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1975 (2) TMI 132
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the levy under Section 58 read with Rule 32(3) - whether it was a tax or a fee.
2. Justification of the levy of contribution on the three donations received by the respondent.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of the Levy under Section 58 Read with Rule 32(3):
Initial Characterization as a Fee:
The levy of 2% on the gross income of public trusts under Section 58 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, was initially characterized as a fee. A fee is generally defined as a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by the government or some other agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the government or the agency in rendering the service.
Distinction Between Fee and Tax:
A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for a public purpose enforceable by law and is not a payment for any specific service rendered. In contrast, a fee must have a correlation to the expenses incurred in rendering the service. The Court cited various precedents to elucidate this distinction, including Hingir-Ramour Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Orissa and H.H. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Mysore.
Accumulation of Surplus:
The Court noted that from 1953 to 1970, the total receipts were Rs. 2,20,78,080, and the total revenue expenditure was Rs. 1,17,86,443. The surplus in the account of the Public Trusts Administration Fund at the end of March 1970 was Rs. 84,49,473. The Court held that the levy was initially a fee as the expenditure was 62% of the contributions levied, showing an approximate correlation.
Transition to a Tax:
The Court acknowledged that if a fee results in a substantial surplus, it may assume the character of a tax. By the end of March 31, 1970, the surplus was Rs. 84,49,473, and the Court concluded that the levy at the rate of 2% on the gross income of the trusts after this date assumed the character of a tax. The Court emphasized that any levy after March 31, 1970, should have a correlation with the services rendered, considering the existence of the surplus fund.
Conclusion:
The Court declared that the levy of contribution at the rate of 2% of the annual gross income of the trusts became a tax after March 31, 1970, and was without the authority of law.
2. Justification of the Levy of Contribution on the Three Donations:
Background:
The respondent received three sums from the international organization in the years ending 30-9-1954, 30-9-1955, and 30-9-1956. The respondent claimed exemption from liability to pay contribution on these donations, which was disallowed by the appellants.
Legal Personality and Donations:
The Court held that the respondent, registered under the Companies Act, had an independent legal personality, and the amounts received were donations coming within the purview of Section 58 of the Act and Rule 32. The Division Bench was correct in holding that these amounts were donations made by the international organization in London to the respondent.
Retrospective Operation of the Amending Act:
The Amending Act of 1962, which came into force on 17-8-1962, provided for the retrospective operation of the amended Section 58. The Court held that by virtue of the deeming provision in Section 58 as amended, the respondent became liable to pay contribution in respect of the three donations in the years they were received (1954, 1955, and 1956).
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the respondent was liable to pay contributions in respect of the three sums and that the Division Bench erred in quashing the orders upholding the levy of contribution on these sums.
Separate Judgments Delivered:
The judgment in Civil Appeal No. 488 of 1973 followed the reasoning in Civil Appeal No. 487 of 1973, concluding that the respondent was liable to pay contribution in respect of the donations in question and quashing the order dated 30th March 1965. The Court made no order as to costs in both appeals.
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1975 (2) TMI 131
The Supreme Court held that the suit and appeal stand abated due to the operation of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The appeal was disposed of as abated, and parties will bear their own costs. (Case citation: 1975 (2) TMI 131 - Supreme Court)
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1975 (2) TMI 130
Issues involved: Interpretation of sub rule (2) of Rule 89 of Order 21 of the CPC, 1908 and the maintainability of an application under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code.
Summary:
1. The appeal involved the interpretation of sub rule (2) of Rule 89 of Order 21 of the CPC, 1908. The decree holder filed a suit in 1951 against the husband of respondent No. 2 for money due on a Promissory note. The suit was dismissed initially but later decreed in 1966. Properties were attached and sold, leading to a legal dispute.
2. The appellant filed an execution for the amount due under the decree. Respondent No. 1 filed applications under Order 21 Rule 90 and Rule 89 of the Code. There were issues regarding the withdrawal of the Rule 90 application and the timeliness of the Rule 89 application.
3. The Court proceedings involved challenges to the application under Rule 89 based on non-maintainability. The Execution Court set aside the sale, leading to an appeal by the appellant, which was dismissed by the High Court.
4. The appellant's plea regarding the sufficiency of the amount deposited by respondent No. 1 was rejected. The main question was whether the application under Rule 89 was maintainable and correctly allowed by the lower courts.
5. The Court examined the interpretation of Rule 89(2) and its historical context. The application under Rule 89 was deemed valid based on the sequence of events and the withdrawal of the Rule 90 application.
6. The Court emphasized that an application under Rule 89 must be withdrawn before it can be prosecuted. The withdrawal of the Rule 90 application was deemed effective based on the actions of respondent No. 1.
7. The Court held that respondent No. 1's application under Rule 89 was rightly allowed. The appeal by the appellant was dismissed, emphasizing that technicalities should not be used to deprive respondent No. 1 of the properties purchased.
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1975 (2) TMI 129
Issues Involved:
1. Hiring and use of Truck No. HRR-5167 for free conveyance of voters.
2. Hiring and use of Tractor No. DLL-9 for free conveyance of voters.
3. Payment of compensation of Rs. 7,000 to Mange Ram and non-disclosure in election expenses.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue No. 1: Hiring and Use of Truck No. HRR-5167
The petitioner alleged that the returned candidate hired Truck No. HRR-5167 for Rs. 200 and used it to convey voters from Turakpur to Mandaura polling station. The High Court found the appellant guilty of this corrupt practice under Section 123(5) and Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. However, the Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence, particularly the testimony of Tara Chand (P.W. 11), who claimed to have witnessed the hiring. The Court found Tara Chand's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and his dubious credibility. The Court also noted that other witnesses from Turakpur who could have substantiated the claim were not examined. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the hiring and use of the truck for free conveyance of voters, reversing the High Court's findings on Issues 1 and 5.
Issue No. 2: Hiring and Use of Tractor No. DLL-9
The petitioner alleged that the returned candidate hired Tractor No. DLL-9 for Rs. 200 through his agents Suba Singh and Om Parkash to convey voters from Aurangabad to Jakhauli polling station. The High Court upheld this charge. However, the Supreme Court found significant discrepancies and lack of credibility in the testimonies of Om Parkash (P.W. 29) and Richhpal Singh (P.W. 14). Om Parkash's testimony was inconsistent and contradicted by other evidence, while Richhpal Singh's statement about being challaned and fined was found dubious, especially since the challan mentioned a deceased person, Shiv Lal, as the owner. The Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove this charge, reversing the High Court's finding on Issue No. 4.
Issue No. 3: Payment of Compensation to Mange Ram
The petitioner alleged that the returned candidate paid Rs. 7,000 to Mange Ram as compensation for injuries sustained in an accident involving Truck No. HRR-5167 and failed to disclose this amount in his election expenses. The High Court found this charge proven. However, the Supreme Court found the evidence unreliable. The testimonies of witnesses like Amir Singh (P.W. 9) and Lakhu Bairagi (P.W. 10) were inconsistent and lacked corroboration. The Court noted that Mange Ram's dying declaration did not implicate the returned candidate in any settlement or payment. Consequently, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to prove this charge, rendering Issue No. 7 redundant and reversing the High Court's finding.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the election petition with costs, concluding that the petitioner failed to prove the essential ingredients of the charges of corrupt practices under Section 123(5) and Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
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1975 (2) TMI 128
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant indulged in corrupt practices under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
2. Whether the findings of the High Court were legally sound in declaring the appellant's election void based on the alleged corrupt practices.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether the appellant indulged in corrupt practices under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The appellant was declared elected to the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh from the Bhainsdeshi Assembly (Reserved) Constituency. Respondent No. 1 filed an Election Petition challenging the appellant's election, alleging corrupt practices. The High Court declared the appellant's election void, holding that he indulged in corrupt practices within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Act.
Respondent No. 1 alleged that the appellant, through his agents, attempted to induce Respondent No. 3 to support his candidature and withdraw from the contest. It was alleged that the appellant offered Respondent No. 3 a sum of Rs. 8,000/- as compensation for his election expenses, leading to Respondent No. 3's support and withdrawal from the contest. The High Court found that:
- The appellant asked Respondent No. 3 to withdraw and support him, offering Rs. 8,000/- as compensation.
- Respondent No. 3 agreed to support the appellant and issued a pamphlet requesting voters to vote for the appellant.
- A sum of Rs. 4,000/- was paid in cash, and a promissory note for Rs. 4,000/- was executed.
- Respondent No. 3 announced his support for the appellant in a meeting, and pamphlets were distributed.
The Supreme Court examined whether these findings constituted "Bribery" under Section 123(1)(A)(b). The Court noted that bribery involves any gift, offer, or promise by a candidate to induce an elector to vote or refrain from voting. The Court emphasized that the payment must have a direct or indirect connection with inducing the voter. The Court held that mere payment to a third person without establishing a nexus between the money and voter inducement does not constitute bribery.
The Court found that Respondent No. 3's actions of canvassing and distributing pamphlets did not transgress the limit to constitute an indirect inducement to voters. The payment to Respondent No. 3 was for him to retire from the contest and persuade voters, not a direct or indirect inducement to voters. Therefore, the appellant's actions did not amount to bribery under Section 123(1)(A)(b).
Issue 2: Whether the findings of the High Court were legally sound in declaring the appellant's election void based on the alleged corrupt practices.
The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's interpretation of Section 123(1)(A)(b) and found it legally unsound. The High Court's reliance on the definition of "Bribery" was not supported by the evidence. The Court cited previous judgments, including Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsul Huda and Anr., to emphasize the requirement of a direct or indirect inducement to voters. The Court concluded that the High Court's findings did not establish a nexus between the payment to Respondent No. 3 and voter inducement.
The Court also referred to the case of Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh, where it was held that payment to third persons without a direct or indirect inducement to voters does not constitute bribery. The Court reiterated that the payment must be shown to have an indirect interest in inducing voters.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in declaring the appellant's election void based on the alleged corrupt practices. The findings did not fit within the definition of "Bribery" under Section 123(1)(A)(b). Consequently, the appellant and Respondent No. 3 were exonerated of the charges of corrupt practices.
Judgment:
The appeal was allowed with costs payable by Respondent No. 1, and the judgment and order of the High Court were set aside.
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1975 (2) TMI 127
Issues Involved:
1. Marriage expenses of Defendant No. 4.
2. Management of the alleged Joint Hindu Family Property.
3. Validity of the second marriage of Defendant No. 1.
4. Prima facie existence of Joint Hindu Family Property.
5. Interim relief during the pendency of a partition suit.
6. Inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Marriage Expenses of Defendant No. 4:
The judgment addresses two applications concerning the marriage expenses of Defendant No. 4. The Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 4 requested the Court to direct Defendant No. 1 to set aside Rs. 75,000 or another appropriate amount for these expenses. The Court noted that the Joint Hindu Family Property was valued over Rs. 5,00,000 and generated a monthly income of at least Rs. 5,000, making Defendant No. 1 capable of meeting the marriage expenses.
2. Management of the Alleged Joint Hindu Family Property:
The Court acknowledged the pending litigations concerning the management of the Joint Hindu Family Property, which is the subject matter of the suit. It was noted that Defendant No. 1, as the Karta and manager, was responsible for managing this property.
3. Validity of the Second Marriage of Defendant No. 1:
The validity of Defendant No. 1's marriage to Defendant No. 5 was contested by the Plaintiffs. This issue was framed in the suit, questioning whether Defendant No. 5 was the legally wedded wife of Defendant No. 1 and whether her sons were his legitimate children.
4. Prima Facie Existence of Joint Hindu Family Property:
The Court examined whether there was a prima facie case to hold that there was Joint Hindu Family Property. The Plaintiffs claimed the property was joint family property, while Defendant No. 1 argued it was his self-acquired property. The Court noted that the income-tax assessment records indicated the property was treated as Joint Hindu Family Property, creating a prima facie case for its existence.
5. Interim Relief During the Pendency of a Partition Suit:
The Court deliberated on whether an interim order for marriage expenses could be issued during a partition suit. It was noted that an unmarried daughter is entitled to maintenance and marriage expenses from the Joint Hindu Family Property. The Court referenced judgments supporting the issuance of interim relief in maintenance suits and concluded that a similar order could be passed in a partition suit.
6. Inherent Powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
The Court considered whether it could exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant the requested interim relief. It was noted that the Supreme Court had affirmed the Court's inherent power to make necessary orders for the ends of justice. The Court concluded that it could exercise these powers to direct Defendant No. 1 to provide Rs. 25,000 for Defendant No. 4's marriage expenses, ensuring the order was properly executed and accounted for.
Conclusion:
The Court directed Defendant No. 1 to deposit Rs. 25,000 with the Registrar of the Court for Defendant No. 4's marriage expenses. This amount was to be managed by the Plaintiffs and Defendants 2 to 4, with proper accounts maintained and security furnished for restitution. The applications were allowed, with each party bearing its own costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 126
Issues:
Challenge to compromise decree based on lack of notice and authorization.
Analysis:
The judgment deals with an application to set aside a compromise decree dated February 7, 1972, in an appeal. The petitioner alleges that the appeal was disposed of without serving any notice on him and without his authorization for his lawyer to act on his behalf. However, the High Court of Patna provided a certificate stating that notice of the appeal was given to the Advocate for the petitioner-respondent and the General Secretary of the Colliery Mazdoor Union, of which the petitioner is a member. The petitioner had engaged Mr. Mukherjee as his lawyer, as evidenced by various documents, including a Vakalatnama bearing the petitioner's thumb mark. Additionally, telegrams exchanged between the parties indicated that the petitioner was aware of the settlement proposal and had not objected to it. The petitioner's claim of lack of authorization for Mr. Mukherjee to act on his behalf was deemed unfounded.
The judgment also addresses the issue of whether the compromise is binding on the petitioner. It was noted that the petitioner was not opposed to the idea of a compromise but wanted the settlement amount to be increased. The petitioner had been receiving half of his wages pursuant to a stay order in the case and did not deny receiving a cheque for the settlement amount. The petitioner's failure to file the statement of the case by the specified deadline resulted in the appeal being set down ex parte against him. Given that the compromise was not unacceptable to the petitioner and that his lawyer acted in his best interest, the court found no lack of authority in Mr. Mukherjee's actions. Consequently, the court determined that there were no merits in the application to set aside the compromise decree and dismissed the application.
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1975 (2) TMI 125
Issues:
Dispute between a Co-operative Housing Society and an individual regarding eviction. Validity of an ad interim injunction granted by the Small Causes Court. Jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to grant injunction against proceedings before an Officer on Special Duty under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.
Analysis:
The case involved a dispute between a Co-operative Housing Society and an individual regarding the eviction of the individual from premises belonging to the Society. The matter was referred to the Officer on Special Duty for adjudication under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. However, during the pendency of the case before the Officer, the individual filed a declaratory suit in the Small Causes Court claiming to be a monthly tenant and obtained an ad interim injunction against the Society and another party from proceeding with the arbitration case before the Officer.
The High Court emphasized that judicial amity and wisdom require that when a matter is pending before an Officer on Special Duty under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, a Judge of the Small Cause Court should not grant an injunction restraining the parties from proceeding with that matter. The Court cited Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1963, which prohibits granting an injunction to restrain a person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding in a Court not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. It was established that an Officer on Special Duty is considered a court in the eye of the law and not subordinate to the Small Cause Court.
The judgment referenced a previous decision affirming this view, where the injunction granted by the Small Cause Court was set aside. The Court held that the Small Cause Court acted without jurisdiction in ordering the ad interim injunction against the petitioners from proceeding with the case before the Officer on Special Duty. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order of the Small Causes Court and made the rule absolute with costs, allowing the application.
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1975 (2) TMI 124
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the husband caused the murder of his wife.
2. Reliability and corroboration of the approver's testimony.
3. Application of the principle of issue-estoppel due to the acquittal of a co-accused in a separate trial.
4. Evaluation of the High Court's interference with the Trial Court's acquittal.
Summary:
1. Whether the husband caused the murder of his wife:
The accused husband was charged u/s 302/24 I.P.C. for the murder of his wife, Bimla, who was found with acid burns and multiple injuries near a railway station and later pronounced dead. The Trial Judge acquitted the accused, but the High Court convicted him u/s 302 I.P.C., leading to this appeal.
2. Reliability and corroboration of the approver's testimony:
The approver, Jasbir Inder Singh (PW 5), a friend of the accused, provided a detailed account of the events leading to Bimla's death. His testimony was corroborated by independent witnesses and material evidence, including:
- Miss V. K. Sharma (PW 2) confirmed Bimla's statement that she was traveling with her husband.
- Raghbir Singh (PW 29), Ticket Collector, confirmed the accused's presence at Bhiwani Railway Station.
- Yudishter (PW 26) confirmed the arrival of the accused's companions at Sirsa without him.
- Shakti Parshaki Ghosh (PW 17) confirmed the booking of the accused's cycle on July 30, 1968.
- Sergeant R.N. Singh (PW 50) confirmed the accused reported acid burns on his hands on August 4, 1968.
3. Application of the principle of issue-estoppel:
The appellant argued that the acquittal of Bhanu Parkash Singh, a co-accused, in a separate trial should estop the conviction of the appellant. However, the court held that issue-estoppel requires the same parties and identical facts-in-issue in both trials. Since the parties and findings differed, issue-estoppel did not apply.
4. Evaluation of the High Court's interference with the Trial Court's acquittal:
The High Court found the Trial Court's reasons for disbelieving the approver and other evidence to be flawed. The High Court's interference was justified as the prima facie appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court was unreasonable. The High Court's conviction was upheld as the evidence, including the accused's subsequent conduct, indicated his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's conviction of the accused u/s 302 I.P.C., finding the approver's testimony reliable and corroborated by independent evidence, and rejecting the application of issue-estoppel.
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1975 (2) TMI 123
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of execution petition filed by a pleader without a vakalat.
2. Interpretation of Order 3, Rule 1 and Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
3. Distinction between an irregularity and a nullity in legal proceedings.
4. Jurisdiction and discretion of the Court in curing procedural defects.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Execution Petition Filed by a Pleader Without a Vakalat
The core issue was whether the execution petition presented by a pleader without a vakalat was valid. The pleader, Mr. P. Viswanatha Rao, filed the execution petition (E.P. No. 15 of 1950) without having a vakalat from the decree-holder at the time of filing. The District Munsif dismissed the petition as a nullity, but the District Judge of Kurnool held it to be an irregularity, remanding the case for fresh disposal.
2. Interpretation of Order 3, Rule 1 and Rule 4 of the CPC
Order 3, Rule 1 of the CPC allows a party to appear, apply, or act in Court personally, through a recognized agent, or by a pleader. Rule 4 specifies that a pleader must be appointed by a document in writing to act on behalf of a party. The Court had to determine whether the presentation of an application by a pleader without a vakalat was an act that required written authorization under Rule 4.
The judgment emphasized that "acting" includes "applying," and therefore, a pleader who makes an application on behalf of a litigant acts for him and must be duly authorized by a written document (vakalat).
3. Distinction Between an Irregularity and a Nullity in Legal Proceedings
The Court examined whether the absence of a vakalat at the time of filing the execution petition was a mere irregularity or a nullity. The Full Bench concluded that non-compliance with Rule 4 is an irregularity, not a nullity. This irregularity could be cured subsequently by filing the vakalat. The Court cited several precedents, including decisions from the Allahabad, Calcutta, and Bombay High Courts, which supported the view that such procedural defects are curable irregularities.
4. Jurisdiction and Discretion of the Court in Curing Procedural Defects
The judgment underscored the Court's discretion to allow the curing of procedural defects if the party acted in good faith and without gross negligence. The Full Bench noted that procedural rules should facilitate justice rather than obstruct it. The presentation of an application by an unauthorized pleader is an irregularity that can be rectified, and the Court has the jurisdiction to permit such rectification.
Conclusion:
The Full Bench answered the reference by stating that the presentation of an application by a pleader without a vakalat is not a nullity but an irregularity that can be cured at a subsequent stage. The appeal was dismissed following this opinion, affirming the District Judge's decision to remand the case for fresh disposal.
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1975 (2) TMI 122
Issues Involved:
1. Whether notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to a tenant holding over is necessary when the original lease deed contains a term that the tenant will quit without notice after the expiry of the period fixed by the original lease.
2. Whether the defendant-appellant can be deemed to have waived its right to question the validity of the plaintiff's notice Ex. A-1 terminating the tenancy.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Necessity of Notice to Quit under Section 106 for a Tenant Holding Over
The judgment begins by examining the necessity of a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (TPA) for a tenant holding over. The court analyzed the provisions of Sections 106, 111(h), 113, and 116 of the TPA. Section 106 prescribes the duration of leases and the requirement of notice to terminate such leases. Section 111 outlines the determination of leases, and Section 116 deals with the renewal of leases by holding over.
The court emphasized that the tenancy created by holding over is a new tenancy and not merely a continuation of the old lease. Therefore, the terms of the original lease, including any stipulation dispensing with notice to quit, cannot be imported into the new tenancy created by holding over unless there is a specific agreement to that effect. The court cited various precedents, including decisions from the Calcutta High Court and the Federal Court, to support this view.
The court concluded that in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a valid notice to quit under Section 106 is necessary to terminate a tenancy created by holding over. The stipulation in the original lease that the tenant would quit without notice after the expiry of the lease period does not apply to the new tenancy created by holding over.
Issue 2: Waiver of Right to Question the Validity of the Notice
The court then addressed whether the defendant-appellant had waived its right to question the validity of the notice Ex. A-1 terminating the tenancy. The concept of waiver, as defined by the Supreme Court in Associated Hotels of India v. Ranjit Singh, is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The court noted that waiver is distinct from estoppel and requires the consent of both parties.
The court found that there was no express waiver by the defendant-appellant. The plaintiff-respondent's claim of implied waiver, based on the defendant's failure to reply to the notice and the delayed amendment of the written statement, was rejected. The court held that the omission to reply to a defective notice does not constitute waiver, and the defendant is not estopped from raising the plea of invalid notice at a later stage.
The court also noted that the amendment to the written statement was allowed by the trial court on payment of costs to the plaintiff-respondent, and this conditional order was not challenged by the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff, by accepting the costs, was precluded from challenging the amendment.
The court further emphasized that the validity of the notice is a question of law that can be raised at any stage, and mere delay in raising the plea does not constitute waiver unless prejudice is caused to the other party. The court found no prejudice to the plaintiff-respondent from the delayed plea and concluded that the defendant-appellant had not waived its right to a valid notice.
Conclusion:
The court answered the first issue in the affirmative, holding that a valid notice to quit under Section 106 of the TPA is necessary to terminate a tenancy created by holding over. The second issue was answered in the negative, concluding that the defendant-appellant had not waived its right to question the validity of the notice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed with costs throughout.
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1975 (2) TMI 121
Issues Involved:
1. Whether oil-engines used for working pumping sets for drawing out water are agricultural machinery under entry No. 12 of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Classification of Oil-Engines as Agricultural Machinery
Background and Contention:
The respondents, an agricultural co-operative society, argued that sales of oil-engines used for drawing water should be classified as sales of agricultural machinery under entry No. 12 of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and thus subject to a sales tax rate of 3%. The Sales Tax Officer disagreed, classifying the oil-engines under the residuary entry No. 22 in Schedule E, thereby subjecting them to a combined sales tax and general sales tax rate of 5%. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax upheld this decision. However, the Tribunal reversed this, accepting the respondents' contention, leading to the present reference.
Relevant Legal Provisions and Amendments:
- Entry No. 12 of Schedule C (pre-amendment): "Agricultural machinery and implements (other than implements specified in entry 1 in Schedule A) and parts of such machinery and implements."
- Amended Entry No. 12 (post-11th May 1973): Excludes "tractors, oil-engines and electric motors."
- Entry No. 15 (pre-15th March 1960): "Machinery used in the manufacture of goods, and spare parts and accessories thereof."
- Entry No. 15(2) (post-15th March 1960): Included "Electric motors and oil-engines other than those adapted for use as component parts of motor vehicles."
Arguments and Evidence:
- The applicant's counsel argued that oil-engines must be exclusively designed for agricultural purposes to be classified as agricultural machinery. He cited the case Pashabhai Patel & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax, where tractors were not considered agricultural machinery due to their diverse uses.
- The Tribunal found that the oil-engines sold by the respondents were commonly used by agriculturists for agricultural purposes, supported by documentary evidence, including resolutions from the Government of Maharashtra and transactions involving tagai loans for agricultural use.
Tribunal's Findings:
- The Tribunal concluded that the oil-engines in question were recognized by both co-operative land mortgage banks and the Government of Maharashtra as being used by agriculturists for drawing water, thus fitting the definition of agricultural machinery under entry No. 12.
- The Assistant Commissioner's view that watering fields had no direct connection to agriculture was dismissed as lacking understanding of agricultural needs.
Supporting Case Law:
- The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Engineering Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh held that an appliance need not be exclusively used for agriculture to be considered an agricultural implement; it suffices if it is commonly used and intimately connected with agricultural operations.
Conclusion:
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the oil-engines sold by the respondents during the assessment period were indeed agricultural machinery within the meaning of entry No. 12 of Schedule C to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The question referred was answered in the affirmative, and costs were awarded to the respondents.
Final Judgment:
Reference answered in the affirmative. The applicant is to pay the respondents' costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 120
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the order of allotment made beyond 30 days.
2. Legality of the compromise agreement in Suit No. 132/1962.
3. Validity of the order of allotment issued by the Rent Controller.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Order of Allotment Made Beyond 30 Days:
The appellant argued that the order of allotment was invalid as it was not made within 30 days of the receipt of the intimation sent by the landlord under section 7(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, as required by Rule 3 of the Rules. The High Court held that the requirement of passing the order of allotment within 30 days is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the District Magistrate has the authority to make an allotment order even after the expiry of the 30-day period, provided the landlord does not nominate a tenant under Rule 4. The Court emphasized that the landlord's right to nominate a tenant arises only if the District Magistrate fails to make an allotment order within 30 days, and even then, the District Magistrate can override the landlord's nomination for recorded reasons. Therefore, the order of allotment made on 17th September 1962, two days after the 30-day period, was not invalid.
2. Legality of the Compromise Agreement in Suit No. 132/1962:
The appellant contended that the third respondent had no right to apply for possession under section 7A of the Act after entering into a compromise in Suit No. 132/1962. The High Court found that the compromise was a fraud on the officers empowered to act under the statute and was void under section 23 of the Contract Act as it was unlawful and against public policy. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that the compromise agreement attempted to curtail the powers of the District Magistrate, which is against the public policy of the Act and the Rules. The third respondent did not commit fraud by ignoring the void compromise when applying for eviction under section 7A. However, Justice Bhagwati dissented, arguing that the third respondent should have disclosed the compromise decree to the District Magistrate when applying under section 7A, as it was a material fact that could influence the exercise of discretion by the District Magistrate.
3. Validity of the Order of Allotment Issued by the Rent Controller:
The appellant argued that the order of allotment issued by the Rent Controller was bad as it was mechanically issued based on the order of the Additional District Magistrate without any application of mind. The High Court held that the order of allotment was made by the Additional District Magistrate after fully hearing the parties and was merely formalized by the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the order was made by the Additional District Magistrate in a quasi-judicial manner, and the Rent Controller merely issued the formal order. Therefore, the order of allotment was not invalid, nor was the order made by the Rent Controller under section 7A of the Act.
Separate Judgment by Justice Bhagwati:
Justice Bhagwati agreed with the majority on the first and third contentions but dissented on the second contention. He argued that the third respondent's non-disclosure of the compromise decree in the application under section 7A vitiated the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He emphasized that parties must disclose all material facts to the authority when seeking discretionary relief. Therefore, he would have allowed the appeal, quashed the order under section 7A, and directed the third respondent to hand over possession of the shop to the appellant.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, based on the majority judgment.
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1975 (2) TMI 119
Issues:
- Appeal against dismissal of suit for injunction and declaration regarding charging of dead rent.
- Interpretation of Mining Leases (Modifications of Terms) Rules, 1956 and Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
- Validity of dead rent charges set by the Government of Rajasthan.
- Applicability of Rule 27(1)(c) to lease renewals.
- Impact of modifications made to the original lease on subsequent renewals.
Analysis:
1. The plaintiff's appeal challenged the dismissal of its suit by the Rajasthan High Court regarding the dead rent charges imposed by the Government of Rajasthan. The plaintiff's mining lease for mica was reduced to 10 sq. miles from 1500 sq. miles, and the dead rent was lowered to &8377; 6/- per acre. The renewal of the lease was granted at a dead rent of &8377; 8/- per acre, leading to the dispute. The plaintiff contended that the dead rent should remain at &8377; 6/- per acre.
2. The appellant raised five key points in the appeal, including the interpretation of the agreement, the power of the State Government to modify lease terms, and the validity of Rule 27 in the renewal process. The respondents argued against the appellant's contentions, asserting that the appeal lacked merit. The Court rejected all arguments presented by the appellant, upholding the dismissal of the suit.
3. The Court emphasized the authority of the State Government to set rules for mining leases under Section 13 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Rule 27(1)(c) specified the yearly dead rent payable by lessees, ensuring certainty in the lease terms. The Court clarified that the State Government's power to fix dead rent rates fell within the prescribed limits, dismissing the appellant's claims of uncertainty and rule violation.
4. The judgment addressed the application of Rule 27(1) to lease renewals, highlighting the necessity of adhering to the prescribed conditions. The modifications made to the original lease in 1959 were deemed valid for the lease's duration, but did not extend to subsequent renewals. The Court ruled that the renewed lease constituted a fresh agreement, subject to the rules in force at the time of renewal.
5. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the State Government was not obligated to maintain the dead rent at the previous rate during lease renewals. The renewal process did not permit alterations to mandatory lease conditions, including the dead rent specified in Rule 27(1)(c). As the dead rent charged by the Government of Rajasthan was within the permissible limits, the appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the lower court's decision.
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1975 (2) TMI 118
Issues involved: Petitioner challenging two letters as discriminatory and violative of Article 14, whether Council of Scientific and Industrial Research qualifies as an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1: Discriminatory Letters
The petitioner, a junior stenographer, sought to declare two letters discriminatory and violative of Article 14, claiming entitlement to the same advance increments as new incumbents. To challenge the circular under Article 14 and 16, it was crucial to establish the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research as an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Issue 2: Council's Status as an Authority
The Council, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was argued to be an agency of the Government based on certain features. However, the Court found that the Council lacked a statutory character like other government entities such as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. The presence of government-appointed members in the Governing Body did not transform the Council into a government department.
Precedents and Conclusion
Citing previous cases, the Court emphasized that entities like Praga Tools Corporation and Hindustan Steel Ltd., despite government connections, were not considered government departments. Similarly, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was deemed not to fall under the definition of an authority as per Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.
Separate Judgment: None.
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1975 (2) TMI 117
Issues Involved:
1. Reliance on legally unproved entries in the Pukar book.
2. Admissibility of the Register under the Evidence Act.
3. Suspicion of fabricated entries in the Pukar Register.
4. Reliance on police challans without best evidence.
5. Reliance on uncorroborated oral testimony.
6. Standard of proof for corrupt practices in elections.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Reliance on Legally Unproved Entries in the Pukar Book
The appellant contended that the High Court erred in relying on unproved entries in the Pukar book, which showed the hiring and payment for trucks used on the election date. The Supreme Court found that the High Court accepted the evidence of Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, based on this Pukar Register without sufficient scrutiny. The High Court did not adequately address the suspicious nature of these entries, nor did it ensure that they were contemporaneous and not fabricated post-election.
Issue 2: Admissibility of the Register under the Evidence Act
The appellant argued that the Pukar Register was inadmissible under the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that documents like the Pukar Register could be proved under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, even though the course of business under which the Register was kept was not proved. However, the Court emphasized that the entries in the Register should be rigorously examined to establish their reliability.
Issue 3: Suspicion of Fabricated Entries in the Pukar Register
The appellant raised concerns about the authenticity of the entries in the Pukar Register, suggesting they were not contemporaneous but fabricated. The Supreme Court noted that these suspicions were not adequately addressed by the High Court. The Court observed that the cross-examination of Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, was insufficient to clarify these doubts, and the High Court too readily accepted the entries without a thorough examination.
Issue 4: Reliance on Police Challans Without Best Evidence
The appellant contended that the High Court erred in relying on police challans of truck drivers without the best evidence from the police. The Supreme Court found that the date of the challans was not seriously disputed before the High Court, and conflicting evidence regarding the date was not adequately addressed. The Court suggested that the High Court should re-examine this issue, considering all relevant evidence, including summoning the original record from the Magistrate's Court.
Issue 5: Reliance on Uncorroborated Oral Testimony
The appellant argued that the High Court relied on uncorroborated oral testimony of truck drivers. The Supreme Court clarified that there is no inflexible rule requiring corroboration of oral testimony in election cases. However, the Court emphasized that oral evidence should be scrutinized carefully, especially in cases involving serious charges like corrupt practices. The Supreme Court found that the High Court did not scrutinize the oral evidence rigorously enough.
Issue 6: Standard of Proof for Corrupt Practices in Elections
The appellant asserted that the High Court overlooked the principle that charges of corrupt practices in elections must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the High Court adopted a standard of proof that was not strict enough. The Court reiterated that charges of corrupt practices are quasi-criminal in nature and require strict proof. The High Court's judgment lacked a rigorous examination of the evidence and did not apply the appropriate standard of proof.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The High Court was directed to re-examine the evidence, particularly the Pukar Register and the police challans, and to apply the stricter standard of proof required for charges of corrupt practices. The appellant was allowed to continue functioning as an elected member subject to the result of the election petition. The costs of the litigation were to abide by the result.
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1975 (2) TMI 116
Issues Involved:
1. Requirement of a speaking order by the magistrate while issuing process under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. Application of judicial mind by the magistrate.
3. Differing views on the necessity of recording reasons for issuing process.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Requirement of a Speaking Order by the Magistrate While Issuing Process Under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
The primary issue in all four cases was whether a magistrate, when issuing process under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), is required by law to pass a speaking order, i.e., to state reasons for doing so. The court noted that there were conflicting opinions on this matter. Some precedents, such as Mubark Karim v. Bundu and Manohar Lal Sharma v. Prem Lata, supported the necessity of a speaking order, arguing that the magistrate must apply his mind to the material and provide sufficient grounds for judicial scrutiny. In contrast, other cases like Hafizar Rahman v. Aminal Hoque and R. N. Bhalla v. Chatur Sain Gupta held that a magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing process, as the mere issuance of process does not equate to a judgment or final order.
2. Application of Judicial Mind by the Magistrate:
The court emphasized the importance of the magistrate applying his mind to the evidence before issuing process. This application of mind ensures that the magistrate forms an opinion based on sufficient grounds. The court referred to various judgments to illustrate this point. For instance, in Mubark Karim v. Bundu, the court held that the magistrate must base his opinion on sufficient grounds apparent from the order, ensuring that the discretion has been judicially exercised. Similarly, in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court highlighted that giving reasons for an order acts as a restraint on abuse of power and allows for judicial scrutiny.
3. Differing Views on the Necessity of Recording Reasons for Issuing Process:
The court analyzed different viewpoints on whether recording reasons for issuing process is necessary. Cases like Manohar Lal Sharma v. Prem Lata and Banarsi Lal Sachdeva v. Raj Rani endorsed the need for a speaking order, suggesting that it ensures the magistrate's application of mind. On the other hand, cases like M. P. Chauhan v. Nirmal Kumari Chauhan and R. N. Bhalla v. Chatur Sain Gupta argued that a magistrate is not required to pass a speaking order under Section 204 CrPC. The court noted that the absence of a requirement for recording reasons might be intentional, given the inbuilt guarantee for the magistrate to apply his mind.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that while issuing process under Section 204 CrPC, the magistrate must form an opinion that there is prima facie sufficient ground for proceeding but is not required to record reasons in a speaking order. The court emphasized that the application of judicial mind can be inferred from the record of the case, and the absence of a detailed speaking order does not invalidate the process issued. The revision petitions and the Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) should be put up before the learned Single Judges for disposal.
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1975 (2) TMI 115
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Distinction between a complaint and a police report.
3. Authority and procedure under the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO).
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
The primary issue was whether Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) applies in cases where cognizance is taken under Section 22 of the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (TOHO). The judgment clarified that TOHO is a special statute that overrides the general provisions of the CrPC. Section 22 of TOHO mandates that cognizance of offences under TOHO can only be taken on a complaint filed by an appropriate authority. The court held that since TOHO specifically prohibits the filing of a police report, the provisions of Section 167(2) CrPC, which require a police report, are not applicable. The court emphasized that "if no police report could be filed, Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code was not attracted."
2. Distinction between a Complaint and a Police Report:
The court discussed the definitions and distinctions between a "complaint" and a "police report" under the CrPC. Section 2(d) of the CrPC defines a complaint as an allegation made to a Magistrate, excluding a police report. Section 2(r) defines a police report as a report forwarded by a police officer under Section 173(2) CrPC. The court noted that TOHO, being a special statute, requires the filing of a complaint by an appropriate authority, not a police report. The court agreed with the observations from the Kerala High Court in Moosakoya v. State of Kerala, which stated that a court cannot take cognizance of an offence under a special statute like TOHO based on a police report, but only on a written complaint by an authorized officer.
3. Authority and Procedure under TOHO:
The court examined the provisions of TOHO, particularly Section 22, which restricts the filing of complaints to appropriate authorities. The court stated that TOHO provides for the regulation of removal, storage, and transplantation of human organs and the prevention of commercial dealings in human organs. It mandates that investigations into breaches of TOHO must be conducted by an authorized officer. The court highlighted that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), despite having the powers of an investigating agency, is prohibited from filing a police report under TOHO and must file a complaint petition instead. The court concluded that the procedure laid down in TOHO must be followed, and the provisions of the CrPC apply only to the extent that they do not conflict with TOHO.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, holding that the provisions of TOHO take precedence over the CrPC in cases involving offences under TOHO. The court reiterated that the special procedures under TOHO must be followed, and the filing of a police report is not permissible under TOHO. The court also noted that the appellants were not entitled to bail under Section 167(2) CrPC as the complaint was filed within the statutory period of 90 days. The judgment emphasized the need for legislative clarity and suggested that the Parliament consider amending the law to address the procedural dichotomy between special statutes like TOHO and the general provisions of the CrPC.
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1975 (2) TMI 114
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court u/Art. 227 of the Constitution.
2. Grounds for eviction under clauses (a) and (k) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rent Act.
Summary:
Jurisdiction of the High Court u/Art. 227 of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction u/Art. 227 by reappreciating evidence and disturbing findings of fact reached by the District Court. The High Court's power under Art. 227 is limited to ensuring that subordinate courts function within their authority and does not extend to correcting mere errors of fact. The High Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 227. The Supreme Court cited previous decisions, including Waryam Singh v. Amarnath and Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commr. of Hills Division, to support this principle.
Grounds for Eviction under Clauses (a) and (k) of Sub-section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rent Act:
The dispute involved a shop leased for business purposes, which the tenant also used for residence. The respondents sought eviction under clauses (a) and (k) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, alleging a change of use. The Trial Court and District Court initially found in favor of the respondents, but the High Court remanded the case to determine the dominant or primary use of the shop. Upon remand, the District Court found the primary use was for business, not residence, and thus ruled against eviction. The High Court, however, reappreciated the evidence and reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference with the District Court's findings was beyond its jurisdiction under Art. 227. The findings of fact by the District Court, being the ultimate court of fact, were binding and could not be questioned by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and reversed the decree for eviction, dismissing the respondents' suit for possession.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the decree for eviction against the appellant was reversed. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appellant throughout.
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1975 (2) TMI 113
Issues:
- Non-compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
- Right of intervention in election petition cases
- Competency of the appellant's appeal under Section 116A of the Act
- Interpretation of provisions related to withdrawal and abatement of election petitions
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around an election petition filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the election of a Member of the State Legislative Assembly. The primary issue raised was the alleged non-compliance with Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, regarding the signing of copies of the election petition and annexures. The High Court eventually dismissed the election petition based on this non-compliance, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the Act. The appellant sought to challenge the High Court's order, arguing for his right to intervene in the case despite not being a party to the original petition.
The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the Act concerning the withdrawal and abatement of election petitions. It was highlighted that withdrawal of an election petition requires leave of the High Court and specific procedures must be followed. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the actions of the third respondent amounted to a withdrawal of the petition, emphasizing that the legislative framework did not provide for intervention by an elector in all circumstances. The Court noted the absence of provisions allowing intervention in cases of collusion or fraud between the election petitioner and a candidate.
The appellant's counsel relied on judicial precedents and general principles of law governing election petitions to support the argument for intervention. However, the Court emphasized that such principles could not be applied beyond the statutory framework provided by the Act. The judgment underscored the need for legislative intervention to address gaps in the law concerning intervention in election petition cases. Ultimately, the Court held that none of the appellant's contentions were valid, leading to the dismissal of the appeal without costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the limitations of intervention by third parties in election petition cases under the existing legal framework. The judgment highlighted the importance of statutory provisions and the need for legislative clarity in addressing issues related to withdrawal, abatement, and intervention in election petitions.
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