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1982 (2) TMI 328
Issues:
1. Validity of the order restricting penalties imposed on the petitioner-assessee.
2. Violation of principles of natural justice in the impugned order.
3. The application of Section 18(2A) in relation to penalties imposed under Section 18(1).
4. Distinction between Section 18(1)(a) and Section 18(2A) in the context of penalty imposition and waiver.
5. Lack of reasons for not waiving or reducing penalties under Section 18(2A).
6. Obligation of quasi-judicial authorities to provide reasons for their decisions.
7. Importance of giving reasons in quasi-judicial proceedings under Section 18(2A).
Analysis:
1. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax imposed penalties on the petitioner-assessee under Section 18(1) of the Act, which the petitioner challenged through writ applications. The petitioner contended that the order lacked reasoning and violated natural justice principles. The Commissioner, in exercising powers under Section 18(2A), restricted the penalties to 25% without providing adequate justification. The court noted that all cases raised common legal questions and decided to address them collectively.
2. The Commissioner considered the voluntary disclosures of wealth by the assessee, cooperation in assessments, and absence of concealment. Despite finding the explanations for late submissions as bona fide, the penalties were not waived under Section 18(2A). The court highlighted the distinction between Section 18(1)(a) and Section 18(2A), emphasizing that the power to waive penalties is different from the power to impose penalties.
3. The court emphasized that the discretion to reduce or waive penalties under Section 18(2A must be exercised based on relevant factors such as the gravity of default and conduct of the assessee. The absence of reasons for not waiving or reducing penalties was deemed a violation of natural justice principles. The court cited various legal precedents to support the importance of providing reasons in quasi-judicial proceedings.
4. The court concluded that the impugned order lacked reasoning for not waiving or reducing penalties under Section 18(2A, and thus quashed the order. The matters were remitted to the Commissioner for proper disposal according to law. The judgment derived guidance from previous legal decisions in similar contexts.
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1982 (2) TMI 327
The Supreme Court granted special leave and directed the petition to be heard on merits along with other pending matters in the High Court. The guarantee will continue until the High Court's decision. (Case Citation: 1982 (2) TMI 327 - SC)
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1982 (2) TMI 326
Issues:
Violation of Sections 5(1)(aa) and 5(1)(c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947; Validity of show cause notices issued under the 1947 Act after its repeal by the 1973 Act; Admissibility of statements taken by officers other than the Director of Enforcement; Justification of penalties imposed on the appellants.
Analysis:
1. The judgment involves cases where the appellants were found guilty of contravening Sections 5(1)(aa) and 5(1)(c) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The charges were upheld by the Appellate Board based on evidence including statements from the appellants and documents seized during a search at their residence.
2. The appellants raised a legal plea regarding the issuance of show cause notices under the repealed 1947 Act after the enactment of the 1973 Act. The court held that liabilities incurred under the old Act could be enforced even after the new Act came into force, citing Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which preserves liabilities incurred under repealed enactments.
3. Another contention was the admissibility of statements taken by officers other than the Director of Enforcement under Section 19(E) of the 1947 Act. The court ruled that the Additional Director's role in conducting the enquiry did not violate Section 19(E) as it pertained to adjudication proceedings and not preliminary investigations.
4. The judgment also addressed the justification of penalties imposed on the appellants. The court considered factors such as the familial relationship between the appellants and the circumstances under which the violations occurred in determining the reasonableness of the penalties. The penalty amounts were adjusted based on these considerations.
5. Ultimately, the court dismissed two appeals while partially allowing one and reducing the aggregate penalty levied on the appellant in that case. The appellant was granted two months to pay the reduced penalty amount. The judgment highlighted the importance of considering individual circumstances in determining the appropriate penalties for violations of the Act.
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1982 (2) TMI 325
Issues:
1. Violation of Section 5(1)(aa) and Section 9(1)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and 1973.
2. Applicability of penalties for contraventions.
3. Legal sustainability of the charges and violations under the Acts.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant was found guilty of contravention of Section 5(1)(aa) and Section 9(1)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and 1973, respectively, by receiving payments from a person in India under instructions from a person abroad. The Assistant Director of Enforcement imposed a penalty of Rs. 15,000 for these violations, which was affirmed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board. The appellant admitted to receiving the amounts under instructions from his co-brother in Singapore, leading to the contraventions. The Board upheld the findings based on the appellant's statements and rejected the appeal against the penalty amount.
2. The appellant challenged the order on three grounds: firstly, disputing the establishment of contraventions under the Acts; secondly, questioning the invocation of the 1947 Act for a violation that occurred before the 1973 Act came into force; and thirdly, arguing against the charges related to the receipts in February and May 1974 under Section 9(1)(b) of the 1973 Act. The court upheld the findings of the authorities below, emphasizing that the appellant's receipt of money through cheques drawn on local banks did not absolve him of the violations.
3. Regarding the second contention, the court invoked Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, supported by Section 81(3) of the 1973 Act, to allow actions under the 1947 Act for offenses committed before the 1973 Act's enforcement. The court clarified that the old Act could be applied to violations occurring during its validity, even after its repeal, as per Section 81(3) of the new Act. This interpretation was consistent with a previous judgment on a similar issue.
4. Finally, the court addressed the third contention concerning the Explanation to Section 9(1)(b) of the 1973 Act, which deals with payments received without corresponding inward remittances. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the Explanation required proof of receipt on behalf of an authorized dealer, stating that it applied to payments received by order or on behalf of an authorized dealer. As the appellant's receipts were not on behalf of an authorized dealer, the court found no merit in the appellant's contentions, leading to the dismissal of the appeal without costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 324
Issues:
1. Determination of whether rental income is classified as income from house property or business income.
2. Allowability of expenditure for upkeep and maintenance of plant and machinery.
3. Carry forward and set off of losses incurred in earlier years.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to two references, M.C.C. No. 39 of 1978 and M.C.C. No. 334 of 1978, involving distinct legal questions. M.C.C. No. 39 of 1978 concerns the assessment year 1974-75, while M.C.C. No. 334 of 1978 pertains to the assessment year 1966-67. The assessee, a private limited company engaged in oil milling, ceased its milling operations in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1965-66. Subsequently, the company rented out some of its godowns previously used for storing raw materials. The primary issue revolves around determining whether the rental income from the godowns should be classified as income from house property under Section 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, or as business income under Section 28.
The judgment highlights the essential distinction between income from house property and business income based on the status of the asset in question. Citing precedents like Commr. of EPT, Bombay City v. Shri. Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd., Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commr. of EPT, and New Savan Sugar and Gur Refining Co. Ltd. v. CIT, Calcutta, the court emphasizes that if the godowns remained business assets and were leased out as such, the rental income would be considered business income. Conversely, if the godowns ceased to be business assets due to the discontinuation of the business, the rental income would be treated as income from house property. The court criticizes the Tribunal for not adequately considering these principles in its decision, necessitating a fresh assessment based on the correct legal framework.
Furthermore, the judgment addresses the deductibility of expenses incurred for the upkeep of plant and machinery, contingent upon the classification of the rental income. If the godowns are deemed business assets, the expenditure would qualify as revenue expenditure; otherwise, it may not be allowed as a deduction. Similarly, the question of carrying forward and setting off losses from previous years hinges on whether the rental income is categorized as business income or income from house property. Precedents such as Lakshmi Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, Madras, and CIT, Lucknow v. Vikram Cotton Mills Ltd. are referenced in this context.
In conclusion, the court rules that the Tribunal erred in its classification of the rental income and instructs a rehearing of the appeals with a directive to apply the correct legal principles. The Tribunal is granted the discretion to consider fresh evidence and is tasked with reevaluating the issues in light of the court's observations. No costs are awarded in relation to these references, emphasizing the need for a thorough reconsideration of the matters at hand.
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1982 (2) TMI 323
Issues:
1. Validity of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer.
2. Compliance with Section 17(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court in interfering with the allotment decision.
4. Application of Section 16(1)(b) of the Act.
5. Possession and occupation of the landlady.
6. Justifiability of the High Court's decision.
Analysis:
1. The appeal challenges the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which quashed the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanded the case for reconsideration. The case revolves around the initial allotment of premises to the appellant without the landlady's nomination, leading to subsequent legal proceedings.
2. The central issue concerns the compliance with Section 17(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, which mandates that the landlord nominates a tenant when a part of the building is vacated voluntarily. The Act aims to protect landlords from undesirable tenants and safeguard their right to choose occupants. The District Judge canceled the appellant's allotment due to non-compliance with this provision.
3. The jurisdiction of the High Court in interfering with the allotment decision was challenged. The High Court's intervention was based on the failure to follow statutory provisions and ensure the landlady's right to nominate a tenant. The High Court's decision to remand the case for fresh consideration was upheld by the Supreme Court.
4. The landlady's application under Section 16(1)(b) for the release of the building in her favor was not adequately considered by the Rent Control authorities. The failure to address this application contributed to the legal complexities and subsequent appeals.
5. The issue of possession and occupation by the landlady was crucial in determining the applicability of Section 17(2). The Court clarified that physical presence is not the sole criterion for possession, and various forms of occupation, such as leaving household effects, can constitute possession in legal terms.
6. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing the importance of upholding the spirit of Section 17(2) to protect landlords' interests. The Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the High Court's directive for a fresh examination of all relevant aspects of the case.
This detailed analysis outlines the key legal issues, statutory provisions, court interventions, and the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court in the case.
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1982 (2) TMI 322
Issues Involved:
1. Locus standi of respondents to file an appeal.
2. Impact of the death of a landholder on proceedings under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961.
3. Interpretation of the Act concerning the determination of surplus land.
4. Validity of the High Court decision in Dadarao Kashiram's case.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Locus Standi of Respondents to File an Appeal:
The court addressed whether respondents 1 to 4 had the locus standi to file an appeal against the Special Deputy Collector's order dropping the proceedings initiated by Bhikoba's return. The court affirmed that respondents 1 to 4, being former landlords of the land in question, were not mere strangers to the proceedings. They had a legitimate interest as they stood to benefit from the distribution of surplus land under the Act. Consequently, they were entitled to challenge any order affecting the extent of surplus land. The court rejected the contention that respondents lacked locus standi.
2. Impact of the Death of a Landholder on Proceedings:
The primary issue was whether proceedings under the Act become infructuous if a landholder dies before the notification of surplus land is published and possession is taken. The court clarified that the liability to surrender surplus land relates back to the appointed day, or the date of possession/acquisition of excess land, or the date of conversion of land into a different class, depending on the circumstances. The death of the landholder does not extinguish this liability. The heirs inherit the land subject to the same obligations, and the proceedings must continue to determine and surrender the surplus land as if the deceased landholder were still alive.
3. Interpretation of the Act Concerning the Determination of Surplus Land:
The court examined the scheme and object of the Act, which aims for equitable distribution of agricultural land by imposing a ceiling on holdings. The determination of surplus land must be made with reference to specific dates (appointed day, date of possession/acquisition of excess land, or date of conversion). The Act's provisions, such as Sections 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, and 21, were interpreted to support the conclusion that the liability to surrender surplus land persists beyond the death of the landholder. The court emphasized that the Act's purpose would be frustrated if proceedings were dropped due to the landholder's death before the declaration of surplus land.
4. Validity of the High Court Decision in Dadarao Kashiram's Case:
The appellants relied on the High Court's decision in Dadarao Kashiram's case, which suggested that proceedings become infructuous upon the landholder's death before the notification under Section 21. The Supreme Court overruled this decision, stating that it was incorrect to apply principles from taxation laws to the Act. The court reiterated that the Act's provisions and objectives necessitate the continuation of proceedings to determine and surrender surplus land, regardless of the landholder's death. The introduction of an explicit provision in the amended Act (second paragraph of new Section 3(2)) was seen as declaratory, reinforcing the existing legal position rather than altering it.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that proceedings under the Act must continue even if the landholder dies before the declaration of surplus land. The heirs of the deceased landholder are bound by the same obligations and must participate in the proceedings to determine and surrender surplus land. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was affirmed.
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1982 (2) TMI 321
Issues Involved:
1. Execution of Death Sentence
2. Commutation of Sentence
3. Judicial Discretion and Administration of Justice
4. Presidential Clemency
Summary:
1. Execution of Death Sentence:
The petitioner, Harbans Singh, along with three others, was involved in the murder of four individuals. The Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit, sentenced them to death on May 1, 1975, which was affirmed by the High Court of Allahabad on October 20, 1975. Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were filed by the co-accused, with varying outcomes: Jeeta Singh's SLP was dismissed, leading to his execution, while Kashmira Singh's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Harbans Singh's SLP and Review Petition were dismissed, and his mercy petition to the President was also rejected.
2. Commutation of Sentence:
The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner and his co-accused were sentenced to death by a common judgment, with no distinction in their involvement in the crime. Since Kashmira Singh's death sentence was commuted, it would be unjust to execute Harbans Singh. The Court recommended that the President of India exercise his power u/s Article 72 of the Constitution to commute the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment.
3. Judicial Discretion and Administration of Justice:
The Court highlighted the inconsistency in the outcomes for the co-accused, emphasizing that it would be a violation of the norms governing the administration of justice to execute Harbans Singh while his co-accused received commutation. The Court directed that prior to the execution of any death sentence, the Jail Superintendent must ascertain if any co-accused's sentence has been commuted and inform the superior authorities to take prompt action.
4. Presidential Clemency:
The Court acknowledged that the President had already rejected the petitioner's mercy petition but recommended reconsideration in light of new facts that were not available earlier. The Court emphasized the importance of comity between judicial powers and the President's powers, suggesting that the President may commute the death sentence based on the Court's recommendation.
Order:
The execution of the death sentence was stayed until the President's decision, and a copy of the judgment was to be forwarded to the President. Justice Amarendra Nath Sen concurred with the Chief Justice's order but made additional observations on the inherent powers of the Court to prevent manifest injustice and the necessity of referring the matter back to the President for reconsideration.
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1982 (2) TMI 320
Issues:
1. Interpretation of a deed as a mortgage by way of conditional sale or a sale with a condition of repurchase.
2. Application of the principle of res judicata in relation to findings in previous suits.
3. Consideration of the intention of the parties in determining the nature of the transaction.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute over the nature of a deed, whether it constituted a mortgage by way of conditional sale or a sale with a condition of repurchase. The deed in question was executed in 1950, and subsequent transactions led to conflicting claims regarding the rights to the property. The court analyzed the language of the deed, surrounding circumstances, and relevant legal precedents to determine the true nature of the transaction.
2. The application of the principle of res judicata was raised by one of the respondents, arguing that findings in a previous suit should bind the appellant. However, the court found three reasons why the decision in the previous suit did not operate as res judicata against the appellant. These reasons included the effacement of the earlier judgment, the finding being adverse to the appellant without an opportunity to appeal, and the dismissal of the earlier suit.
3. The court emphasized the importance of considering the intention of the parties in determining the nature of the transaction. Legal precedents were cited to highlight that the relationship of debtor and creditor, as well as the presence of a charge on the property conveyed, were crucial factors in distinguishing between a mortgage and a sale with a condition of repurchase. The court carefully analyzed the language of the deed, absence of interest provisions, possession transfer, and the stipulated repurchase period to conclude that the transaction was a sale with a condition of repurchase.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deed in question was a sale with a condition of repurchase based on the interpretation of the deed and surrounding circumstances. The judgment highlighted the importance of considering the intention of the parties and applying legal principles to determine the nature of the transaction. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs due to the extensive litigation involved in the case.
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1982 (2) TMI 319
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the writ petition.
2. Validity of the additional panel prepared in 1973.
3. Authority of the Director of Public Instruction in preparing the panel.
4. Eligibility of respondents-writ petitioners for appointment.
5. Appointment of candidates in different circles.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The appellants contended that the writ petition should fail as some of the petitioners had already been appointed to the posts of primary teachers, relying on the precedent set in Ganesh Nayek & Ors. Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. However, the court rejected this contention, stating that Order 1 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows joint applications if they arise out of common questions of law and fact, applies to writ proceedings. The court emphasized that dismissing the entire writ petition on technical grounds would be against the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The court referenced Salil Kumar Datta J.'s decision in N. N. Singh & Ors. v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works & Ors., which held that if the claims are severable, the petition should not fail entirely if some petitioners are disentitled to relief.
2. Validity of the Additional Panel Prepared in 1973:
The appellants argued that the respondents-writ petitioners were included in an additional panel prepared in 1973, which was not authorized. The court examined the records and found that a single panel consisting of 2231 candidates was prepared, which included names from two lists dated July 27, 1973, and July 29, 1973. The court held that the inclusion of names in two lists does not constitute two separate panels and that the Director of Public Instruction referred to one panel in his communication.
3. Authority of the Director of Public Instruction in Preparing the Panel:
The appellants contended that the Director of Public Instruction had no authority to prepare an additional panel and that the respondents-writ petitioners were not selected by the Advisory-cum-selection Committee. The court found this contention meritless, stating that the Advisory Committee assists the Director, but the final panel is prepared by the Director of Public Instruction. The court noted that there was no evidence or allegation of malafide or bias against the Director. The court also found no record to show that the Advisory Committee did not select the 199 candidates included in the list dated July 29, 1973.
4. Eligibility of Respondents-Writ Petitioners for Appointment:
The appellants argued that the respondents-writ petitioners were not eligible for appointment as they were not selected by the Advisory Committee. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the District School Board, having appointed these candidates in deputation vacancies from time to time, could not now challenge their eligibility. The court emphasized that the Advisory Committee's role is to assist, and the final authority lies with the Director of Public Instruction.
5. Appointment of Candidates in Different Circles:
The appellants contended that candidates approved for one circle should not be appointed in another circle. The court did not find it necessary to decide on this point, stating that appointments should be made in accordance with Rule 3(2) of the Rules, as directed by the learned judge.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the directions of the learned judge to consider and absorb the respondents-writ petitioners in permanent vacancies. The court found no merit in the contentions raised by the appellants and emphasized the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience in its judgment. There was no order as to costs.
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1982 (2) TMI 318
Issues Involved:
1. Whether non-candidates can be impleaded as parties to an election petition.
2. Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Summary:
Issue 1: Whether non-candidates can be impleaded as parties to an election petition.
The appellants, including the Chief Minister and two Ministers of West Bengal, were impleaded by the first respondent in an election petition questioning the election of the second respondent. The appellants argued that they could not be impleaded as they were not candidates at the election. The High Court of Calcutta dismissed their application to strike out their names, leading to this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the concept of "proper parties" is not relevant in election law. Only those persons who are expressly directed to be impleaded by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, can be made parties to an election petition. The Court emphasized that the election petition is a statutory proceeding, and only those rules which the statute makes and applies are relevant. The Court concluded that only candidates at the election may be joined as respondents to an election petition under Sections 82 and 86(4) of the Act, and no others.
Issue 2: Interpretation of relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951. It noted that the right to elect, be elected, and dispute an election are statutory rights subject to statutory limitations. The Court reiterated that the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is a complete and self-contained code for election disputes.
The Court referred to Sections 81, 82, and 86(4) of the Act to determine who may be joined as respondents to an election petition. Section 82 specifies that the petitioner shall join as respondents the returned candidates and any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made. Section 86(4) allows any candidate not already a respondent to be joined as a respondent. The Court found no provision allowing non-candidates to be joined as respondents.
The Court also addressed the argument that the Civil Procedure Code applies to election petitions, noting that it applies only "as far as may be" and subject to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. The Court concluded that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be invoked to permit what the Act does not allow.
The appeal was allowed, and the names of the appellants and the seventh respondent were directed to be struck out from the array of parties in the election petition. The Court also considered several decisions cited before it, including S.B. Adityen & Anr. v. S. Kandaswami & Ors., Dwijendra Lal Sen Gupta v. Herekrishna Koner, H.R. Gokhale v. Bharucha Noshir C. & Ors., and S. Iqbal Singh v. S. Gurdas Singh Badal & Ors.
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1982 (2) TMI 317
Issues involved:
The judgment involves the interpretation of the Madhya Pradesh Entertainments Duty and Advertisement Tax Act, 1936 regarding the liability to pay entertainment duty for running a Video Games Parlour.
Summary:
Issue 1: Interpretation of the term 'entertainment' under the Act
The petitioners, running a Video Games Parlour, challenged notices demanding entertainment duty. The Act defines 'entertainment' as any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, or sport for which persons are admitted for payment. The question was whether coins inserted in the slot for playing games constitute payment for admission to entertainment. The definition of 'entertainment' is inclusive, and the tax is on the spectator who witnesses amusement or entertainment. The court held that the payment made by a person to play games in the parlour is not payment for admission to entertainment as contemplated by the Act. The petitioners do not receive payment for admission to entertainment when collecting amounts inserted by players. Therefore, no duty is payable under Section 3 of the Act for such payments, and the notices of demand were quashed.
Issue 2: Scope of charging section and liability of the proprietor
The charging section of the Act requires every proprietor of an entertainment to pay duty for admission. The court emphasized that for an activity to be considered entertainment, it must likely amuse or entertain a person. In the case of the Video Games Parlour, visitors derive entertainment from their own performance in playing the games, not from the exhibition or performance offered by the petitioners. The court ruled that the activity of the petitioners should be likely to amuse or entertain a person to fall under the charging section. As visitors do not see or hear anything entertaining upon entering the parlour, and only derive thrill from their own performance, no duty is payable by the petitioners under the Act.
Conclusion:
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh quashed the notices of demand issued by the respondent, stating that the petitioners are not liable to pay entertainment duty under the Act. Each party was directed to bear their own costs, and any security amount was to be refunded to the petitioners.
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1982 (2) TMI 316
Issues Involved:
1. Whether it is mandatory for the Investigating Police Officer to hand over the seal used for sealing incriminating articles and samples to a non-official immediately or soon thereafter.
2. Whether the non-appearance or non-production of such a non-official, who was entrusted with the seal, would by itself be fatal to the prosecution case.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Mandatory Handing Over of Seal to Non-Official
The court examined whether there is any statutory or inferential provision requiring the Investigating Police Officer to hand over the seal used for sealing incriminating articles to a non-official immediately or soon after its use. The court found no direct or inferential statutory provision or instruction mandating this practice. The only provision remotely relevant was para 22.16(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, which mandates sealing parcels with the seal impression of a responsible officer but does not require handing over the seal to a non-official. The court noted, "It is discretionary for the Investigating Officer to convert the sealed property into a parcel for special protection thereof or not."
Additionally, the court observed that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and its Rules, which deal extensively with the sealing and despatch of samples, do not mandate that the seal used should be entrusted to a non-official. The court emphasized that there is no statutory or executive instruction requiring the Investigating Officer to hand over the seal to a non-official, nor is there any requirement for the non-official to be produced as a witness. The court concluded, "There is neither any mandatory nor even a directory provision requiring that the seal used by the Investigating Officer must be handed over to a third person forthwith."
Issue 2: Non-Production of Non-Official Witness
The court addressed whether the non-production of a non-official witness, who was entrusted with the seal, would be fatal to the prosecution case. The court highlighted that there is no statutory requirement for producing such a witness. The court stated, "There is no provision or instruction having statutory force which spells out a binding requirement that the person to whom such a seal might have been entrusted must be produced by the prosecution."
The court further reasoned that the mere handing over of a seal to a non-official does not ensure against tampering, as the non-official may not necessarily be of unimpeachable integrity. The court observed, "There can be no guarantee that the non-official to whom such a seal is entrusted would be one of unimpeachable integrity far above a responsible police official amenable to administrative discipline."
The court also noted that the argument for handing over the seal to a non-official stems from an inherent mistrust of police officers, which is not a judicial approach. The court cited authoritative precedents emphasizing the presumption that public officials act honestly. The court concluded, "The success or failure of criminal prosecution should not turn wholly on the technicality of the handing over or non-handing over of the investigative seal or the production or non-production only of a witness with regard thereto."
Overruling Previous Judgments
The court overruled previous judgments that suggested the necessity of handing over the seal to a non-official and the fatal consequence of non-production of such a witness. Specifically, the court overruled the decisions in Hans Raj v. State of Punjab and State of Punjab v. Bur Singh, which had held that the non-production of a non-official witness to whom the seal was handed over was fatal to the prosecution case. The court stated, "For the very detailed reasons recorded in the earlier part of the judgment and with the greatest respect to the learned Judges we are unable to subscribe to the view that it is either mandatory to hand over the seal for the safe custody to a non-official or on his non-production, a finding in favour of the prosecution cannot be given."
The court emphasized that criminal trials should focus on the credibility and acceptability of the evidence on record, rather than technicalities. The court stated, "The substantial issues of a criminal trial like the proof and punishment of serious crime ought not to be converted into a plaything of technicalities."
Conclusion
The court concluded that:
1. There is neither a statutory requirement nor a precedential mandate for handing over the seal used by the police officer in the course of an investigation to a third person forthwith.
2. The non-production of such a witness cannot by itself affect the merits of the trial.
The court directed that both criminal revisions go back for decision on merits before a Single Bench.
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1982 (2) TMI 315
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
2. Determination of whether rice bran qualifies as an essential commodity.
3. Analysis of the term "foodstuffs" under Section 2(a)(v) of the Act.
4. Consideration of rice bran as a foodstuff for human consumption.
5. Reference to previous court decisions regarding the classification of rice bran.
Analysis:
The judgment by the Supreme Court involved an appeal regarding the regulation of rice bran under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The appellants, dealers in rice products, challenged the Haryana Rice Bran (Distribution and Price) Control Order, 1967, arguing that rice bran is not an essential commodity. The Court examined the provisions of the Act, particularly Section 3, which empowers the government to regulate essential commodities. The Act allows for delegation of powers to State Governments, as seen in the notification issued by the Central Government on July 24, 1967.
The key issue revolved around whether rice bran qualifies as an essential commodity under the Act. The Court analyzed the definition of "essential commodity" under Section 2(a), focusing on sub-clauses (i) and (v). Sub-clause (i) includes "cattle fodder" within the definition, while sub-clause (v) encompasses "foodstuffs." The Court deliberated on whether rice bran could be classified as either cattle fodder or foodstuff to fall under the purview of essential commodities regulation.
The Court determined that rice bran could be considered a foodstuff within the meaning of Section 2(a)(v) of the Act. It emphasized that foodstuffs encompass items consumed by various living beings, not limited to humans. The Court cited dictionary definitions of "food" to support its conclusion that rice bran, commonly used as feed for livestock, qualifies as a foodstuff. Therefore, the power conferred by Section 3 of the Act could be utilized to regulate the production, sale, or supply of rice bran.
Additionally, the Court addressed arguments suggesting rice bran's potential for human consumption. While acknowledging claims regarding the edible uses of rice bran oil, the Court sought further evidence to support such assertions. The judgment highlighted the possibility of technological advancements enabling rice bran to become a common food item for human consumption in the future.
Furthermore, the Court referenced a previous decision regarding the classification of rice bran as cattle fodder but emphasized its stance that rice bran, being a foodstuff, falls under the category of essential commodities. The judgment dismissed the appeal, concluding that rice bran qualifies as an essential commodity subject to regulation under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
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1982 (2) TMI 314
Issues Involved:
1. Equal Pay for Equal Work
2. Discrimination in Pay Scales
3. Jurisdiction under Article 32
4. Role of Pay Commission
5. Constitutional Interpretation
Summary:
1. Equal Pay for Equal Work:
The petitioner, a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force, invoked Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting the constitutional goal of "equal pay for equal work" as proclaimed by Article 39(d). The petitioner argued that his duties were as onerous as those of other drivers in different departments, yet he received a lower pay scale.
2. Discrimination in Pay Scales:
The petitioner highlighted the disparity in pay scales between Driver-Constables in the Delhi Police Force and drivers in other departments like the Railway Protection Force and various non-Secretariat and Secretariat offices. The petitioner contended that there was no justification for this discrimination, especially since their duties and responsibilities were similar, if not more arduous.
3. Jurisdiction under Article 32:
The Supreme Court acknowledged the petitioner's right to approach the highest court for redress under Article 32, emphasizing that the equality clauses of the Constitution must have substantive meaning for everyone, including the underprivileged.
4. Role of Pay Commission:
The Third Pay Commission had considered the claims of all drivers as a common category but separated the case of constable-drivers, intending to consider them along with other police personnel. The petitioner argued that this separation led to the neglect of special considerations applicable to driver-constables, resulting in an unjust pay scale.
5. Constitutional Interpretation:
The Court held that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but a constitutional goal deducible from Articles 14 and 16, read in light of the Preamble and Article 39(d). The Court rejected the respondents' argument that different departments justify different pay scales irrespective of identical duties and responsibilities.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, directing the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and other driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on par with the drivers of the Railway Protection Force, effective from January 1, 1973. The Court emphasized that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" must be recognized and acted upon to ensure justice and equality.
Petition allowed.
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1982 (2) TMI 313
Issues:
- Appeal against Central Excise duty order
- Classification of varnished cloth under Central Excise Tariff
- Distinction between varnished cloth and plastic materials
Analysis:
The appeal was filed by a Plastic Processing Company against an order passed by the Collector of Central Excise Calcutta, directing the payment of Central Excise duty amounting to a specific sum under rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. A personal hearing was granted to the appellants by the Board, during which the Advocate representing the company submitted various documents and samples to support their case. The Advocate argued that the varnished cloth manufactured by the company is distinct from plastic materials covered under the Central Excise Tariff. The Board carefully considered the submissions and observed that the varnish used by the company, although containing synthetic resin, differs from plastic materials as described in the tariff.
The Board noted that the varnish used by the company, falling under a specific item in the Central Excise Tariff, cannot be classified as a preparation of cellulose derivatives or other artificial plastic materials. Additionally, the Board agreed with the appellant's contention that varnished cloth is different from cotton fabric impregnated, coated, or laminated with cellulose derivatives or plastic materials. The Board recognized varnished cloth as a separate class of fabric with distinct use and appearance compared to normal coated cotton fabrics. Referring to a specific standard, the Board highlighted the description of "yellow varnished cloth" as manufactured with a clean insulating varnish consisting of a drying oil and resin.
It was clarified that the classification of materials received by the appellant from others was not the subject of consideration in this case. The Board also acknowledged that a type of varnish is formed before being used to coat cotton fabric, emphasizing that the question of its dutiability was not under consideration. Consequently, the Board allowed the appeal and overturned the Collector's order, ruling in favor of the Plastic Processing Company.
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1982 (2) TMI 312
The Government of India considered a revision application regarding exemption Notification No. 71/78. The petitioners were not eligible for the concession under the notification as they did not satisfy the conditions in both clause (a)(ii) and clause (aa). The order-in-appeal was upheld, and the revision application was rejected.
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1982 (2) TMI 311
The judgment in Government of India v. Shri D.N. Mehta and K.L. Rekhi (1982) involved the classification of paraldehyde (IP) as a non-excisable product. The Assistant Collector classified it as a P.P. medicine due to differences in its advertised use compared to the pharmacopoeia. The Appellate Collector upheld this classification. However, the petitioners argued that referencing additional research on the product did not change its pharmacopoeial nature. The Government accepted this argument and allowed the revision application.
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1982 (2) TMI 310
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners were liable to pay Central Excise duty on dyed/processed worsted woollen yarn.
2. Whether Notification No. 236 of 1976 applies to the petitioners' case.
3. Whether the definition of "manufacture" under Central Excise law includes dyeing of woollen yarn.
4. Whether the duty paid at the grey stage exempts the yarn from further duty upon processing.
Analysis:
1. The petitioners were engaged in dyeing/processing worsted woollen yarn without obtaining a Central Excise license and cleared yarn without paying duty. The Assistant Collector held that duty became leviable under Item 18B of the Central Excise Tariff upon processing/dyeing, and the petitioners failed to apply for proforma credit, leading to a confirmed duty demand. The appeal was rejected due to lack of proof of duty payment on the grey yarn.
2. In the revision application, the petitioners argued that dyed yarn was not distinct from grey yarn under Item 18B, and Notification No. 236 of 1976 did not apply. They contended that the dyed yarn should not be liable for further duty as it remained worsted woollen yarn throughout the process. They also claimed that evidence of duty payment was overlooked in the appellate order.
3. The petitioners further argued that the process of dyeing woollen yarn did not fall under the definition of "manufacture" in Central Excise law, unlike fabrics. The Government agreed, stating that dyeing duty paid grey yarn does not create a new commodity, and the duty should only be paid once based on the form in which the yarn is cleared from the factory.
4. Consequently, the Government set aside the order-in-appeal and allowed the revision application, holding that duty paid at the grey stage exempted the yarn from further duty upon processing. The judgment clarified that the duty should only be levied once, depending on the form in which the yarn is cleared from the factory, and dyeing of woollen yarn was not considered a separate manufacturing process under the Central Excise law.
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1982 (2) TMI 309
The judgment by the Central Government of India in the case of Shri D. N. Mehta involved a dispute regarding the refund of duty paid twice on an I.C. Engine. The petitioners' claim for refund was initially rejected due to procedural reasons, but the Government accepted their contention that the case involved double payment and allowed the revision application.
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