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1991 (12) TMI 294
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the newly introduced pension scheme to retired employees.
2. Classification of retired employees based on cut-off dates.
3. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
4. Financial and administrative implications of extending the pension scheme.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of the Newly Introduced Pension Scheme to Retired Employees:
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a new pension scheme effective from November 1, 1990, replacing the existing Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) Scheme. The new pension scheme was applicable to all employees entering Bank service on or after November 1, 1990. In-service employees were given an option to opt-out of the pension scheme and continue with the CPF scheme. Employees who retired between January 1, 1986, and November 1, 1990, could opt for the pension scheme provided they refunded the Bank's contribution to the provident fund with interest. Employees who retired before January 1, 1986, were not eligible for the pension scheme.
2. Classification of Retired Employees Based on Cut-off Dates:
Petitioners, who retired on or before December 31, 1985, challenged the cut-off date fixed under Regulations 3(3) and 31, arguing it was artificial and had no relation to the objective of the pension scheme. They contended that the classification between those who retired before and after January 1, 1986, violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondents justified the cut-off date by stating it was chosen because the pension scheme was patterned on the Central Government Employees' scheme revised by the Fourth Central Pay Commission effective January 1, 1986. Additionally, records of retired employees were maintained for a limited period, making it impractical to extend the scheme to those who retired earlier.
3. Alleged Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioners argued that the classification was arbitrary and violated Article 14, which forbids class legislation. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, which held that pension is a right and not a bounty, and any classification must satisfy the twin test of being based on an intelligible differentia and having a rational nexus to the objective. The respondents countered that the pension scheme was a new scheme, and the cut-off date was based on rational considerations, including financial implications and administrative feasibility.
4. Financial and Administrative Implications of Extending the Pension Scheme:
The respondents highlighted the financial and administrative difficulties in extending the pension scheme to all retirees regardless of their retirement date. They pointed out that the pension scheme was introduced as a new scheme, and extending it to all retirees would impose a significant financial burden and pose challenges due to the unavailability of records for older retirees. The court recognized these practical considerations and the rationale behind the cut-off date.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the classification based on the cut-off date of January 1, 1986, was not arbitrary or violative of Article 14. The court acknowledged the distinction between revising an existing scheme and introducing a new scheme and found that the cut-off date was justified based on financial and administrative considerations. The petitioners' claim to extend the pension scheme to all retirees was found to be unsustainable. The judgment emphasized that the choice of the cut-off date must be supported on the touchstone of Article 14 and must be based on rational considerations.
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1991 (12) TMI 293
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the partition in 1968.
2. Validity of the will dated 24.1.1969.
3. Validity of the deed of settlement.
4. The right of substituted plaintiffs to continue the suit.
5. Preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit after the original plaintiff's death.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Partition in 1968:
The trial court found that the partition in 1968, as alleged by the plaintiff, was established and acted upon. The third defendant's claim of a prior partition in 1952 was not substantiated. The High Court did not dispute this finding but dismissed the suit on preliminary grounds.
2. Validity of the Will Dated 24.1.1969:
The trial court validated the will executed by the original plaintiff, Urmila, in favor of her brother's son. The defendants contested the will's validity, claiming Urmila was not in a fit state of mind at the time of execution. The High Court did not address the merits of this issue due to its preliminary objection ruling.
3. Validity of the Deed of Settlement:
The trial court also upheld the deed of settlement executed by Urmila in favor of the fourth defendant. The High Court's decision did not delve into the merits of this finding, instead focusing on the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit.
4. The Right of Substituted Plaintiffs to Continue the Suit:
The High Court held that the substituted plaintiffs (Urmila's legal representatives) could not continue the suit as their cause of action was different from the original plaintiff's. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the substituted plaintiffs were continuing the same suit for the same reliefs as claimed by Urmila. The Supreme Court found no basis for distinguishing between natural heirs and those claiming under a deed of settlement or will in this context.
5. Preliminary Objection Regarding the Maintainability of the Suit:
The High Court accepted the preliminary objection that the suit was not maintainable after Urmila's death, as the substituted plaintiffs were not natural heirs and were claiming under different legal instruments (settlement and will). The Supreme Court overruled this, emphasizing that the cause of action remained the same and the substituted plaintiffs were entitled to continue the suit.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court. The High Court was directed to hear and dispose of the appeals on their merits. The Supreme Court held that the substituted plaintiffs could continue the suit as filed by the original plaintiff, Urmila, as their cause of action was not different merely because they claimed under a settlement and a will. The appellants/defendants were awarded costs for the appeal and the High Court proceedings.
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1991 (12) TMI 292
Issues Involved:
1. Retroactivity of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 68 of 1984.
2. Applicability of Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act.
3. Interpretation of Section 30 of the Amendment Act.
4. Conflict with the decision in Zora Singh's case.
5. Jurisdiction and role of the civil court, High Court, and Supreme Court in awarding compensation.
6. Impact of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, and its relation to the Central Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Retroactivity of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 68 of 1984:
The judgment discusses the retroactivity of certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the 1984 Amendment Act. The court acknowledges the conflict of opinion regarding the retroactivity of these provisions. Specifically, the court examines whether the provisions of Section 23(1-A) and the amended Section 23(2) apply retrospectively to cases where the land acquisition proceedings were initiated before the Amendment Act came into force.
2. Applicability of Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act:
The judgment addresses whether claimants are entitled to the benefits of Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act. The court notes that the award by the Collector in this case was made prior to 30-4-1982, and the decision of the civil court on reference under Section 18 was made after the Amendment Act came into force. The court concludes that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is not available to the claimants in this case because the proceedings and the award by the Collector were completed before the specified date.
3. Interpretation of Section 30 of the Amendment Act:
Section 30 of the Amendment Act provides transitional provisions with limited retrospective effect. The court explains that Section 30(1) applies to two situations: (i) proceedings pending on 30-4-1982 where no award was made by the Collector before that date, and (ii) proceedings commenced after 30-4-1982, regardless of whether an award was made before the commencement of the Amendment Act. The court finds that the present case does not fall within these situations, and therefore, the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is not applicable.
4. Conflict with the decision in Zora Singh's case:
The court refers to the decision in Zora Singh's case, where it was held that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is available to all cases where the civil court makes its award after the Amendment Act came into force, irrespective of the date of the Collector's award. The court expresses respectful disagreement with this view, stating that it does not align with the language and intention of the Amendment Act. The court emphasizes that the retrospective application of Section 23(1-A) is limited to the situations specified in Section 30(1) of the Amendment Act.
5. Jurisdiction and role of the civil court, High Court, and Supreme Court in awarding compensation:
The judgment clarifies that the expression "court" in Section 23(1-A) refers not only to the civil court on reference under Section 18 but also to the High Court and Supreme Court on appeal. The court explains that the principles and benefits provided in Section 23 apply equally to the Collector, civil court, High Court, and Supreme Court. The court disagrees with the view that the civil court can award the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in every case decided after the Amendment Act came into force, regardless of the date of the Collector's award.
6. Impact of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, and its relation to the Central Act:
The court addresses the contention that the provisions of the Central Act cannot have retrospective effect in the State of Kerala, where the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, was in force until 24-9-1984. The court rejects this contention, stating that the Central Act, as amended, applies retrospectively as specified in the Amendment Act. The court refers to the decision in Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, which held that the effect of the amendment of Section 1(2) of the Principal Act is the same as the repeal of the Kerala Act.
Conclusion:
The court concludes that the matter requires reconsideration by a larger bench, particularly regarding the correctness of the decision in Zora Singh's case. The papers are to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
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1991 (12) TMI 291
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the materials supplied by the Commission to the contractors amounted to a sale within the meaning of "sale" as defined under section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
2. Whether the supply of cement, steel, etc., made by the Commission to the contractors could be eligible for sales tax.
3. Jurisdiction regarding initiation of proceedings under section 10-B of the Act.
4. Whether the Tribunal's remand order violated the principles of natural justice.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the materials supplied by the Commission to the contractors amounted to a sale within the meaning of "sale" as defined under section 2(h) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948:
The core issue revolved around whether the transfer of materials like cement and steel from the Commission to the contractors constituted a sale. The Commission argued that the materials supplied were not sold but were provided for construction purposes, with ownership and title remaining with the Commission. The relevant clauses of the contract (Clauses 10, 11, and 33) were examined to determine the nature of the transaction. Clause 10 indicated that materials supplied remained the absolute property of the Commission. Clause 33 emphasized that unused materials had to be returned, and failure to do so would result in penalties. The court referenced the case of Hindustan Housing Factory [1989] 75 STC 233, which supported the view that if ownership and title remained with the supplier, the transaction did not amount to a sale.
2. Whether the supply of cement, steel, etc., made by the Commission to the contractors could be eligible for sales tax:
The court considered whether these supplies could be taxed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Commission contended that since there was no transfer of property, the transaction could not be termed a sale and thus was not eligible for sales tax. The court agreed, citing the Hindustan Housing Factory case, which established that if materials supplied for construction remained under the ownership of the supplier and were merely provided for the execution of a contract, the transaction did not constitute a sale.
3. Jurisdiction regarding initiation of proceedings under section 10-B of the Act:
The Commission challenged the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) to initiate proceedings under section 10-B, arguing that the proceedings should have been conducted under section 21 for escaped turnover. The court noted that section 10-B allows for revision of orders based on the materials on record at the time of the original order. The Calcutta High Court's decision in Ganga Properties v. Income-tax Officer [1979] 118 ITR 447 was referenced, which held that revision jurisdiction could only be exercised based on materials on record of the original order. The court found that the initiation of proceedings under section 10-B was not justified based on subsequent materials.
4. Whether the Tribunal's remand order violated the principles of natural justice:
The Commission argued that the Tribunal's order to remand the case for examination of specific documents without prior notice violated the principles of natural justice. The court acknowledged this concern, emphasizing that the Tribunal should have given the Commission an opportunity to present its case regarding the documents. However, the court found the remand itself to be justified, as it allowed for a thorough examination of the documents with due notice to the parties. The court directed the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) to decide the case afresh, applying the principles laid down in Hindustan Housing Factory and Ansal Properties 1989 UPTC 1366, while ignoring the Tribunal's specific observations before the operative portion of its judgment.
Conclusion:
The revision was disposed of with directions to the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) to re-examine the case, considering the principles established in relevant case law and ensuring due process. The court emphasized that the materials supplied did not constitute a sale and were not eligible for sales tax, and it underscored the necessity of adhering to principles of natural justice in the proceedings.
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1991 (12) TMI 290
Issues:
1. Exemption under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for bamboo and cane products.
2. Interpretation of Entry 52 in Schedule III of Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947.
3. Applicability of Section 8(2A) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
4. General exemption under State Sales Tax Law.
Analysis:
The petitioners, an association of craftsmen producing bamboo and cane products, sought a writ to quash notices for tax returns and payments under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The association members claimed exemption under Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, specifically under Entry 52 of Schedule III for Khadi and Village Industries products. The dispute arose as the Tax Superintendent insisted on tax payments despite the claimed exemption (Issue 1).
Entry 52 in Schedule III of the Assam Sales Tax Act exempts Khadi and Village Industries products sold by certified producers or organizations. The association members, certified by the Khadi and Village Industries Board, qualified for this exemption. The court noted that the exemption was not limited to specific circumstances, making it a general exemption under the State Sales Tax Law (Issue 2).
Section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act provides for nil tax if goods are exempt under the State Sales Tax Law generally. The court clarified that a general exemption must not be limited to specific conditions. The exemption for the association members selling village industry products met this criterion, making them exempt from Central Sales Tax (Issue 3).
The court referenced precedents to support its interpretation that the exemption for village industry products was general under the State Law, aligning with the provisions of Section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act (Issue 4). Consequently, the court declared that the association members were exempt from Central Sales Tax as long as they held the required certificates, as per Entry 52 of Schedule III of the Assam Sales Tax Act.
In conclusion, the writ petition was disposed of with a declaration that the sale of goods by the association members would not be taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, provided they possessed the necessary certificates as specified in the State Sales Tax Law.
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1991 (12) TMI 289
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Single Judge to pass further orders altering the previous judgment.
2. Allegations of contempt of court for non-compliance with the court's order.
3. Validity of election procedures and voters' list.
4. Appealability of the order under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Single Judge to Pass Further Orders Altering the Previous Judgment:
The appeal contested the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge to pass the impugned judgment and order, which altered the previous order dated 21.7.89. The learned Single Judge was of the view that he could justifiably give appropriate further directions in the matter of holding the election since his earlier judgment dated 21.7.89 had the approval of the apex Court. However, the appellants argued that it was not within the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge to effect changes from the earlier order by passing further orders and directions. The court noted that the learned Single Judge made several changes from his earlier order, such as appointing the Assistant District Judge as the Returning Officer and directing the immediate declaration of results after counting.
2. Allegations of Contempt of Court for Non-Compliance with the Court's Order:
The contempt application alleged that the appellants and other respondents violated the court's order dated 21.7.89 by not allowing the Special Officers to conduct the election. The learned Single Judge issued a Rule Nisi against the appellants and other respondents but did not come to a specific finding as to whether a case for contempt had been made out. The learned Single Judge focused on passing effective directions to hold the election rather than determining the guilt of the contemners.
3. Validity of Election Procedures and Voters' List:
The appellants raised concerns about the election procedures and the voters' list prepared by the Special Officers, alleging discrepancies and irregularities. They contended that the voters' list was partisan and excluded bona fide members while including ineligible persons. The learned Single Judge directed the election to be held in the compound of the District Judge's Court, Alipur, under the supervision of the Assistant District Judge. However, the court found that judicial officers should not be personally involved in the election process to avoid embarrassment and directed the Special Officers to serve as Returning Officers.
4. Appealability of the Order under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
The respondents argued that the order was not appealable under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as no punishment was imposed. The court, however, held that Section 19(1) provides for an appeal against any "order or decision" of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The court cited previous judgments to support the view that an appeal lies from any order or decision that prejudicially affects a party, even if no punishment is imposed. The court concluded that the learned Single Judge went beyond his jurisdiction in passing the order under appeal without deciding whether contempt had been committed.
Conclusion:
The appeal was disposed of with directions for the Special Officers to decide upon an election schedule and venue after scrutinizing the voters' list. The election was to be held by secret ballot with police protection, and the newly elected Executive Committee was to assume office with the leave of the Additional District Judge. The court emphasized that judicial officers should not be personally involved in the election process. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 288
Issues Involved:
1. Delay in filing Form No. 11A for continuation of registration.
2. Validity of reasons for condonation of delay.
3. Applicability of legal precedents and statutory provisions.
4. Competence of the appeal against the Income Tax Officer's (ITO) order.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Delay in filing Form No. 11A for continuation of registration:
The assessee firm filed Form No. 11A with a delay of 3 months and 19 days for the assessment year 1987-88. The delay was attributed to the partnership deed being held by the bank for loan negotiations and subsequent forgetfulness by the partners. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) rejected these reasons, while the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) found the delay condonable due to business inexperience.
2. Validity of reasons for condonation of delay:
The ITO found the reasons provided by the assessee firm unconvincing and false, asserting that the partnership deed was never filed with the bank. The ITO relied on precedents like Sri Ramamohan Motor Service v. CIT and Bengal Decorators v. CIT to emphasize strict compliance with the rules. Conversely, the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) considered the delay as short and attributed it to business inexperience, thus condoning it.
3. Applicability of legal precedents and statutory provisions:
The ITO cited several legal precedents to support strict compliance with the rules for registration benefits. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, however, distinguished these cases on factual grounds. The Tribunal noted that the ITO should have passed the order under section 184(4) rather than section 185(1)(b), as the latter applies to non-genuine firms. The Tribunal also referenced the CBDT Circular, which mandates that the ITO should not pass orders under section 185(1)(b) if the delay is not condoned.
4. Competence of the appeal against the Income Tax Officer's (ITO) order:
The Tribunal held that the appeal was competent, as the ITO's order not only refused to condone the delay but also denied continuation of registration and treated the firm as unregistered. The Tribunal cited the Madras High Court decision in CIT v. Ganesh Fire Works Industries, which emphasized a more lenient approach post-amendment of section 185. The Tribunal also underscored the binding nature of CBDT Circulars, as per the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. T. V. Ramanaiah & Sons.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities, condoned the delay, and directed the ITO to consider Form No. 11A on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, emphasizing that the explanation for the delay was credible and that the procedural requirements were not as stringent as previously interpreted.
Separate Judgments:
No separate judgments were delivered by the judges in this case.
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1991 (12) TMI 287
Issues Involved:
1. Contempt of Court by Advocates
2. Apology Tendered by Contemners
3. Appropriate Sentence or Direction
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Contempt of Court by Advocates:
The contemners, a group of advocates, disrupted court proceedings on 26th September 1991 by storming courtrooms, standing on chairs and tables, and shouting slogans against the Chief Justice and Judges. They prevented lawyers and litigants from conducting their cases and insisted on reading a scandalous memorandum in the Chief Justice's Court. This act was seen as a gross interference with the administration of justice and was considered the gravest possible contempt of court. The court noted that such behavior from members of the Bar, who are integral to the administration of justice, was unacceptable and undermined public faith in the judiciary.
2. Apology Tendered by Contemners:
Initially, the contemners contested the show cause notice and sought time to file detailed replies. On 4th October 1991, Sh. B.D. Kaushik expressed moral responsibility and regret for the incident, followed by other contemners. However, the court found the use of the word 'regret' insufficient and questioned whether it amounted to an apology. Eventually, the contemners stated that their regret amounted to an apology, which was presented as unconditional and unqualified. Despite this, the court was not convinced of the sincerity of the apology, noting that it came late and appeared to be a tactical move rather than genuine repentance.
3. Appropriate Sentence or Direction:
The court had to decide on the appropriate sentence for the contemners, considering their unqualified apology. The judgment highlighted the need for a balance between mercy and the seriousness of the contempt. The court referenced the Supreme Court's observations in re: S. Mulgaokar and L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., emphasizing that not all apologies should lead to leniency, especially when the contempt is grave and deliberate. Ultimately, the court decided to defer the sentence for one year, during which the contemners' conduct would be monitored. If they maintained good behavior and did not repeat such acts, the rule would be discharged; otherwise, they would be called to receive the sentence.
Separate Judgments:
- S.B. Wad, J.: Emphasized the gravity of the contempt and the need for a strong response to maintain the judiciary's dignity. Proposed a sentence of one month imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000 for each contemner.
- D.P. Wadhwa, J.: Agreed with the need for severe punishment, noting that the apology was not sincere and the contemners' actions were premeditated and deliberate.
- Sunanda Bhandare, J.: Highlighted the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and the need for timely action to uphold discipline.
- Arun B. Saharya, J.: Stressed the ongoing strike by the contemners and the need to restore the administration of justice.
- Y.K. Sabharwal, J.: Noted the high responsibilities of the legal profession and the grave impact of the contemners' actions on the judiciary.
- Anil Dev Singh, J.: Suggested a lenient approach, proposing suspension of the sentence subject to good behavior for one year.
- Jaspal Singh, J.: Criticized the so-called apology as insincere and highlighted the need for a strong punitive response.
- C.M. Nayar, J.: Agreed with the conclusions regarding guilt and deferred sentence, emphasizing the need for the Bar to avoid strikes and maintain the judicial system's image.
Order of the Court:
The majority decision was to defer the sentence for one year, monitoring the contemners' conduct. If they maintained good behavior, the rule would be discharged; otherwise, they would receive the sentence.
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1991 (12) TMI 286
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to try the suit.
2. Breach of Trust by the defendants.
3. Legality of the appointment of the fourth defendant as a trustee.
4. Validity of resolutions passed by the defendants regarding the lease and rent of the trust property.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the City Civil Court:
The primary issue debated was whether the City Civil Court (City Court) had the jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a co-trustee, alleged breach of trust by the defendants and sought declarations and injunctions. The City Court dismissed the interim reliefs, prompting the plaintiff to appeal. The court examined whether the City Court had jurisdiction over the suit, considering the trust was a private trust governed by the Trusts Act, which does not specify a forum for suits alleging breach of trust. Several sections of the Trusts Act imply that such matters should be addressed by a 'Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction' (Principal Court). The court concluded that breach of trust suits must be instituted in the Principal Court, which, in this case, is not the City Court. The City Court is an additional civil court for Greater Bombay and does not have the status of a Principal Court.
2. Breach of Trust by the Defendants:
The plaintiff accused defendant No. 1 of misusing her position as a managing trustee with the support of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 had leased the trust property, Dhan Bhavan, to herself at a nominal rent and later reduced the rent to nothing through resolutions passed without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff claimed these actions violated the trust deed and the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.
3. Legality of the Appointment of the Fourth Defendant as a Trustee:
The plaintiff challenged the appointment of defendant No. 4 as a trustee, asserting that his consent was not obtained for the appointment, rendering it illegal. The court noted that the plaintiff sought declarations to nullify the resolutions related to the lease and the appointment of defendant No. 4.
4. Validity of Resolutions Passed by the Defendants:
The plaintiff sought declarations to nullify the resolutions granting the lease of Dhan Bhavan to defendant No. 1 and the reduction of rent to nothing. The court examined whether these resolutions were passed in accordance with the trust deed and the Trusts Act. The court highlighted that the plaintiff was not a party to these resolutions, and as a trustee, defendant No. 1 could not lease the trust property to herself or make decisions against the trust property without proper consent.
Conclusion:
The court held that the City Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit as it was not a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The impugned order was set aside on this ground, and the status quo was ordered to continue for eight weeks to allow the appellant to consider his position. The appeal was allowed with costs left to be decided in the suit.
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1991 (12) TMI 285
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant had a lien on the post of Lekhpal.
2. Whether the appellant was on deputation in the Consolidation Department and entitled to revert to his substantive post.
Summary:
1. Lien on the Post of Lekhpal:
The appellant claimed that he held a substantive post of Lekhpal and had a lien on it. He relied on a letter dated 10.6.63 from the office of the Collector of Moradabad. However, the court found that the appellant did not satisfactorily substantiate his claim of holding the post of Lekhpal in a substantive capacity. The appointment order dated 6.4.53 indicated that his position was temporary. The court emphasized that a lien, as defined in Rule 9(13) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules, means the title to hold a permanent post substantively. The appellant's temporary status and lack of confirmation in a permanent post meant he did not have a lien on the post of Lekhpal.
2. Deputation in the Consolidation Department:
The appellant contended that he was on deputation to the Consolidation Department and should have been reverted to his original post of Lekhpal instead of being terminated. The court found no documentary evidence to support his claim of deputation. The respondents consistently denied the deputation claim, and the appellant failed to provide any proof to refute this denial. Consequently, the court rejected the appellant's claim of deputation.
Termination Order:
The appellant argued that his termination was punitive and violated Article 311 of the Constitution. The court noted that the termination order was a termination simpliciter of a temporary employee without casting any stigma or disclosing penal consequences. The High Court had observed that the appellant had several adverse entries in his character roll, justifying the termination. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and can be terminated by giving one month's notice. The court referred to the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, which upheld the termination of temporary employees based on adverse entries.
Ex-Gratia Payment:
Despite dismissing the appeal, the court acknowledged the appellant's long service of over 18 years and directed the Government of Uttar Pradesh to pay an ex-gratia amount of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant within four months.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, and the termination order was upheld. The court directed an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant. No order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 284
Issues Involved:
1. Validity and enforceability of guarantee bonds (consideration and agreement).
2. Agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 regarding the execution of guarantee bonds by all directors.
3. Agreement to levy penal interest and compound interest with quarterly rests.
4. Compliance with Reserve Bank of India (RBI) circulars regarding interest rates.
5. Calculation of interest rates and amounts due under various loan accounts.
Detailed Analysis:
Point No. 1: Validity and Enforceability of Guarantee Bonds
The third defendant contended that the guarantee bonds were not supported by consideration as they were executed after the loan was sanctioned. The court referred to Section 127 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which states that past consideration is valid consideration. The court cited several precedents, including *Kali Charan v. Abdul Rahman* and *Chakanlal v. Kanhaiyalal*, to affirm that past benefits to the principal debtor constitute sufficient consideration for a guarantee. The court concluded that the guarantee bonds executed by the third defendant were valid and enforceable as they were executed pursuant to the terms of the loan sanction order and the resolution of the Board of Directors. Therefore, Point No. 1 was answered in the negative, affirming the validity of the guarantee bonds.
Point No. 2: Agreement Regarding Execution of Guarantee Bonds by All Directors
The third defendant claimed there was an agreement that the guarantee bonds would not be enforceable unless all directors executed them. The court examined the evidence and found inconsistencies between the written statement and the evidence provided by D.W.1. The court also considered the improbability of such an agreement given the bank's requirement for all directors to stand as sureties. The court concluded that no such agreement was proved by the third defendant. Thus, Point No. 2 was answered in the negative.
Point No. 2A: Liability of Defendant No. 3 if Agreement Proved
Since Point No. 2 was answered in the negative, Point No. 2A did not arise.
Point No. 2B: Extent of Liability of Defendants 3(A) and 3(B)
The court noted that the liability of the legal representatives of the deceased third defendant (defendants 3A and 3B) is limited to the extent of the estate that devolved upon them. The trial court's decree was modified to reflect this limitation. Point No. 2B was answered accordingly.
Point No. 3: Agreement to Levy Penal Interest and Compound Interest with Quarterly Rests
The court examined the loan documents and found clear agreements to pay compound interest and penal interest on overdue amounts. For the OSL loan, the court interpreted the terms to mean that interest was payable with quarterly rests, thus allowing for compounding. For the SODH and PCL loans, the documents explicitly stated the agreement to compound interest quarterly. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff had proved the agreement to levy penal interest and compound interest with quarterly rests. Point No. 3 was answered affirmatively.
Points No. 4 & 5: Compliance with RBI Circulars and Calculation of Interest Rates
The court reviewed the relevant RBI circulars and determined that the interest rates charged by the plaintiff bank were in compliance with these circulars. For the OSL loan, the interest was recalculated to align with the RBI-prescribed rates, resulting in a reduction of the amount due. For the SODH loan, the interest charged did not exceed the RBI limits, and any excess interest had been credited back. For the PCL loan, the court found that the interest charged was within the permissible limits. Therefore, the court concluded that the interest rates were compliant with RBI circulars, and the amounts due were correctly calculated, subject to the modification for the OSL loan. Points No. 4 and 5 were answered accordingly.
Miscellaneous Contentions:
The court addressed additional contentions, including the proof of account entries and the calculation of future interest. The court rejected the contention that the account entries were not proved, as there was no specific challenge to any entry. The court also declined to modify the decree to allow compounding of future interest due to the absence of a cross-objection or appeal by the plaintiff.
Conclusion:
The appeals were allowed in part, modifying the trial court's decree to dismiss the suit against defendants 4 and 5 and reduce the amount due under the OSL loan. The decree was affirmed in all other respects, with the liability of defendants 3A and 3B limited to the estate of the third defendant. The parties were directed to bear costs proportionate to their success.
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1991 (12) TMI 283
Issues:
1. Unjust enrichment claim for Excise Duty paid on Skimmed Milk Powder.
2. Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for refund.
3. Application of the principle of unjust enrichment.
4. Interpretation of Central Excise Act provisions.
5. Precedents on unjust enrichment in tax matters.
6. Alternative remedy and laches in seeking refund.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought a refund of Excise Duty amounting to Rs. 1,17,31,275.71 paid on Skimmed Milk Powder, claiming unjust enrichment. The petitioner sold the powder between 1970 and 1977, paying the duty without objection until a subsequent notification changed the tax status. The petitioner alleged ignorance of the duty exemption before 1977, leading to the demand for a refund.
2. The High Court deliberated on the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to order the refund of the Excise Duty. It considered whether the duty was actually passed on to consumers and if the court should grant the refund, given the circumstances of the case.
3. The Court analyzed the concept of unjust enrichment, emphasizing that the burden of the duty was ultimately borne by the consumers, not the petitioner. It highlighted the potential for the petitioner to benefit unjustly if a refund were granted, as the duty recovery from customers would result in the company retaining the refunded amount, leading to enrichment at the expense of consumers.
4. The judgment referenced provisions of the Central Excise Act, particularly Sections 12-A to 12-D, which address the refund of duty and the establishment of a Consumer Welfare Fund. These sections create a framework for addressing situations of duty refunds and preventing unjust enrichment by ensuring the benefit reaches the consumers.
5. The Court cited various Supreme Court and High Court decisions on unjust enrichment in tax matters. It referenced cases where refunds were denied to prevent unjust enrichment, emphasizing the need to consider the impact on consumers and the principle of equity in tax refund cases.
6. Additionally, the Court considered the petitioner's delay in seeking the refund and the availability of alternative remedies. It noted that the petitioner had not availed itself of the appropriate appeal mechanisms against the duty assessments made earlier, and the delay in filing the writ petition was not justified by the petitioner's claim of discovering the taxability issue only in 1980.
In conclusion, the Court dismissed the writ petition, citing reasons of unjust enrichment, lack of diligence in pursuing the remedy, and the delay in seeking the refund. The judgment underscored the importance of preventing unjust enrichment and upholding the principles of equity in tax refund cases.
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1991 (12) TMI 282
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case include specific performance of an agreement for purchase of a residential house, multiple rounds of litigation, rejection of ad interim injunction, grant of temporary injunction, interpretation of Order 39 Rule 1(c) of the Civil Procedure Code, and the principles governing the grant of ad interim injunction.
Specific Performance and Litigation History:
The case involved a series of litigations starting from a suit for specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of a residential house. Subsequent rounds of litigation included objections to execution applications, claims of joint family property, and allegations of fraud by the respondent against the appellant.
Grant of Temporary Injunction:
The Court discussed the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1(c) which allows for the grant of temporary injunction to prevent dispossession or injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute. The Court emphasized that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief based on the existence of a serious disputed question, probability of entitlement to relief, protection from potential injury, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.
Principles Governing Ad Interim Injunction:
The Court highlighted that the burden lies on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case that needs adjudication at trial. The Court must also consider irreparable injury, lack of alternative remedies, and balance of convenience before granting an injunction. The Court stressed that the grant of injunction is a judicial discretion based on sound judgment to maintain the status quo pending the suit.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in granting the temporary injunction without proper consideration of the facts and circumstances. The Court set aside the High Court's order and confirmed the trial Court's decision. The Court clarified that its observations were prima facie and subject to evidence and proof at the trial on merits. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 281
Issues Involved:
1. Amendment of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Judicial) Recruitment Rules, 1967.
2. Issuance of a writ of mandamus to the State Government to amend the rules.
3. Consultation process between the High Court and the Public Service Commission.
Summary:
Amendment of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Judicial) Recruitment Rules, 1967:
The appeal concerns the judgment and order dated February 22, 1991, of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir, which relates to the amendment of the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Judicial) Recruitment Rules, 1967. The High Court proposed amendments to provide for a 25% reservation of vacancies in the Service by way of promotion/transfer for certain High Court employees, including Assistant Registrars, Readers, Court Officers, and Librarians. The proposed amendment included substituting Rule 4 and adding Chapter IV-A to prescribe the procedure for recruitment by promotion/transfer.
Issuance of a writ of mandamus to the State Government to amend the rules:
The High Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to consider effectively the amendments proposed by the High Court and to carry the process of amending the rules to its logical conclusion within three months. The Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a particular legislation or to the executive to make rules, as these powers are legislative in nature. The direction given by the High Court was deemed impermissible and was set aside.
Consultation process between the High Court and the Public Service Commission:
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of effective consultation between the High Court and the Public Service Commission (Commission) as required u/s 110 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution. The Commission had raised several points regarding the proposed amendments, which were not fully considered by the High Court. The Supreme Court suggested that a more detailed examination of the issues raised by the Commission is necessary and recommended the formation of a Committee of Judges to review the matter comprehensively. The recommendations made by the High Court after such consideration should receive due weight and regard from the State Government.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order of the Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the respondents was dismissed. The High Court was advised to reconsider the matter relating to the amendment of the rules in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court. There were no orders as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 280
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the detention orders under the COFEPOSA Act.
2. Subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
3. Procedural safeguards and application of mind by the detaining authority.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Detention Orders:
The petitioners sought quashing of the detention orders and declarations made against them u/s 3(1)(i) and 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detentions were based on the suspicion of smuggling activities by the petitioners, who were apprehended by the Coast Guards and handed over to the Customs Authority. The Karnataka Government issued the detention orders on 7-3-1991, which were served on the petitioners on 11-3-1991, leading to their detention in the Central Prison, Bangalore. The Advisory Board opined that there was sufficient cause for the detention, leading to the continuation of detention up to 10-3-1993.
2. Subjective Satisfaction of the Detaining Authority:
The primary contention was that the detaining authority did not arrive at the requisite satisfaction u/s 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The court examined whether the detaining authority applied its mind to the relevant materials before making the detention orders. The court referred to several legal precedents, emphasizing that the subjective satisfaction must be based on materials of rationally probative value and must not be illusory. The court scrutinized the original records and found that the detaining authority, Sri N. A. Muthanna, Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department, had only a short time to peruse the voluminous documents. The court concluded that the detaining authority could not have possibly applied his mind to the materials, rendering the satisfaction illusory.
3. Procedural Safeguards and Application of Mind:
The court noted that the procedural safeguards provided under the Constitution and laws were not adhered to. The detaining authority's endorsement of the proposal without scrutinizing the materials indicated a lack of application of mind. The court emphasized that the subjective satisfaction required for preventive detention must be real and not based on the opinion of another authority. The court found that the detaining authority acted on the views expressed by the Law Department without independently applying his mind.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the detention orders and the declarations made under the COFEPOSA Act, finding them vitiated by illegality due to the lack of application of mind by the detaining authority. The court highlighted the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary and unjustified invasion of personal liberty. The petitions were allowed, and the impugned detention orders and declarations were quashed.
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1991 (12) TMI 279
Issues Involved:
1. Non-compliance with Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act.
2. Delay in passing the order of detention.
3. Non-application of mind by the detaining authority and lack of subjective satisfaction due to the case being a solitary incident.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Non-compliance with Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act
The petitioner argued that the State Government did not submit the report about the detention to the Central Government within ten days as required by Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act. The State Government, however, stated in its affidavit that the report was forwarded to the Central Government on 5-2-1991, within the stipulated period. The petitioner contended that it was not enough to show that the report was forwarded; it must also be shown that the report was received by the Central Government within ten days. The court noted that Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act only requires the report to be forwarded within ten days, not necessarily received. The court found no non-compliance with Section 3(2) and rejected the petitioner's contention.
Issue 2: Delay in passing the order of detention
The petitioner contended that there was an eight-month delay in passing the detention order, which indicated a lack of promptitude. The court examined the timeline: the gold pieces were seized on 13-6-1990, the proposal for detention was initiated on 23-8-1990, approved on 27-8-1990, and the detention order was issued on 4-2-1991. The court acknowledged some unexplained delays but emphasized that delay in passing the detention order is not necessarily fatal unless it makes the grounds stale, illusory, or snaps the live-link between the grounds and the order. The court found that the delay did not render the grounds stale or illusory and did not snap the live-link. Therefore, the delay did not vitiate the detention order.
Issue 3: Non-application of mind by the detaining authority and lack of subjective satisfaction
The petitioner argued that the detaining authority did not apply its mind and lacked subjective satisfaction because the case involved a solitary incident. The court noted that a solitary incident could justify a detention order if it showed the potential for future smuggling activities. The court found that the petitioner's involvement in smuggling gold pieces for monetary consideration and his frequent travels to India indicated a likelihood of future smuggling activities. The court emphasized that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, unless shown to be unwarranted or perverse, should not be interfered with. The court concluded that the detaining authority's inference was neither unwarranted nor perverse and upheld the detention order.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, finding no merit in the grounds raised by the petitioner. The order of detention passed under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act was upheld.
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1991 (12) TMI 278
Issues:
The construction of Section 127-A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.
Details of Judgment:
1. The High Court emphasized that each tenement must be individually assessed for property tax under Section 127-A. Tax cannot be imposed on a building with an annual letting value up to Rs. 1800. The aggregation of annual letting values for exemption applies, not for taxation. The unit for tax assessment is a building, not a person. If an individual owns multiple buildings in the same Municipality, each building must be assessed separately. Previous decisions were cited to support this interpretation.
2. The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's mechanical approach to construction, advocating for a purposeful interpretation to fulfill the Act's objectives. Section 127-A's table for taxation does not include buildings with an annual letting value below Rs. 1800. Buildings under this threshold are exempt, with the proviso allowing aggregation of values for exemption purposes only. The proviso aims to prevent exemption for buildings owned by the same person exceeding Rs. 1800 in total value.
3. While each building is a tax unit and those under Rs. 1800 are exempt, aggregation of values necessitates treating all such buildings as one unit for taxation. Any other interpretation would nullify the proviso and defeat the Act's purpose. The legislature did not intend blanket tax exemption for all buildings owned by an individual exceeding Rs. 1800 in total value.
4. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court's decision, stating that the previous rulings did not correctly interpret the law. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The decision was to be applied prospectively, with no recovery or refund for the period before this judgment.
5. No costs were awarded in this matter.
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1991 (12) TMI 277
Issues:
1. Validity of the order quashing the proceedings for realization of fine.
2. Bar of limitation in recovery proceedings.
3. Interpretation of Section 70 of the Indian Penal Code.
Analysis:
1. The State of U.P. filed a criminal appeal against the High Court's order quashing the proceedings for realization of fine imposed on Mehtab Singh. The High Court set aside the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, and ruled that the recovery proceedings were barred by time as there was no order staying the recovery of the fine after the dismissal of the appeal in 1968. The Supreme Court observed that the recovery proceedings were not time-barred as there was a stay of recovery of the fine during the pendency of the appeal, as evidenced by previous court orders.
2. The issue of limitation in the recovery proceedings was raised before the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, who held that the proceedings were not time-barred as the period of limitation could only begin after the Supreme Court's order confirming the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reiterated that the State must commence recovery proceedings within six years of the sentence, and the plea of limitation is not applicable if steps for realization have been initiated within this period. The Court emphasized that the suspension of fine collection by a higher court suspends the levy of the fine, thereby halting the running of the limitation period.
3. The interpretation of Section 70 of the Indian Penal Code was crucial in determining the validity of the recovery proceedings. The Supreme Court clarified that the State must initiate recovery proceedings within six years of the sentence, and the period of limitation does not start running if the fine is not leviable due to a stay order. The Court emphasized a common-sense reading of the provision, stating that once steps for recovery are initiated, the plea of limitation is irrelevant. The Court highlighted the importance of judicial orders and the suspension of fine collection in determining the applicability of the limitation period.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Additional Sessions Judge's decision, emphasizing the importance of court orders, the suspension of fine recovery, and the initiation of recovery proceedings within the statutory limitation period.
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1991 (12) TMI 276
Issues Involved:
1. Whether St. Stephen's College is a minority-run institution.
2. Whether St. Stephen's College as a minority institution is bound by the University circulars dated June 5, 1980, and June 9, 1980.
3. Whether St. Stephen's College and the Allahabad Agricultural Institute are entitled to accord preference to or reserve seats for students of their own community and whether such preference or reservation would be invalid under Article 29(2) of the Constitution.
Summary:
First Issue: Minority Status of St. Stephen's College
St. Stephen's College was established in 1881 by the Cambridge Mission in collaboration with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG). The College was founded to impart Christian religious instruction and education based on Christian values. The College has maintained its Christian character through its name, emblem, motto, and religious instruction. The Constitution of the College, including the Memorandum of the Society and Rules, reflects its Christian character. The management of the College is looked after by the Supreme Council and the Governing Body, both of which have a significant Christian presence. The Principal and Vice Principal must be members of the Church of North India. The College's Constitution has been registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and the University of Delhi, and the University has not objected to any of its provisions. Therefore, St. Stephen's College is established and administered by a minority community, viz., the Christian community, which is a religious minority in India and the Union Territory of Delhi.
Second Issue: University Circulars
The University issued circulars on June 5, 1980, and June 9, 1980, directing that all colleges, including St. Stephen's College, admit students solely on the basis of merit determined by the percentage of marks secured in qualifying examinations. St. Stephen's College has been following its own admission programme for over 100 years, which includes an interview process. The College argued that its admission programme is an integral part of its administration, which it is entitled to under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The University circulars, if followed, would disrupt the College's established admission process. The College also contended that Christian students generally lack merit compared to other applicants and would be disadvantaged if admissions were based solely on marks. Therefore, the circulars are not merely regulative but interfere with the College's right to administer its own admission programme.
Third Issue: Preference and Reservation
St. Stephen's College and the Allahabad Agricultural Institute accord preference to students of their own community. St. Stephen's College gives relaxation up to 10% to Christian students and similar concessions to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and sportsmen. The College argued that without such concessions, Christian students would not be within the zone of consideration. The Delhi University and the Students' Union contended that the circulars ensure uniformity and fairness in admissions and that the College cannot practice discrimination based on religion as it receives maintenance grants from the government. Article 30(1) of the Constitution allows minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, but this right is subject to the State's power to regulate education and maintain standards. Therefore, while the College can manage its affairs, it must adhere to regulations that ensure educational standards and fairness.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that St. Stephen's College is a minority-run institution and has the right to administer its own admission programme under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. However, this right is subject to the State's power to regulate educational standards and ensure fairness in admissions. The College's practice of giving preference to Christian students and others through concessions is valid, provided it does not compromise educational standards and fairness.
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1991 (12) TMI 275
Issues Involved: Alleged rape of two Nuns at Gajraula in Uttar Pradesh, demand for CBI investigation, transfer of case from Sessions Judge, Muradabad to Sessions Judge, Delhi.
Alleged Rape Incident: The petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India pertains to the alleged rape of two Nuns at St. Mary's Convent School by criminals who broke in, assaulted several other Nuns, and looted cash. The incident involved miscreants entering the premises, manhandling and assaulting the Nuns, committing rape, and looting money meant for staff salaries and other expenses.
Investigation and Arrests: The Senior Superintendent of Police filed counter-affidavits stating the arrests of accused persons and recovery of stolen property. Despite identification parades, the victims did not identify the accused before the Magistrate. The petitioners contested the arrests, claiming the real culprits were different individuals.
CBI Investigation: The petitioners sought CBI investigation due to doubts about the fairness of the police investigation and the identification of the accused. The Court, considering the circumstances, directed the CBI to conduct further investigation into the case, emphasizing the need for justice and public confidence. The CBI was instructed to complete the investigation within three months.
Decision: The Court directed the CBI to take up the investigation immediately, with assistance from local police authorities. The State of Uttar Pradesh was directed to provide full cooperation. The proceedings before the Sessions Judge were stayed until the CBI completed its investigation. The Court declined the transfer of the case from the Sessions Judge, Muradabad, and disposed of the writ petition accordingly.
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