|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 1387 Records
-
2016 (2) TMI 1395
Clandestine movement of tread rubber and pre-cured tread rubber without payment of duty - evidence of shortage of raw materials - HELD THAT:- The CESTAT, after hearing the learned counsel for parties held that the Commissioner had noted that for manufacture of the main item, the assessee had to procure raw sulphur, raw rubber and there was no shortage or excess of raw materials in the books. The CESTAT considering the appeals of the Revenue and the assessee held that while there is no merit in the appeal of the Revenue, the assessee had clearly explained with evidence that the material had come for replacement and evidence was produced.
After examining the contents and assimilating the relevant facts, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee - Having bestowed anxious consideration to the facts and materials which led to the impugned decision of the Tribunal, there are no ground to interfere in this appeal.
This appeal, therefore, fails.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1394
Addition of interest waived before accrual - According to AO, the assessee avoided crediting this interest to itself from a company which he had controlling stake as shareholder and director, hence added back this interest to the returned income of the assessee - assessee pleaded for commercial expediency
HELD THAT:- As relying on M/S. BAGORIA UDYOG [2011 (3) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] the waiver of interest before the year end cannot be treated as income in the given facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, we delete the addition and allow this issue of assessee’s appeal.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1393
TP Adjustment - interest charged on receivable - payment was right from the initial stage towards subscription for shares - whether this transaction is clearly hit by the provision of section 92(2) of the I.T. Act 1961? - HELD THAT:- Allotment of shares does not make any change to the position of the assessee, as the subsidiary is admittedly a wholly owned subsidiary of the assessee. A delay in allotment of shares by the subsidiary company, as long as the subsidiary is a wholly owned subsidiary, does not prejudice the interests of the assessee. It is, therefore, wrong to even allege that an assessee does not behave in a commercially rationale manner, as expected in an arm’s length situation, when the assessee does not ask for payment of interest for the period of delay in allotment of shares.
The assessee has behaved in a commercially rational manner inasmuch as whether the new shares are allotted at x point of time or y point of time, it does not make a difference to the position of the shareholder so far as the subsidiary is wholly owned by a single shareholder- as is the factual position in this case. The nominal value of shares, as long as all the shares are held by the assessee is entirely benefit neutral from a commercial point of view. The very foundation of the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer is, therefore, wholly devoid of legally sustainable merits and factually correct assumptions.
Thus, we hold that the adjustment on account of notional interest on the share application money, which has been recharacterized as loan, is not sustainable in law. We, therefore, direct the Assessing Officer to delete the same. Assessee appeal allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1392
Maintainability of appeal - it was held by High Court that 'For the reasons indicated by the court in dismissing the accompanying appeal, the present appeal shall stand dismissed.'
HELD THAT:- There are no legal and valid ground for interference. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1391
Denial of the benefit of the exemption Notification No.32/2005-Cus. Dt. 08/04/2005 - nexus between the imported and exported goods - Difference of opinion - In view of the difference of views between the two Members, the following points emerge for consideration by a Third Member:
(i) Whether the appellants are covered by the Target Plus Scheme, read with the provisions of Handbook of Procedure, in respect of the imports of RBD Palmolein oil made by them as against the export of Rice and Wheat;
(ii) Whether the appellants have satisfied the criteria of broad nexus between the imported and exported goods;
(iii) Whether the disputed issue is covered by the decisions of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, as observed by Member(Judicial) or the same is distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the case, as held be Member(Technical); and
(iv) Whether the appeal has to be allowed as held by Member(Judicial) or to be rejected as held by Member(Technical).
-
2016 (2) TMI 1390
Claim of deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) denied - interest income earned by the assessee on deposits made out of surplus funds - Held that:- As in M/s Guttigedarara Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. Versus The Income Tax Officer [2015 (7) TMI 874 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] interest income earned by a Credit Co-operative Society on deposits of surplus funds with scheduled bank would qualify for deduction u/s.80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act - Decided in favour of assessee
-
2016 (2) TMI 1387
Deduction u/s 36(1)(vii)(a) - provision made by the assessee during the relevant previous year - whether assessee is not entitled to claiming deduction on account of 10% of aggregate average advance made by rural branches? - HELD THAT:- As placed on record that in exercise of the powers conferred on the Reserve Bank of India according to Banking Regulation Act the assessee had been granted licence to commence and carry on banking business subject to certain conditions.
In addition to the above information, our attention has also been drawn on Arvind Sahakari Bank Ltd., Katol [2015 (9) TMI 1768 - ITAT NAGPUR] wherein after considering the provisions of section 36(1)(vii)(a) and the Banking Regulation Act, the coordinate bench has held as agree with the assessee that once the Reserve Bank of India recognizes and notifies a Cooperative Bank as a non scheduled bank, the Revenue cannot contend otherwise. Admittedly upon fulfilling all the necessary conditions of the RBI, the assessee bank has been duly notified as a non schedule bank and hence being a non schedule bank it is entitled to deduction u/s 36(1)(viia). Decided against revenue.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1386
Works contract or concession agreement - Dismissal of application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - dispute was covered under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 Act or not - right to collect the toll and the other revenue from the vehicles and users during the Concession Period - HELD THAT:- Considering Clause 26 of the impugned agreement which pertains to settlement of disputes and is of crucial importance to the substantive question raised in the petition as well as appeal, it categorically states that if the dispute regarding the breach or termination thereof exists between the parties and cannot be settled within 30 days, the dispute is referred to arbitration under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that the arbitration panel decision shall be final and binding on the parties. However, the provision has been invoked by the petitioners-appellants stating that in section (d) of section 2 of Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam 1983 is involved then the matter shall be regulated by the Act of 1983 and the Arbitration Tribunal shall be constituted under section 3 of the said Act and it is this point which is a crucial important in the present petition.
In the matter of SPEDRA ENGINEERING CORPORATION ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS, BHOPAL VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1987 (6) TMI 398 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] the Court has held that the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 was a special enactment providing for statutory arbitration arising out of disputes in respect of works contracts. The present is not a works contract as already held above and both the decisions are, therefore, not applicable to the dispute at hand. Similarly considering the fact that the factual matrix pertains to non-extension of the additional period conceded and not being granted which led to the filing of the application under section 9, then there are no hesitation in holding that although the work pertains to construction of Road Dewas Bypass road starting from 159/4 of Bhopal - Ujjain Road (SH-18) and joining Km. 577/6 of Agra-Bombay Road (NH-3) intersecting NH-3 in Km. 567/8 and SH-18 in Km. 151/8 (total length of 19.8 Kms.), yet the dispute pertains to the concession or concessional period given in terms of the concession right or concession area during the contract period.
The impugned order dated 16-2-2015 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Dewas in Arbitration Case No. 1/2015 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is granted liberty to move appropriate application under the provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the lower Court.
Petition allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1385
Re-classification of service for the purpose of cenvat credit - Management Consultancy Service or Business Auxiliary Service - it was held by CESTAT that 'The service tax paid by M/s. IHCL was at the behest of the department and was not altered during the disputed period. Credit of service tax paid on the invoices cannot be denied or utilisation reduced on the grounds that classification of the services was wrongly done at the service provider’s end.'
HELD THAT:- Appeal admitted.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1384
Prosecution of husband of the petitioner under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - allegation against the petitioner is that she has instigated her husband to legalize the income illegally acquired by him - offence punishable under Section 109, 177, 468, 465 and 471 IPC - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, initially the case is registered against husband of the petitioner and petitioner was interrogated and those statements recorded through the petitioner are made use of for registering the case against the petitioner, which is not permissible in view of the right enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In order to exercise power of inherent jurisdiction to interdict criminal prosecution, the circumstances are that no case is made out for the alleged offences on the available materials, to prevent the abuse of process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. It is alleged that the petitioner has instigated her husband to legalize the illegal income of her husband by purchasing site, flat, complex and buildings in her name. Except the allegation, the prosecution has not placed any material in support of this allegation.
It is true that just because the person is assessed to Income tax and income tax is paid is the conclusive proof that the income and the properties assessed in his/her name are the properties of that assessee. Because by acquiring the property in the name of family members and by assessing the income and the properties in his/her name and paying the income tax, one can easily get through. It depends upon the facts of the particular case for which the other attendant factors are to be considered - Here in the instant case, the petitioner claims agricultural income as well as the business income for which she has been assessed all throughout, which are not duly verified before asserting that the petitioner has committed the alleged offences.
Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the materials brought on record, consider the explanation given by the parties and to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. The court below has failed to apply this test before taking cognizance of the offences alleged against the petitioner.
This is a case where petitioner has made out a case for interference and to set aside the impugned order so far as the petitioner is concerned - the impugned order is set aside - petition allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1383
Issues involved:
The issue involved in this case is the withdrawal of an appeal by the appellant due to the direction from the Central Board of Excise and Customs based on the value of the appeal being less than Rs.15,00,000.
Withdrawal of Appeal:
The learned Special Standing Counsel for Central Excise submitted that the Central Board of Excise and Customs directed the appellant to withdraw the appeal since its value was less than Rs.15,00,000. Consequently, permission was sought and accorded for the withdrawal of the appeal.
Dismissal of Appeal:
In light of the direction from the Central Board of Excise and Customs and the permission granted for withdrawal, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Any miscellaneous petitions that were pending were also deemed dismissed as a result.
Costs:
The judgment specified that there shall be no order as to costs, indicating that no specific costs were awarded in this case.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1382
Withdrawal of Prosecution proceedings granted approval - Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure - jurisdiction of Magistrate to allow the prosecution from preferring the application for withdrawal - HELD THAT:- The application for withdrawal of the application preferred Under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure was taken up by the learned Magistrate who vide order on 07.01.2012 opined that nothing precluded the prosecution from filing such an application and no right had accrued to the defence on that score, for it was the duty of the Court to deal with such an application as per the established parameters of law. Be it stated, the learned Magistrate further opined that the application preferred by the accused persons Under Section 91 Code of Criminal Procedure did not warrant any consideration and accordingly allowed the prayer. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to another date for consideration of charge.
Regard being had to the language employed in Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure, reference made to the Constitution Bench decision in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors. [1986 (12) TMI 388 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Court referred to Section 333 of the old Code and after taking note of the language employed Under Section 321 of the present Code came to hold that Section 321 enables the Public Prosecutor, in charge of the case to withdraw from the prosecution of any person at any time before the judgment is pronounced, but the application for withdrawal has to get the consent of the court and if the court gives consent for such withdrawal the accused will be discharged if no charge has been framed or acquitted if charge has been framed or where no such charge is required to be framed.
In the case at hand, when the order passed by the Lt. Governor was assailed in Writ Petition, the learned single Judge analyzing the communication and other facts referred to all the decisions earlier taken by the Committee and its recommendations made for withdrawal from the prosecution in the cases. Thereafter, the learned single Judge scrutinized the minutes of the meeting and took note of the fact that the Screening Committee on 13.09.2011 had apparently not apply its own mind or made a thorough scrutiny of the charge-sheets filed in the cases but heavily relied upon the examination of the cases by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Legal Affairs, Law and Justice with the approval of the Union Home Minister.
In the impugned order herein, the learned single Judge has observed that no doubt the withdrawal from prosecution is an executive and non-judicial act but there is a wide discretion with the court, which ought to be exercised judicially on well established principles. That is to say, the court has to be satisfied that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the course of justice for illegitimate purposes.
In the case at hand, the learned Magistrate was directed by the High Court to consider the application filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor seeking withdrawal of the application earlier preferred Under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure. In such a situation, it is difficult to appreciate how Section 91 of Code of Criminal Procedure can be taken aid of by the accused persons. In view of the same, there are no shadow of doubt that the High Court has fallen into error by permitting the accused persons to file an application Section 91 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Whether the High Court was justified in remitting the matter to the learned Magistrate for reconsideration of the application seeking withdrawal of the earlier application filed Under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure? - HELD THAT:- The learned single Judge by placing reliance on certain authorities has held that decidedly it is the Public Prosecutor who has to take the decision and not the Government or the Lt. Governor and so that dismissal of the writ petition against grant of consent by Lt. Governor to the withdrawal of application Under Section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure had been erroneously relied upon by the courts below, particularly when right to pursue remedies before the criminal courts was preserved while deciding the writ petition.
There can be no cavil over the proposition that when an application of withdrawal from the prosecution Under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure is filed by the Public Prosecutor, he has the sole responsibility and the law casts an obligation that he should be satisfied on the basis of materials on record keeping in view certain legal parameters. The Public Prosecutor having been satisfied, as the application would show, had filed the application - The principle stating that the Public Prosecutor should apply his mind and take an independent decision about filing an application Under Section 321 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be faulted but stretching the said principle to say that he is to convince the court that he has filed an application for not pressing the earlier application would not be appropriate.
The impugned order dated 30.07.2015 passed by the High Court is set aside. As the impugned order is set aside, consequentially the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 22.09.2015 has to pave the path of extinction - The appeals are allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1381
Application for impleading him as a party to the suit allowed - Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell - no privity of contract between the petitioner-plaintiff and respondent no.4 - HELD THAT:- As per the ration of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in THOMSON PRESS (INDIA) LTD. VERSUS NANAK BUILDERS AND INVESTORS P. LTD. AND ORS. [2013 (2) TMI 898 - SUPREME COURT], 'a proper party is the person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all the matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made'. So, even if no relief is claimed against a person but, if his presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all the matters involved in the suit, he will be considered to be a proper party and got impleaded as a defendant in the suit.
In the instant case also respondent no.4-Ranvir Singh has raised certain issues which requires his presence to enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all the matters in issue. Though, no relief has been claimed in the suit against him. But, certainly his rights are likely to be effected from the decision of the suit as he is also seeking the specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 12.08.2006 executed by respondent no.1 in his favour with respect to the same land.
Consequently, no fault can be found with the discretion exercised by the learned trial Court to allow the application filed by respondent no.4 for impleading him as a party to the suit.
There are no illegality in the impugned order calling for interference by this Court while exercising the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The present revision petitions having, no merits, are hereby dismissed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1380
Maintainability of suit for declaration and permanent injunction - suit for declaration of possession of land - time limitation - compromise decree required compulsory registration or not - HELD THAT:- In the Instant case, the plaintiff has challenged the resultant decree based on compromise on the ground that she was ailing at the relevant time and was not in a position to give free will for execution of said compromise which ultimately resulted into decree. The ailment with which the plaintiff was suffering at the relevant time was stated to be Epilepsy - In order to substantiate the plea of ailment, the plaintiff got examined Dr. Surjit Singh PW-4, who stated that Jagtar Kaur was suffering from Epilepsy from the years 1976 to 1982 and she got treatment from him upto the year 1984. The deposition of Doctor was not in the context of proving that she was confined on account of Epilepsy and was not in a position to re-capitulate the facts and there was a loss of memory or she was totally incapacitated on account of such ailment in terms of faculty of mind and physical movements.
In view of bar created under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, no suit shall lie to set aside the decree on the ground that compromise on which the suit was based was not lawful. At the most the plaintiff could have filed application in the said suit as all the issues are required to be decided in the same suit. Since particulars of fraud have not been pleaded and proved in the case, therefore, the suit was not maintainable in view of bar created under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC - After the execution of decree the plaintiff cannot presumed to be co-sharer since the decree was based on compromise on account of family settlement. Plaintiff is Bua of the defendants. She was married long back and was laying in her matrimonial house. The decree based on compromise pointed out semblance of interest and was not required to be compulsorily registered as the decree recognized pre-existing right of the defendants and it cannot be said that right was created in favour of defendants for the first time.
Both the questions of law are to be answered in favour of the appellants to hold that subsequent suit is barred in terms of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC and subsequent decree dated 06.10.1979 was not required to be compulsorily registered.
Since the civil Court decree dated 06.10.1979 was not fraudulent, therefore, filing of suit on 26.08.1983 was patently barred by limitation.
Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court cannot subscribe the view taken by the lower Appellate Court inasmuch as that the decree based on compromise was legally required to be questioned in the same suit and the subsequent suit is barred in terms of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. The plaintiff cannot be held to be co-sharer in the land and suit based on title is within limitation.
Appeal allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1379
Invocation of writ jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- Ordinarily writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law.
Since the High Court has not considered the merits of the appeal preferred before the Division Bench, the matter remanded to the Division Bench for re-hearing the appeal on its own merits without being influenced by any observations made in this order.
Appeal allowed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1378
Addition of 1.6% of an expenditure u/s 37(1) - onus to prove the genuineness of expenditure - whether tribunal right in law in restricting the addition to 1.6% in respect of wages instead of 10.3% and 6.6% adopted by the assessing authority? - HELD THAT:- One of the vital basis for the decision of the Tribunal and when this Court has by the aforesaid Judgment in [2015 (7) TMI 536 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] has set aside the said order of the Tribunal and has remanded the matter wherein held that on careful perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained inasmuch as the Tribunal has not applied its mind judiciously to the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the same, interest of justice requires that the matter has to be re-dealt by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore.
Thus we find that similar course deserves to be adopted even in the present matter.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1377
Determination of income - method of accounting adopted for revenue reorganization - Accounting of real estate transactions - AO applying the percentage completion method (PCM) and rejecting the project completion method accounting adopted by the assessee - whether Accounting Standard (AS-9) which sanctions the project completion method, was correctly applicable in the circumstances of the cases? - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble High Court [2015 (11) TMI 1283 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has upheld that conclusion of the ITAT [2012 (4) TMI 621 - ITAT DELHI] that the adoption of PCM is in establish method of accounting and without there being any rationale or new development in the fact and circumstances of the case as well as without bringing out any defect on record in the accounting procedure adopted by the assessee, the revenue could not have concluded that the project completion method was not appropriate for the assessee. Hence, order of Hon’ble High Court is also applicable in favour of the assessee to the present case pertaining to AY 2010-11 and accordingly sole ground of the revenue being devoid of merits is dismissed in the result appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1376
Compensation on acquisition of land - Fixation of the land value based on acquisition proceedings initiated in 1981 in Village Judian - HELD THAT:- The pre-amended provision put a cap on the maximum; the compensation by court should not be beyond the amount claimed. The amendment in 1984, on the contrary, put a cap on the minimum; compensation cannot be less that what was awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The cap on maximum having been expressly omitted, and the cap that is put is only on minimum, it is clear that the amount of compensation that a court can award is no longer restricted to the amount claimed by the applicant. It is the duty of the Court to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration the true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of the claim made by the owner.
In Bhag Singh and Others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh BHAG SINGH VERSUS UT. OF CHANDIGARH THRU LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [1985 (8) TMI 373 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that there may be situations where the amount higher than claimed may be awarded to the claimant.
In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal [2000 (9) TMI 1092 - SUPREME COURT], this Court held that under the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, the Court can grant a higher compensation than claimed by the applicant in his pleadings.
In the case of the appellants herein, it is an admitted position that the properties do not abut the national highway. Admittedly, it is situated about 375 yards away from the national highway and it appears that there is only the narrow Nahan Kothi Road connecting the properties of the appellants to the national highway. Therefore, it will not be just and proper to award land value of Rs.250/- per square yard, which is granted to the property in adjoining village. Having regard to the factual and legal position obtained above, we are of the considered view that the just and fair compensation in the case of appellants would be Rs. 200/- per square yard.
These appeals are disposed off fixing the land value at Rs. 200/- per square yard and the appellants shall also be entitled to all the statutory benefits. The amount as above shall be paid and deposited after adjusting the deficit court fee, if any, before the Executing Court within a period of three months from today.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1375
Disallowance of deduction u/s 80IA r.w.s. 80IA(4)(iv) - power generated by the Respondent partly consumed and partly sold and the rate with regard to the latter - Appeal against MAHENDRA SPONGE AND POWER LTD. [2015 (6) TMI 1243 - ITAT RAIPUR] wherein held on this very fact that the said assessee was a manufacturer of Iron steel and captive power plant has supplied electricity to its manufacturer unit which was at higher rate than the power supplied to Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board and computation of the market value of the power is correct after considering it with the rate of power available in the open market namely the price charged by the Board.
HELD THAT:- We find that the issue has been decided in the case of M/S GODAWARI POWER & ISPAT LTD. [2013 (10) TMI 5 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] as held market value of the power supplied to the Steel-Division should be computed considering the rate of power to a consumer in the open market and it should not be compared with the rate of power when it is sold to a supplier as this is not the rate for which a consumer or the Steel- Division could have purchased power in the open market. The rate of power to a supplier is not the market rate to a consumer in the open market - AO committed an illegality in computing the market value by taking into account the rate charged to a supplier
Sitting in coordinate jurisdiction, there is no occasion for us to re-examine the matter and arrive at any other determination. The fact that a Special Leave Petition may have been preferred against the same and in which there is no interim order, does not persuade us to entertain this appeal.
-
2016 (2) TMI 1374
Denial of indemnity and a provision for recovery granted to the insurer - seeking for enhancement - HELD THAT:- At the Appellate Court, the owner has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC that has elicited through RTI a response to say the licence number had been wrongly given as 18690/Ag/2003 when it was actually 16690/Ag/ 2003 and that it had been issued in the name of Balkar Singh. A response through RTI is of a public officer and it is a public document and would require no further corroboration in the manner contemplated under Section 77 of the Evidence Act. The document must be taken to be true of what its recitals state. The certified copy of the licence issued also shows that the licence had been renewed at the DTO Office at Mansa on 26.08.2008, which was valid up to 19.09.2011. This also shows that the driver had a valid driving licence at the relevant time. The additional evidence is relevant and important to decide that the owner and driver were entitled to full indemnity. The award denying indemnity and providing for a right of recovery against for the insurer is set aside.
The appeals filed by the owner and driver are allowed - The amount deposited by the owner and driver at the time of preferring the appeals are ordered to be returned to the owner.
........
|
9911796707
