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1969 (3) TMI 106
Issues:
1. Relief against forfeiture of tenancy rights under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.
2. Jurisdiction of the appellate court to grant relief against forfeiture.
3. Exercise of discretion by the District Court in granting relief against forfeiture.
4. Confirmation of the District Court's decision by the High Court.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: The case involved the issue of relief against forfeiture of tenancy rights under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. The tenants sought relief against forfeiture after failing to pay rent for two years, as per the terms of the lease agreement. The Trial Court initially decreed in favor of the landlord, but the District Court later granted relief to the tenants, considering their willingness to pay the outstanding amount along with interest and costs. The District Court invoked Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act to relieve the tenants against forfeiture due to their readiness to fulfill the payment obligations.
Issue 2: The appellant contended that the jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent lies only with the Court of First Instance and not with the appellate court. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the appellate court also has the authority to provide equitable relief in appropriate cases. The Court highlighted that an appeal constitutes a rehearing of the suit, allowing the appellate court to exercise jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture, even if the Court of First Instance had already passed a decree for ejectment.
Issue 3: The appellant further argued that the District Court did not properly exercise its discretion in granting relief against forfeiture. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the District Court's decision. The District Court considered factors such as valuable constructions on the leased land and the tenants' deposit exceeding the amount due to the landlord. The Court emphasized that the exercise of discretion by the District Court was justified given the circumstances of the case.
Issue 4: The High Court summarily dismissed the second appeal against the District Court's decision, effectively confirming the view of the District Court. The Supreme Court noted that in cases where the lower courts have exercised their discretion appropriately, interference by the higher court is not warranted unless there is evidence of misconduct by the tenants disentitling them to relief against forfeiture. As no such evidence was presented, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal with costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 105
Issues Involved:
1. Requirement of registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. Definition and applicability of "motor vehicle" under Section 2(18) of the Act.
3. The exemption criteria for vehicles used in enclosed premises.
4. Interpretation of the term "adapted for use upon roads."
5. Relevance of the vehicle's purpose and manufacturer's intention in determining registration requirements.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Requirement of Registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:
The petitioner challenged a communication from the Regional Transport Officer (RTO) requiring the registration of Diesel Mogurt Dumpers under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The petitioner sought a writ of Certiorari to quash this communication and prevent the RTO from insisting on the registration of the Dumpers.
2. Definition and Applicability of "Motor Vehicle" under Section 2(18) of the Act:
The court examined the definition of "motor vehicle" under Section 2(18) of the Act, which includes any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads but excludes vehicles adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises. The court noted that the exemption applies only to vehicles incapable of being used elsewhere as a goods vehicle, omnibus, stage carriage, or cab.
3. The Exemption Criteria for Vehicles Used in Enclosed Premises:
The petitioner argued that the Dumpers were used exclusively within a well-defined mining area and should be exempt from registration under the Act. However, the court found that the mining area was not enclosed by a fence or trench, as required for the exemption. The court emphasized that the exemption is limited to vehicles designed and manufactured for use only in a factory or enclosed premises.
4. Interpretation of the Term "Adapted for Use upon Roads":
The court considered whether the Dumpers, capable of carrying loads outside the mining area, fell within the definition of a "motor vehicle." The court referred to a decision in Bolain Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, which clarified that if a vehicle is reasonably suitable for use on public roads, it must be registered under the Act. The court concluded that the Dumpers could be used outside the mining area like any other goods vehicle, thus requiring registration.
5. Relevance of the Vehicle's Purpose and Manufacturer's Intention in Determining Registration Requirements:
The petitioner contended that the vehicle's purpose and the manufacturer's intention should be considered. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the statutory exemption under Section 2(18) of the Act does not depend on the vehicle's intended use but on its capability for use only in a factory or enclosed premises. The court distinguished the case from the decision in Daley v. Hargreaves, which was based on specific statutory provisions in the United Kingdom.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Dumpers in question did not qualify for the exemption under Section 2(18) of the Act and were required to be registered. The petition was dismissed with costs, and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief.
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1969 (3) TMI 104
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 46 and 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966.
2. Violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, and 31 of the Constitution.
3. Power of the Commissioner to remove or suspend a Mathadhipathi.
4. Right to practice and propagate religion and manage religious affairs.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 46 and 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966:
The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Sections 46 and 47 of the Act. Section 46 allows the Commissioner to initiate proceedings for removing a Mathadhipathi on grounds such as unsound mind, breach of trust, or immoral life, among others. Section 47 deals with the administration of the Math during a temporary vacancy or suspension of the Mathadhipathi. The court held that these provisions are not unconstitutional as they provide reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public and ensure proper administration of the religious institution.
2. Violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, and 31 of the Constitution:
The petitioner argued that Sections 46 and 47 violate Articles 14 (equality before the law), 19(1)(f) (right to property), 25 (freedom of religion), 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs), and 31 (right to property). The court found that the restrictions imposed by the Act are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The court noted that the grounds for removal under Section 46 are specific and justified, and the procedural safeguards ensure that the proceedings before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial.
3. Power of the Commissioner to Remove or Suspend a Mathadhipathi:
The petitioner contended that the power given to the Commissioner to remove or suspend a Mathadhipathi under Section 46 infringes on the fundamental rights of the Mathadhipathi. The court held that the procedural change from court to Commissioner does not contravene Articles 14 or 19(1)(f), as the Commissioner's proceedings are quasi-judicial, and the Mathadhipathi has the right to challenge the removal order in court, with a further right of appeal to the High Court. The court also upheld the power of the Commissioner to suspend the Mathadhipathi during the inquiry, stating that it is necessary to prevent tampering with evidence or misappropriation of funds.
4. Right to Practice and Propagate Religion and Manage Religious Affairs:
The petitioner argued that the suspension and administrative control by the Commissioner violate Articles 25 and 26, which guarantee the right to practice and propagate religion and manage religious affairs. The court found no evidence that the petitioner was prohibited from practicing or propagating his religion. The court also held that Sections 46 and 47 do not empower the Commissioner to interfere with religious rites and ceremonies or take away the right of administration permanently. The temporary administration by the Assistant Commissioner during the suspension is justified due to the pending inquiry into serious charges against the petitioner.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the provisions of Sections 46 and 47 of the Act do not violate the constitutional rights of the petitioner. The restrictions imposed are reasonable and necessary for the proper administration of the Math. The court also directed that the petitioner be allowed to receive personal offerings (padakanukas) and maintain accounts, and the inquiry under Section 46 be concluded within three months. No order as to costs was made.
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1969 (3) TMI 103
Issues:
Conviction under Section 85(a) read with Section 73-A of the Employees' State Insurance Act, Section 85(g) read with Section 73-E of the Act, and Section 85(g) read with Regulation 26 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulation, 1950.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction under Section 85(a) read with Section 73-A of the Employees' State Insurance Act:
The petitioner, a Director of a company, was convicted for failing to make special contributions as required by Section 73-A of the Act within the specified time frame. The prosecution established that the petitioner, as a Director, was liable for contraventions of the Act regardless of his specific role in the company's management. The court found the petitioner's presence during an inspection and submission of required forms as evidence of his liability under the Act. The judgment upheld the conviction and fine imposed under this section.
2. Conviction under Section 85(g) read with Section 73-E of the Employees' State Insurance Act:
The petitioner was also convicted for failing to submit returns in the prescribed form within the specified timeframe under Section 73-E of the Act. The court emphasized that the obligation to submit returns was mandatory, regardless of whether there was a termination of contributions. The judgment noted that failure to submit the required return constituted an offense, even if there was no actual termination of contributions. The court upheld the conviction and fine imposed under this section.
3. Conviction under Section 85(g) read with Regulation 26 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulation, 1950:
The petitioner was convicted under Regulation 26 for failing to submit a return in duplicate in form No. 6 within the specified time frame. The court clarified that the submission of this return was necessary to indicate any termination of contributions, and failure to do so constituted a technical offense. The judgment highlighted that even in cases where there was no termination of contributions, the prescribed return must be submitted. The court upheld the conviction and fine imposed under this section.
In conclusion, the judgment maintained the conviction and fines imposed on the petitioner under all three counts of charge. The court found no reason to interfere with the conviction and maintained the sentences under the relevant sections of the Employees' State Insurance Act. The Rule was discharged, with a reduction in sentence under Section 85(g) read with Regulation 26 of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulation, 1950.
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1969 (3) TMI 102
Issues:
1. Validity of sales tax assessment on imported "bardana" under a notification.
2. Legality of penalty imposed for not filing returns in time.
3. Constitutionality of sales tax levy on imported "bardana" in comparison to locally produced "bardana."
4. Validity of the notification under Section 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act.
5. Interpretation of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution in relation to the case.
Analysis:
1. The Rajasthan High Court held the assessment of sales tax on imported "bardana" invalid under a notification issued under Section 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. The court found that the imposition of penalty for not filing returns in time was also illegal. The court determined that the tax levy on imported "bardana" was discriminatory and contravened Article 301 of the Constitution, as it did not extend to locally produced "bardana."
2. The Respondent, a partnership firm acting as a commission agent, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the sales tax assessment and penalty. The High Court acknowledged the government's obligation to refund the tax collected on imported "bardana" but denied relief due to insufficient details on the tax amount paid and timing of payments by the Respondent.
3. The State contended that the notification validly exempted the sale of "bardana" meaning gunny bags made from jute, not all types of containers. The State argued that the exemption did not cover sales tax on imported "bardana" at the first point of sale by the importer. The High Court's decision was based on the broad interpretation of "bardana" to include various containers, leading to discrimination in taxation between imported and locally produced goods.
4. Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution were considered in the context of the case. Article 301 guarantees free trade, commerce, and intercourse within India, while Article 304(a) allows states to impose taxes on imported goods similar to locally produced goods without discrimination. The court emphasized the need to prevent discrimination in taxation between imported and locally produced goods, as illustrated in a prior judgment involving excise duty on foreign liquor.
5. The High Court's decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, emphasizing the discriminatory nature of the tax levy on imported "bardana." The court noted that the term "bardana" encompassed various containers, not just gunny bags, leading to an unconstitutional distinction in taxation. The court directed the High Court to determine the refund amount for the tax paid on imported "bardana" and dismissed the appeals with costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 101
The High Court of Madras held that bonus should be considered part of wages and can be attached in execution of a decree. The judgment of the lower court was set aside and the matter remitted for further consideration to determine if the respondent is a mechanic or a laborer.
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1969 (3) TMI 100
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of detention and conviction by the General Court-martial.
2. Compliance with Rule 15 of the Air Force Act Rules, 1950.
3. Admission of confessional statement and cross-examination of defense witness.
4. Maintainability of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
5. Scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Locus standi of the petitioner's wife to file the petition.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Detention and Conviction by the General Court-martial:
The petitioner, convicted by a General Court-martial on charges of criminal misappropriation of Air Force Public Fund Accounts, sought a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of illegal detention and conviction. The petitioner argued that his conviction was not in accordance with the procedure established by law.
2. Compliance with Rule 15 of the Air Force Act Rules, 1950:
The petitioner contended that he was not given an effective opportunity to defend himself as required under Rule 15 of the Air Force Act Rules, 1950. He alleged that the Commanding Officer did not allow him to cross-examine witnesses or present his defense adequately. The return affidavit by the respondents denied these allegations, asserting that Rule 15 was complied with in letter and spirit, and the compliance was proved at the trial by the petitioner's own witness.
3. Admission of Confessional Statement and Cross-examination of Defense Witness:
The petitioner challenged the admission of his confessional statement as evidence, arguing it was not voluntary. Additionally, he objected to the cross-examination of his defense witness, Fit. Lt. S. C. Bhately, by the Prosecutor. The respondents maintained that the confessional statement was admitted after due consideration and that cross-examination of the witness was justified as he was examined on oath by the petitioner.
4. Maintainability of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus:
A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the petition, arguing that habeas corpus is not available to a prisoner serving a legal sentence passed by a Court-martial. The court discussed whether it could examine the legality of a conviction and sentence by a duly constituted Court-martial in habeas corpus proceedings. It was concluded that habeas corpus cannot be used to question the correctness of a decision of a competent court, including a Court-martial, unless there is a jurisdictional error.
5. Scope of the High Court's Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The petitioner's counsel argued that Article 21 of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, allows the High Court to examine the legality of the conviction and sentence. The court acknowledged that while it has the jurisdiction to scrutinize the proceedings of a Court-martial, this jurisdiction is limited to examining whether the person was subject to military law and whether the Court-martial was properly convened and constituted. The court held that Article 226 does not expand this jurisdiction to include errors of procedure that do not affect the Court-martial's jurisdiction.
6. Locus Standi of the Petitioner's Wife to File the Petition:
The petition was filed by the petitioner's wife, which raised the issue of her locus standi. The court recognized that a writ of habeas corpus can be filed by someone other than the prisoner, such as a spouse or a person with a legitimate interest. However, for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner must be directly affected by the order. The court did not express a final opinion on this issue due to the dismissal of the petition on other grounds.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the alleged non-compliance with Rule 15 of the Air Force Act Rules, 1950, did not vitiate the trial and conviction. The court held that habeas corpus cannot be used to challenge the correctness of a Court-martial's decision unless there is a jurisdictional error. The petitioner's wife had the locus standi to file the habeas corpus petition, but the court did not decide on her standing for a writ of certiorari. The judgments of the concurring judges were in agreement with the main opinion, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
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1969 (3) TMI 99
Issues:
- Suit dismissed as barred by limitation
- Interpretation of Section 19 of the Limitation Act
- Whether payment by money order constitutes acknowledgment
- Applicability of previous case law
Analysis:
1. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his suit by the Subordinate Judge, Erode, on the grounds of limitation. The suit was based on a promissory note and a payment of Rs. 100 made by the respondent through a money order. The lower appellate Court found that the payment was received by the petitioner on 18th July, 1962, and deemed the suit out of time, despite the contention that the money order date should be considered as the payment date.
2. Citing the case of Karasinga Rao Garu v. Rangayya AIR1943Mad133, the lower Appellate Court set aside the trial Court's judgment, emphasizing the need for an acknowledgment of the payment to save limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
3. Section 19 of the Limitation Act XXXVI of 1963, a replica of Section 20 of the earlier enactment, was discussed. It requires payment on account of a debt with an acknowledgment, and the receipt of rent or produce of mortgaged land is deemed payment. The provision excludes money payable under a court order from the definition of debt.
4. The judgment analyzed the nature of payment through money order, comparing it to payment by cheque. It argued that when a debtor sends money through the post office, it signifies an intention to pay the creditor, similar to payment by cheque. The completion of a money order form by the debtor indicates the purpose of payment to the creditor, thus constituting an acknowledgment and triggering a fresh period of limitation.
5. The judgment addressed whether an open payment through a money order coupon could be considered an acknowledgment under Section 19. It concluded that if a debtor sends money towards a specific debt, it is an acknowledgment, supported by a Division Bench decision of the Court and disagreed with a Patna High Court judgment on the matter.
6. The Court found that the payment through money order satisfied the requirements of Section 19, constituting both a payment within the limitation period and an acknowledgment of the debt due. It criticized the lower court's reliance on a previous case, Narasinga Rao Garu v. Rangayya AIR1943Mad133, stating it was inapplicable to the present case.
7. Consequently, the judgment set aside the lower court's decision, allowing the civil revision petition with costs.
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1969 (3) TMI 98
Issues Involved:
1. Plea of Limitation
2. Allegations of Fraud and Deception
3. Validity of Sales by Guardian
4. Applicability of Article 44 of the Limitation Act
5. Role of De Facto Guardians
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Plea of Limitation:
The main question for decision in this appeal relates to a plea of limitation. The suit was filed on April 20, 1954, while the sales in question were effected in 1938. The plaintiff claimed that she only became aware of her right to sue in 1947 due to alleged fraud by the first defendant. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was barred by limitation. The appeal's main point for determination is whether the suit was brought within the time allowed by law.
2. Allegations of Fraud and Deception:
The plaintiff alleged that the first defendant concealed the nature of her title and the management acts from her, claiming that the sales were effected without necessity and for inadequate consideration. The first defendant denied these charges, asserting that the sales were effected with the knowledge and approval of the plaintiff's husband and father-in-law. The court emphasized that general allegations of fraud are insufficient and must be specific. The court found that the plaintiff's claims lacked detailed particulars and were vague, failing to meet the requirements of Rule 6 of Order 7, Civil Procedure Code.
3. Validity of Sales by Guardian:
The sales were executed by the first defendant, who acted as the guardian of the plaintiff and her sister, the 12th defendant. The court found that the first defendant acted with the consent of the lawful guardians (the husbands of the plaintiff and the 12th defendant). The court noted that the 12th defendant never questioned the validity of the sales and did not participate in the trial.
4. Applicability of Article 44 of the Limitation Act:
The court discussed whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act, which pertains to setting aside alienations by a guardian, applied to this case. The court held that Article 44 applies to both de jure and de facto guardians. The court rejected the argument that the sales were void because the first defendant was not the legal guardian after the plaintiff's marriage. The court concluded that the sales were voidable, not void, and thus fell within the purview of Article 44.
5. Role of De Facto Guardians:
The court addressed the role of de facto guardians, noting that Hindu Law recognizes the power of a de facto guardian to deal with a minor's property in cases of necessity. The court found that the first defendant acted with the consent of the lawful guardians and that the sales were beneficial to the minors. The court concluded that the sales were binding on the minors and that the applicable provision of the Limitation Act was Article 44.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish fraud with the required specificity and that the sales were valid and binding. The court also held that the provisions of Article 44 of the Limitation Act applied, and the suit was not saved from the bar of limitation even if the plaintiff's allegations of fraud were accepted as true. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the appellant was ordered to pay the court fee due on the memorandum of appeal.
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1969 (3) TMI 97
Issues:
- Suit for partition and injunction against property transfers
- Impleadment of petitioners as defendants
- Validity of property sale in violation of injunction order
Analysis:
1. The plaintiffs filed a suit for partition claiming 1/3rd interest in the property, with defendants also claiming 1/3rd interest each. An injunction order was passed to prevent any property transfers during the suit. Despite this, defendant No. 1 transferred land to the petitioners, who sought to be impleaded as defendants. The Subordinate Judge initially dismissed their request to be added as parties.
2. The main contention in the revision was the impleadment of the petitioners as defendants. The Civil Procedure Code allows for the continuation of a suit in cases of assignment or devolution of interest with the court's permission. As the petitioners acquired properties from defendant No. 1, they should be allowed to safeguard their interests in the ongoing suit.
3. The sale to the petitioners was questioned due to the injunction order prohibiting transfers. The crucial issue was whether the sale in violation of the injunction was void or valid. If the sale was void, the petitioners would have no right to be added to the suit. However, if the sale was valid, the petitioners acquired an interest despite any issues with defendant No. 1's ownership.
4. The judgment analyzed legal precedents and concluded that a purchase in violation of an injunction order is not necessarily a nullity. The sale to the petitioners was deemed valid, granting them the right to be impleaded as defendants in the ongoing suit.
5. The respondent argued that the impleadment request was not pursued in the lower court. However, the judgment found no indication that the request was withdrawn, leading to the decision to allow the petitioners to be added as defendants.
6. The final ruling confirmed the rejection of the request for the petitioners' tenants to harvest the crop but allowed the petitioners to be impleaded as defendants. The Civil Revision was partially allowed, with each party bearing their own costs.
7. Additional directions were given regarding an interim stay and an inquiry into the harvesting of the crop by the petitioners. The court instructed the Subordinate Judge to address these matters if properly presented before him.
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1969 (3) TMI 96
Issues:
- Application for compensation dismissed on a preliminary ground by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
- Whether the applicant attained majority at the time of the accident.
- Whether the minority of the applicants is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
Analysis:
The appeal was against the dismissal of the compensation application by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal based on a preliminary ground. The applicants claimed they were minors at the time of the accident, with one of them attaining majority after the incident and filing the claim within two months of becoming a major. The Tribunal framed two preliminary issues: the attainment of majority by the applicant and whether minority could be a sufficient cause for delay. The Tribunal found in favor of the appellants on the first issue but dismissed the claim petition citing that the minority of the appellants was not a sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the Motor Vehicles Act.
The appellant's counsel argued that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act should apply, excluding the time the appellant remained a minor. Additionally, it was contended that since all applicants were minors, the delay deserved to be condoned under the proviso to Section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The counsel also relied on a previous judgment for support.
The interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was crucial in determining the applicability of Section 6 for excluding the time the appellant was a minor. The court analyzed the definition of "suit" under the Limitation Act and its broader meaning under the Code of Civil Procedure. It concluded that an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act should be considered a suit, thus attracting the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act.
In a previous Division Bench judgment, it was noted that the word "suit" could have a wide connotation, encompassing legal proceedings to enforce civil rights. The court, referring to another case, emphasized that a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, though not a plaint technically, was akin to a plaint and pertained to a dispute triable in a civil court. Therefore, the court held that the appellant, who was a minor at the time of the accident, was entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, rendering the application timely.
Consequently, the Tribunal's conclusions were set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal, with counsel's fees fixed at a specific amount.
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1969 (3) TMI 95
Issues:
1. Interpretation of ancestral property rights under customary law.
2. Application of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 on ancestral property.
3. Validity of declaratory decree on ancestral property alienation.
4. Rights of sons, daughters, and widow in ancestral property.
5. Application of Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act 1 of 1920.
6. Jurisdiction under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC.
Analysis:
1. The case involved the sale of ancestral property by a Hindu Jat in 1916, governed by customary law, without legal necessity. A declaratory decree was obtained in 1920, stating the alienation was ineffective beyond the vendor's lifetime, affecting reversionary rights.
2. After the vendor's death in 1959, his estate devolved upon his widow, sons, and daughters under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A suit was filed by the sons, daughters, and widow against the legal representatives of the buyer, leading to conflicting judgments at different levels.
3. The High Court held that the sons were entitled to the ancestral property alienated by the vendor, excluding the widow and daughters due to the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act 1 of 1920. The declaratory decree obtained by a reversioner had the effect of restoring the alienated property to the estate of the vendor.
4. The Court rejected the argument that the sons had no subsisting reversionary interest post the Hindu Succession Act, emphasizing that the Act did not nullify the earlier decree. It was established that the property reverted to the estate of the vendor upon his death.
5. The Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act 1 of 1920 restricted the rights to contest ancestral property alienations. The Court clarified the effect of the declaratory decree and the rights of family members under customary law and subsequent legislation.
6. The judgment highlighted the jurisdiction under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC, allowing the Appellate Court to pass any decree that ought to have been passed, ensuring justice in cases where all parties are not in appeal.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's decree, granting possession of the ancestral property to the sons, widow, and daughters, with specific interests specified. Mesne profits were awarded, and costs were allowed throughout.
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1969 (3) TMI 94
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the principle of res judicata.
2. Executability of the mortgage decree under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of the Principle of Res Judicata:
The primary question was whether the objection raised by the judgment debtors regarding the executability of the decree was barred by the principle of res judicata. The judgment debtors had previously filed applications (Misc. Case Nos. 94 and 110 of 1959) which were dismissed for default. The court held that for a plea to be barred by res judicata, it must have been heard and finally decided by the court. Dismissals for default do not constitute a final decision. The court cited the Judicial Committee's decision in Maharaja Radha Parshad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai, which stated that dismissal for default does not operate as res judicata. The court also referenced several other cases supporting this view, including Pulvarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Velluri Jagannadha Rao and others. Consequently, the court agreed with the High Court that the plea of res judicata was unsustainable.
2. Executability of the Mortgage Decree under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950:
The second issue was whether the mortgage decree had become unexecutable due to the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The judgment debtors argued that the execution was barred under the Act, while the appellants contended that the Bakasht lands, part of the mortgaged property, had not vested in the State and hence could be proceeded against. The court examined Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Act. Section 4(a) states that once an estate vests in the State, all rights, including possession, vest in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 provides that lands in khas possession of an intermediary are deemed to be settled with such intermediary as a raiyat under the State. The court concluded that the entire mortgaged estate had vested in the State, and the proprietary interest was lost, although some rights were settled back on the proprietors as raiyats.
Section 4(d) of the Act specifies that no suit for recovery of money secured by a mortgage on such estate shall lie in any civil court, and all pending suits and proceedings shall be dropped. The court held that the only remedy available to the decree-holders was to claim compensation under Chapter IV of the Act, not to proceed with execution. This interpretation was supported by previous decisions of the Supreme Court, including Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. and Krishna Prasad v. Gauri Kumari Devi, which dealt with similar provisions under different land reform acts. The court emphasized that the scheme of the Act required claims to be submitted before the Claims Officer, and no remedy outside the Act was permissible.
The court concluded that the decision of the majority in the Full Bench decision in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh v. Ram Saroop Singh was incorrect and aligned with the interpretation provided by Kamla Sahai, J. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's decision that the execution of the mortgage decree was barred under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, and it was held that the objection regarding executability was not barred by res judicata, and the execution of the mortgage decree was barred under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The decree-holders were directed to seek compensation under the Act.
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1969 (3) TMI 93
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Gujarat Housing Board is a necessary or proper party in land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Interpretation of the right to "appear and adduce evidence" under Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by the Gujarat Act XX of 1963.
3. Applicability of the Civil Procedure Code provisions to the Gujarat Housing Board in land acquisition proceedings.
4. The extent of the Gujarat Housing Board's rights in land acquisition proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Necessary or Proper Party:
The primary issue was whether the Gujarat Housing Board, established under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961, qualifies as a necessary or proper party in land acquisition proceedings. The court concluded that the Gujarat Housing Board is neither a necessary nor a proper party in these proceedings. The Board's role is limited to appearing and adducing evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation, as per Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The court emphasized that the Board does not have the status of a party against whom relief can be claimed or an award can be passed.
2. Right to "Appear and Adduce Evidence":
The court examined the amended Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, which mandates that local authorities or companies must be called upon to appear and adduce evidence in compensation determination proceedings. The court interpreted this right to mean that the Board can present its evidence and cross-examine witnesses to challenge the compensation claimed by landowners. However, this right does not elevate the Board to the status of a full party in the proceedings.
3. Applicability of Civil Procedure Code:
The court noted that Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act states that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to all proceedings under the Act, except where inconsistent with the Act itself. Given the specific provisions of Section 50(2), the court held that the Board could not invoke Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code for joinder as a party. The Board's role is strictly defined by the Land Acquisition Act, and it cannot be considered a necessary or proper party under the Civil Procedure Code.
4. Extent of Board's Rights:
The court clarified that while the Board has the right to appear and adduce evidence, this right is limited to the determination of compensation. The Board cannot demand a reference under Section 18 of the Act, nor can it file an appeal against the award. The court emphasized that the Board's right to adduce evidence includes the right to cross-examine the claimant's witnesses, making the right more effective and meaningful. However, this limited right does not transform the Board into a full party in the legal proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court set aside the orders in certain revision applications and directed that the Gujarat Housing Board be allowed to appear and adduce evidence in the land acquisition proceedings, including the right to cross-examine witnesses. However, the Board was not granted the status of a party defendant. The court made no order as to costs in all the applications.
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1969 (3) TMI 92
Issues:
1. Whether the company's premises at Eluru constitute a factory.
2. Whether the workers on the premises are considered "workers" as defined in the law.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The main issue in this case revolves around determining whether the company's premises at Eluru qualify as a factory under the law. The definition of a factory under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act 1948 is crucial, requiring 20 or more workers engaged in a manufacturing process with power. The prosecution contended that manufacturing processes were indeed being carried out at the Eluru premises, supported by evidence of tobacco processing activities. The Court analyzed the processes involved, such as moistening, stripping, and packing of tobacco leaves, concluding that these activities constituted manufacturing processes as defined in the law. The Court also referenced previous cases to explain the broad scope of manufacturing processes.
Issue 2:
The second issue involves determining whether the workers on the premises qualify as "workers" under the law. The definition of a worker under Section 2(1) of the Act includes individuals employed directly or through an agency in a manufacturing process. The appellant argued that the workers were employed by independent contractors and not directly by the management. The Court examined the relationship between the workers and the management, emphasizing the indicators of a contract of service, such as the master's control over work methods and payment of wages. The Court referred to previous cases to explain the criteria for establishing a contract of service.
Conclusion:
The Court found that the company's premises at Eluru met the criteria to be classified as a factory, as manufacturing processes were being carried out. Additionally, the workers on the premises were considered "workers" under the law, as the prosecution provided evidence of their employment by the management. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision that the premises constituted a factory and the appellant was liable for contravention of the Factories Act.
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1969 (3) TMI 91
Issues:
1. Whether the present suit is barred by res judicata in view of a previous decision in Civil Suit No. 15 of 1943.
Analysis:
The case involves a dispute over the ownership of certain properties between the father of the appellants and the father of the respondents. The appellants claimed possession based on a gift, while the respondents asserted that the properties were gifted to them. A previous Civil Suit No. 15 of 1943 had decided in favor of the appellants, but subsequent actions by the respondents led to a new suit for partition by one of the sons of the respondent. The key issue was whether the decision in the earlier suit operated as res judicata in the present case.
In the previous suit, the controversy was about whether the properties were gifted to the father of the appellants or the father of the respondents. The High Court in the present case had taken a view contrary to the trial court's decision that the suit was not barred by res judicata. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the properties in dispute were the same in both suits. It was noted that the father of the respondents could have represented his family in the earlier suit, and it was unnecessary for him to specify whether he was acting as an individual or as the family's Karta. The Court highlighted that a decree against the manager could operate as res judicata against coparceners who were not parties to the suit, even if the manager's capacity was not expressly stated.
The Court cited various precedents to support its conclusion that the decision in the previous suit should indeed operate as res judicata in the present case. It was established that when the manager represents the family and the property in question is family property, the suit is considered to be brought against or by the manager on behalf of the family. The Court ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and reinstating the trial court's decision. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appellants in all courts.
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1969 (3) TMI 90
Issues:
- Appeal under Article 227 of the Constitution refused by Madhya Pradesh High Court
- Barred appeal by Board of Revenue due to time limitation
- Interpretation of provisions of Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951
- Exclusion of time taken to obtain judgment copy in computing appeal period
- Application of principles of Limitation Act in appeals before Board of Revenue
Analysis:
The judgment involves an appeal under Article 227 of the Constitution that was refused by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, leading to the appellant's appeal being dismissed by the Board of Revenue on the grounds of time limitation. The case revolves around the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, where the appellant, a Sardar and Jagirdar, had his jagir resumed by the State. The appellant received a memorandum regarding compensation but faced delays in obtaining a copy of the judgment detailing the calculations. The Board of Revenue held the appeal as time-barred under Section 20 of the Act.
The Court delved into the provisions of the Act, emphasizing the importance of having a copy of the judgment to effectively challenge decisions. It was highlighted that without the judgment copy, the appellant could not formulate grounds for appeal. The question arose regarding the exclusion of time taken to obtain the judgment copy from the appeal period of 90 days as per Section 29 of the Act. The judgment discussed the applicability of the principles of the Limitation Act in such appeals before the Board of Revenue.
The Court analyzed the provisions of the Ryotwari Act, specifically Section 34, which outlines the time limit for appeals to the Board. It was noted that Section 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act guides the Board to follow the principles of the Limitation Act for extension and computation of the period of limitation. The judgment highlighted the need to interpret "principles of limitation" in Section 149(2) as the extension of the period of limitation, as established by previous court decisions.
In conclusion, the Court held that the time spent in obtaining the judgment copy should have been excluded from the appeal period calculation. The Board of Revenue was criticized for not considering the appellant's case for condonation of delay and for not acting judiciously in dismissing the appeal solely on the grounds of limitation. The judgment allowed the appeal, quashed the Board's order, and remanded the matter for further consideration in accordance with the law and observations made by the Court.
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1969 (3) TMI 89
Issues:
1. Validity of distress warrant issued for recovery of municipal taxes.
2. Jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad.
3. Ultra vires nature of Rule 5 under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act.
4. Applicability of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961 on the proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The main issue in this case was the validity of the distress warrant issued for the recovery of municipal taxes. The appellants argued that the municipal taxes and electricity charges did not constitute rent and could not be recovered through a distress warrant. However, the Court held that since the appellants had agreed to pay municipal taxes and electricity charges as part of the rent, they were indeed recoverable through a distress warrant. The Court found no merit in this argument and upheld the validity of the distress warrant for the recovery of municipal taxes.
2. Another issue raised was regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, to issue a distress warrant in a suit under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. The appellants contended that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to issue a distress warrant while a standard rent determination application was pending. However, the Court ruled that the Court of Small Causes had the power to issue a distress warrant even when an application for standard rent determination was pending. The Court clarified that until standard rent is determined, rent at the contractual rate is payable, and the process for recovery by distress warrant may be adopted.
3. The appellants also challenged the vires of Rule 5 under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, arguing that it was ultra vires the State Government. The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Act and concluded that Rule 5 was validly framed under the authority conferred by Section 49 of the Act. The Court found no basis to support the argument that Rule 5 was ultra vires, both before and after the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961.
4. Lastly, the issue of the applicability of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961 on the proceedings was discussed. The Court explained that the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad became a Court of exclusive jurisdiction to try suits, proceedings, claims, and questions arising under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947 by virtue of the amendments made in Section 28 of the Act. The Court clarified that the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, had the power to issue a distress warrant under Section 53 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, and this power could be exercised even in suits exclusively triable by it under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the distress warrant for the recovery of municipal taxes, affirming the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, and ruling that Rule 5 was not ultra vires. The Court also clarified the applicability of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961 on the proceedings, emphasizing the Court's power to issue a distress warrant even during pending standard rent determination applications.
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1969 (3) TMI 88
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act when a plaintiff fails to prove tenancy.
2. Determination of burden of proof in cases involving possession and adverse possession.
3. Interpretation of dispossession and discontinuance of possession under Article 142.
4. Examination of previous case law and judicial precedents related to Articles 142 and 144.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act:
The primary issue is whether Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act applies when a plaintiff claims possession against a defendant alleging tenancy but fails to prove the tenancy. Article 142 applies to suits "for possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession," with a limitation period of twelve years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance. Article 144 is the residuary Article, applying to "suits for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not otherwise specially provided for in the Limitation Act," with a limitation period of twelve years from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
The court concluded that if a plaintiff fails to prove the tenancy, Article 142 will not apply, and the applicable Article will be Article 144. This is because Article 144 covers cases not specifically provided for by other Articles, including Article 142, which is specific to cases of dispossession or discontinuance of possession.
2. Determination of Burden of Proof:
The court emphasized that the burden of proof shifts depending on the applicable Article. Under Article 142, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession was within twelve years of the suit. Conversely, under Article 144, the plaintiff must prove title, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish adverse possession for more than twelve years.
The trial court and lower appellate court found that the plaintiff failed to prove tenancy or possession within twelve years of the suit. However, no clear finding was recorded regarding the defendant's adverse possession. The court noted that the plaintiff's failure to prove tenancy does not automatically disprove the plaintiff's title, and thus Article 144 should apply, requiring the defendant to prove adverse possession.
3. Interpretation of Dispossession and Discontinuance of Possession:
The court clarified the terms "dispossession" and "discontinuance of possession" under Article 142. Dispossession involves an ouster or driving out of possession against the will of the person in actual possession, while discontinuance implies a voluntary act of abandonment followed by another's possession. The court noted that mere failure to prove tenancy does not equate to dispossession or discontinuance.
The court highlighted that even if the plaintiff voluntarily handed over possession, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff was dispossessed or discontinued possession. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's position in Gurbinder Singh v. Lal Singh, emphasizing that wrongful possession cannot be assumed against the true owner if the transfer of possession was voluntary.
4. Examination of Previous Case Law and Judicial Precedents:
The court reviewed several previous cases to support its conclusions. In Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Babni, it was held that a plaintiff could succeed on title even if tenancy was not proved. Similarly, in Balmakund v. Dalu, the plaintiff's failure to prove tenancy did not preclude a decree based on title. The court also referenced the Full Bench decision in Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand, which supported the view that Article 144 applies when the plaintiff's allegations of tenancy are not proved.
The court distinguished the present case from earlier cases like Sangam Lal v. Ganga Din, where Article 142 was applied due to specific findings of dispossession. The court noted that the consistent view before Sangam Lal was that Article 144 applies in cases where tenancy is not proved, and the plaintiff relies on title.
Conclusion:
The Full Bench concluded that if a plaintiff claims possession against a defendant alleging tenancy and fails to prove the tenancy, Article 142 of the Limitation Act will not apply. The only applicable Article in such cases is Article 144. The court emphasized the importance of determining the correct Article based on the facts and allegations in the plaint, and the burden of proof shifts accordingly. The court's answer to the referred question was that Article 144 applies when tenancy is not proved, and the plaintiff's suit should be decided based on title and adverse possession considerations.
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1969 (3) TMI 87
Whether a corporation is an agent of he State
Held that:- The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government. Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn where it is performing in substance governmental and not commercial functions.
The definition of the employer, on the contrary, suggests that an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Government means either the industry carried pn directly by a department of the Government, such as the Posts and Telegraphs or the Railways, or one carried on by such department through the instrumentality of an agent. The contention that the appropriate Government to make the aforesaid reference was the Central Government and not the State Government has no merit and cannot be sustained.
The second contention that the questions referred to were regulated by the company's standing orders and an application for a modification of the said standing orders relating to those questions was actually pending before the certifying authority .under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act precluded a reference thereof under section 10 of the Act requires no discussion as it is covered by the decision in Management of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [1967 (9) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT] and Management jf Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S.S. Railway Workers Union [1968 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT] . Appeal dismissed.
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