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1987 (2) TMI 533
Issues Involved:
1. Grant or refusal of bail in substantive appeals on capital charges.
2. Delay in the hearing of appeals.
3. Constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
4. Conditions in jails and their impact on bail considerations.
5. Legal and judicial guidelines for granting bail during the pendency of appeals.
6. The role of the judiciary in balancing individual liberty with societal interests.
7. The impact of prolonged incarceration on the accused and the legal system.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Grant or Refusal of Bail in Substantive Appeals on Capital Charges:
The judgment addresses the necessity for certainty and uniformity in the discretionary arena of granting or refusing bail in substantive appeals on capital charges. The petitioner, convicted under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and 333 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, was sentenced to life imprisonment and denied bail during the trial. His co-appellants were granted bail, but he was not, as he was considered the main assailant.
2. Delay in the Hearing of Appeals:
The petitioner renewed his bail request due to the prolonged delay in the hearing of his appeal. The court noted that delays in hearing appeals for capital offenses within the High Court necessitated firm judicial guidelines. The judgment emphasizes that delays in hearing appeals, caused by the court's own limitations, are a significant issue that must be addressed.
3. Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial under Article 21:
The judgment extensively discusses the constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21, which includes the expeditious disposal of substantive appeals. It is highlighted that prolonged incarceration during the pendency of appeals, when caused by the court's inability to hear the appeals promptly, violates the spirit of the right to a speedy trial.
4. Conditions in Jails and Their Impact on Bail Considerations:
The judgment acknowledges the sub-human conditions prevalent in jails, particularly in Bihar, which further justify the need for granting bail during the pendency of appeals. It is noted that the prison conditions are deplorable, and prolonged incarceration in such conditions is inhumane.
5. Legal and Judicial Guidelines for Granting Bail During the Pendency of Appeals:
The judgment establishes that the issue of delay in hearing appeals is directly relevant for the grant of bail. It is held that the reasonable period for hearing such appeals should not exceed one year. If the High Court cannot hear the appeal within this period, the appellant should be granted bail unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise.
6. The Role of the Judiciary in Balancing Individual Liberty with Societal Interests:
The judgment emphasizes the judiciary's role in balancing individual liberty with societal interests. It is noted that while the right to bail should be considered, it should not be granted in cases involving particularly heinous crimes that shock the conscience of society. Such cases should be heard out of turn and disposed of within one year.
7. The Impact of Prolonged Incarceration on the Accused and the Legal System:
The judgment highlights the irreparable harm caused by prolonged incarceration, particularly when the accused is ultimately acquitted. It is noted that the legal system does not provide adequate compensation for such wrongful imprisonment, and the lost years cannot be compensated in monetary terms.
Separate Judgments:
Concurring Judgment:
N.P. Singh, J., concurs with the judgment, agreeing with the principles and guidelines established for granting bail during the pendency of appeals.
Dissenting Judgment:
S.H.S. Abidi, J., dissents, disagreeing with the principle that an appellant should be considered for bail if the appeal is not disposed of within one year. He argues that fixing a rigid period for granting bail without considering the merits of the case is not appropriate. He emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that considers both individual liberty and societal interests.
Conclusion:
The judgment establishes important guidelines for granting bail during the pendency of appeals in capital cases, emphasizing the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the need to address delays in the judicial system. It balances individual rights with societal interests and highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring justice.
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1987 (2) TMI 532
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the requirement of sanction for prosecution of a public servant.
2. Determining the applicability of Section 197 to a public servant removable by an authority other than the Government.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an appeal filed against the rejection of a Revision Petition by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant faced a complaint under Sections 120(b), 467, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, challenging the maintainability of the prosecution due to the absence of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court held that Section 197 applies only when a public servant is not removable from office except by or with the sanction of the Government. Since the appellant could be removed by a competent authority without government sanction, Section 197 was deemed inapplicable.
The appellant argued that post-nationalization, being in a bank, he qualifies as a public servant under Section 197. Additionally, it was contended that the authority empowered to remove the appellant operates under regulations approved by the Government, suggesting the need for government sanction. However, the Courts maintained that the appellant's removable status by a non-government authority does not trigger the requirement for government sanction under Section 197.
Section 197 of the CrPC was examined to determine its applicability, emphasizing that it applies only when a public servant is irremovable from office without government sanction. The judgment clarified that even if the appellant is considered a public servant, Section 197 does not apply due to his removable status by an authority other than the Government. The argument that regulations empowering the removal authority are government-approved was dismissed, affirming that the appellant's removal did not necessitate government sanction.
In conclusion, the Courts upheld that the appellant's status as a removable public servant by a non-government authority precludes the need for government sanction under Section 197. The judgment emphasized the specific criteria outlined in the provision and dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decision.
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1987 (2) TMI 531
Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP) and Special Inspector General of Police (SIGP) in imposing punishment and hearing appeals.
2. Delegation of disciplinary powers by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to the DIGP.
3. Retroactive effect of administrative orders.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner, a police officer, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings resulting in a punishment of compulsory retirement by the DIGP, later modified to reversion by the SIGP. The legality of these actions was challenged primarily on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the DIGP and SIGP in imposing and reviewing the punishment. The counsel for the petitioner contended that as per the Rajasthan Civil Services Rules, the Disciplinary Authority for the petitioner should have been the IGP, and thus, the actions of the DIGP and SIGP were without jurisdiction.
2. Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Civil Services Rules specifies the Disciplinary Authority for government servants. It was argued that the IGP, being the Head of the Department for the petitioner, should have been the competent authority to impose disciplinary actions. The counsel highlighted that the DIGP lacked the authority to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement on the petitioner without delegation of power by the IGP as per the rules.
3. The legality of the retrospective delegation of disciplinary powers by the IGP to the DIGP was also contested. The government advocate argued that the delegation made effective from a prior date validated the actions of the DIGP. However, the petitioner's counsel emphasized that administrative orders cannot have retrospective effect, citing legal principles and precedents that support the notion that administrative orders are effective only prospectively and cannot validate actions taken prior to the delegation of powers.
4. The court analyzed the relevant rules and legal principles, including the distinction between administrative orders and statutory rules, to determine the validity of the disciplinary actions against the petitioner. Relying on precedents and established legal principles, the court concluded that the order passed by the DIGP imposing the punishment on the petitioner was not authorized and should be set aside. Consequently, the appellate order by the SIGP was also invalidated.
5. The court allowed the writ petition, quashing the notification with retrospective effect and setting aside the orders passed by the DIGP and SIGP. It was clarified that the ruling did not prevent the State Government from taking lawful action against the petitioner. The judgment highlighted the importance of adherence to legal procedures and the scope of authority when imposing disciplinary actions on government servants.
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1987 (2) TMI 530
Issues:
Appeal arising from a suit for declaration of entitlement to salary as a trained graduate teacher, admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage, interpretation of pleadings, adverse inference for non-production of documents, plea of limitation, compliance with Section 80 of CPC.
Analysis:
The second appeal stemmed from a suit filed by the respondent, a teacher, seeking a declaration of entitlement to the salary of a trained graduate teacher from June 1963. The lower appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, prompting the State Government's appeal. The substantial question of law admitted for appeal focused on the correctness of the lower appellate court's decision in accordance with the law.
The State Government raised two key points in the appeal. Firstly, it contested the admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage. The plaintiff had submitted various documents, including diplomas and certificates, which the lower appellate court deemed necessary for a just decision. The High Court upheld the lower court's discretion in considering the documents, finding no grounds for interference.
Secondly, the State argued misinterpretation of pleadings by the lower court. It contended that specific denials were lacking, leading to erroneous conclusions. However, the court highlighted the rule of 'traverse,' allowing inferences in the absence of specific denials, which was valid in this case.
Regarding non-production of documents by the State, an adverse inference was drawn by the lower court. The High Court emphasized the State's duty as a virtuous litigant to disclose all relevant documents, criticizing the State's plea of privileged documents as unjustified and deprecated.
The plea of limitation was also raised by the State, but the High Court found it untenable, emphasizing the State's obligation to meet honest claims, even if time-barred. Compliance with Section 80 of CPC was also scrutinized, with the court condemning the State's callous approach and failure to consider claims before litigation.
Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the appeal, imposing costs due to the State's disregard for the law. Despite the fair submissions by the State's counsel, the court emphasized the importance of upholding legal standards and penalizing non-compliance.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed various legal issues arising from the appeal, emphasizing the importance of adherence to legal procedures, fair litigation practices, and the State's duty to meet just claims.
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1987 (2) TMI 529
Issues:
Delegation of quasi-judicial powers by the Commissioner under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
Analysis:
The case involved petitions challenging property tax valuation made by a Municipal Corporation under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. The petitioners objected to the valuation and contended that the Commissioner had no authority to delegate powers under Section 148 of the Act. The main issue was whether the power to determine objections to valuation under Section 148 could be delegated by the Commissioner to any officer of the Corporation as per Section 69(4) of the Act. The Supreme Court precedent established that judicial power cannot be delegated unless expressly permitted by law.
The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Act, specifically Section 69(4), which empowers the Commissioner to delegate powers to any officer of the Corporation. It was argued that this provision only pertained to administrative powers, but the Court held that it enabled delegation of all powers conferred upon the Commissioner by the Act, including quasi-judicial powers. The Court referenced a Supreme Court decision to emphasize that control and superintendence in delegation of quasi-judicial functions do not imply intervention in decision-making but rather administrative control.
The Court rejected the argument that the power to decide objections could not be delegated to an officer who participated in the valuation process, noting no evidence of bias. It clarified that the duty to make a provisional valuation and decide objections both rested with the Commissioner. The Court distinguished between objections hearing and appeals, stating that appeals were under the jurisdiction of the District Court. Ultimately, the petitions were dismissed, parties were to bear their own costs, and any security amount was to be refunded to the petitioners. Interim stay orders were also vacated.
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1987 (2) TMI 528
The appeal involved a dispute regarding disallowance under section 37(3A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that expenses incurred on running and maintenance of a jeep should not be subjected to disallowance under the said provision. The appeal was partly allowed.
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1987 (2) TMI 527
Issues:
Eviction under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 due to unauthorized sub-letting created before the Act came into force; Validity of sub-lease without landlord's consent; Effect of notice of termination on pre-existing sub-lease; Rights of sub-tenant independent of tenant; Surrender of tenancy rights and its impact on sub-tenancy; Protection under the Act for sub-tenants against eviction.
Analysis:
The judgment involves an appeal by a landlord against a High Court decision in an eviction suit under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The High Court allowed the revision, holding that eviction cannot be ordered under Section 13(2) as the sub-tenancy was created before the Act came into force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The landlord had leased out premises to a tenant who sub-let to another without consent, leading to the eviction dispute.
The landlord argued that the sub-lease was unlawful due to a clause in the lease deed prohibiting sub-leasing without consent. However, as the lease deed was not filed in court as evidence, this argument was dismissed. Another contention was that the sub-tenancy became unlawful after a notice of termination was served, but since the sub-lease predated the notice, it remained valid. The landlord also claimed that the sub-tenant was bound by the eviction order against the tenant, citing legal precedents, but these arguments were rejected.
Regarding the surrender of tenancy rights, the court explained that a lease cannot be terminated in part, and a sub-lessee has rights under the Transfer of Property Act. The judgment clarified that the Act protects tenants, not sub-tenants, against unreasonable eviction, but in this case, the sub-tenant was challenging eviction under Section 13(2) due to the timing of the sub-lease. Ultimately, the court found no merit in the landlord's contentions and dismissed the appeal, with each party bearing their own costs.
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1987 (2) TMI 526
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the business of running a lodging house qualifies as an "industrial undertaking" under Section 54D of the Income-tax Act.
2. Whether the assessee is entitled to tax exemption on capital gains used for constructing a lodging house.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the business of running a lodging house qualifies as an "industrial undertaking" under Section 54D of the Income-tax Act:
The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of "industrial undertaking" within the meaning of Section 54D of the Income-tax Act. The facts of the case reveal that the assessee owned an ice factory, part of which was compulsorily acquired by the government. The assessee utilized the capital gains from this acquisition to construct a lodging house and claimed tax exemption under Section 54D, arguing that the lodging house constitutes an "industrial undertaking."
The Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner both found that a lodging house does not qualify as an "industrial undertaking." However, the High Court disagreed, stating that the term "industrial undertaking" should be understood in its popular sense, meaning any enterprise or business venture. The Court emphasized that the Income-tax Act is of general application and should be construed liberally. The Court cited the Supreme Court's interpretation of "business" as a broad term encompassing any systematic activity with a set purpose.
The Court concluded that the "running of a lodge" by the assessee can be considered an "industrial undertaking" within the meaning of Section 54D. The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that "industrial undertaking" should be limited to activities involving the manufacture or production of articles.
2. Whether the assessee is entitled to tax exemption on capital gains used for constructing a lodging house:
The Court examined whether the assessee met the requirements of Section 54D for tax exemption on capital gains. The section provides that capital gains from the compulsory acquisition of a capital asset used for an industrial undertaking can be exempt from tax if the gains are used to purchase or construct a new land or building for the purpose of shifting or re-establishing the industrial undertaking.
The Court noted that the assessee had indeed used the capital gains for constructing a lodging house. Since the Court had already determined that the lodging house qualifies as an "industrial undertaking," the assessee met the conditions for tax exemption under Section 54D.
The Court also addressed the Revenue's argument that the term "industrial undertaking" should be interpreted narrowly, based on other sections of the Income-tax Act like Sections 10A, 33B, 80M, and 80J. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating that these sections have specific requirements and do not limit the general meaning of "industrial undertaking" in Section 54D.
Conclusion:
The High Court concluded that the lodging house constructed by the assessee qualifies as an "industrial undertaking" under Section 54D of the Income-tax Act. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to tax exemption on the capital gains used for constructing the lodging house. The Tribunal's finding that running a lodging house does not constitute an "industrial undertaking" was deemed erroneous. The question was answered in the negative, against the Revenue, and both parties were directed to bear their respective costs.
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1987 (2) TMI 525
Issues Involved:
1. Rectification of the Register of Members.
2. Time Limit for Exercising Power to Refuse Registration.
3. Bona Fide Exercise of Power by the Directors.
4. Legal Provisions and Interpretation.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Rectification of the Register of Members:
The petitioners sought rectification of the Register of Members of the respondent company by deleting the name of the deceased shareholder and substituting their names as heirs. The deceased, P.V. Mehta, held 100 shares in the respondent company. After his death, the petitioners, as legal heirs, requested the transmission of these shares. Despite obtaining the necessary heirship certificates, the respondent company refused to register the transfer, leading to the filing of this petition under Section 155 of the Companies Act.
2. Time Limit for Exercising Power to Refuse Registration:
The central argument by the petitioners was that under Article 26 of the Articles of Association and Section 111(2) of the Companies Act, the directors must exercise their power to refuse registration within two months. Mr. Kamdar argued that if the power to decline registration is not exercised within this period, it is lost. He cited the case of Swaledale Cleaners Ltd., In re [1968] 1 ALL ER 1132, which held that unreasonable delay in exercising the power of veto results in the loss of that power. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that Section 111 does not provide for an automatic vesting of rights in the transferee upon the expiry of two months. The court emphasized that the section only mandates sending a notice of refusal within two months, and failure to do so results in a penalty, not the loss of the right to refuse.
3. Bona Fide Exercise of Power by the Directors:
Mr. Kamdar argued that the directors' refusal to register the transfer after a long period indicated mala fide exercise of power. He relied on Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. N.K. Firodia [1971] 41 Comp Cas 1, which held that the court can test the reasons given by the directors to ensure they acted in the company's interest. The court acknowledged this principle but found that the reasons provided by the respondent company, such as ongoing disputes and the deceased's alleged prejudicial behavior, were sufficient to justify the refusal. The court noted that no specific allegations of mala fides were made in the petition, and without evidence, it could not conclude that the directors acted with ulterior motives.
4. Legal Provisions and Interpretation:
The court examined Articles 26 and 34 of the Articles of Association and Section 111 of the Companies Act. Article 26 allows directors to decline registration without assigning reasons, provided they send notice within two months. Article 34 deals with the rights of heirs to be registered as shareholders upon the death of a member. Section 111 outlines the power to refuse registration and the consequences of failing to send notice of refusal. The court concluded that Section 111 does not create an absolute right for the transferee upon the expiry of two months but imposes a penalty for non-compliance. The court also referred to the case of Amraoti Electric Supply Co. v. R.S. Chandak [1954] 24 Comp Cas 465, which supported the view that the failure to send notice results in a penalty, not automatic registration.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the directors' refusal to register the transfer was justified and not mala fide. The court held that the right to refuse registration is not lost upon the expiry of two months, and the petitioners did not have an absolute right to have the shares transferred in their names. The court also noted that the petitioners could pursue other legal remedies if they believed the refusal was motivated by mala fides. There was no order as to costs.
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1987 (2) TMI 524
Issues:
1. Correction of name in a maintenance petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Jurisdiction of criminal court to allow amendment of pleadings.
3. Revision filed against the Magistrate's order by the respondent.
4. Sessions Judge's decision to set aside the maintenance petition.
5. The nature of proceedings under Section 125 of the Code.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the first petitioner's name was erroneously mentioned as Malathi instead of Madhavi. The respondent admitted marriage and paternity but contested the children's paternity. The Magistrate awarded maintenance, considering the clerical mistake and identity confirmation by the first petitioner.
2. The first petitioner sought permission to correct her name, which the Magistrate denied, citing jurisdictional limitations. Despite this, the first petitioner testified to her correct name, leading to the Magistrate recognizing the clerical error and granting maintenance. The respondent challenged this in a revision petition before the Sessions Judge.
3. The Sessions Judge set aside the maintenance order, criticizing the Magistrate for allowing the correction and awarding maintenance based on an affidavit. The Judge opined that the Magistrate should have dismissed the petition if he couldn't amend the pleadings. The Sessions Judge sympathized with the minors affected by the decision.
4. The High Court criticized the Sessions Judge's decision, questioning the setting aside of maintenance for the minors. The Court emphasized the importance of correcting clerical errors to serve justice, especially when the parties' identities were clear. The Court highlighted the social purpose of Section 125 proceedings and the need to avoid technical denials of relief.
5. The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 125 are civil in nature, aiming to prevent vagrancy and enforce maintenance liability. It emphasized the importance of considering the substance over form, allowing corrections for justice. The Court reinstated the Magistrate's order, emphasizing the need to prevent miscarriages of justice and uphold the purpose of the provision.
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1987 (2) TMI 523
Issues involved:
The judgment addresses common questions of law arising from three cases regarding breach of contract, assessment of damages, and recovery proceedings initiated by the State under the Revenue Recovery Act.
Case 1 - C.A. No. 471 of 1975:
- The respondent entered into an agreement with the State for paddy procurement.
- Dispute arose over short delivery of rice leading to damages assessment by the State.
- Full Bench opinion stated State cannot adjudicate breach or assess damages not admitted by respondent.
- State's appeal dismissed based on Full Bench opinion.
- State contended Deputy Commissioner had authority to decide breach and assess damages.
- Supreme Court held Deputy Commissioner's power limited to admitted breaches, not disputed ones.
Case 2 - C.A. No. 3602 of 1984:
- Two contractors failed to complete building construction contracts with the State.
- Damages assessed and sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
- High Court quashed recovery proceedings based on Full Bench ruling.
- State appealed against High Court judgment.
Case 3 - C.A. No. 461 of 1987:
- Similar to Case 2, contractors challenged damages assessment and recovery proceedings.
- High Court allowed writ petitions and quashed recovery proceedings.
- State appealed against High Court decision.
The Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that the Deputy Commissioner could decide breach and assess damages, emphasizing that such power is limited to undisputed breaches. Additionally, the Court disagreed with the Full Bench's view on recovering damages as arrears of land revenue, stating that damages payable under the contract can be recovered as per the terms of the agreement. As the State officers acted as arbiters in disputes, the Court upheld the High Court's decisions, dismissing all appeals.
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1987 (2) TMI 522
Issues:
Interpretation of nomination rights under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 in the event of the death of a contributor.
Analysis:
The civil revision pertains to a dispute over the distribution of amounts such as provident fund, gratuity, security deposit, and unpaid salary following the death of an employee. The deceased had nominated his wife under the Provident Fund Scheme, but no nominations were made for the remaining amounts. The deceased's parents claimed half of the total amount due to the deceased. The trial court granted an injunction against the disbursement of the amounts, which was later partially vacated by the Additional Senior Sub-Judge, allowing half of the amount to be disbursed to the deceased's wife.
The key legal question raised was regarding the rights of the nominee under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. The petitioner argued that the nominee has an absolute right to receive the amount standing to the credit in the fund, excluding other heirs. The petitioner relied on legal precedents and English decisions to support this interpretation. However, the respondents contested this interpretation, citing a Supreme Court judgment regarding nominee rights in a life insurance policy under the Insurance Act, 1938.
The court analyzed the provisions of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, and the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, regarding nomination rights. The court noted the differences in the language and intent of the two Acts. Despite the petitioner's arguments, the court held that the nominee's right to receive the provident fund amount cannot be interpreted in the same manner as under the Provident Funds Act, 1925. The court emphasized the legislative history and the special nature of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, as a subsequent enactment with specific provisions for employee benefits.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, upholding the impugned order based on the legal analysis provided. The court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions and rejected them. The judgment highlights the importance of interpreting nominee rights under specific legislative frameworks and the significance of legislative history in determining legal outcomes.
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1987 (2) TMI 521
Issues involved: Application for temporary permit under Section 68(F)(IC) of the Motor Vehicles Act, validity of draft scheme published under Section 68C, delay in finalizing scheme under Section 68D, continuation of services under permits obtained u/s 68F(1A) or 68F(IC).
Validity of Draft Scheme under Section 68C:
The appellant applied for a temporary permit under Section 68(F)(IC) of the Motor Vehicles Act due to a scheme published under Section 68C by the State Transport Undertaking. The Supreme Court called upon the State Transport Undertaking to explain the delay in finalizing the scheme under Section 68D, which remains unapproved. Citing precedents, the Court quashed the draft scheme due to the State Transport Undertaking's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court allowed the continuation of services under permits obtained u/s 68F(1A) or 68F(IC) until 31-8-1987 for those currently operating services.
Future Course of Action:
The Court reserved liberty for the State Transport Undertaking to either initiate a fresh scheme under Section 68C or proceed with any other draft scheme already published for the route in question. With the quashing of the scheme, the Court clarified that the consideration of applications under Section 68F(IC) in relation to the now-quashed draft scheme does not arise.
Disposition:
The appeal was disposed of accordingly, affirming the quashing of the draft scheme and providing guidance on the continuation of services under existing permits until a specified date.
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1987 (2) TMI 520
Issues:
Interpretation of Rule 51(A) of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules regarding preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Education Agency.
Analysis:
The judgment in question involves the correct interpretation and application of Rule 51(A) of the Kerala Education Rules, specifically addressing the preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Education Agency. The Rule provides qualified teachers relieved due to termination of vacancies with a preference for reappointment when future vacancies arise. The case at hand concerns a teacher, the appellant, who had temporary appointments in the respondent's school, following which a permanent vacancy arose for which both the appellant and another teacher, the 4th respondent, applied. The question was whether the earlier appointee should have preferential treatment over the later appointee, as per the Rule. The appellant contended that she had a preferential claim under Rule 51(A, while the management argued for the discretion to choose among temporary teachers. The High Court dismissed the appellant's claim, emphasizing the management's right to choose. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, highlighting the importance of fairness and justice in interpreting the Rule.
The Supreme Court analyzed the language of Rule 51(A) and the accompanying note, which clarified the preference based on the date of first appointment, with age being a determining factor when appointment dates are the same. The note provided a guideline for the application of the Rule, emphasizing fairness and adherence to the appointment order. The Court noted that while the Rule did not explicitly mandate preference for the earlier appointee, the note's inclusion indicated the intention for such prioritization. The Court disagreed with the Division Bench's interpretation, which focused more on the abstract wording of the Rule rather than the underlying principles of fairness and justice.
The Court also referenced a previous Division Bench judgment that supported the appellant's contention regarding priority based on the title to reappointment. The Court expressed disappointment that the appellate Bench did not refer the matter to a Full Bench for resolution, considering the element of fair play and justice in the appellant's claim. Ultimately, the Court held that the Rule should be construed to give priority to the earlier appointee, as understood correctly by the school Manager in a previous instance. The Court emphasized that the Rule's current form conferred priority to the earlier appointee, and the appellant was entitled to succeed in the case. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, allowing the appeal in favor of the appellant and directing the first respondent to cover the appellant's costs.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of interpreting rules in a manner that upholds principles of fairness and justice, particularly in matters of employment and appointment preferences. The Court's decision clarifies the application of Rule 51(A) and establishes the priority of the earlier appointee in cases of future vacancies, ensuring consistency and adherence to the Rule's intended purpose.
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1987 (2) TMI 519
The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the revision filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. The case involved the definition of "manufacturer" under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, where the Sales Tax Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that purchases from hawkers did not constitute manufacturing. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision based on previous case law. (Case citation: 1987 (2) TMI 519 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1987 (2) TMI 518
Issues Involved:
1. Procedural Irregularity in Transfer of Case
2. Jurisdiction and Powers of Sessions Judges
3. Application of Sections 462 and 465 Cr.P.C.
Summary:
Procedural Irregularity in Transfer of Case:
The appeals were preferred by the State of Karnataka against the High Court of Karnataka's judgment, which set aside the conviction of the respondents and remanded the cases for retrial. The High Court observed that the Sessions Case No. 35 of 1980 was initially pending before the II Additional Sessions Judge, who framed charges and recorded the plea. However, after the City Civil Courts Act came into force in November 1980, the case was shown as pending before the IV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and later, evidence was recorded by the III Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge. The High Court found no order of transfer u/s 407 Cr.P.C. and concluded that the trial was irregular.
Jurisdiction and Powers of Sessions Judges:
The Principal Sessions Judge has the authority u/s 194 Cr.P.C. to make over a Sessions case for trial to any Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court assumed that the case could not be transferred after the plea was recorded by the II Additional Sessions Judge, based on Sec. 409 clause 2, which restricts withdrawal of cases after the trial has commenced. However, the Supreme Court noted that the Principal Sessions Judge could have transferred the case through general or special orders, and the III Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try the case.
Application of Sections 462 and 465 Cr.P.C.:
The Supreme Court emphasized that u/s 465 Cr.P.C., a finding or sentence by a competent court cannot be reversed due to procedural irregularities unless it results in a failure of justice. Similarly, u/s 462 Cr.P.C., errors in territorial jurisdiction do not invalidate proceedings unless they cause a failure of justice. The Supreme Court found no evidence of prejudice or failure of justice in the High Court's judgment or in the arguments presented. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and quashed the direction for retrial, remitting the appeals back to the High Court for disposal on merits.
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1987 (2) TMI 517
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of assessable value of ships under the Central Excise Act or Valuation Rules, 1975.
2. Inclusion of payments under escalation clauses in the assessable value.
3. Applicability of the larger period of limitation under Section 11A of the Act.
4. Legality and jurisdiction of the claim for additional duty.
5. Appellant's right to raise jurisdiction and limitation issues in the second appeal.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of Assessable Value of Ships:
The Tribunal examined how the assessable value of ships constructed and delivered under a contract should be determined. It was noted that under Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the assessable value for levy of duty ad valorem is the normal price at which goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee in the course of wholesale trade. However, ships are constructed as per specific contracts and are not sold in the wholesale market. Therefore, the normal price is not ascertainable, and the value must be determined under Section 4(1)(b) using the Valuation Rules, 1975. Rule 7 was deemed applicable, allowing the proper officer to determine the value based on the best judgment, ensuring it is not arbitrary but has a nexus with discovered facts.
2. Inclusion of Payments under Escalation Clauses:
The Tribunal addressed whether payments made under escalation clauses in the contract form part of the assessable value. The contract stipulated that the price was subject to escalation for steel, labor, and customs duty. The Tribunal held that these escalations are part of the money consideration under Section 2(10) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and thus, part of the price. Consequently, the amounts paid towards escalation are part of the assessable value for duty.
3. Applicability of Larger Period of Limitation:
The Tribunal considered whether the notice to show cause dated 19-2-1981 could invoke the larger period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A of the Act. The appellant argued that without allegations of fraud, collusion, or wilful misstatement, the larger period could not be invoked. The Tribunal found that the notice did not make such allegations, and thus, the larger period of limitation was not applicable.
4. Legality and Jurisdiction of the Claim for Additional Duty:
The Tribunal examined whether the claim for additional duty was illegal, without jurisdiction, or barred by limitation. It was held that the demand for additional duty was premature as the escalated amounts were still under arbitration and not realized. Therefore, the show cause notice was set aside as premature.
5. Appellant's Right to Raise Jurisdiction and Limitation Issues:
The Tribunal considered whether the appellant was precluded from raising jurisdiction and limitation issues in the second appeal. The Tribunal concluded that since the notice was premature, the bar of limitation and jurisdiction issues did not arise for consideration.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the demand made in the notice to show cause dated 17-12-1980 was set aside as premature. The respondent was given liberty to issue demands/notices to show cause in respect of such amounts in escalation as may be awarded in the arbitration proceedings pending between the appellant and the buyers of the ships. The appeal was allowed subject to this condition.
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1987 (2) TMI 516
Issues involved:
The liability of a partnership firm under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and the validity of the notification issued by the State Government under section 1(5) of the Act.
Liability under the Employees' State Insurance Act:
The petitioner, a partnership firm engaged in providing music services at events, challenged its liability to contribute under the Employees' State Insurance Act, primarily arguing that its business premises did not qualify as a 'shop' and that its business being seasonal, the Act should not apply. The Court held that the definition of a 'shop' includes places where services are sold, and as the petitioner provided music services for a fee, its premises qualified as a shop under the Act. Additionally, the intermittent nature of the services provided did not exempt the petitioner from the Act, as the definition of an 'employee' under the Act is broad and includes part-time and daily wage workers. The Court dismissed the petition, upholding the liability of the petitioner under the Act.
Validity of the State Government's Notification:
The petitioner also challenged the validity of the notification issued by the State Government under section 1(5) of the Act, arguing that it amounted to excessive delegation of legislative powers and violated constitutional provisions. The Court rejected these contentions, finding no merit in the argument that applying the Act to businesses operating seasonally was unconstitutional. The Writ Petition under Article 32 was dismissed, affirming the validity of the notification and the application of the Act to establishments like the petitioner's business.
This judgment clarifies the scope of the Employees' State Insurance Act in relation to businesses such as the petitioner's and affirms the applicability of the Act to establishments providing services for a fee, even if the services are seasonal in nature. The Court's decision emphasizes the broad definition of 'employee' under the Act and upholds the validity of notifications issued by the State Government under the Act.
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1987 (2) TMI 515
Issues:
1. Conviction and sentencing of appellants under section 302 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Involvement of the appellants in the murder of a Member of the Indian Administrative Service.
3. Judicial and extra-judicial confessions in relation to the case.
4. Allegations of conspiracy against one of the appellants.
5. Evaluation of circumstantial evidence to establish complicity in the conspiracy.
The Supreme Court heard appeals against the conviction and sentencing of the appellants under section 302 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The victim, a Member of the Indian Administrative Service, was murdered in a bomb blast orchestrated by one of the appellants. The incident took place as the victim was leaving his office, and the appellant threw a bomb at him, resulting in his death. The appellant confessed to his guilt and implicated another appellant in the murder conspiracy. The court examined 75 witnesses, and there was direct evidence of the appellant's involvement. The court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant, dismissing his appeal.
Regarding the involvement of another appellant, the court analyzed the allegations of conspiracy against him. The appellant, previously detained for criminal activities, had a motive due to his detention and the demolition of his Ashram. The prosecution relied on confessions and circumstantial evidence to establish his complicity. However, the court found discrepancies in the evidence, including conflicting statements and lack of concrete proof linking the appellant to the murder conspiracy. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the appellant's involvement beyond reasonable doubt, leading to his acquittal and release.
The court scrutinized the judicial and extra-judicial confessions in the case. While the judicial confession was deemed inadmissible due to procedural irregularities, the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant at the time of his apprehension was considered. Witnesses testified to the confession made by the appellant after being assaulted, but the court highlighted the limitations of using a co-accused's confession as substantive evidence against others. The court emphasized the need for corroborative evidence to support any conclusions drawn from such confessions.
In evaluating the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, the court emphasized the importance of establishing a clear link and completing the chain of evidence to prove conspiracy. Despite the prosecution's efforts to connect the appellants through various events and motives, the court found the evidence insufficient to conclusively prove the conspiracy. The court highlighted the need for thorough investigations in cases of such gravity and expressed disappointment over investigative lapses in the case.
Ultimately, the court disposed of the appeals, upholding one conviction while acquitting the other appellant due to insufficient evidence of conspiracy. The judgment underscored the critical role of evidence, procedural adherence, and thorough investigations in criminal cases of serious nature.
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1987 (2) TMI 514
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves determining whether the assessee had business connection in India and the assessment of income attributable to operations in India under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Assessee's Business Connection in India:
The Tribunal was tasked with deciding if the assessee had business connection in India. The Tribunal, after considering the agreement dated 23-12-1960, found that part of the income from payments made by an Indian company to the assessee was assessable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal's decision on this matter was not challenged by the revenue and was deemed final.
Assessment of Income Attributable to Operations in India:
The revenue raised a question regarding the assessment of income attributable to operations in India. The Tribunal, in the absence of relevant particulars from both the department and the assessee, estimated that 10% of the net profits estimated by the Income-tax Officer would be a proper estimate of the assessee's income accrued in India. The Tribunal's decision in this regard was upheld, as it was based on materials on record and was deemed appropriate and legal.
Conclusion:
The High Court, after considering the findings of the Tribunal and the lack of challenge from the revenue, affirmed the Tribunal's decision regarding the assessee's business connection in India and the assessment of income attributable to operations in India. The Court ruled in favor of the assessee on these matters, with no order as to costs.
Separate Judgment:
Shyamal Kumar Sen, J., concurred with the decision.
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