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1979 (12) TMI 165
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of bids without initial deposit
2. Non-compliance with condition No. 11 (25% deposit)
3. Validity of contract under Article 299 of the Constitution
4. Recovery under Section 82 of the Forest Act, 1927
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of bids without initial deposit:
The petitioner contended that the bids were invalid as he did not deposit the required 10% earnest money. The court referred to the terms and conditions of the auction (Annexure-A) and noted that the Divisional Forest Officer waived the 10% deposit condition at the petitioner's request. This waiver was within the officer's administrative authority. The court concluded that the bids did not suffer any invalidity due to the absence of the 10% deposit.
2. Non-compliance with condition No. 11 (25% deposit):
The petitioner argued that the bids were invalid as he did not deposit 25% of the price offered. The court interpreted condition No. 11, stating that the term "successful bidder" applies to a bidder whose bid has been accepted. Thus, the 25% deposit is not a condition precedent for the validity of a bid but a requirement post-acceptance. The court found this argument devoid of substance.
3. Validity of contract under Article 299 of the Constitution:
The petitioner argued that there was no valid contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. The court examined the bid-sheet signed by the petitioner and the Divisional Forest Officer and found it did not meet the requirements of Article 299 (1). The court cited precedents (K.P. Choudhary v. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 203; State M.P. v. Ratanlal, 1967 MPLJ 104 (SC) 106) and concluded that the bid list did not constitute a valid contract as it was not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor nor executed by an authorized person.
4. Recovery under Section 82 of the Forest Act, 1927:
The court considered whether the deficiency could be recovered under Section 82 of the Forest Act, 1927, as substituted by Madhya Pradesh Act No. 9 of 1965. Section 82 allows recovery of money payable to the State Government under the terms of a notice relating to the sale of forest produce by auction. The court found that the petitioner's liability for the deficiency was covered by condition No. 13 of the sale notice (Annexure-A). The court interpreted Section 82 as creating a statutory liability, enforceable even without a contract as envisaged under Article 299. This interpretation was supported by the Supreme Court's decision in A. Damodaran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1976 SC 1533, which held that statutory liabilities could be enforced under statutory provisions irrespective of the existence of a formal contract.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, holding that the recovery proceedings were valid under Section 82 of the Forest Act, 1927. There was no order as to costs, and the security amount was to be refunded to the petitioner.
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1979 (12) TMI 164
Issues:
Appeal against conviction and sentence under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970; Evaluation of eyewitness testimony; Scope of power to dismiss an appeal summarily under Section 384 of the CrPC; Constitutional validity of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an appeal by three accused individuals against their conviction and sentence in a murder case. The appellants were initially acquitted by the Sessions Judge but later convicted by the High Court based on eyewitness testimony and other evidence. The High Court found the eyewitnesses' accounts to be reliable and trustworthy, contrary to the Sessions Judge's assessment. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence and the judgments of the lower courts, found no sufficient grounds to interfere and summarily dismissed the appeal under Section 384 of the CrPC.
In a subsequent development, before signing the judgment, a decision of the Supreme Court in another case raised questions about the power of courts to dismiss appeals summarily under Section 384 of the CrPC. The appellants in that case challenged the constitutional validity of certain rules empowering summary dismissal of appeals. The matter was referred to a Bench of five Judges to address the constitutional validity and related issues. The Court rejected the contention that a right of appeal mandates a detailed hearing with records and reasoned judgment, emphasizing that summary dismissal is not inherently unconstitutional.
The judgment clarifies that the discussion on the constitutional validity of the rules in the referred case does not extend to the validity of Section 384 of the CrPC. The Court highlighted that the specific challenge to Section 384 was not raised or argued, making the decision in that case non-binding as precedent on the validity of Section 384. The order of dismissal of the appeal summarily under Section 384 of the CrPC was upheld based on the specific circumstances and arguments presented in this case.
In conclusion, the judgment addresses the appeal against conviction, the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the power to dismiss appeals summarily under Section 384 of the CrPC, and the constitutional validity of specific rules. It provides clarity on the scope and limitations of summary dismissal of appeals, emphasizing the discretion of the courts in such matters based on the facts and arguments presented in each case.
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1979 (12) TMI 163
Issues:
1. Interpretation of orders passed under sections 18(1)(c) and 18(2A) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
2. Assessment of the conduct of the assessee in penalty proceedings.
3. Appeal jurisdiction of the ITAT under section 18(2A) of the Act.
4. Requirement of the Tribunal to state a case and refer questions of law under section 27(3) of the Act.
Analysis:
1. The judgment pertains to four connected applications under section 27(3) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, seeking the ITAT to state a case and refer questions of law arising from its order dated October 13, 1977. The primary issue revolves around determining whether the order passed by the WTO on November 1, 1973, was under section 18(1)(c) or giving effect to the CWT's order under section 18(2A) of the Act. The dispute centers on the appeal jurisdiction before the AAC and the Tribunal based on the nature of the order.
2. The factual background involves an assessment year of 1970-71, where the assessee failed to disclose the value of shares in the original return. Subsequently, a reassessment was conducted, and penalty proceedings were initiated under section 18(1)(c) of the Act. The CWT reduced the penalty, leading to an appeal by the assessee. The ITAT's decision to cancel the penalties was based on the assessment of the assessee's conduct, deeming it non-contumacious and honest. This issue highlights the significance of assessing the conduct of the assessee in penalty proceedings under the Act.
3. The appeal jurisdiction of the ITAT under section 18(2A) was contested, leading to a difference of opinion within the Tribunal. The Judicial Member opined in favor of entertaining the appeal, while the Accountant Member held otherwise. The matter was referred to the President of the Tribunal, who ultimately agreed with the Judicial Member's view. The subsequent decision of the Tribunal to allow the appeal and quash the penalty underscores the importance of clarity regarding the appeal jurisdiction under the Act.
4. The Tribunal's dismissal of the CWT's application under section 27(1) to refer questions of law was challenged, leading to the present applications before the High Court. The Court, after considering the arguments and perusing the Tribunal's orders, found that a question of law indeed arose from the Tribunal's decision. Consequently, the Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and refer the pertinent question for consideration. This aspect emphasizes the procedural requirement for the Tribunal to address questions of law arising from its orders under the Act.
In conclusion, the judgment delves into intricate legal interpretations concerning the Wealth Tax Act, focusing on the nature of orders, appeal jurisdiction, assessment of conduct in penalty proceedings, and the Tribunal's obligation to refer questions of law. The detailed analysis provides clarity on the complexities involved in such matters and underscores the necessity for precise legal interpretations in tax law proceedings.
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1979 (12) TMI 162
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of surcharge collection by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
2. Alleged discriminatory treatment violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Authority and delegation of powers within the DDA.
4. Maintainability of the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Surcharge Collection by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA):
The petitioners, allottees of flats constructed by the DDA under the Middle Income Group (MIG) scheme, contested the surcharge levied as part of the sale price of the flats. They argued that the DDA, which operates on a 'no profit no loss' basis, unlawfully collected a surcharge ranging from Rs. 3,400 to Rs. 6,000 per flat, making a profit contrary to its stated policy. They contended that this surcharge was unauthorized, as it was not part of the cost price formula prescribed by the DDA. The DDA, however, justified the surcharge by stating it was used to finance housing projects for lower income groups, thereby making housing affordable for weaker sections of society.
2. Alleged Discriminatory Treatment Violating Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioners argued that the surcharge was discriminatory as it was not uniformly applied across all MIG schemes. They claimed that no surcharge was levied on other MIG schemes prior to November 1976 and after January 1977, except for the three schemes in question and one in Wazirpur. They alleged this violated Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law, as similarly situated individuals were treated unequally. The court, however, found that the classification by the DDA based on time, location, and other relevant factors was reasonable and did not violate Article 14. The court noted that the DDA's pricing policy, which included the surcharge, was applied uniformly within the specified period and was not arbitrary or discriminatory.
3. Authority and Delegation of Powers within the DDA:
The petitioners challenged the authority of the Vice-Chairman of the DDA to levy the surcharge, arguing that such power was not delegated to him. The court examined the relevant regulations and found that the Vice-Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the DDA, was empowered to administer the regulations and fix the disposal price of flats, including any surcharge. The court also noted that the DDA had adopted resolutions delegating these powers to the Vice-Chairman, and the surcharge was included in the disposal price approved by him, thereby making the levy authorized and valid.
4. Maintainability of the Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution:
The DDA raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petitions under Article 32, arguing that the petitioners were seeking to reopen concluded contracts rather than enforce a fundamental right. The court acknowledged that the petitions were essentially an attempt to recover part of the purchase price paid for the flats, which was a matter of contract law rather than constitutional law. The court emphasized that Article 32 is not the appropriate remedy for such contractual disputes and that the petitioners had voluntarily entered into the contracts with full knowledge of the terms, including the price. The court, therefore, found the petitions to be an improper use of Article 32 jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners. The surcharge levied by the DDA was deemed lawful and not discriminatory, and the Vice-Chairman was found to have the authority to include the surcharge in the disposal price. The court also reiterated that Article 32 is not the appropriate forum for resolving contractual disputes. There was no order as to costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 161
Issues Involved:
1. Whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court is an "appeal" within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.
2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, as amended by Ordinance 26 of 1975.
3. Whether the appellant can invoke the protection under Section 13A(c) of the Act.
4. The scope of the term "proceeding" under Section 13A.
5. The relevance of Section 22 of the Act in the context of appeals and revisions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court is an "appeal" within the meaning of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950:
The judgment clarifies that an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be equated with an ordinary remedy of appeal under any provisions of law. It is an extraordinary right within the discretion of the Supreme Court. Therefore, such an application does not come within the contemplation of an appeal pending before the court under Section 13A(a). The term "proceeding" in Section 13A(a) and (b) means suit, appeal, or application for revision, as per the explanation appended to Section 13A. Hence, a suit, appeal, or application for revision must be pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance.
2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, as amended by Ordinance 26 of 1975:
Section 13A was introduced to provide tenants with an opportunity to deposit arrears of rent within a specified time, thereby avoiding eviction solely on the ground of non-payment of rent. The amended Section 13A extends this benefit to pending suits, appeals, and applications for revision on the date of commencement of the Ordinance, i.e., September 29, 1975. The provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) apply mutatis mutandis to all appeals or applications for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the amending Ordinance.
3. Whether the appellant can invoke the protection under Section 13A(c) of the Act:
The appellant argued that since special leave had been granted by the Supreme Court, an appeal was pending against the High Court's judgment, and thus, he was entitled to the protection under Section 13A(c). However, the judgment clarifies that there is no provision in an appeal by special leave for the presentation of a memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court Rules state that on the grant of special leave, the petition for special leave is treated as the petition of appeal and registered and numbered as such. The terminus a quo for the purpose of Section 13A(c) is from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal, which does not apply to appeals by special leave.
4. The scope of the term "proceeding" under Section 13A:
The term "proceeding" as used in Section 13A refers to suits, regular appeals, and applications for revision under the ordinary law. It does not include applications for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The judgment emphasizes that the legislature would have explicitly mentioned applications for special leave if it intended to include them within the ambit of "proceeding."
5. The relevance of Section 22 of the Act in the context of appeals and revisions:
Section 22 provides for appeals and revisions from every decree or order passed by a court under the Act. It specifies that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order, but the High Court's power of revision is not affected. The judgment indicates that Section 22 deals with decrees or orders passed under Sections 6, 7, 11, 19A, and 19C of the Act. It does not cover decrees or orders passed in suits for eviction, which lie in ordinary civil courts of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, usual rights of appeal and revision are available in eviction suits, and Section 13A(c) does not extend to appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not take advantage of Section 13A in this appeal by special leave. The applications under Section 13A were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs. The judgment underscores that the benefits of Section 13A are confined to the hierarchy of courts specified under the Act and do not extend to appeals by special leave to the Supreme Court.
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1979 (12) TMI 160
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the revenue auction sale.
2. Compliance with Section 36 of the Revenue Recovery Act.
3. Compliance with Section 44 of the Revenue Recovery Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the Revenue Auction Sale:
The appellant contended that the revenue auction sale conducted was illegal. The primary arguments were that the loan amount was not outstanding at the time of sale, the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and principles of natural justice were violated, and the land was sold for a significantly lower amount than its actual value. The court rejected the first argument, stating that once the court-auction sale was set aside and the appellant received restitution, the auction purchaser became a stranger to the property. Consequently, the amount paid by the auction purchaser was rightly refunded, and the loan amount remained outstanding. The court also examined the compliance with Sections 36 and 44 of the Act to address the second and third arguments.
2. Compliance with Section 36 of the Revenue Recovery Act:
Section 36 requires a notice of sale to be affixed on the land to be sold. The appellant argued that this notice was not affixed, which was found to be true by the court. The court discussed whether this failure constituted a material irregularity or an illegality. The court referenced the Board's Standing Order 41, which classifies such a failure as an illegality. The court concluded that the failure to affix the sale notice on the land was a basic and inescapable obligation, and its non-compliance vitiated the sale. Therefore, the sale was set aside on this ground.
3. Compliance with Section 44 of the Revenue Recovery Act:
Section 44 stipulates that only a portion of the land sufficient to discharge the arrears should be sold. The appellant argued that the entire land was sold, which was contrary to this provision. The court found that the amount due was only Rs. 2,518, but the entire land of 3.40 acres was sold, which violated Section 44. The court held that this violation constituted an illegality, as the sale should have been limited to a portion sufficient to recover the amount due. This illegality further vitiated the sale.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of Ramanujam, J., and quashed the revenue sale. The court concluded that the failure to comply with Sections 36 and 44 of the Revenue Recovery Act constituted illegalities that vitiated the sale. The court rejected the request for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating that the case did not need to be decided by the Supreme Court based on the admitted facts and application of the relevant sections of the Act.
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1979 (12) TMI 159
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order framing charges is an interlocutory order.
2. The applicability of Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979.
3. The scope and interpretation of the term "interlocutory order" under the Special Courts Act, 1979.
4. The impact of the non obstante clause in Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979.
5. The right to appeal under Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the order framing charges is an interlocutory order:
The primary issue is whether the order framing charges against the appellant under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, is an interlocutory order. The Court examined various precedents and interpretations of the term "interlocutory order." It concluded that an interlocutory order is one that does not decide the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or trial. The order framing charges does not terminate the proceedings but allows the trial to continue, making it an interlocutory order.
2. The applicability of Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979:
Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979, provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence, or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 11(1) must be interpreted in its natural sense and not in a special or wider sense as used in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. The scope and interpretation of the term "interlocutory order" under the Special Courts Act, 1979:
The Court analyzed the term "interlocutory order" by referring to various legal dictionaries and precedents. It concluded that an interlocutory order is one that does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties. The Court held that the order framing charges is an interlocutory order as it does not conclude the trial but allows it to continue.
4. The impact of the non obstante clause in Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979:
The non obstante clause in Section 11(1) of the Act excludes the application of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including Section 397(2), which bars appeals against interlocutory orders. The Court held that the non obstante clause does not change the meaning of "interlocutory order" and that the term should be interpreted in its natural sense. The clause aims to ensure the quickest dispatch and expeditious disposal of cases by preventing delays that could arise from appeals against interlocutory orders.
5. The right to appeal under Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979:
The Court emphasized that the right to appeal under Section 11 of the Act is limited to judgments, sentences, or orders that are not interlocutory. Since the order framing charges is an interlocutory order, no appeal lies against it under Section 11. The Court also noted that the Act provides sufficient safeguards for the accused, including the right to appeal against final orders and the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the Solicitor General and dismissed the appeal as being not maintainable. The Court concluded that the order framing charges is an interlocutory order and, therefore, not appealable under Section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979. The interpretation of "interlocutory order" must be in its natural sense, and the non obstante clause in Section 11(1) does not alter this interpretation.
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1979 (12) TMI 158
Issues Involved:
1. Ownership of the suit house.
2. Benami transaction claim.
3. Entitlement to possession and mesne profits.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Ownership of the Suit House:
The principal issue was the ownership of the suit house. The plaintiffs claimed ownership based on a patta dated July 12, 1940, issued in their names. The defendant contended that he was the exclusive owner, asserting that the house was acquired jointly by him and Bharat Singh out of their joint funds. The trial court held that Bharat Singh secured the house for the plaintiffs with their money, while the High Court found that Bharat Singh purchased the house with his own money in the plaintiffs' names without intending to confer any beneficial interest on them. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the consideration for the house was paid by Bharat Singh out of his own funds.
2. Benami Transaction Claim:
The defendant claimed the transaction was benami, asserting that the plaintiffs were holding the property as benamidars for Bharat Singh. The Supreme Court analyzed the principles governing benami transactions, noting that the burden of proof lies on the person asserting the transaction to be benami. The Court considered the surrounding circumstances, relationship of the parties, and the conduct of Bharat Singh. It found that Bharat Singh intended to make plaintiff No. 2 the owner of the house, supported by declarations made by Bharat Singh and the fact that the original patta was handed over to plaintiff No. 2. The Court concluded that the transaction was not benami and Bharat Singh intended to constitute plaintiff No. 2 as the absolute owner.
3. Entitlement to Possession and Mesne Profits:
The trial court decreed possession of the house in favor of the plaintiffs and directed the defendant to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 50 per month from September 20, 1956, until possession was restored. The High Court modified this decree, granting joint possession to plaintiff No. 1. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decree, reinstating the trial court's direction for possession to plaintiff No. 2 and ordered the defendant to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50 per month from September 20, 1956, till the date of delivery of possession. The Court also directed an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine future mesne profits.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1971, granting possession of the suit house to plaintiff No. 2 and ordering the defendant to pay mesne profits. Civil Appeal No. 629 of 1971 was dismissed without costs.
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1979 (12) TMI 157
Issues:
1. Whether a film certified for public exhibition by the Board of Censors can be prosecuted for obscenity under s. 292 I.P.C.
2. Legal effect of s. 5A of the Cinematograph Act and s. 79 I.P.C. on the public exhibition of films.
3. Interpretation of s. 79 I.P.C. in relation to justification by law for acts that may constitute an offence.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around a prosecution initiated against the producer, actor, photographer, exhibitor, and distributor of a film titled "Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram" on grounds of obscenity under s. 292 I.P.C. The petitioner contended that the film had been duly certified for public show by the Board of Censors and thus should be protected from prosecution under s. 79 I.P.C. The Court delved into the legal implications of the certification process under s. 5A of the Cinematograph Act and its impact on justifying the public exhibition of films, especially in cases of alleged obscenity.
The Court analyzed s. 79 I.P.C., which provides an exception where an act ceases to be an offence if justified by law or done based on a mistaken belief of being justified by law. The judgment emphasized that if the Board of Censors sanctions public exhibition in good faith and within their jurisdiction, the producer and related parties are protected under s. 79. The Court highlighted the importance of the certification process and the need to balance freedom of expression with societal restrictions, especially in the realm of cinema, which has a significant impact on the masses.
The judgment underscored the specialized nature of the Cinematograph Act in regulating films and the role of the Board of Censors in ensuring compliance with legal and moral standards. It emphasized the need for a robust certification process to prevent the exhibition of films that may harm public morals. The Court also addressed the potential abuse of power by the censors and the importance of upholding public interest by preventing the certification of films that could corrupt societal values.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, quashing the prosecution against the film producer based on the protective provisions of s. 79 I.P.C. and the certification granted under s. 5A of the Cinematograph Act. The judgment highlighted the delicate balance between artistic expression, public morality, and the regulatory framework governing the exhibition of films, emphasizing the need for a conscientious approach by the authorities involved in certifying films.
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1979 (12) TMI 156
Issues involved: Appeal against conviction and sentence, reliability of eye-witness testimony, power of the Court to dismiss appeal summarily under S. 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Conviction and Sentence Appeal: The three accused appealed against their conviction and sentence under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The High Court of Gujarat reversed the order of acquittal by the Sessions Judge and convicted them for offences under s. 302/120--B of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing them to imprisonment for life. The prosecution relied on the evidence of eye witnesses Rata Mala, Ganesh, and Ruda. The High Court found the testimony of Rata Mala and Ganesh to be reliable and trustworthy, overturning the Sessions Judge's reasons for acquittal. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the appeal under S. 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after finding no sufficient grounds for interference.
Power to Dismiss Appeal Summarily: A separate judgment highlighted the challenge to the constitutional validity of Rule 15(1)(c) of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, which allows for the summary dismissal of appeals. The Court rejected the argument that a right of appeal obligates the Court to hear both parties, examine records, and provide a reasoned judgment. The Court also dismissed the contention that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including S. 384, are not applicable to the Supreme Court. The decision clarified that the validity of S. 384 was not raised or argued, and therefore, the discussion on this issue is not a binding precedent. The Court concluded that the order of dismissal of the appeal summarily stands.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, emphasizing the reliability of the eye-witness testimony. Additionally, the Court clarified the power to dismiss appeals summarily under S. 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, affirming the validity of Rule 15(1)(c) of O.XXI of the Supreme Court Rules.
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1979 (12) TMI 155
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and validity of notices issued under Sections 59(a) and 61 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
2. Whether the right to receive enhanced compensation is "property" for estate duty purposes.
3. Whether the non-disclosure of land acquisition proceedings and pending references amounts to omission or failure to disclose material facts.
4. Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 59(a) was justified.
5. Whether the rectification under Section 61 was a case of mistake apparent from the record or a change of opinion.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality and Validity of Notices Issued Under Sections 59(a) and 61 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:
The Supreme Court examined the legality and validity of two notices issued by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad, under Sections 59(a) and 61 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The notices were issued to reopen and rectify estate duty assessments based on enhanced compensation awarded by the Civil Court for lands acquired by the government.
2. Whether the Right to Receive Enhanced Compensation is "Property" for Estate Duty Purposes:
The Court held that the right to receive compensation for lands acquired by the government is "property" and passes on the death of the deceased. This right is indivisible and includes the right to receive enhanced compensation. The Court stated, "The right to receive compensation for the lands acquired by the Government, at their market value on the date of acquisition is one and indivisible right."
3. Whether the Non-Disclosure of Land Acquisition Proceedings and Pending References Amounts to Omission or Failure to Disclose Material Facts:
The Court noted that the non-disclosure of pending land acquisition references by the accountable person was a primary and material fact. The High Court held that this non-disclosure amounted to an omission or failure, which could lead the assessing authority to a reasonable belief that property chargeable to estate duty had escaped assessment.
4. Whether the Reopening of Assessment Under Section 59(a) was Justified:
The Court found that the notice under Section 59(a) was issued on the wrong basis. The notice was based on the assumption that the acquired lands still formed part of the estate of the deceased and had been undervalued. The Court stated, "The very issuance of the notice under s. 59(a) which was done on a basis clearly unsustainable in law is liable to be quashed on this ground." Consequently, the reassessment made pursuant to the notice was also quashed.
5. Whether the Rectification Under Section 61 was a Case of Mistake Apparent from the Record or a Change of Opinion:
The Court held that the notice under Section 61 was not a case of rectification of any mistake apparent from the record but a change of opinion regarding the valuation of the acquired lands. The Court observed, "In substance, it cannot be said to be a case of rectification of any mistake apparent from the record but the respondent is really seeking to change his opinion about the valuation of the acquired lands because some other authority, namely, the Civil Court has valued the same differently." The notice and the subsequent rectification order were quashed.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashing the notices issued under Sections 59(a) and 61 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, as well as the subsequent reassessment and rectification orders. The Court emphasized that the right to receive compensation is property, but the notices were issued on incorrect bases and constituted a change of opinion rather than rectification of a mistake apparent from the record. The revenue was ordered to pay the costs of the appeals to the appellants.
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1979 (12) TMI 154
Issues:
Challenge to judgment quashing notice under Gold (Control) Act, 1968 based on possession of gold sovereigns and gold rod without declaration. Interpretation of Sec. 16 and Sec. 8(1) of the Act. Jurisdiction of Gold Control Officer to issue notice. Relevance of facts in determining jurisdiction. Applicability of Bench decision on permissible limit of gold possession.
Analysis:
The appeal before the Calcutta High Court involved a challenge by the authorities under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 against a judgment quashing a notice issued under Sec. 79 of the Act. The respondent, a licensed gold dealer, was found in possession of gold sovereigns and a gold rod during a search by customs officers. The impugned notice was issued on the grounds of violation of Sec. 8(1) for not declaring possession of primary gold and failure to furnish a declaration under Sec. 16 for exceeding the permissible limit. However, no gold bearing foreign marks as alleged were recovered from the respondent's custody. The weight discrepancies in the notice were noted, raising questions about the accuracy of the information provided.
The High Court relied on a previous Bench decision to determine that no declaration was required as the total quantity of gold recovered did not exceed the limit specified in Sec. 16(5)(b) of the Act. The judgment emphasized that the gold in question belonged to the respondent's family and did not surpass the permissible threshold. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed based on this interpretation, leading to the authorities challenging this decision in the appeal.
The appellants argued that the respondent was obligated to make a declaration under Sec. 16, but refrained from pursuing this point due to the precedent set by the Bench decision. The jurisdiction of the Gold Control Officer to issue the notice was contested based on the possession of primary gold, specifically the gold rod, without a declaration. The Act's provisions regarding possession and acquisition of primary gold were scrutinized to determine the legality of the notice issued.
The Court highlighted the importance of factual accuracy in determining jurisdiction, noting that relevant facts, such as the origin of the gold rod in the respondent's possession, were crucial in assessing the authorities' right to issue the notice. It was emphasized that the Court's jurisdiction in writ proceedings is limited to examining the authorities' jurisdiction to issue notices, but factual elements, if admitted or not denied, can influence this assessment. The failure of the appellants to address pertinent facts led to the dismissal of the appeal, as the Court found that the authorities lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with no order for costs, and all interim orders were vacated. The judgment underscored the significance of factual accuracy and adherence to legal provisions in the issuance of notices under the Gold (Control) Act, emphasizing the need for authorities to establish jurisdiction based on accurate and relevant information.
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1979 (12) TMI 153
Issues:
Appeal for enhancement of sentence under Section 377(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an offence under Section 86(1)(ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968.
Analysis:
The appellant filed an appeal seeking enhancement of the sentence imposed on the respondent for an offence under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. The respondent was apprehended by the Central Excise Inspector for possessing two circular gold rods (KADAS) of significant weight and purity. The lower court convicted the respondent but only imposed a fine without any imprisonment. The appellant argued that a deterrent sentence was necessary due to the nature of the offence, citing a relevant legal precedent. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel contended that the evidence did not establish possession of primary gold, rather it was an ornament. The respondent claimed entitlement to acquittal or, alternatively, argued that the amended law and previous departmental action justified the sentence imposed by the trial court.
The prosecution relied on the testimony of witnesses, including the Excise Inspector who seized the articles and an approved gold tester. The definition of "primary gold" and "ornament" under the Act was crucial in determining the nature of the seized items. The prosecution's argument that the seized bangles were primary gold was challenged by the defense, highlighting the lack of evidence to support this claim. The defense emphasized that the articles were commonly used ornaments and not primary gold, as testified by the expert witness. The prosecution's failure to establish the seized items as primary gold raised doubts about the conviction and the basis for the sentence imposed by the lower court.
The court noted the lack of evidence supporting the prosecution's claim that the seized articles were primary gold. The Excise Inspector's misunderstanding of the law and the absence of conclusive evidence regarding the nature of the seized items undermined the conviction. Consequently, the court concluded that the conviction could not be sustained, leading to the setting aside of both the conviction and sentence against the respondent. As a result, the appeal for sentence enhancement was deemed unsubstantiated, and any fine paid by the respondent was directed to be refunded.
In conclusion, the judgment focused on the interpretation of the Gold (Control) Act definitions to determine the nature of the seized items. The lack of conclusive evidence supporting the prosecution's claim of possession of primary gold led to the overturning of the conviction and sentence imposed on the respondent. The court's decision highlighted the importance of clear evidence and proper legal interpretation in criminal proceedings involving specialized offenses like those under the Gold (Control) Act.
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1979 (12) TMI 152
Issues:
1. Interpretation of law regarding levy of countervailing duty on imported goods.
2. Challenge to the vires of the levy of countervailing duty.
3. Examination of the Customs Tariff Act provisions and the Explanation to section 3(1).
4. Reference to the Tariff Commission's report and its relevance to the levy of countervailing duty.
5. Comparison with a Supreme Court judgment on countervailing duty.
6. Analysis of the wording of the Explanation in section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act.
7. Determination of the applicability of countervailing duty corresponding to Item 68 CET in the appeals.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the interpretation of law concerning the levy of countervailing duty on imported goods. The appellants disputed the levy of countervailing duty under Item 68 CET, arguing that it is beyond the competence of the Union legislature.
2. The challenge to the vires of the levy of countervailing duty was raised by the appellants, indicating their intention to challenge it in the High Court. They sought to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the court.
3. The judgment extensively examines the provisions of the Customs Tariff Act, particularly focusing on the Explanation to section 3(1). The Explanation clarifies the basis for levying countervailing duty on goods not manufactured in India.
4. The appellants referred to the Tariff Commission's report, highlighting the pragmatic reasons behind the insertion of the Explanation in the Customs Tariff Act. The judgment analyzes the relevance of this report to the legality of countervailing duty.
5. A comparison was made with a Supreme Court judgment regarding countervailing duty on imported goods. The judgment distinguishes the applicability of countervailing duty under different legal contexts and constitutional provisions.
6. The wording of the Explanation in section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act was thoroughly analyzed. The appellants challenged the interpretation of the Explanation, questioning its application to goods not manufactured in India.
7. Ultimately, the judgment concludes that the levy of countervailing duty corresponding to Item 68 CET in all three appeals was proper. The appeals were rejected based on the interpretation of the Customs Tariff Act provisions and the Explanation to section 3(1).
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1979 (12) TMI 151
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of nylon rods, nylon tubings, and nylon fishing line under the Central Excise Tariff.
2. Entitlement to exemption from duty under Notification No. 68/71.
3. Rejection of refund claims by the lower authority.
4. Opportunity to represent the case before rejection of refunds and confirmation of demands.
5. Applicability of the Bombay High Court judgment in the case of M/s. Nirlon Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals Ltd.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of Nylon Products:
The appellants manufactured nylon rods, nylon tubings, and nylon fishing line of cross-section above 1 mm. Initially, these products were classified under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff, liable to duty at 1% ad valorem. The appellants contested this classification, asserting that these products should fall under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff, which pertains to articles of plastics. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise approved their classification lists, indicating that the products were classifiable under Item 15A(2) and exempted from duty under Notification No. 68/71.
2. Entitlement to Exemption from Duty:
The appellants claimed exemption from duty for the said products under Notification No. 68/71, dated 29-5-1971. This was initially accepted by the Assistant Collector, who approved the classification lists. However, the lower authority later rejected the refund claims, arguing that the products, being manufactured from polyamide type nylon moulding powder, were not plastic grade and thus correctly classifiable under Item 68.
3. Rejection of Refund Claims:
The lower authority rejected the refund claims based on the classification of the products under Item 68, relying on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Nirlon Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals Ltd. The appellants contended that their products were indeed plastic grade articles, as supported by the Chemical Examiner's report and other expert opinions.
4. Opportunity to Represent the Case:
The appellants argued that the lower authority did not provide them an opportunity to represent their case before rejecting the refunds or confirming the demands, violating the principles of natural justice. However, during the personal hearing, the appellants chose not to pursue this point and requested the appeals be decided on merits.
5. Applicability of the Bombay High Court Judgment:
The lower authority's decision heavily relied on the Bombay High Court's judgment in the case of M/s. Nirlon Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals Ltd., which dealt with the classification of polymer chips. The appellants argued that the ratio decidendi of that case was not applicable to their products, as the polymer chips in question were intermediate products used in manufacturing nylon filament yarn, not plastic articles.
Final Judgment:
The appellate authority carefully reviewed the records, submissions, and expert opinions. It was concluded that the impugned goods, manufactured from polyamide chips (Nylon 6), are indeed articles of plastics falling under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff. The evidence, including the Chemical Examiner's report and expert certificates, supported this classification. The authority also noted that the raw material used by the appellants, Ultramid B4/BASF (nylon 6), is suitable for producing plastic articles through injection moulding and extrusion processes.
The authority held that the impugned goods are correctly classifiable under Item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff and not under Item 68. Consequently, the appellants are entitled to the exemption under Notification No. 68/71-C.E., dated 29-5-1971. The 14 appeals were allowed with consequential relief, setting aside the lower authority's orders and granting the refunds due to the appellants.
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1979 (12) TMI 150
Issues: Classification of crank shafts of vacuum pumps under the Customs tariff schedule.
The judgment in the case of Commissioner/Appellate Authority v. Appellate Collector of Customs, Bombay dealt with the classification of crank shafts of vacuum pumps under the Customs tariff schedule. The appellants argued that the crank shafts should be assessed as parts of pumps under Heading 84.11(1), the same heading under which pumps themselves would be assessed. The Customs House had assessed the goods under a broader heading, which covers transmission shafts and cranks. The judgment emphasized the importance of the Explanatory Notes of the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN) in interpreting tariff entries, even though they are not statutorily binding. The Explanatory Notes are considered valuable for achieving uniformity in Customs classification among different countries. The judgment highlighted the principle that in case of ambiguity in taxation statutes, the interpretation in favor of the taxpayer should be adopted to ensure uniformity and certainty in commodity taxation.
The judgment referred to specific pages of the Explanatory Notes of CCCN to support the classification decision. It was noted that crank shafts of internal combustion engines are classified differently from those of pumps, under Heading 84.63 instead of 84.06. The judge applied the principle of uniformity in commodity taxation and rejected the appeal, stating that the same criteria should apply to the classification of crank shafts of pumps and internal combustion engines. The judgment emphasized the significance of adhering to the Explanatory Notes for interpreting tariff entries to achieve the desired uniformity in commodity taxation. Despite the judge's personal inclination towards a different interpretation, the decision was based on the importance of maintaining consistency in the application of taxation statutes.
Furthermore, the judgment discussed the non-statutory status of the Explanatory Notes and the reasons behind the government's reluctance to provide statutory recognition, citing prohibitive costs as a barrier. The judge expressed the view that the cost of the Explanatory Notes hinders their wider adoption and utility, especially in third world countries. The judgment suggested that the Customs Cooperation Council should explore alternative funding sources to make the Explanatory Notes more accessible and affordable for taxpayers.
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1979 (12) TMI 149
Whether the imposition of vend fee on denatured spirit for grant of license for wholesale vend of denatured spirit is within the competence of State ?
Held that:- The provisions in the Act which provided for a levy on retail vend of foreign liquor was held to be valid. The power to legislate under List II Entry 8 relating to intoxicating Liquor comprises of liquor which contains alcohol whether it is potable or not. The power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of the intoxicating liquor and its exclusive right regarding intoxicating liquor cannot be questioned.
The purpose of introduction of Act 5 of 1976 was to make it clear that U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act, 1972 shall be deemed to and always to have been valid. In view of our findings that U.P. Excise (Amendment) Act, 1972 was valid, the effect of U.P. Act 5 of 1976 is to remove all doubts and to give retrospective effect.
Unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that specially denatured spirit for industrial purpose is different from the ordinary denatured spirit. The definition of alcohol under rule 12 includes both ordinary as well as specially denatured spirit. It is true that the stand taken by the Government in the earlier proceedings was different but that would not make any difference so long as the Government had a right to impose the levy. It has been found that after the addition of S. 24A by Act 30 of 1972, the Commissioner was entitled to accept payment for conferring the privilege which the State owned exclusively.
The conditions relating to grant of a licence for issue of denatured spirit for industrial purpose are laid down in rule 4. Special conditions regarding licence in form F.L. 39, 40 and 41 are prescribed in rule 5. The appellants/petitioners having applied for and obtained licences in form F.L. 39 are bound to comply with the conditions. Act 5 of 1976 has been given retrospective effect as the levy imposed under Act 30 of 1972 was found to be illegal and unsustainable by the Allahabad High Court which was reversed by this Court by giving retrospective effect, the State has only restored the status quo enabling the collection of the levy validly made by Act 30 of 1972. On the facts of the case there could be no complaint because what is sought to be collected is levy which was legally made.
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1979 (12) TMI 148
Whether the respondent is not liable to pay the damage even though no contract in writing had been executed in accordance with Article A 299 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The respondent by his own conduct in not depositing the 1/6th of the bids offered by him made it impassible, for the excise authorities to conclude the contract.
As the respondent did not comply with the demand, the excise authority concerned decided to conduct a resale of the excise privileges on March 21, 1951, and also to prosecute the respondent for an offence punishable under section 185 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the respondent gave a representation (Exh. 7) on March 30, 1951 stating that I any action other than prosecuting him may be taken. He stated in that representation that his sole object in offering the bids was to help the Government and to help himself but when he calculated whether he would make any profit he felt that he would not do so. According to the said representation, that was the reason for not depositing 1/6th of the bid amount at the fall of the hammer. He, however, did not question the authority of the excise authorities to put up the excise privileges for resale and to claim the loss occasioned by such resale from him. In these circumstances I am of the view that it is not possible to hold that the respondent was not in law liable for the claim made by the State Government even though no contracts were formally entered into between the respondent and the State Government. The liability of the respondent in the instant case arises under the statute and it also arises as the result of a civil wrong or a tort committed by him, in offering the highest bid with open eyes and in not fulfilling the obligations arising therefrom. Thus the respondent should be made liable for the sum claimed in the suit and the decree made by the trial court should be restored.
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1979 (12) TMI 147
Whether inside prison or outside, a person shall not be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save by methods 'right, just and fair'?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Allow the petition and direct a writ to issue, including the six mandates and further order that a copy of it be sent for suitable action to the Ministry of Home Affairs and to all the State Governments since Prison Justice has pervasive relevance
The prisoner who is the victim has been repeatedly questioned under different surroundings and divergent statements are recorded. We do not wish to state what we consider to be the obvious inference, but we are taken aback when the Assistant Public Prosecutor has given an opinion which, if we make presumption in his favour, shows in differences and, if we make contrary inferences, makes us suspect. When offences are alleged to have taken place within the prison, there should be no tinge or trace of departmental collusion or league between the police and the prison staff. We make these minimal observations so that the State may be alerted for appropriate action. Surely, The conduct of the prosecution cannot be entrusted to one who has condemned it in advance.
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1979 (12) TMI 146
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are:
1. Whether the appeal before the first appellate authority could be considered time-barred due to the delay in depositing one-third of the tax amount?
2. Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the first appellate authority was justified despite the tax amount being paid after the specified time?
Issue 1: Time-barred appeal
The assessee was assessed to tax under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and filed an appeal against the order of assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the assessee to pay a sum of Rs. 6,000 out of the tax assessed by a certain date. The assessee deposited Rs. 1,000 on time but paid the remaining amount after a significant delay. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner issued a notice questioning the delay in payment, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. The Tribunal upheld the dismissal, citing the delay in depositing one-third of the tax amount. However, the High Court clarified that the appeal could not be considered time-barred solely based on the delay in depositing the tax amount, as per the provisions of section 38(3) and (4) of the Act.
Issue 2: Dismissal of the appeal
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeal on the grounds of non-compliance with the payment deadline set by the authority. The Tribunal supported this decision, believing that one-third of the tax amount must be paid before or along with the appeal memo. However, the High Court disagreed with this interpretation, emphasizing that the condition of depositing tax should be fulfilled before the appeal is admitted or entertained, not necessarily at the time of filing the appeal. The Court referred to relevant legal precedents and highlighted the distinction between filing an appeal and admitting or entertaining it. Consequently, the High Court ruled that the dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified.
In conclusion, the High Court answered the questions posed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal as follows:
1. The appeal was not time-barred.
2. The dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not proper.
No costs were awarded in this matter.
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