 of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act regarding tenant re-entry.
4. Legislative intent and comparison with the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of the term "renovation" under Section 13(1)(h) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, 1951:
The primary issue was whether the term "renovation" includes the demolition of an existing building and the construction of a new one. The court noted that the term "renovation" is not defined in the Act, necessitating reliance on dictionary meanings. According to Webster's Dictionary and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, "renovation" means making something new or restoring it to good condition, which includes repairs and replacement of worn parts. The court emphasized that since the Legislature used "repairs" and "renovation" disjunctively, they must have intended distinct meanings. Thus, "renovation" encompasses more than mere repairs and includes demolition and reconstruction. The court rejected arguments that "renovation" should be limited to non-demolition activities, stating that the Legislature's addition of "renovation" in the Saurashtra Act, which was not present in the Bombay Act, indicated an intention to broaden the scope to include new constructions.
2. Whether the landlord's requirement for renovation is bona fide and reasonable:
The court examined whether the plaintiff's requirement for renovation was genuine and necessary. It was established that the building was old, poorly ventilated, and below the level of the footpath, though structurally stable for another 25 to 30 years. The court referred to previous judgments, including the Supreme Court's interpretation in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, which held that the landlord's requirement must be genuine and honest, evaluated based on surrounding circumstances. The court found that the plaintiff had a real and honest desire to improve the property by constructing a new building, supported by plans, estimates, and financial capability. Consequently, the requirement was deemed bona fide and reasonable.
3. Applicability of Section 16 of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act regarding tenant re-entry:
Section 16 allows tenants to re-enter premises after repairs but does not provide for re-entry after renovation. The court reasoned that the Legislature differentiated between repairs and renovation, implying that renovation includes more extensive changes, such as demolition and reconstruction. This distinction aligns with the policy of excluding new buildings from the Act's purview, as stated in Section 4(2). Hence, tenants do not have a right of re-entry after the completion of renovation involving new construction.
4. Legislative intent and comparison with the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947:
The court analyzed the legislative history, noting that the Saurashtra Act included "renovation" to expand the landlord's rights beyond those in the Bombay Act. The addition of "renovation" indicated an intention to allow landlords to obtain possession for more extensive works, including demolition and new construction. The court dismissed arguments that the absence of a provision similar to Section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Act, which explicitly allowed for demolition and rebuilding, implied a restriction in the Saurashtra Act. Instead, the broader interpretation of "renovation" under the Saurashtra Act was deemed sufficient to cover such cases.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the term "renovation" in Section 13(1)(h) of the Saurashtra Act includes demolition and reconstruction of a building. The plaintiff's requirement for renovation was found to be bona fide and reasonable, entitling him to a decree for eviction. The appeals were dismissed, and the plaintiff was granted possession of the premises. The court also refused a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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1968 (12) TMI 102
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the nominee of the Registrar appointed under Section 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, is a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Whether the offences charged in the complaint fall within the description of the offence under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and if so, whether the complaint is maintainable without the sanction of the Registrar.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Nominee of the Registrar as a "Court" under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The appellants contended that the nominee of the Registrar under Section 95 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, should be considered a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This section stipulates that no court shall take cognizance of certain offences, including those under Sections 465 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, when such offences are alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on a complaint in writing of such court.
The court examined the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, including Sections 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, and 97, which outline the powers and functions of the Registrar and his nominee. These sections reveal that the nominee acts substantially as an arbitrator and derives authority from the Registrar, who can withdraw such authority at any time. The nominee's adjudication is termed an award, and the procedure followed is akin to that of a civil proceeding.
The court concluded that merely because the nominee is required to act judicially and follow procedures similar to those in civil courts, it does not make the nominee a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The nominee's function is analogous to that of a statutory arbitrator, and the judicial power exercised is not sufficient to categorize the nominee as a court.
2. Offences under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and the Requirement of Registrar's Sanction:
The appellants argued that the offences charged in the complaint fell within the description of the offence under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. This section penalizes the destruction, mutilation, alteration, falsification, or secreting of any register, book of account, or document belonging to the society by its officers or members. The appellants contended that without the sanction of the Registrar, the complaint was not maintainable.
The court analyzed the provisions of Section 146(p) and compared them with Sections 463 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code, which deal with forgery and the making of false documents. Section 146(p) does not require the specific intentions mentioned in Sections 463 and 464 IPC and applies to officers or members of the society. The court noted that while certain acts might fall under both sections, they are distinct offences with different intentions and applicable to different sets of persons.
The court held that the enactment of Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act did not imply a pro tanto repeal of Sections 463 and 464 IPC. The offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act are cumulative, and the legislature did not intend to repeal the IPC provisions by enacting Section 146(p). Consequently, the requirement of the Registrar's sanction under Section 148(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act did not apply to offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC.
Conclusion:
Both contentions raised by the appellants were rejected. The nominee of the Registrar is not a "court" within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC are distinct from those under Section 146(p) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The appeal was dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 101
Issues Involved:
1. Violation of Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Validity of the confessions under Section 24 of the Evidence Act.
3. Truthfulness of the confessions.
4. Requirement of corroboration for extra-judicial confessions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Violation of Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962:
The first contention was that the accused were not presented to a Magistrate until the 23rd of March 1965, violating Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, which mandates that an arrested person must be presented "without unnecessary delay." The court noted that Section 104(2) comes into play only after a formal arrest. The accused were formally arrested after their statements were recorded and were presented to the Magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest, thus complying with Article 22(2) of the Constitution. The court held that there was no "unnecessary delay" in presenting the accused to the Magistrate.
2. Validity of the Confessions under Section 24 of the Evidence Act:
The main argument was that the confessions were obtained under compulsion and should be excluded under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The court examined whether the accused were in custody or under arrest at the time of making the confessions. It was concluded that although there was some restriction on their movements, this did not equate to formal arrest. The court referred to the distinction between "arrest" and "custody," noting that the presence of some surveillance does not necessarily make a confession involuntary. The court found no evidence of inducement, threat, or promise that would render the confessions involuntary.
3. Truthfulness of the Confessions:
The court examined the coherence and consistency of the confessions. Despite some minor inconsistencies in the narrative of how the accused got acquainted and the events at the crime scene, the court did not find these sufficient to render the confessions untrue. The court also considered the circumstances and evidence presented, including the behavior of the accused when confronted by the excise officers, which supported the truthfulness of the confessions.
4. Requirement of Corroboration for Extra-Judicial Confessions:
The court acknowledged the prudence of requiring corroboration for retracted confessions but found "abundant corroboration" in this case. The immediate admission by accused No. 2 at the scene and the behavior of accused No. 1 when questioned provided sufficient corroboration. The court also addressed the non-examination of the driver Bapu, concluding that the absence of his testimony did not necessitate an adverse inference against the prosecution, as no objection was raised during the trial regarding his non-examination.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions and sentences of three years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, and one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, were upheld. The court found that the confessions were voluntary, true, and sufficiently corroborated. The accused were ordered to surrender to bail within two weeks.
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1968 (12) TMI 100
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement of a puisne mortgagee to institute a separate suit after being a party in a prior mortgagee's suit.
2. Rate of interest applicable post the date of the suit.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement of a Puisne Mortgagee to Institute a Separate Suit:
The primary issue was whether a puisne mortgagee, who was a party in a prior mortgagee's suit, could initiate a separate suit for his mortgage and seek a decree in Form 5-A after the prior mortgagee's claim was settled without a sale of the mortgaged property. The appellant argued that the respondent, being a puisne mortgagee, should have applied for a final decree for sale in the original suit (Suit No. 135 of 1948) and could not bring a fresh suit. The court rejected this argument, stating that Clause 5 of the decree in Form 9 allows a puisne mortgagee to apply for a final decree if he redeems the prior mortgage. The puisne mortgagee can step into the shoes of the prior mortgagee and apply for a final decree if he pays off the prior mortgage. The court emphasized that a puisne mortgagee is added as a defendant in such suits to redeem the prior mortgage if desired and to prove his mortgage for participation in any surplus sale proceeds. The rights of a puisne mortgagee are to redeem the prior mortgage and participate in surplus sale proceeds. This view is supported by precedents like Vedavyasa Ayyar v. The Madura Hindu Labha Nidhi Co. Ltd. and Shiv Kumar Prosad v. The Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta. English practices, as mentioned in Platt v. Mendel, were distinguished from Indian practices under the Transfer of Property Act and the Civil Procedure Code. The court concluded that the respondent was entitled to institute a separate suit for his mortgage.
2. Rate of Interest Applicable Post the Date of the Suit:
The second issue was whether the High Court was justified in granting interest at the rate of 12% per annum with monthly rests after the date of the suit. The appellant contended that the maximum interest should not exceed 6% per annum simple interest on the principal sum adjudged. The court found this argument well-founded. Historically, under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, courts had discretion to order interest at reasonable rates on the principal sum from the date of the suit. However, Order 34, Rules 2 and 4, which apply to mortgage suits, required courts to account for interest as per the mortgage contract until the redemption period expired. After the redemption period, interest depended on the decree's directions. The 1929 amendment to Order 34 inserted Rule 11, giving courts discretion to order interest at reasonable rates post the suit date. The Federal Court in Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram held that Rule 11 provided courts with discretion regarding pendente lite and subsequent interest, even if the contractual rate was not penal or excessive. Applying this principle, the court decided that the respondent should receive interest at the contractual rate until the suit date and simple interest at 6% per annum on the principal sum from the suit date until realization.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed to the extent that the decree of the Calcutta High Court was modified. The respondent was awarded interest at the contractual rate until the suit date and simple interest at 6% per annum from the suit date until realization. The respondent was also awarded costs proportionate to his success in the present suit but not for the previous suit (Suit No. 135 of 1948). The High Court's order regarding costs was modified accordingly, with no order as to costs for this appeal.
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1968 (12) TMI 99
Issues:
1. Whether expenditure on acquiring or producing designs for wallpaper and furnishing fabrics qualifies as capital expenditure for investment allowances.
2. Whether the designs themselves can be considered as "plant."
3. Whether the cost of acquiring designs can be considered as expenditure on the provision of patterned blocks, screens, and rollers.
Analysis:
1. The case revolves around determining if the expenditure incurred by the taxpayers on acquiring or producing designs for wallpaper and fabrics qualifies as capital expenditure for investment allowances under the Finance Act, 1954. The Crown concedes that the expenditure can be classified as capital expenditure, leaving the question of whether it was for the provision of new machinery or plant.
2. The judgment delves into the definition of "plant" and whether designs themselves can be categorized as such. The court refers to past cases and interpretations, ultimately deciding that designs, being the tools of the trade for the styling committee, do not fall under the definition of "plant." Despite recognizing the argument for an expanded interpretation, the court adheres to the existing understanding.
3. The court addresses the argument regarding whether the cost of acquiring designs can be considered as expenditure on providing patterned blocks, screens, and rollers. While acknowledging the Crown's perspective, the court emphasizes the statutory requirement of isolating the provision of patterned blocks and the associated costs. It concludes that some fraction of the total design costs should be allowed, rejecting the notion that none of the design costs should be included in the expenditure.
In conclusion, the court dismisses the appeal, upholding that a portion of the design costs should be allowed as part of the expenditure. The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the expenditure in question, the classification of designs as "plant," and the correlation between acquiring designs and the provision of patterned blocks, screens, and rollers.
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1968 (12) TMI 98
The High Court of Kerala allowed the revision petition and set aside the District Judge's order in I.A. No. 1326 of 1967 due to an error of law. The District Judge failed to exercise jurisdiction in a case of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The Court directed the District Judge to take the appeal on file as a pauper appeal without further consideration of the decree's legality. The revision petitioner was denied costs for not challenging the original order directly.
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1968 (12) TMI 97
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the arrests on November 6, 1968.
2. Violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
3. Validity of the remand orders.
4. Allegations of mala fides in the arrests.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Arrests on November 6, 1968:
The court examined the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Madhu Limaye and others on November 6, 1968. It was found that the arrests were made for offenses under Section 188, IPC, which are non-cognizable. The police reports mentioned various proceedings under Sections 151, 107, and 117 of the Cr.P.C., but these did not justify the arrests without a warrant. The court noted that no first information report (FIR) was registered on November 6, 1968, and it was only on November 19, 1968, that an FIR was formally recorded, likely due to the legal actions initiated by the arrested persons. The court concluded that the arrests were effected by police officers without specific orders or directions from a Magistrate, making them illegal.
2. Violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution:
Article 22(1) mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds for their arrest and be allowed to consult a legal practitioner. Madhu Limaye asserted that neither he nor his companions were informed of the reasons for their arrest. The State did not effectively counter this claim. The court emphasized the importance of this constitutional provision, noting its role in safeguarding personal liberty. The failure to inform the arrested persons of the grounds for their arrest constituted a violation of Article 22(1), entitling them to be released.
3. Validity of the Remand Orders:
The court scrutinized the remand orders issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on November 6 and 20, 1968. It was found that these orders were routine and mechanical, lacking proper judicial application of mind. Given the illegal nature of the initial arrests and the violation of Article 22(1), the remand orders could not cure the constitutional infirmities. The court held that the arrested persons were entitled to be released forthwith due to the flawed remand process.
4. Allegations of Mala Fides:
Madhu Limaye alleged that the arrests were made for extraneous considerations and were actuated by mala fides. The court noted that such matters are typically not addressed in habeas corpus proceedings and suggested that these allegations could be more appropriately agitated in other legal actions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court ordered the release of Madhu Limaye and the other arrested persons solely on the ground of violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The court refrained from expressing any opinion on the legality of the arrests with reference to the offenses under Section 188, IPC, and the proceedings under Sections 151 and 107 of the Cr.P.C., as these matters were still sub judice. The court clarified that its observations would not affect the ongoing legal proceedings related to the incidents of November 5 and 6, 1968, in the State of Bihar.
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1968 (12) TMI 96
Issues Involved:
1. Justification of adjudicating upon charges levied for the maintenance of the assisted siding.
2. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 41(1)(c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890.
3. Entitlement of the Railway to haulage charges for lines 3 and 4.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Justification of Adjudicating Upon Charges Levied for the Maintenance of the Assisted Siding:
The appellant argued that the Tribunal was not justified in adjudicating upon the charges levied for the maintenance of the assisted siding based on the pleadings. The Tribunal reviewed the original complaint, amendments, and evidence, concluding that the respondent was entitled to raise the question of the revision of hauling charges. The Tribunal noted, "In seeking for such correction being made in the complaint the complainants were not obliged to attack the increase under the aforesaid item as unreasonable... It has also to be mentioned that the respondent was not, in any way, misled by the allegations contained in the complaint and that no surprise was sprung on the respondent by pressing the complainants' case against the increase on account of interest and maintenance charges." The Tribunal held that the reasonableness of all charges levied by the respondent in respect of the assisted siding could and ought to be considered under issue number 4.
The Supreme Court found no misdirection by the Tribunal in this conclusion. The Court referenced the Privy Council's decision in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran, noting that "no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward." However, the Court clarified that this rule does not apply when parties go to trial with knowledge of a particular issue, even if no specific issue has been framed. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's finding that the Railway was ready with the required evidence and no prejudice had been caused was correct.
2. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Section 41(1)(c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890:
The appellant contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction under Section 41(1)(c) to determine the reasonableness of charges levied for maintaining the assisted siding. Section 41(1)(c) allows complaints to the Tribunal if a railway administration "is levying any other charge which is unreasonable." The appellant argued that this should be limited to charges for carriage of goods, not hauling charges. However, the Court referenced its decision in Union of India v. Indian Sugar Mills Association, which interpreted "any other charge" broadly to include charges for services beyond statutory duties. The Court stated, "The definition of 'rate' cannot be applied to the expression 'rates of any other charges'... Here the word 'rates' merely means the scale or amount of any other charges."
The Court upheld that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 41(1)(c) as it related to the reasonableness of the charges for the assisted siding.
3. Entitlement of the Railway to Haulage Charges for Lines 3 and 4:
The Tribunal reviewed the evidence and concluded that the Railway was not entitled to haulage charges for lines 3 and 4. It found that handling the respondent's traffic at the assisted siding involved less cost and work for the Railway than handling it at the goods shed siding. The Tribunal stated, "The services rendered by the respondent railway in connection with the handling of complainants' goods traffic at the assisted siding cannot be said to be any special or extra service... the claim for the haulage charge for the shunting operation done at the assisted siding is unjustified and unsustainable."
The Supreme Court noted that this was a finding of fact by the Tribunal, supported by ample evidence, and found no reason to displace it. The Court emphasized that it was not sitting as a regular court of appeal from the Tribunal's decisions and would not ordinarily go into questions of fact.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs, upholding the Tribunal's findings on all three issues. The Tribunal was justified in adjudicating upon the charges, had jurisdiction under Section 41(1)(c), and correctly found that the Railway was not entitled to haulage charges for lines 3 and 4.
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1968 (12) TMI 95
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the settlor was entitled to execute the second Trust deed in pursuance of the power reserved by him under the original Trust deed.
2. Whether the validity of the second Trust deed is not open to challenge in view of the order made by Ramfry, J. on August 25, 1937.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the settlor was entitled to execute the second Trust deed in pursuance of the power reserved by him under the original Trust deed:
The settlor executed a Trust deed on December 6, 1930, reserving the power to alter the quantum of interest given to each of the beneficiaries "by his instrument by will alone and in no other way or act." The settlor later sought to alter this clause to allow changes by deed inter vivos. The trial court decreed the suit favoring the plaintiff, holding that the power reserved by the settlor was irrevocable and the order passed by Ramfry, J. was null and void as it was made without jurisdiction. The first appellate court reversed this decision, but the High Court restored the trial court's decree.
The law on the point, as stated by Halsbury and Hanbury, establishes that a settlor is incompetent to vary the terms of a Trust unless explicitly reserved. The stipulation in the Trust deed that the variation could only be made by will and not otherwise was deemed a material condition. Consequently, the settlor had no power to execute the second Trust deed by deed inter vivos.
2. Whether the validity of the second Trust deed is not open to challenge in view of the order made by Ramfry, J. on August 25, 1937:
The order by Ramfry, J. permitted the settlor to revoke the clause in the Trust deed and authorized him to alter the quantum of interest by deed inter vivos. The validity of this order was challenged on the grounds that the judge had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. Jurisdiction, as defined by Mukherjee, Acting C.J., refers to the authority of a court to decide matters that are litigated before it. The court must have the power to hear and decide the specific questions at issue.
The court examined whether Ramfry, J. had jurisdiction under various statutes:
- Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882: This section only allows the court to give "opinion, advice or direction on any present questions respecting the management or administration of the trust property." The relief sought by the settlor did not fall within this scope.
- Section 10(1) of the Official Trustees Act, 1913: This provision allows the court to appoint the Official Trustee but does not empower it to grant the reliefs sought by the settlor.
- Section 43 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act, 1866: Similar to Section 34 of the Indian Trusts Act, this section allows the court to give opinion, advice, or direction on questions respecting the management or administration of the trust property.
The inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in England, as discussed in Chapman v. Chapman, does not extend to sanctioning the modification or remoulding of the beneficial trusts of a settlement. The court concluded that Ramfry, J. had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question, making it null and void.
Modifications in the Decree:
The circumstances of the case required modifications in the decree of the High Court. The Official Trustee was not to be treated as a trustee de-son-tort but should account as if he was a trustee. The accounting should start from the date of the institution of the present suit, not from when the Official Trustee took charge. The plaintiff-respondent is entitled to costs from the Trust Estate.
Conclusion:
Subject to the modifications directed above, the appeal was dismissed, and the decree of the High Court was modified accordingly.
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1968 (12) TMI 94
Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of the appellant's statement recorded by the village Mukhiya.
2. Reliance on circumstantial evidence for conviction.
3. Evaluation of the appellant's explanation and defense.
4. Legal principles regarding the acceptance and rejection of parts of a confession or statement.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Admissibility of the Appellant's Statement:
The primary issue is whether the statement of the appellant recorded by a village Mukhiya before he was handed over to the police is admissible in evidence. The court found that the statement (Ex. 6) was voluntarily made and thus admissible. The High Court rejected the appellant's contention that the statement was coerced, noting that no suggestion of assault or coercion was made to the witnesses who had taken the appellant to the Mukhiya. The appellant's claim that he was forced to sign a blank paper was also dismissed as it undermined his argument of coercion.
2. Reliance on Circumstantial Evidence:
The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial. The High Court found several incriminating circumstances against the appellant:
- He was seen washing blood-stained clothes shortly after the murder.
- He possessed blood-stained exercise books and a knife at the time of his apprehension.
- The injuries on the victim could have been caused by the knife found with the appellant.
- The appellant had a cut injury on his left hand, consistent with a scuffle.
- The appellant's explanations for his injuries and possession of blood-stained items were deemed unacceptable.
3. Evaluation of the Appellant's Explanation and Defense:
The appellant's defense included a statement under s. 342 Cr. P.C. and his statement recorded by the Mukhiya. He claimed that the murder was committed by one Lal Mohan Sharma and that he was a helpless spectator. He also provided an inconsistent explanation for his injury, initially blaming a herdsman. The High Court found these explanations implausible and inconsistent with the evidence. The appellant's claim of being forced to sign a blank paper was also rejected.
4. Legal Principles Regarding Acceptance and Rejection of Parts of a Confession:
The appellant's counsel argued that the court must consider the statement as a whole and cannot selectively accept parts of it. The court, however, held that while the entire statement must be considered, the jury is not bound to give equal weight to all parts. They may accept parts that are corroborated by other evidence and reject parts that are inherently improbable or contradicted by other evidence. The court cited legal principles from Taylor's Law of Evidence and Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, supporting the view that the jury can believe parts of a confession and disbelieve others if justified by the circumstances.
Conclusion:
The High Court's judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant. The court found that the inculpatory parts of the appellant's statement, corroborated by other evidence, conclusively proved his guilt, while the exculpatory parts were inherently improbable and contradicted by the evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.
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