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1986 (12) TMI 392
Issues Involved:
The issue involves the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer (TDS) under section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to demand further tax from the employer in cases where regular assessment of an employee has been completed and the tax fully paid by the employee.
Jurisdiction of Income-tax Officer (TDS) under Section 201:
The case involved a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, regarding the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer (TDS) to demand additional tax from the employer in situations where the tax was not properly deducted by the employer in the cases of some employees. The Tribunal upheld that the Income-tax Officer (TDS) does not have the jurisdiction to demand further tax from the employer after the employee has completed regular assessment and fully paid the tax, as established in the case law CIT v. Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [1983] 140 ITR 818.
Factual Background and Legal Proceedings:
The Divisional Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Sagar, filed the annual return of salary income for the assessment year 1977-78, showing the tax deductible under section 192 of the Act. The Income-tax Officer (TDS) in Bhopal found discrepancies in tax deductions for certain employees and demanded additional tax under section 201 of the Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the assessee's appeal, which was further upheld by the Tribunal. The Tribunal then referred the question of law to the High Court for its opinion.
Court's Decision and Conclusion:
After considering the arguments presented, the High Court concluded that the Income-tax Officer (TDS) does not have the jurisdiction to demand further tax from the employer once the employee has completed regular assessment and paid the tax in full. Citing the precedent set in CIT v. Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [1983] 140 ITR 818, the High Court answered the question in the affirmative, ruling against the Department. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in this reference.
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1986 (12) TMI 390
Issues:
1. Validity of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.
2. Reliance on statements recorded by an unauthorized officer.
3. Failure to produce relevant records in a Habeas Corpus petition.
4. Validity of detention order under the de facto doctrine.
5. Non-application of mind by the detaining authority.
6. Infringement of Constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) by not considering the detenu's representation.
Analysis:
Validity of Detention:
The petitioner sought the release of her husband detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The detaining authority justified the detention to prevent actions prejudicial to foreign exchange. The High Court and the Supreme Court considered the legality of the detention order.
Reliance on Unauthorized Officer's Statements:
The detaining authority relied on statements by an officer not authorized under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The petitioner argued that this reliance was invalid as the officer was not a gazetted officer of Enforcement. The lack of proper authorization raised doubts on the validity of the detention.
Failure to Produce Relevant Records:
In a Habeas Corpus petition, the burden lies on the respondents to substantiate the detention's legality. The failure to produce records showing the officer's authorization cast doubt on the detention's validity. The absence of evidence regarding the officer's status raised concerns about procedural irregularities.
Validity under De Facto Doctrine:
The petitioner contended that the detention order was void from the beginning. The detaining authority's assumption regarding the officer's status and the validity of statements were questioned. The reliance on the de facto doctrine to support the detention order was challenged.
Non-Application of Mind:
Allegations of factual misstatements in the grounds of detention raised concerns about the detaining authority's application of mind. The petitioner argued that errors in the facts presented undermined the detention's validity. The lack of proper consideration of all relevant facts was highlighted as a significant flaw.
Constitutional Safeguards Infringement:
The petitioner claimed a violation of Constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the detenu's representation. The representation filed through a third party was not acknowledged, leading to the assertion that the detention was illegal. The failure to address the representation was seen as a breach of the detenu's rights.
Additional Application for Prosecution:
The Union Government applied for prosecution under Section 340 of the CrPC against individuals for forging documents related to the detenu's representation. Allegations of document forgery and interpolations in records were raised, prompting further legal action.
Conclusion:
After thorough consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition and the Writ Petition. None of the petitioner's contentions were upheld. The Court reserved orders on the application for prosecution. Detailed reasons for the judgment and any consequential directions were to follow.
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1986 (12) TMI 389
The Bombay High Court quashed and set aside an order of detention issued on 23rd June 1983 due to non-consideration of an Advisory Board report, following precedents set by the Supreme Court and previous High Court cases. The detenu was directed to be released immediately unless needed in another case.
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1986 (12) TMI 388
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the withdrawal of prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Mishra.
2. Role and autonomy of the Public Prosecutor in the withdrawal process.
3. Judicial scrutiny of the grounds for withdrawal.
4. Application of Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
Summary:
1. Validity of the Withdrawal of Prosecution:
The principal issue was whether the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Mishra, former Chief Minister of Bihar, was rightly allowed to be withdrawn by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The prosecution was based on allegations of defalcation, embezzlement, and conspiracy related to the Patna Urban Cooperative Bank. The Supreme Court highlighted that the decision to withdraw the prosecution was taken by the Cabinet presided over by Dr. Mishra himself, raising concerns about the propriety and transparency of such a decision.
2. Role and Autonomy of the Public Prosecutor:
The Court examined whether the Public Prosecutor acted independently or merely followed the directives of the Government. It was emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must exercise independent judgment and cannot be a mere mouthpiece of the Executive. The Court noted that the Public Prosecutor should not surrender his discretion to the Government and must apply his mind independently to the facts and circumstances of the case.
3. Judicial Scrutiny of the Grounds for Withdrawal:
The Court scrutinized the grounds on which the withdrawal was sought, which included lack of evidence, political vendetta, reasons of state and public policy, and adverse effects on public interest. The Court emphasized that the grounds for withdrawal must be legitimate and in furtherance of public justice. It was found that the Special Judge and the High Court failed to adequately scrutinize the grounds and merely accepted the Public Prosecutor's application without proper judicial consideration.
4. Application of Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC):
Section 321 CrPC allows the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution with the consent of the Court. The Court reiterated that this power must be exercised in the interest of public justice and not for extraneous or illegitimate reasons. The Court held that the withdrawal of prosecution in this case was not justified on the grounds presented and directed that the prosecution should proceed against Dr. Jagannath Mishra and others.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court, and directed that the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Mishra and others should continue in accordance with law. The judgment underscored the importance of judicial scrutiny in the withdrawal of prosecutions and the necessity for the Public Prosecutor to act independently and in the interest of public justice.
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1986 (12) TMI 387
Issues:
Appeal against orders for return of seized account books and documents under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Learned Single Judge:
The petitioners appealed against the orders of the Single Judge for the return of seized books and documents under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appellants argued that the Single Judge exceeded jurisdiction as per section 132, which allows the Income-tax Department to retain account books for up to 180 days. The proceedings under section 132(5) were stayed, and returning the books at this stage would violate section 132(8) and hinder the assessment process.
2. Provisions of Section 132:
Section 132 empowers income-tax authorities to conduct searches and seizures in cases of undisclosed income. The purpose of retaining books for 180 days is to inspect them to determine undisclosed assets or income. The Single Judge obtained an undertaking from the respondents to make the records available to the authorities when required, ensuring access for the appellants. The conditions set by the Single Judge safeguarded the department's interests, allowing for temporary custody of the seized documents.
3. Competence of the Single Judge:
The Single Judge issued orders after hearing both parties, indicating a willingness to consider objections and modify the orders if necessary. The appellants can present their case for altering or vacating the orders before the Single Judge. The Single Judge has the power to pass orders in line with the provisions of the Act based on the facts of the case.
4. Conclusion:
The High Court found no illegality or infirmity in the Single Judge's orders and refrained from interfering. The orders did not affect the rights of the appellants adversely. The appeals and related petitions were disposed of with the expectation that the Single Judge would consider the appellants' objections and make appropriate orders in accordance with the law.
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1986 (12) TMI 386
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a judgment given in the absence of the appellant or his counsel but decided on merits can be recalled by the Court under its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether the judgment given in the absence of the appellant or his counsel but decided on merits, can be recalled by the Court under its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
Preliminary Objections:
- Objection on Reference Validity: It was argued that the reference to the larger bench was unnecessary as the referring judge had already agreed with a previous judgment, thus expressing a definite opinion. However, the Court held that despite the agreement, the judge had the right to refer the matter to the Chief Justice for a larger bench's consideration.
- Objection on Language of the Question: The use of the word "or" instead of "and" in the reference question was challenged. The Court clarified that the question related to cases where neither the appellant nor his counsel was present, and thus the word "and" could be read instead of "or."
Legal Provisions and Interpretations:
- Section 362, Cr.P.C.: This section imposes a complete bar on altering or reviewing a judgment or final order, except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. The Court had to consider whether this bar applies even when the judgment was passed without hearing the accused.
- Section 482, Cr.P.C.: This section preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. The Court had to determine if these inherent powers could override the prohibition in Section 362.
Arguments for Recalling Judgment:
- Inherent Powers: It was argued that the inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. are broad enough to recall a judgment if it was passed without giving the accused a chance to be heard, as this would secure the ends of justice.
- Distinction Between Review and Recall: The Court was urged to distinguish between reviewing/altering a judgment and recalling it. Recalling a judgment would mean complete abrogation, not merely correcting errors.
- Principle of Natural Justice: The right to be heard is fundamental, and denying this right would violate the principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution.
Precedents and Judicial Opinions:
- Support for Recalling Judgments: Various cases and judgments were cited where courts had recalled judgments to ensure justice, emphasizing the importance of hearing the accused or their counsel.
- Opposition to Recalling Judgments: Other cases emphasized that Section 362, Cr.P.C. imposes a strict bar on altering or reviewing judgments, and inherent powers under Section 482 cannot be used to circumvent this prohibition.
Court's Conclusion:
- Power of Recall: The Court concluded that recalling a judgment is different from reviewing or altering it. Recalling a judgment means completely abrogating it and rehearing the case.
- Exercise of Inherent Powers: The Court held that inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. could be exercised to recall a judgment if the accused was not given a hearing, provided the case falls within the conditions laid down in Section 482.
- Principles of Natural Justice: The Court emphasized that the right to be heard is a fundamental right, and denying this right would violate principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution.
Final Answer to the Reference:
1. The power of recall is different from the power of altering or reviewing the judgment.
2. Powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can and should be exercised by the Court to recall a judgment if the hearing was not given to the accused, provided the case meets one of the three conditions laid down under Section 482.
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1986 (12) TMI 385
Issues:
1. Interpretation of provisions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
2. Alleged contraventions under sections 10(1)(b) and 12(2)(b) of the Act.
3. Application of principles of natural justice.
4. Assessment of penalties based on evidence and legal provisions.
Analysis:
Interpretation of Provisions: The judgment pertains to a batch of appeals under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The court highlighted the procedural aspects involving penalties under sections 50, 52, and 54 of the Act. It emphasized that appeals before the court should be limited to questions of law, distinguishing between departmental inquiries and proceedings where the department and the dealer are parties.
Alleged Contraventions: The case involved a dealer in goat hair who faced charges of sending goods to West European countries instead of East European countries as claimed. The documents seized indicated discrepancies in export destinations and receipt of export proceeds in rupees. The adjudicating authority imposed penalties under sections 10(1)(b) and 12(2)(b) of the Act, leading to appeals before the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, which reduced the penalties considering the circumstances.
Application of Natural Justice: The appellant contended a failure of natural justice due to delays in proceedings and lack of access to seized documents. The court noted that the appellant had opportunities to inspect documents, but delays in adjudication were acknowledged. However, the court found no denial of natural justice solely based on the delay, emphasizing the need for specific circumstances to establish such a claim.
Assessment of Penalties: The court scrutinized the basis for penalties under sections 10(1)(b) and 12(2)(b). It observed that the contravention under section 10(1)(b) was supported by evidence of securing foreign exchange, but the contravention under section 12(2)(b) lacked clarity. The court highlighted the stringent proof required for penalties under the Act, setting aside the penalty under section 12(2)(b) due to insufficient evidence and lack of material supporting the contravention.
Conclusion: The judgment concluded by setting aside the penalty under section 12(2)(b) while confirming the penalty under section 10(1)(b) as modified by the Appellate Board. The court emphasized the necessity for proper documentation in adjudicatory orders for effective scrutiny in appellate processes. No costs were awarded, and a one-month timeline was provided for payment.
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1986 (12) TMI 384
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the revision under Section 115 of the CPC lies to the High Court from a revision order passed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965?
2. Whether the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 in setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below in ordering eviction of the appellant from the premises in question reversing the findings of facts?
3. Whether eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building could be ordered for the user of the building for residence of the landlord if the Accommodation Controller had refused permission under Section 17 of the Act to convert the building from non-residential to residential?
4. Where the Accommodation Controller refused the permission to convert the building from non-residential to residential, does the claim to the building by the landlord for a residential purpose become illegal and not recognized by law, and whether the claim of the landlord can still be held to be bona fide?
5. Whether in ordering eviction the special reasons relied on by the High Court on a reappreciation of facts are borne out from the evidence in this case and whether the facts stated by the High Court constitute "special reasons" required under the first proviso to Section 11(3) in ordering eviction and setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below?
Detailed Analysis:
1. Revision under Section 115 of CPC:
The Supreme Court held that no revision lies to the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC from a revision order passed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Court emphasized that the Act provides a complete code for the regulation of leasing and eviction processes, stipulating that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law except as provided in Section 20. The Court stated, "It is inconceivable to have two revisions. The scheme of the Act does not warrant such a conclusion."
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115:
The Supreme Court found that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC by setting aside the judgments and orders of the lower courts. The Court noted that the High Court's interference was contrary to the legislative intent and public policy, which aims for quick disposal and finality of cases. The Court stated, "The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts must so construe."
3. Eviction for Residential Use:
The Court did not delve into the merits of whether eviction from a non-residential building for residential use is permissible if the Accommodation Controller had refused conversion under Section 17, as it resolved the case on the jurisdictional issue alone.
4. Legality and Bona Fide of Landlord's Claim:
Similarly, the Court did not address the legality and bona fides of the landlord's claim for residential use following the Accommodation Controller's refusal for conversion, given the primary jurisdictional finding.
5. Special Reasons for Eviction:
The Supreme Court did not analyze whether the High Court's special reasons for ordering eviction were supported by evidence, as the appeal was allowed on the jurisdictional ground alone.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and reinstating the decisions of the lower courts. The Court emphasized the finality of the appellate authority's decision under the Act and ruled out the possibility of a second revision to the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC. The Court also noted a concession by the tenant's counsel to increase the rent to Rs. 500 per month. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 383
Issues Involved:
1. Conflict between Division Bench judgments regarding the presumption u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. Whether the presumption of consideration under S. 118 can be rebutted by a preponderance of probabilities.
3. The impact of the plaintiff's admission and change of stance on the presumption under S. 118.
Summary:
1. Conflict between Division Bench judgments regarding the presumption u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
The Full Bench was convened to resolve a conflict between Division Bench judgments. In Janaka Lakshmi's case, the court held that even if both parties' stories were disbelieved, the presumption under S. 118 would still operate, leading to a decree in favor of the plaintiff. Conversely, in Maddam Lingaiah's case, the court dissented from this view, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Kundanlal v. Custodian Evacuee Property and earlier Madras High Court decisions.
2. Whether the presumption of consideration under S. 118 can be rebutted by a preponderance of probabilities:
The court emphasized that the presumption under S. 118 can be rebutted by showing a preponderance of probabilities. It is not necessary for the defendant to prove with absolute certainty that no consideration existed. The defendant can rely on direct or circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact to show that the consideration as stated in the promissory note or in the plaintiff's pleadings does not exist. Once the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, and the presumption under S. 118 "disappears."
3. The impact of the plaintiff's admission and change of stance on the presumption under S. 118:
In the present case, the plaintiff admitted that no cash was lent as recited in the promissory notes and later suggested that the notes were renewals of earlier notes. This change of stance, along with other circumstantial evidence, allowed the defendant to successfully rebut the presumption under S. 118 by a preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, the evidential burden shifted back to the plaintiff, who failed to discharge the legal burden of proving consideration.
Conclusion:
The court overruled the decision in Janaka Lakshmi's case and followed the Supreme Court's decision in Kundanlal's case. It held that the presumption under S. 118 can be rebutted by a preponderance of probabilities and that once rebutted, the presumption "disappears." The appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed without costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 382
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the civil suit after the insertion of Clause (ee) in Section 87(1) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908.
2. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts versus Revenue Officers under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.
3. Interpretation of statutory provisions and legislative intent.
4. Presumption of correctness of entries in revenue records.
5. Applicability of Section 258 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Civil Suit:
The primary issue was whether a civil suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession was maintainable after the insertion of Clause (ee) in Section 87(1) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The court held that such a civil suit remains maintainable. The insertion of Clause (ee) did not expressly or impliedly bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The court emphasized that Section 87 does not indicate an express bar against civil suits, and there is no statutory language suggesting that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ousted.
2. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts versus Revenue Officers:
The court examined the jurisdictional boundaries between Civil Courts and Revenue Officers. It was argued that questions relating to title or possession should be agitated before a Revenue Officer under Section 87. However, the court concluded that Section 87 provides a special and additional remedy without derogating the civil rights of parties. The court highlighted that Section 258 only bars suits to vary, modify, or set aside decisions of Revenue Officers in specific cases and does not create a blanket bar against civil jurisdiction.
3. Interpretation of Statutory Provisions and Legislative Intent:
The court delved into the legislative history and the broader purpose of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. The insertion of Clause (ee) aimed to bring disputes regarding title or interest in land within the purview of Revenue Officers but did not intend to oust Civil Courts' jurisdiction. The court underscored that the legislative intent was not to abrogate the remedy of civil suits but to provide an additional forum for resolving disputes.
4. Presumption of Correctness of Entries in Revenue Records:
The court discussed the presumptions attached to entries in the record-of-rights under Section 84. These entries are presumed correct until proven otherwise. However, this presumption does not bar civil suits challenging the correctness of such entries. The court noted that the remedy under Section 87 is available within a narrow limitation period of three months, which does not preclude subsequent civil suits for declaration of title or possession.
5. Applicability of Section 258:
Section 258 bars suits to vary, modify, or set aside decisions of Revenue Officers in specific cases, but this bar is conditional. The court clarified that Section 258 applies only if there is a prior decision by a Revenue Officer under Section 87. If no such decision exists, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not barred. The court emphasized that Section 258 does not create an absolute bar and allows civil suits on grounds of fraud or want of jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that a civil suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession remains maintainable even after the insertion of Clause (ee) in Section 87(1) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the maintainability of the civil suits and upholding the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. The court reiterated the principle that exclusion of civil jurisdiction must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied, neither of which was found in the statutory provisions under consideration.
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1986 (12) TMI 381
Issues Involved:
1. Locus Standi of Petitioners
2. Constitutional Validity of Re-promulgation of Ordinances by the Governor
3. Examination of Governor's Satisfaction in Issuing Ordinances
4. Usurpation of Legislative Function by the Executive
Summary:
1. Locus Standi of Petitioners:
The respondents contended that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions since two of the challenged ordinances had already lapsed and their provisions were enacted into Acts of the Legislature. However, the Court rejected this preliminary objection, stating that at the date when the writ petitions were filed, the ordinances were in operation and affected the interests of petitioners Nos. 2 and 4. Moreover, Petitioner No. 1, a professor deeply interested in constitutional functioning, was held to have sufficient interest to maintain the petition u/s Article 32 for vindication of public interest.
2. Constitutional Validity of Re-promulgation of Ordinances by the Governor:
The core issue was whether the Governor could re-promulgate ordinances for an indefinite period, thus usurping the legislative power. The Court observed that the power to promulgate ordinances u/s Article 213 is an emergency power meant for immediate action when the Legislature is not in session. The practice of re-promulgating ordinances by the Governor of Bihar, without converting them into Acts, was held to be unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that such a practice amounted to a "fraud on the Constitution" and was repugnant to the constitutional scheme, as it allowed the Executive to bypass the Legislature and continue the provisions of an ordinance beyond the period limited by the Constitution.
3. Examination of Governor's Satisfaction in Issuing Ordinances:
The respondents argued that the Court could not examine the Governor's satisfaction in issuing an ordinance. The Court clarified that the issue at hand was not about the Governor's satisfaction but whether the Governor had the power to re-promulgate the same ordinance successively without legislative approval. The Court held that the Governor could not assume legislative functions beyond the limits set by the Constitution.
4. Usurpation of Legislative Function by the Executive:
The Court noted that the Executive in Bihar had taken over the legislative role by re-promulgating ordinances for years, which was contrary to the constitutional scheme. The Court stressed that the primary law-making authority is the Legislature, and the Executive cannot continue the provisions of an ordinance by re-promulgation without legislative approval. The Court struck down the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Ordinance, 1983, as unconstitutional and void, and directed the State of Bihar to pay Rs. 10,000 as costs to Petitioner No. 1 for bringing the matter to the Court's notice.
Conclusion:
The petitions were allowed, and the practice of re-promulgating ordinances by the Governor of Bihar was declared unconstitutional, emphasizing the need for adherence to constitutional limitations and legislative processes.
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1986 (12) TMI 380
Issues Involved:
1. Admission of additional evidence by the appellate authority.
2. Consideration of evidence adduced by the appellant before the Rent Controller.
3. Bona fide requirement of the landlord u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.
4. Alleged benami transaction and vacant possession of another house.
Summary:
1. Admission of Additional Evidence:
The appellant contended that the appellate authority erred in admitting additional evidence at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court held that the appellate authority has the same jurisdiction as the trial court to admit additional evidence if warranted by the facts and circumstances. Section 15(4) of the Act specifically provides that the appellate authority can admit additional evidence if necessary. The Court found that no prejudice was caused to the appellant by the admission of such evidence.
2. Consideration of Evidence Adduced by the Appellant:
The appellant argued that the appellate authority did not consider the evidence presented before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that the appellate authority had considered all the facts recorded by the Rent Controller and the additional evidence. The appellate authority was conscious of the evidence adduced by the appellant before the Rent Controller.
3. Bona Fide Requirement of the Landlord u/s 13(3)(a)(i):
The main issue was whether the landlord's requirement was bona fide under section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The Rent Controller had rejected the landlord's petition, but the appellate authority allowed it. The Supreme Court upheld the appellate authority's decision, noting that the landlord's family had inadequate accommodation in the ancestral house. The Court also held that the respondent was a licensee in the ancestral house and not occupying another residential building in the urban area.
4. Alleged Benami Transaction and Vacant Possession:
The appellant claimed that the respondent had purchased another house and sold it in a benami transaction. The Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to support the claim that the sale was a benami transaction. The Court also held that the respondent did not have vacant possession of the house near Kabir Bhavan and that the sale of the house did not disentitle the respondent from seeking eviction.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellate authority was justified in admitting additional evidence and that the landlord's requirement was bona fide. The Court found no merit in the appellant's contentions regarding the consideration of evidence and the alleged benami transaction. The High Court's decision to dismiss the revision petition was upheld. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 379
Issues Involved:
The appeal challenges the judgment of the Bombay High Court regarding grievances related to the working of the New Observation Home managed by the Children's Aid Society, Bombay.
Working of the New Observation Home:
The appellant, a freelance journalist, raised grievances about the functioning of the New Observation Home, alleging delays in repatriation of children, lack of proper follow-up actions, and illegal detention resulting in harassment to the children. The High Court found some allegations baseless but accepted others, issuing recommendations for improvement.
Directions and Recommendations:
The High Court recommended various actions, including sending repatriation orders to the police, reviewing allowances for escort duties, and constituting an Escort Service. It also emphasized the need for prompt actions by the Government and Magistrates to ensure the welfare of children in Observation Homes.
Appellant's Contentions:
The appellant argued that children in Observation Homes were forced to work without remuneration, leading to financial gains for the Society. She contended that the High Court's directions were inadequate and failed to consider mandatory provisions of the Children's Act and constitutional rights. The appellant suggested that the Society should be treated as a State entity for better protection of children's rights.
Judicial Observations:
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of proper upbringing and training of children for the country's future. It highlighted the need for trained personnel, including Child Welfare Officers and Juvenile Court officials, to handle children's issues sensitively and effectively. The Court agreed that the Respondent-Society should be treated as a State entity and directed the State of Maharashtra to enforce laws and implement necessary measures for child welfare.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court directed the State of Maharashtra to enforce laws, fulfill constitutional obligations, and implement the High Court's and its own directions. The Court also awarded costs to the appellant and criticized disparaging observations made by the High Court against her, emphasizing her genuine efforts for the welfare of children. Justice Pathak concurred with the order treating the Children's Aid Society as part of "the State" under Article 12 of the Constitution.
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1986 (12) TMI 378
Issues Involved
1. Preliminary Objection on Compensation Claim
2. Scope and Ambit of Article 32
3. Applicability of Article 21 to Private Corporations
4. Measure of Liability for Hazardous Industries
Summary
1. Preliminary Objection on Compensation Claim
Mr. Diwan, representing Shriram, raised a preliminary objection that the Court should not decide constitutional issues related to compensation as no such claim was originally made in the writ petition. The Court rejected this objection, stating that applications for compensation by the Delhi Legal Aid & Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association are for enforcement of the fundamental right to life u/s Article 21 and should not be dismissed on hypertechnical grounds.
2. Scope and Ambit of Article 32
The Court reiterated that Article 32 not only empowers the Court to issue directions, orders, or writs for enforcement of fundamental rights but also imposes a constitutional obligation to protect these rights. The Court has the power to forge new remedies and strategies for enforcement, especially for the poor and disadvantaged who cannot approach the Court. The Court endorsed the broadening of locus standi and epistolary jurisdiction, allowing letters addressed to individual justices to be entertained if they represent the deprived or disadvantaged.
3. Applicability of Article 21 to Private Corporations
The Court discussed whether Article 21 is applicable to Shriram, a private corporation engaged in an industry with potential to affect life and health. The Court examined the extensive control and regulation by the State over such industries and the sizable aid provided by the Government. The Court noted the evolving jurisprudence that corporations performing public functions or receiving significant state aid could be considered state actors. However, the Court refrained from making a definitive pronouncement on this issue, leaving it for detailed consideration if necessary in the future.
4. Measure of Liability for Hazardous Industries
The Court deliberated on the liability of enterprises engaged in hazardous industries, rejecting the traditional rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The Court evolved a new principle of "absolute liability," holding that enterprises engaged in hazardous activities owe an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure no harm results from their activities. Such enterprises must compensate for any harm caused, regardless of negligence, and the compensation should be proportional to the enterprise's capacity and magnitude to have a deterrent effect.
Conclusion
The Court directed the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board to file actions for compensation on behalf of victims of the oleum gas leak within two months, with necessary funds provided by the Delhi Administration. The High Court was instructed to expedite the disposal of such actions. The writ petition was disposed of, with the issue of relocation and other matters scheduled for hearing on 3rd February 1987.
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1986 (12) TMI 377
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the tender of arrears of rent within the meaning of the proviso to Section 13(2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
2. Interpretation of the term "first hearing" in the context of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Tender of Arrears of Rent:
The primary issue in this case was whether the tenant's tender of arrears of rent, interest, and costs on 2.7.1969 was valid under the proviso to Section 13(2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The tenant-appellant had deposited Rs. 336 for arrears of rent from 13.2.1968 to 12.6.1969, Rs. 15 as interest, and Rs. 25 as costs on 2.7.1969. The Rent Controller initially found this tender invalid, stating that the tenant failed to tender the amount on the first hearing date, 26.6.1969. However, the appellate authority reversed this decision, holding that the tenant could not be penalized for the Rent Controller's failure to assess the costs on 26.6.1969. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, on revision, reinstated the Rent Controller's order, stating that the tender on 2.7.1969 was not valid as it was not made on the first hearing date.
2. Interpretation of "First Hearing":
The Supreme Court's judgment focused on the interpretation of the term "first hearing" under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Court examined whether 26.6.1969, the date mentioned in the summons for the tenant's appearance, constituted the "first hearing." The Supreme Court held that the "first hearing" does not refer to the returnable date of the summons but to the date when the court applies its mind to the case, typically after the issues are framed or evidence is taken. This interpretation aligns with previous judgments, including Ved Prakash v. Vishwa Mohan [1981] 3 SCC 667, where the Court held that "first hearing" occurs when the court begins to consider the case substantively.
The Supreme Court drew parallels with similar provisions in other rent control statutes, such as Section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and Section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. The Court noted that these statutes also interpret "first hearing" as the stage when the court actively engages with the case, not merely the returnable date of the summons.
The Court concluded that the term "first hearing" in the context of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act should be interpreted to promote the Act's objective of protecting tenants from arbitrary eviction. Therefore, the tenant's tender on 2.7.1969, when the Rent Controller assessed the costs, was deemed valid.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order of eviction and confirming the appellate authority's judgment dismissing the eviction application. The Court emphasized that the "first hearing" refers to the date when the court substantively considers the case, not the initial appearance date. This interpretation ensures that tenants are not unfairly penalized due to procedural delays beyond their control. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (12) TMI 376
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Select Lists for promotions.
2. Amendment of Regulation 5(7) and its compliance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
3. Compliance with Regulation 6(iii).
4. Principles of Natural Justice.
5. Participation of unauthorized members in the Selection Committee.
6. Consistency of Regulations 3 and 5 with Rule 8(1) of the Recruitment Rules.
7. Allegations of mala fide actions by the State Government.
Summary:
1. Validity of Select Lists for Promotions:
The Select Lists of 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1983 for promotion to the Indian Administrative Service were challenged on the grounds that the Selection Committee did not record any reasons for superseding the appellants/petitioners. The court held that under the amended Regulation 5, the Selection Committee was not required to record reasons for supersession. The amended Regulation emphasized merit and suitability over seniority, thus making it unnecessary to record reasons for superseding senior officers.
2. Amendment of Regulation 5(7) and its Compliance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:
The appellants argued that the amendment of Regulation 5(7) was violative of Articles 14 and 16 as it conferred unguided power on the Selection Committee. The court found no merit in this submission, stating that the amended regulation provided a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary categorization and emphasized merit as the primary criterion for selection.
3. Compliance with Regulation 6(iii):
The appellants contended that the Select List of 1978 was vitiated due to non-compliance with Regulation 6(iii), which required the State Government to forward reasons for supersession to the Commission. The court held that after the amendment of Regulation 5, the Committee was under no obligation to record reasons, and thus the State Government was not required to forward any reasons to the Commission.
4. Principles of Natural Justice:
The appellants argued that principles of Natural Justice required the Selection Committee to record reasons for supersession. The court rejected this argument, stating that there was no statutory provision requiring the recording of reasons and that principles of Natural Justice did not apply to the selection process in this context.
5. Participation of Unauthorized Members in the Selection Committee:
The appellants challenged the participation of Shri I.C. Puri in the Selection Committee, arguing that he was not authorized to be a member. The court found that Shri Puri, designated as Financial Commissioner (Development), was discharging the functions of the Development Commissioner and was thus competent to participate in the committee's deliberations.
6. Consistency of Regulations 3 and 5 with Rule 8(1) of the Recruitment Rules:
The appellants argued that Regulations 3 and 5 were ultra vires Rule 8(1) of the Recruitment Rules. The court held that Regulations 3 and 5 did not impinge upon the State Government's power to make recommendations for appointment to the service and were consistent with Rule 8(1).
7. Allegations of Mala Fide Actions by the State Government:
The appellants alleged that the State Government deliberately delayed forwarding its comments on the Select List of 1980 to the Commission to give undue advantage to certain officers. The court found no material to substantiate the allegations of mala fide and held that the delay did not cause any prejudice to the appellants.
Conclusion:
The appeals and writ petitions were dismissed, and the court upheld the validity of the Select Lists and the amendments to Regulation 5. The court emphasized that the selection process based on merit was a laudable objective and provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrary decisions.
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1986 (12) TMI 375
Issues:
1. Computation of capital for relief under s. 80J of the IT Act for asst. yrs. 1971-72 and 1972-73.
2. Inclusion of borrowed money in computing capital for relief under s. 80J of the IT Act.
3. Admissibility of deduction under s. 80-J for income derived from the priority industry.
4. Treatment of cash allowance as part of salary for disallowable expenditure under s. 40(a)(v).
Analysis:
1. The first issue pertains to the computation of capital for relief under s. 80J of the IT Act for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73. The Tribunal had computed the capital based on the average amount of increase or decrease in assets and liabilities during the previous year. However, the High Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohia Machinery Ltd. case, held that the computation should be as on the first day of the previous year. Therefore, the High Court answered the questions in the negative and in favor of the Department.
2. The second issue involves whether borrowed money should be included in computing capital for relief under s. 80J of the IT Act. The High Court again relied on the Supreme Court decision in the Lohia Machinery Ltd. case and answered the question in the negative and in favor of the Department for both assessment years.
3. The third issue concerns the admissibility of deduction under s. 80-J for income derived from the priority industry. The High Court, considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in Combay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. case and Lohia Machinery Ltd. case, concluded that the deduction is not admissible for the whole income derived from the priority industry but only for the income computed after making deductions provided in the IT Act. Therefore, the question was answered in the negative and in favor of the revenue.
4. The final issue addresses whether cash allowance should be considered as part of salary for disallowable expenditure under s. 40(a)(v). For the assessment year 1971-72, the High Court answered this question in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee based on a previous decision. However, for the assessment year 1972-73, the High Court noted an amendment to the relevant provision and found that the Tribunal had not considered this amendment. The High Court left it to the Tribunal to reexamine this issue for the latter assessment year in light of the amendment, without expressing any opinion on the interpretation of the amended provision.
In conclusion, the references under the IT Act were disposed of with each issue analyzed and answered as per the relevant legal provisions and precedents cited in the judgment.
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1986 (12) TMI 374
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of clause (5) of Article 371-D of the Constitution.
2. Power of the State Government to modify or annul orders of the Administrative Tribunal.
Summary:
Issue 1: Constitutional Validity of Clause (5) of Article 371-D
The writ petitions initially challenged the constitutional validity of both clauses (3) and (5) of Article 371-D of the Constitution. However, the challenge to clause (3) was not pressed, and arguments were confined to clause (5). Clause (5) states that the order of the Administrative Tribunal becomes effective upon confirmation by the State Government or after three months from the date of the order, whichever is earlier. The proviso to clause (5) allows the State Government to modify or annul any order of the Administrative Tribunal before it becomes effective.
Issue 2: Power of the State Government to Modify or Annul Orders
The Court found that the power conferred on the State Government to modify or annul the orders of the Administrative Tribunal is "shocking and clearly subversive of the principles of justice." It violates the basic concept of justice by allowing a party to the litigation (the State Government) to override the decision of the Tribunal. This provision is also prone to abuse and misuse, as evidenced by the State Government's frequent and indiscriminate use of this power.
The Court emphasized that the power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution, which cannot be abrogated. The proviso to clause (5) undermines the effectiveness and efficacy of the Administrative Tribunal, making it less effective than the High Court in matters of judicial review. This renders the Administrative Tribunal a less effective institutional mechanism, violating the basic structure doctrine.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared clause (5) of Article 371-D, along with its proviso, unconstitutional and void. The Government of India was directed to amend the Presidential Order to conform with this judgment. Orders made by the State Government under the proviso to clause (5) were quashed and set aside. The Court also provided specific directions for the remand and reconsideration of cases affected by this judgment. The petitions were allowed, and the review petitions were disposed of accordingly.
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1986 (12) TMI 373
Issues:
Challenge to certain provisions of Communication of Pension Rules for civilian and defence pensioners - recovery of excess amount upon commutation, need for rationalizing commutation provisions.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to applications under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging provisions of the Communication of Pension Rules for civilian and defence pensioners. The petitioners sought to strike down rules allowing the Union of India to recover more than the commuted amount from pensioners and requested a revised scheme for commutation. It was acknowledged that civilians could commute up to one-third of their pension, while defence personnel could commute up to 43-45%. The petitioners argued for a reevaluation due to increased life expectancy in India, which was not refuted by the respondent. The Court suggested a review of the rules, leading the respondent to consider the matter and eventually agree to restore the commuted portion of pension for civilian employees at age 70 or after 15 years, effective from April 1, 1986.
The judgment highlighted the distinction in treatment between civilian and defence personnel regarding pension commutation. While civilian pensioners could restore the commuted portion after 15 years, defence personnel faced challenges due to early retirement ages and higher pension rates. The Court noted the advantages of commutation, such as lump sum availability and risk mitigation, and the precedent set by some State Governments adopting the 15-year rule. Despite the petitioners' arguments, the Court upheld the 15-year period for civilian pensioners, emphasizing the benefits of commutation.
Regarding the restoration of commuted pension, the respondent agreed to extend the benefit to civilian employees from April 1, 1985, due to delays in the hearing process. However, the judgment pointed out that the respondent's decision did not cover all classes of Defence personnel, leading to a discussion on retirement ages and pension entitlements for lower ranks in the Defence services. The Court rejected the respondent's argument on weightage compensation and advocated for a uniform restoration period of 15 years for all pensioners, including Defence personnel, effective from April 1, 1985.
In conclusion, the Court directed the respondent to implement the order within three months, appreciating the efforts to alleviate pensioners' hardships. The judgment underscored the equitable treatment of civilian and Defence pensioners in restoring commuted portions of pension, emphasizing the need to provide relief to those who served the nation.
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1986 (12) TMI 372
Issues Involved:
The appeal involves determining whether the appellate Order passed by the Director-General, Border Roads Organisation complies with the requirements of r. 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965.
Comprehensive Details of the Judgment:
The appellant, appointed as Supervisor (Barracks & Stores) Grade I, was terminated from service by the Chief Engineer but absconded before receiving the termination order. Subsequently, the Director-General cancelled the termination order and directed disciplinary action against the appellant for desertion. After a departmental inquiry, the appellant was removed from service. The appellant appealed this decision under r. 23 of the Rules to the Director-General, who upheld the removal order without proper consideration of r. 27(2) requirements.
The Supreme Court highlighted that r. 27(2) mandates the appellate authority to consider procedural compliance, evidence validity, and adequacy of the penalty imposed. The Court found that the Director-General failed to assess whether the Rules were followed, the evidence supported the findings, and if the penalty was appropriate. As a result, the Court set aside the Director-General's order due to non-compliance with r. 27(2) and directed a fresh disposal of the appeal.
Regarding the necessity of reasons in appellate orders, the Court referenced previous judgments emphasizing that while reasons are not mandatory in every case, they may be required if the appellate authority disagrees with the disciplinary authority's findings. The Court cited cases where the absence of detailed reasons in support of orders did not render them illegal, reinforcing that statutory tribunals are not always obligated to provide reasons for their decisions.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, overturned the Director-General's order, and instructed a reconsideration of the appeal with adherence to r. 27(2) requirements. No costs were awarded in this matter.
Judgment Highlight:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Director-General's order, and directed a fresh disposal of the appeal with proper consideration of r. 27(2) requirements.
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