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Showing 1 to 20 of 1736 Records
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2020 (2) TMI 1742
Validity of Resolution Plan - Adjudicating Authority's approval of the resolution plan was upheld by NCLAT - HELD THAT:- There are no ground to interfere with the impugned order(s) passed by the Tribunal. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1741
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reasons to believe - figures that have been mentioned in the reasons for reopening for the AY.2009-2010 are the figures in respect of the AY.2010-11 - HELD THAT:- Formation of reason is a sine qua non for re-opening the Assessment. In this case, the figures given for justifying the re-opening the Assessment for the Assessment Year 2010-11 has been given as the reason for re-opening the Assessment for Assessment Year 2009-10.
Thus, it is clear that there was no reason available with respondent for re-opening the Assessment for Assessment Year 2009-10 though such reasons existed. The fact that the notice was issued mechanically at the fag end of limitation makes it clear that it was issued without formation of any opinion. Therefore, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. WP allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1740
Invocation of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973 - territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed under Sections 120(B)/406/420/34 of the IPC - HELD THAT:- The object of inserting Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. is to avoid unnecessary harassment to persons who are arraigned as accused. The legislature in its wisdom has incorporated an extra precaution by which the Magistrate is required to come to a satisfaction after an enquiry or investigation as to whether there are sufficient materials to proceed against the accused persons. Examining from that perspective, mere fact that the present petitioner have appeared before the learned Magistrate after receipt of summons will not obliterate the requirement of law of the learned Magistrate to come to a conclusion of availability of enough materials to proceed in the case.
Though a submission has been made on behalf of the complainant that sufficient time has elapsed since filing of the complaint and in the meantime 7(seven) numbers of witnesses have already been examined and cross-examined, what is required to be seen is the stage of the proceeding, which, in the instant case is at the stage of framing of charges after adducing the evidence by the witnesses. Therefore, the ground of delay taken by the complainant cannot be countenanced.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhjit Pawar [2016 (12) TMI 1774 - SUPREME COURT] was dealing with an identical situation. It has been laid down that the issue being a pure illegal issue, it can be raised for the first time even in the High Court.
This Court is of the opinion that a case for interference in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is made out due to noncompliance of the provisions of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. This Court however, makes it clear that the interference is only on the aforesaid provision and not on the question of lack of territorial jurisdiction, which is left open to be decided by the appropriate Court.
Conclusion - The compliance with Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. is mandatory when the accused resides outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent unnecessary harassment of individuals through false complaints. The learned Magistrate must adhere to the provisions of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. before issuing process to the petitioners, who are residents outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
The impugned order is set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1739
Enforceable contract between the government and the appellant or not - the letter of allotment was not properly stamped or registered to assume the character of an agreement for sale - whether this court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction should entertain this matter or it should be relegated to a civil court or civil forum? - HELD THAT:- The fundamental principle is that if the writ court is to relegate a litigant to an alternative remedy, it has to do so at the earliest, preferably at the motion stage before filing of affidavits. Once the writ application is entertained and admitted, normally, it is not desirable to send the writ petitioner to an alternative forum. Here, the writ application was entertained. Directions for affidavits were made. Affidavits were filed. Thereafter, the writ was decided - The various grounds urged in this appeal point towards arbitrariness, unreasonableness and mala fide conduct on the part of the respondents. Now, it is well settled that if a public law element is involved in a commercial transaction between the parties and the dispute can be resolved by affidavit evidence, the court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to remedy the wrong, if proved. The appellant has certainly framed a substantial cause of action on the above grounds. Therefore, the writ was rightly entertained.
Once, a decision is taken by the government which has attained finality, without any change of circumstances it cannot be changed. This is because the government is required under Article 14 of the Constitution to act predictably, consistently, fairly, reasonably, uniformly and without caprice. Apart from anything else, the letter of allotment was a firm decision of the government, which ordinarily in the absence of breach of contract on the part of the appellant, the government could not revoke. However, the government could do so by a valid exercise of administrative or legislative powers.
There was a change of mind or an alteration in the attitude of the government. It was of the opinion that it should not divest itself of the legal ownership of the land. The entire swath of land in New Town should continue to belong to it. So, the conveyance of land in favour of the appellant was to be abandoned. Instead, they would get only a leasehold subject to stringent conditions like restriction on subletting, partition etc., as the government did not like fragmented holdings in that area - In the contractual field it could be changed only by mutual agreement. The unilateral decision to change the terms of allotment by converting it into an allotment of leasehold interest with the above restrictions without a valid piece of legislation or a lawful administrative act or policy was arbitrary, unreasonable, wrongful and illegal.
Conclusion - i) The unilateral decision to alter the contract terms from freehold to leasehold was arbitrary, unreasonable, and illegal. ii) A legitimate expectation had been created by the letter of allotment and the acceptance of consideration, which could not be unilaterally altered without legislative or valid administrative action.
The impugned Judgment and order dated 7th March, 2019 is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1738
TP Adjustment - exemption u/s 10A - Treatment to interest income - ITAT Directing to adopt 16.63% Arm’s Length margin for transaction relating to non US entities based on MAP concluded with US Tax Authorities
ITAT justification in holding that exemption u/s 10A is allowable prior to the setting off, of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation.
ITAT justification in holding interest income as business income
HC [2019 (6) TMI 1734 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] confirmed ITAT justification
HELD THAT:- The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1737
Addition u/s 68 on account of Barter transaction - alleged share capital and share premium issued against shares only - HELD THAT:- We note that the ld. CIT(A) has rightly observed that shares have been issued against the shares therefore it is nothing but barter system of issuing shares in lieu of shares. Therefore section 68 of the Act does not apply.
Respectfully following the judgment of M/s Anand Enterprises Ltd. [2018 (9) TMI 1779 - ITAT KOLKATA] we note that the shares have been issued in exchange of shares therefore no any cash is involved in these transactions. Hence the provision of section 68 does not attract - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2020 (2) TMI 1736
Whether the orders dated 13.06.2018 and 29.06.2018 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar, were without jurisdiction due to being passed by a single member instead of a full bench as per Section 21 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016? - HELD THAT:- In view of the provision contained under Section 81 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 and as per decision taken by the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority in Agenda No. 1 of meeting dated 05.12.2018 the impugned orders dated 13.6.2018 and 29.06.2018 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar has been rightly passed by the single member and the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction has no force and is declined.
Considering the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the complaint was filed by respondent no.5 before the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar in the year 2012. Since then several notices were issued and adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the authorities concerned but th petitioner was avoiding the appearance and hearing of the case being no alternative the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar passed the impugned orders.
There are no hesitation to observe that the undisputed fact is that the respondent no.5 has paid the entire amount towards the cost of Flat yet possession of the Flat was not given to the respondent no.5 since 2012 till filing of this writ petition. It is further not denied by the petitioner that the order of the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar was passed in the year 2018 and since then any amount in compliance of the order impugned was paid to the respondent no.5. This conduct of the petitioner shows that he is not liable to get any sympathy by this Court while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further obseraved that the law of equity and principle of natural justice go in favour of respondent No. 5.
Conclusion - The delegation of powers to a single member is valid under Section 81 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The interest rate applied is justified under the U.P. Real Estate Regulation (Agreement for Sale/Lease) Rules, 2018.
Petition dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1735
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - HELD THAT:- Assessee entered into an international transaction of non-binding investment advisory services with its Associate Enterprises thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list. Rational for inclusion of the six comparables excluded by the TPO have been dealt with in extensive detail by the Tribunal and we are in agreement with the reasons recorded by the Tribunal. Further the reasons given for inclusion of the five new comparables by the TPO have been decidedly set aside by the Tribunal on the basis of decisions rendered by this Court either in the case of the assessee itself and / or in other cases after proper consideration.
It is clear that the appeal filed under Section 260A of said Act is required to be entertained only on “substantial question of law” arising out of the order of the Tribunal, keeping in mind that we can not disturb findings of fact under Section 260A of the said Act unless such findings are shown to be ex-facie perverse and unsustainable and exhibit a total non-application of mind. We are therefore of considered opinion that the present appeal filed by the Revenue does not give rise to any substantial question of law. The appeal filed by the Revenue is found to be devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1734
Offence under FERA - violation of provisions of Section 9(1)(b) of FERA - seizure of currency office premises - violation of provisions of FERA solely on the basis of the statement of Ashish Jain recorded on 4.10.1995? - penalty imposed - HELD THAT:- In the present case, neither the Adjudicating Authority (Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate) nor the appellate authority (Special Director, Appeals) had applied their minds on the question whether the statement made by Ashish Jain was voluntary in view of its retraction on the very next day. In fact, the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that it was accepted by the Appellate Authority (Special Director, Appeals) that the statement of Ashish Jain had no evidentiary value.
This Court is of the view that the statement of Sh. Ashish Jain could not be relied upon as, first of all, it was retracted on the very next day. And, secondly, the statement was very vague and bereft of any particulars, inasmuch as, it did not name or describe any person from whom funds had been received and whom the said funds had been distributed to. As noticed above, neither the adjudicating authority nor any of the appellate authorities, including the Tribunal, had applied their minds as to whether the said statement was voluntary or not. Thus, the question whether the appellant could be held guilty for violation of provisions of Section 9(1)(b) of FERA, on the sole basis of the statement of Sh. Ashish Jain, must be answered in the negative.
Whether there is any material on record to establish that the appellant was guilty of violation of provisions of Section 9(1)(b) of FERA if the statement of Sh. Ashish Jain ? - Clearly, the answer to the above question must also be in the negative as there is no material whatsoever on record to establish the same. None of the orders of the authorities below, namely, the Adjudicating Authority, the Appellate Authority or the Tribunal refer to any cogent material to substantiate the allegation of the commission of an offence under Section 9(1)(b) of FERA.
This Court is of the view that confiscation of the amount of ₹ 7,95,000/- from the office of the appellant is unsustainable. Consequently, the present appeal must be allowed. The order dated 17.02.2014 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate); the order dated 24.09.2014 passed by the Appellate Authority (Special Director, Appeals); and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal are unsustainable and are, accordingly, set aside.
The amount seized from the premises of the appellant are liable to be returned to the appellant.
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2020 (2) TMI 1733
ITAT exercising the power of remand to DRP - Tribunal justification in remanding the matter back to the DRP to examine the issue whether the appellant had conceded that it had a permanent establishment in India - HELD THAT:- We find that the Tribunal in its very detailed order recorded the rival submissions of the parties. In this background, in our view, there was no purpose of remanding the matter back to the DRP on a small aspect, namely whether the appellant had made any concession with regard to the existence of its PE in the India. The same was a matter of record, if at all. The Tribunal could have decided the said issue and all other issues arising from answer to the said issue, or in consequences thereof. We, therefore, answer the question framed in favour of the appellant. We set aside the impugned order in so far as the operative direction contained in paragraph 88 is concerned. We, however, make it clear that the Tribunal shall limit its consideration to the aforesaid aspects, since the aspect of issuance of notice under Section 147/148 stands concluded against the assessee.
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2020 (2) TMI 1732
Dishonor of Cheque - acquittal of charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act - rebuttal of presumption - HELD THAT:- Even considering the deposition of the accused who entered the witness box explaining the transaction, it is revealed that complainant appears to be a loan shark and charging interest @10% p.m. and appears to have misused pre-signed cheques obtained prior to advancing any amount. Not only that neither the complainant nor his advocate has courage to cross-examine respondent No.2-original accused who entered the witness box for rebutting the presumption through admissible evidence apart from preponderance of probability. The accused is supposed to rebut the presumption based on preponderance of probability only. Whereas, he is successful in this case to rebut the same by leading her own evidence.
There are no reason to interfere with the order of acquittal based on sound reasonings and reached after appreciation of evidence. The applicant-original complainant has failed to make out a case to grant Special Leave to Appeal under sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and, therefore, this application stands rejected.
Application dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1727
Validity of the assessment made by the AO u/s 143(3)/147 - approval given by the Ld. Pr. CIT and merely a single word “yes” was used by the Ld. Pr. CIT while according his approval - HELD THAT:- As reopening of assessment to be bad in law on the ground that the approval for reopening of assessment given by the Ld. Pr. CIT in a mechanical manner without application of mind did not meet the statutory requirement of section 151 of the Act. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1726
Legality of the Trial Court's order to expunge certain portions of the affidavit-in-evidence - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the impugned order dated 23rd February, 2019 shows that the Trial Court has done a minute examination of the affidavit-in-evidence to expunge certain portions of the affidavit. This Court has perused the objectionable portions pointed out by the Defendant. Most of the objectionable portions, including paragraphs 2 and 3 are primarily expanding on or giving further factual basis for what has already been pleaded in the plaint.
In the plaint, the Plaintiff has sought Rs. 10,000/- per month. However, in the affidavit, the Plaintiff is trying to place on record a document to support the plea that the neighbouring properties are fetching Rs. 35,000/- per month. The question as to what should be the mesne profits has to be adjudicated by the Trial Court. The Defendant is obviously at liberty to controvert the averments made in the affidavit-in-evidence.
The modifications which have been directed by the Trial Court are not found appropriate. The affidavit-in-evidence shall be read as it is. The objections of the Defendant shall be recorded prior to or during the cross-examination and the same shall be considered at the time of final adjudication. The objections as to mode of proof, admissibility, etc., if raised, would also be liable to be adjudicated at the final stage.
Petition disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1725
Claim for damages - loss of stock in trade comprising of raw materials including Mustard Oil Seed, Mustard Oil in tanks and its by-products - damaged during the super cyclone which hit the appellant's business premises on 29th October, 1999 - HELD THAT:- When any party approaches the appellate forum and obtains conditional order of stay, the deposit made is only to prevent the remaining amount being paid. If the appeal is lost, the whole amount becomes due as per of order/decree of the court below. In the present case the National Commission dismissed the appeal and thus observed that the amount had to be paid as per the order of the State Commission. Interim orders to protect the respondent in the interregnum period during the pendency of appeal certainly cannot affect the decree which arises out of the order of the State Commission though, naturally, the amount released to the appellant as a condition of stay would be adjusted against the amount due. The effect of the order of the National Commission was to reiterate the order of the State Commission which had directed payment of Rs.16,00,000/- by 31st March, 2008, failing, interest @ 9% from 1st November, 1999 would be chargeable. The amount was not deposited within that window, nor even interim order obtained, though soon after that the interim order was obtained. That would not make any difference.
The order/decree of the State Commission must be implemented in its entirety and thus the view taken by the State Commission in execution proceedings vide order dated 30th October 2015 is the correct view and consequently the impugned order of the National Consumers Redressal Commission is liable to be set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1724
Seeking withdrawal of appeal - HELD THAT:- The appellant has moved a memo dated 10.1.2020 stating that they have availed the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, which has been accepted by the Department and discharge certificate has also been issued by the Designated Committee, which has also been produced on record. In view of the discharge certificate, the present appeal is dismissed as deemed to be withdrawn.
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2020 (2) TMI 1723
Applicability of Section 50C - multiplicative factor of '3' applied by the AO - as per AO appellant misusing the agricultural lands owned by it for other than agricultural purposes for which no permission or sanction of or notice to the appropriate authority was given - property comes in category type-1 i.e. for agricultural / residential or for commercial type-3 - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has decided the issues and deleted the additions, after elaborately discussing the detailed evidences as held contention of the appellant that where the property could not be registered due to any reason (here being in extended lal-doora) the transaction in relation thereto was outside the scope of Sec. 50 C stands rejected.
Multiplicative factor of '3' applied by the AO was misdirected as the same was done by the AO on the basis of the factor of abuse of the land by the appellant which was not envisaged by the Delhi Government while laying down the different multiplicative factors as 1,2 and 3 for "permissible" uses of lands. Since such a situation was not envisaged by the Delhi stamp Rules, the factor of ‘3’ is held to be invalid.
Therefore, we are fully agree with the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) passed in his impugned order and we are of the view that no interference is called for in the well reasoned order passed by the Ld. CIT(A). Assessee appeal allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1722
Estimation of income - Bogus purchases - AO in this case has made 12.5% addition - Assessee has prayed that when only the profits earned by the assessee on these bogus purchase transaction is to be taxed the gross profit already shown by the assessee and offered to tax should be reduced from the standard 12.5% being directed to be disallowed
HELD THAT:- We modify the order of learned CITA and direct that the disallowance in this case be restricted to 12.5% of the bogus purchases as reduced by the gross profit rate already declared by the assessee on these transactions. It goes without saying that if the gross profit already declared is more than 12.5% no disallowance is called for. Ld counsel of the assessee fairly accepted this proposition. Appeals filed by the assessee stand partly allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1721
Seeking sanction to the Scheme of Arrangement between Huntsman International (India) Private Limited and Huntsman Advanced Materials Solutions Private Limited and their respective shareholders - Sections 230 - 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- From the material on record and after perusing the clarifications and submissions of the Petitioner Companies to the Report filed by the Regional Director, the Scheme appears to be fair and reasonable and is not violative of any provisions of law and is not contrary to public policy - Since all the requisite statutory compliances have been fulfilled, the Company Scheme Petition filed by the Petitioner Companies is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a), (c) and (d) of the Company Scheme Petition.
Petition disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1720
Territorial jurisdiction as per CBDT’s notification No.50 of 2014 w.e.f. 15.11.2014 defining jurisdiction as per the postal PIN - appellant filed the return in Surat, but the assessment was done in Kolkata - as per revenue assessee is a stopped from challenging territorial jurisdiction at this belated stage wherein the lower authorities have framed the same as per law.
THAT:- Hon'ble apex court’s landmark decision in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. [1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] as considered in All Cargo Global Logistic Ltd. [2012 (7) TMI 222 - ITAT MUMBAI(SB)] holds that an additional ground can very well allowed to be raised before the tribunal in order to determine correct taxable income provided all the relevant facts are on record.
We make it clear that the assessee has already filed the necessary details of as it had filed its return in Surat only as it is evident from a perusal thereof in page-1 of the paper book. As further find from the department’s record also suggests the assessee’s jurisdiction is in Surat only. The same makes it clear sufficiently clear that impugned assessment in Kolkata suffers from lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, reasoning mutatis mutandis to quash the impugned assessment since suffering from lack of territorial jurisdiction. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1719
TP Adjustment - Ad-hoc disallowance of expenses allocated - adoption of the head count basis for the purpose of allocating the common pool expenses inter se the assessee and CWNIPL - neither any valid methodology for allocation of expenses was submitted by the assessee nor the one submitted was found to be substantiated, therefore, the A.O in the absence of the requisite information the A.O on an ad hoc basis disallowed 30% of such expenses and made a consequential addition/disallowance u/s 37 - HELD THAT:- We find substantial force in the contention of the ld. A.R, that the common expenses incurred by CWNIPL towards Finance, Administration and Human Resources functions may not vary with every change in number of the employees employed either by the assessee or CWNIPL. Although, the number of employees of the assessee vis-a-vis CWNIPL does give a fair picture and provides a basis for allocating the aforesaid common employee costs between them, however, the same cannot be expected to vary with every change in the number of employees employed by them.
As such, the cost incurred towards provision of the aforesaid common services may continue to be the same despite insignificant variation in the number of employees of the assessee or CWNIPL. Accordingly, we are unable to sustain the view taken by the A.O/DRP that as the fluctuation/change in the number of employees of the assessee and CWNIPL during the year is not witnessed by a corresponding fluctuation/change in common employee costs, therefore, the allocation of the common expenses on a head count basis cannot be safely adopted for allocating the said expenses between them.
The amount reimbursed by the assessee was towards its share of expenses that were incurred by CWNIPL in respect of the common staff that was providing administrative, human resource and finance services, while for those debited in the accounts of the assessee pertained to the operational staff that was on the pay rolls of the assessee. As such, it can safely be concluded that there was no overlapping or duplication of the expenses debited by the assessee in its books of accounts. Be that as it may, the A.O/DRP had not doubted the fact as regards sharing of the common expenses by the assessee and CWNIPL, but had only assailed the adoption of the head count as a basis for allocating the common pool expenses. As such, the aforesaid doubts raised by the DRP looses their significance in the backdrop of the reasoning, and also the basis, that was adopted for dislodging the assesse’s claim of allocation of expenses.
We find that the A.O in A.Y. 2011-12 while re-adjudicating the issue pursuant to the “setting aside” of the matter to his file by the Tribunal, had accepted, that the reimbursement of expenses by the assessee for (i) administration and (ii) human resource functions could safely be allocated by using the average number of employee as the allocation key.
As regards the reimbursement of expenses by the assessee for finance function the A.O had changed the allocation key to turnover of the assessee vis-à-vis that of CWNIPL. Now, as the adverse inferences/objections which were drawn by the A.O/DRP for concluding that the head count basis adopted was not a correct basis for allocating the employee costs in the case of the present assessee had been vacated by us, therefore, we are of the considered view that no infirmity could be related to the allocation of the aforesaid common employee costs on head count basis by the assessee during the year under consideration.
Accordingly, we “set aside” the order passed by the A.O, and direct him to accept the head count basis for the allocation of the aforesaid common expenses viz. (i). administration costs; (ii) human resources costs; and (iii). finance costs, between the assessee and CWNIPL. The Grounds of appeal No. 1 to 3 are allowed in terms of our aforesaid observations.
Re-characterisation of the amount received by the assessee towards reimbursement of expenses from its group entities, as royalty/FTS by the A.O/DRP - AO concluded that the circuit charges which were received by the assessee were to be treated as royalty /FTS under Sec. 9(1)(vi)/9(1)(vii) and Article 13 of the India – U.K. Tax Treaty - HELD THAT:- As is discernible from the records, the A.O while giving effect to the order of the Tribunal had vide his order [2016 (7) TMI 100 - ITAT MUMBAI] after verifying the copies of back to back invoices as regards the payments for the services rendered to the third parties had accepted the claim of the assessee, and had concluded that the amounts received from the third parties was towards reimbursements on cost to cost basis of their share of common pool expenses, and not FTS. As the facts and the issue involved in the year under consideration remains the same as were there before us in the case of the assessee for A.Y. 2011-12, therefore, direct the A.O to vacate the addition that was made by him by treating the receipts as FTS/Royalty.
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