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1970 (3) TMI 183
Issues:
- Conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
- Validity of confession and its retraction
- Corroboration of confession with circumstantial evidence
- Sentencing
Analysis:
The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death for the murder of three individuals, including his parents and brother. The prosecution alleged that the appellant had a motive to commit the murders due to family disputes over property inheritance. The appellant's confession, made before a Magistrate, formed a crucial part of the evidence against him. The confession was retracted during the trial, but the court found corroboration of the confession in the appellant's conduct, such as changing clothes after the murders and being present near the crime scene. The court emphasized that a retracted confession requires corroboration to establish its reliability, and in this case, the circumstantial evidence supported the confession. The court upheld the conviction based on the confession and corroborating evidence.
The defense argued that the confession was not voluntary, citing alleged police misconduct and lack of statutory requirements in recording the confession. The defense also contended that a retracted confession should not be relied upon without substantial corroboration. However, the court clarified that a confession can be accepted if found voluntary and true, fitting into the proved facts of the case. The court highlighted that a retracted confession requires scrutiny to determine if the retraction affects its voluntary nature. In this case, the court found the confession to be voluntary and true, dismissing the defense's arguments regarding its validity.
Regarding sentencing, the court noted the absence of mitigating circumstances due to the gravity of the crimes committed by the appellant. Given the nature of the offenses - three murders within the appellant's family - the court upheld the death penalty as the appropriate punishment. The court concluded that the appeal lacked merit, affirming the conviction and sentencing of the appellant for the murders.
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1970 (3) TMI 182
Issues:
1. Whether an affidavit, where the deponent swears and not affirms, requires a stamp duty of Re. 1/- as prescribed in Article 4 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act.
2. Competence of the State Legislature to amend Article 4 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act.
3. Definition and scope of "affidavit" under various enactments or rules.
4. Whether an affidavit not duly stamped under Article 4 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act has to be impounded and sent to the Collector or can be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty.
5. Interpretation of "instrument" under Sections 33, 35, and 36 of the Stamp Act.
6. Conditions for an instrument to be considered duly stamped.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Stamp Duty on Affidavits:
The primary issue is whether an affidavit, where the deponent swears and not affirms, requires a stamp duty of Re. 1/- as per Article 4 of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act, amended by the U. P. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1969. The amended Article 4 specifies that an affidavit, including an affirmation or declaration, requires a stamp duty of Re. 1/- if filed or used in any Court, and Rs. 4.50 in any other case. Prior to the amendment, such affidavits were exempt from duty, but the amendment introduced a chargeable stamp duty at a lower rate for court-related affidavits.
2. Competence of State Legislature:
The contention is whether the U. P. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1969, specifically Article 4 of Schedule I-B, is within the competence of the State Legislature. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, particularly Items 91 and 97 of List I (Union List), Item 63 of List II (State List), and Item 44 of List III (Concurrent List) are relevant. The State Legislature has the power to amend stamp duty rates for documents not specified in Item 91 of List I. Item 44 of List III allows the State to amend the Stamp Act for documents chargeable with stamp duty, excluding judicial stamps. The U. P. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1969, received the President's assent and is valid and operative from October 1, 1969.
3. Definition and Scope of "Affidavit":
The term "affidavit" is defined in Section 4(3) of the U. P. General Clauses Act to include affirmation and declaration for persons allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing. Section 6 of the Oaths Act, 1873, indicates that making an oath is the general rule, with affirmation as an exception for certain individuals. Thus, an affidavit can be a document where facts are either sworn or affirmed. The expression "including an affirmation or declaration" in Article 4 of Schedule I-B clarifies that affidavits with affirmed facts are also covered, making the term "affidavit" inclusive and not restrictive.
4. Impounding and Admissibility of Unstamped Affidavits:
The issue is whether an unstamped affidavit must be impounded and sent to the Collector or can be admitted in evidence upon payment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty. Sections 33, 35, and 36 of the Stamp Act are pertinent. An "instrument" under Section 2(14) includes documents creating, transferring, limiting, extending, extinguishing, or recording rights or liabilities. Affidavits generally do not create or transfer rights but recite them. However, for Sections 3, 33, 35, and 36, an "instrument" means one chargeable with duty, irrespective of the definition in Section 2(14). An unstamped affidavit can be admitted in evidence on payment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty as per Section 35, and must be impounded under Section 33.
5. Interpretation of "Instrument":
The term "instrument" in Sections 33, 35, and 36 refers to any document chargeable with duty under Section 3, even if it does not fall within the definition in Section 2(14). Therefore, affidavits chargeable under Article 4 of Schedule I-B are considered instruments for these sections. An unstamped affidavit can be admitted in evidence upon payment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty, and must be impounded and sent to the Collector for further action.
6. Conditions for Duly Stamped Instrument:
An instrument is duly stamped if the prescribed stamp duty is paid, an impressed stamp (not adhesive) is used within the prescribed limits, and the document is stamped before or at the time of execution as per Section 17 of the Stamp Act.
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1970 (3) TMI 181
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the adoption of Shyam Behari Lal by Gopal Das.
2. Proof of custom of adoption on the day of birth.
3. Evidence supporting the adoption.
4. Delay in filing the suit by Debi Prasad.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Adoption of Shyam Behari Lal by Gopal Das:
The principal question in this case was whether the adoption of Shyam Behari Lal by Gopal Das was true and valid. The High Court concluded that Shyam Behari Lal had been validly adopted by Gopal Das, and the Supreme Court upheld this conclusion. The court noted that although Shyam Behari Lal could not establish the custom of adoption on the day of birth, there was considerable documentary evidence showing that Gopal Das treated him as his son for over a quarter of a century. The court emphasized that in cases of ancient adoption, the absence of direct evidence is common, and long recognition as an adopted son by family and community members raises a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the adoption.
2. Proof of Custom of Adoption on the Day of Birth:
Shyam Behari Lal pleaded that in the community of Gopal Das, there was a custom of taking a child in adoption on the very day of its birth. However, he failed to establish this custom. The court noted that no satisfactory evidence was provided to support the existence of such a custom. Despite this, the court found that the consistent and continuous treatment of Shyam Behari Lal as the son of Gopal Das by Gopal Das himself and other family members was sufficient to prove the adoption.
3. Evidence Supporting the Adoption:
The court analyzed various pieces of documentary evidence to support the adoption claim. Key evidence included:
- An application for school admission in 1907, signed by Gopal Das, stating that Shyam Behari Lal was his son.
- Deposition of Gopal Das in a 1917 lawsuit, where he admitted that Shyam Behari Lal was his son.
- Income tax assessment orders from 1921-1936, where Shyam Behari Lal's professional income was included in the income of the Hindu Undivided Family (H.U.F.) headed by Gopal Das.
- Admissions made by Debi Prasad in various legal documents and depositions, acknowledging Shyam Behari Lal as the son of Gopal Das and the proprietor of the family business after Gopal Das's death.
The court concluded that the consistent and continuous treatment of Shyam Behari Lal as the son of Gopal Das by family members and in official documents provided satisfactory proof of the adoption.
4. Delay in Filing the Suit by Debi Prasad:
The court noted that the suit was filed in 1946, nearly 12 years after the death of Gopal Das and his wife in 1934. Debi Prasad failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay. The court observed that this delay suggested that the suit might be speculative. The court emphasized that the long period during which Shyam Behari Lal was recognized as the adopted son by family members and in official documents raised a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the adoption.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's conclusion that Shyam Behari Lal was the adopted son of Gopal Das and that the adoption was valid. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the court found no merit in the other contentions raised by the appellants.
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1970 (3) TMI 180
Issues:
1. Charges under Sections 302 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Identification of accused and relationship between parties.
3. Pre-arranged plan and common intention.
4. Interpretation of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. Conviction and sentencing.
Analysis:
1. Charges under Sections 302 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code:
The appellants were charged with offenses under Sections 302 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of one individual and causing hurt to another. The deceased was the brother-in-law of one of the victims, and key eyewitnesses were identified in the case.
2. Identification of accused and relationship between parties:
Accused individuals were identified, and their relationships were established, highlighting familial ties and living arrangements. The prosecution presented a case involving a prior quarrel and subsequent threats made by the accused towards the victims.
3. Pre-arranged plan and common intention:
The judgment detailed a pre-arranged plan by the accused to attack the victims upon their return home. The court found evidence of a concerted attack under a common intention, emphasizing the participation and united criminal behavior of all accused parties.
4. Interpretation of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code:
The court referred to legal precedents to interpret Section 34, emphasizing the element of participation in actions and the need for a pre-arranged plan to establish common intention. The judgment highlighted the joint liability principle embodied in Section 34.
5. Conviction and sentencing:
After a trial, the accused were initially convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge. However, differing opinions arose in the High Court, leading to a review under Section 429 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The final judgment upheld the convictions under Section 302 read with Section 34, altering the previous verdicts and imposing life imprisonment on the accused.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentencing of the accused based on the established pre-arranged plan, common intention, and joint liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The judgment emphasized the need for a comprehensive review of the case under Section 429 and the application of legal principles to establish guilt in the murder case.
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1970 (3) TMI 179
Issues:
Detention under Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964 - Compliance with procedural requirements - Explanation of grounds of detention in a language understood by the detenu - Vagueness of grounds for detention.
Analysis:
The petitioner was detained under the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964. The order of detention was served on him with an endorsement by the Station House Officer confirming that the contents were explained to him in Urdu. The grounds of detention, disclosed later, accused him of inciting landless people to occupy land and creating disturbances. The Advisory Board upheld the detention. The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging illegal detention and lack of understanding of the grounds due to illiteracy. The key issues examined were the service of grounds in a language understood by the detenu and the adequacy of the grounds for making a representation.
The Court scrutinized conflicting affidavits regarding the explanation of grounds in Urdu. While the government claimed compliance, discrepancies in ink and a significant correction in a document raised doubts. Emphasizing the detenu's illiteracy, the Court held that mere thumb impressions on English documents did not fulfill the statutory requirement of explaining grounds in the detenu's language. Consequently, the Court rejected the government's version and accepted the detenu's affidavit, ruling non-compliance with the law.
Regarding the vagueness of grounds, the Court found them insufficient for the detenu to make a meaningful representation. The lack of specific details such as names, dates, and locations rendered the grounds vague and inadequate. Citing precedents, the Court deemed the grounds too ambiguous for a proper response, further invalidating the detention.
Consequently, the Court declared the detention unlawful and ordered the release of the petitioner. The petitioner's preference to be released in Jammu, due to lack of means, was honored. The judgment highlighted the necessity of complying with legal procedures, especially in preventive detention cases, to safeguard the rights of the detenu.
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1970 (3) TMI 178
Issues:
- Interpretation of Section 417(3) of the CrPC regarding the right of a complainant to appeal against an acquittal.
- Determination of whether a case instituted upon a complaint entitles the complainant to seek special leave to appeal.
- Analysis of the legal procedures and definitions related to the initiation and trial of criminal cases.
- Examination of the specific circumstances of the case involving a complaint by the appellant and subsequent acquittal of the respondents.
- Review of the High Court's decision regarding the appellant's locus standi to file an appeal under Section 417(3).
- Assessment of the impact of a revision application and the appellant's statutory right to move the High Court for special leave.
Detailed Analysis:
The judgment involves an appeal against the High Court of Mysore's decision regarding the appellant's right to seek special leave under Section 417(3) of the CrPC. The appellant, Bhimappa, had filed a complaint against the respondents for setting his house on fire, leading to their acquittal by the Sessions Judge. The primary issue is the interpretation of Section 417(3) and whether a case instituted upon a complaint allows the complainant to appeal against an acquittal.
The Court delves into the legal procedures governing the initiation and trial of criminal cases, emphasizing the significance of the term "case instituted upon complaint." It highlights that the word "case" typically refers to a proceeding resulting in the discharge, conviction, or acquittal of an accused person, with "instituted" indicating the initiation of proceedings based on a complaint disclosing the commission of an offense.
Moreover, the judgment scrutinizes the specific circumstances of the case where the police initially charged two respondents, prompting Bhimappa to file a complaint against all three respondents. The Court observes that the cases remained distinct throughout the trial process, with separate charges and trial proceedings, leading to individual acquittals for each case.
The Court overturns the High Court's decision on the appellant's locus standi, asserting that Bhimappa had the right to seek special leave under Section 417(3) as his case was instituted upon his complaint. It clarifies that the revision application's outcome did not affect Bhimappa's statutory right to move the High Court for special leave, emphasizing the preservation of his entitlement to a hearing on the petition.
In conclusion, the Court sets aside the High Court's order and remits the case for the High Court's reconsideration of Bhimappa's petition for special leave under Section 417(3), emphasizing the importance of upholding the complainant's right to appeal against an acquittal in cases initiated through a complaint.
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1970 (3) TMI 177
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Municipal Commissioner's order dated October 13, 1969.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice.
3. Nature of proceedings under Section 258 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949.
4. Consequences of non-compliance with natural justice principles.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Municipal Commissioner's Order Dated October 13, 1969
The petition was directed against an order issued by the Municipal Commissioner of Baroda under Section 258 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The order canceled the previously granted permission to erect a building, citing material misrepresentations and fraudulent statements by the petitioner. However, the order did not specify the alleged misrepresentations or fraudulent statements nor the material on which the decision was based.
2. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice
The impugned order was challenged primarily on the grounds of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. The petitioners argued that they were not given a reasonable opportunity to represent their case before the order was passed. The Court held that the Municipal Commissioner failed to provide prior notice or particulars of the alleged misrepresentations or fraudulent statements, and did not afford the petitioners an opportunity to correct or controvert the charges against them.
3. Nature of Proceedings Under Section 258 of the Act
The Court examined whether the proceedings under Section 258 were quasi-judicial or administrative. It concluded that the proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature. The decision rested on the fact that the Municipal Commissioner's power to cancel building permission affects an individual's rights and interests adversely. The Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, which provided tests to determine whether an act is administrative or quasi-judicial.
4. Consequences of Non-Compliance with Natural Justice Principles
The Court emphasized that any order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is void. The argument that the defect in the order could be cured by a subsequent hearing was rejected. The Court stated that an order made in breach of natural justice principles cannot be validated ex post facto by affording the affected person an opportunity to represent their case after the order is passed. The Court also rejected the argument that non-compliance with natural justice did not result in a miscarriage of justice, stating that the breach of natural justice itself constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the petition and quashed the Municipal Commissioner's order dated October 13, 1969, under Section 258 of the Act. The respondents were directed to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioners. The judgment underscores the necessity for administrative authorities to adhere to principles of natural justice, especially when their decisions have significant adverse effects on individuals' rights.
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1970 (3) TMI 176
Issues:
Validity of the decree under execution based on alleged subletting without court's satisfaction under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the validity of a decree under execution in a case involving alleged subletting without the court's satisfaction under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act. The appellant leased out a shop to the 1st respondent with a clause prohibiting subletting. Upon alleging subletting to the second respondent, the appellant sought eviction under the Rent Control Act. During the trial, a compromise was reached, resulting in a compromise decree without any reference to subletting. The 1st respondent was given four years to vacate, but the second respondent resisted execution, claiming non-binding status. A subsequent compromise extended the second respondent's stay, leading to further execution resistance based on the decree's nullity due to the absence of court satisfaction under Section 13(1).
The Court highlighted that a decree for possession can only be passed if the court is satisfied with the grounds under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act. In this case, the court did not apply its mind to the alleged subletting, passing the decree solely based on the compromise. As a result, the court lacked competence to issue the decree, rendering it a nullity. Citing precedents, the Court emphasized that decrees passed in contravention of Section 13(1) are void, as seen in Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass and Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decree's nullity and denying execution based on it.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the necessity of court satisfaction under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act for passing possession decrees. It underscores that decrees issued without such satisfaction are null and void, prohibiting their execution. The case serves as a reminder of the legal requirements for eviction decrees under rent control laws, ensuring tenant protection and due process in possession disputes.
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1970 (3) TMI 175
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Supreme Court's decision in Sreeram's case.
2. Whether the amendment to Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1969 applies retrospectively.
3. Validity of the confiscation and penalty order under Section 167(8) and Section 167(37) of the Sea Customs Act.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court to order a refund under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Detailed Analysis:
I. Applicability of the Supreme Court's Decision in Sreeram's Case:
The first point raised by the appellants was whether the majority decision in Sreeram's case applied to the facts of the instant case. The Supreme Court in Sreeram's case had held that an exporter's obligation under Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, was merely to furnish a declaration that the amount representing the full export value of the goods had been, or would be, paid in the prescribed manner. It was determined that no offense under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act was committed if such a declaration was furnished, regardless of its truthfulness. The Supreme Court's decision was affirmed in subsequent cases, including McLeod & Co. v. Collector of Customs and Backer Gray & Co. v. Union of India. The court concluded that for making an incorrect or false declaration, authorities could proceed under other provisions of the law but not under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. Therefore, the impugned order of confiscation and penalty under Section 167(8) could not be upheld.
II. Retrospective Application of the 1969 Amendment:
The court examined whether the amendment to Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in 1969, which required declarations to be "true in all material particulars," applied retrospectively. The court concluded that the amendment was not retrospective and would not affect declarations made prior to its enactment. The court rejected the argument that the amendment should be construed as retrospective, noting that penal statutes should not be construed to be retrospective unless explicitly stated. The court cited several precedents, including R. v. Vine and Midland Ry v. Pye, to support its conclusion that retrospective application would unjustly penalize actions that were legal at the time they were performed.
III. Validity of the Confiscation and Penalty Order under Section 167(8) and Section 167(37):
The court analyzed the validity of the confiscation and penalty order under both Section 167(8) and Section 167(37) of the Sea Customs Act. The court noted that the Additional Collector had relied on both sections in imposing the order of confiscation and penalty. However, the court found that the order of confiscation could not be struck down as it was also founded on Section 167(37), which was independent of Section 167(8). The court held that the findings of the Customs Authorities, which included that the contract disclosed by the respondent did not relate to the disputed goods and that the declared value was incorrect, established an offense under Section 167(37). Therefore, the confiscation order was upheld. However, the court found that the personal penalty of Rs. 35,000 could not be imposed under Section 167(37), which specified a maximum penalty of Rs. 1,000. The penalty was determined to be imposed under Section 167(8), which was without jurisdiction, and thus, the penalty order was quashed.
IV. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Order Refund under Article 226:
The appellants contended that the High Court was not justified in directing a refund in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court rejected this contention, noting that a duty to refund arises as soon as it is held that the impugned order was ultra vires. The court cited several cases, including R. v. Income-tax Special Purposes Commrs. and Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiyalal, to support the proposition that a claim for refund can be allowed in a proceeding for mandamus. The court distinguished the case from Suganmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the sole relief sought was a refund, and noted that refund as an ancillary relief was permissible.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed in part. The court quashed the personal penalty of Rs. 35,000 imposed on the respondent and directed the appellants to refund this amount within two months. The order of confiscation and the fine of Rs. 2,00,000 paid to redeem the confiscated goods were upheld. The court also directed the refund of Rs. 2,00,000 out of Rs. 2,35,000 deposited with the Registrar, Original Side, to the appellants upon proper application.
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1970 (3) TMI 174
Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the writ petition.
2. Financial condition of the S. S. Light Railway and its impact on dearness allowance.
3. Legal principles governing dearness allowance.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The workers raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction to quash the award of the Industrial Tribunal, which had its permanent office in Lucknow. The court dismissed this objection, noting that part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. Specifically, some tribunal hearings took place within the Supreme Court premises in Delhi, and the Central Government published the award in Delhi. The court referenced the Bombay High Court's decision in *Damaomal Kausomal Raisinghani v. Union of India* and *W. W. Joshi v. State of Bombay*, supporting its jurisdiction under Article 226(1-A) of the Constitution, which allows High Courts to issue writs if any part of the cause of action arises within their jurisdiction. Consequently, the preliminary objection was overruled.
2. Financial Condition of the S. S. Light Railway and its Impact on Dearness Allowance:
The petitioner argued that the financial condition of the S. S. Light Railway did not support the increased dearness allowance mandated by the Tandon Award No. 2. The tribunal found that the railway's economic condition did not justify reducing the already meager wage packets of the workers. The tribunal emphasized that it would only interfere with contracts under compelling circumstances and found no such compelling reasons in this case. It noted that other avenues for economy and revenue increase had not been fully explored. The tribunal concluded that the railway's financial position did not preclude it from paying the dearness allowance. The court agreed, finding no evidence that the railway was unable to comply with the award. The petitioners had not demonstrated financial incapacity to pay the dearness allowance, and the court noted that the railway had been paying dearness allowance at a rate higher than that awarded.
3. Legal Principles Governing Dearness Allowance:
The court discussed the principles for granting dearness allowance, referencing the Supreme Court's decisions in *South Indian Bank Ltd. v. A. R. Chacko* and *Ahmedabad Mill Owner's Association v. Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad*. The principles include:
- Full neutralization is typically not given except to the lowest class of employees.
- Dearness allowance should be on a sliding scale, increasing with the cost of living.
- The basis for fixation of wages and dearness allowance is industry-cum-region.
- Employees receiving the same wages should receive the same dearness allowance.
- The financial burden on the employer and their ability to bear it are crucial factors.
The court noted that the S. S. Light Railway workers had been paid more dearness allowance than what was ordered by the impugned award, and there was no basis for quashing the award. Any significant changes in the financial position of the management could be addressed through further adjudication based on altered circumstances.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was dismissed, and the Tandon Award No. 2 was upheld. The court found no merit in the arguments against the award and emphasized that the financial condition of the railway did not preclude it from paying the dearness allowance as directed. The petitioners were ordered to pay costs, with counsel's fee set at Rs. 200.
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1970 (3) TMI 173
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the litigation expenditure of Rs. 6,000.00 was a permissible allowance under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Permissibility of Litigation Expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv):
Background and Facts:
The assessed-firm, engaged in the import and export of iron and steel, incurred Rs. 6,000.00 in legal expenses for defending one of its partners, Chaman Lal, who was prosecuted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted Chaman Lal, holding that the foreign exchange had been used for its intended purpose. The assessed-firm claimed this expenditure as a deductible expense in computing its business income.
Income Tax Officer's Decision:
The Income Tax Officer rejected the claim, stating that the expenditure was not incidental to the assessed-firm's business.
Appellate Assistant Commissioner's Decision:
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the deduction, reasoning that the prosecution was directly connected to the firm's business activities.
Tribunal's Decision:
The Tribunal upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision, stating that the litigation expenses were incidental to the firm's business and referenced the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. H. Hirjee, noting that it did not universally preclude legal expenses incurred in criminal litigation from being deductible.
Legal Framework:
Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, allows for the deduction of any expenditure not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses, laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business.
Court's Analysis:
The court examined whether the litigation expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the business. It referenced several precedents:
- Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga: Legal expenses incurred to protect business interests in civil litigation were deemed deductible.
- Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax: Expenditure on civil litigation to protect business interests was allowed as a deduction even if the litigation was unsuccessful.
- Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal v. H. Hirjee: The Supreme Court held that legal expenses for defending a criminal prosecution were not deductible if the primary purpose was to protect the individual from conviction and imprisonment, rather than the business.
Distinguishing Factors:
The court distinguished between expenses incurred for defending an employee versus an owner. It noted that while expenses for defending an employee could be deductible if incurred to protect the business's good name, the same did not apply to a partner or owner.
Relevant Precedents:
- Spofforth and Prince v. Colder: Legal costs for defending a partner in criminal proceedings were not deductible.
- Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. Commissioner of Income Tax: Penalties for breaches of law were not deductible.
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Burma v. Gasper and Company: Legal expenses for defending partners in criminal charges were not deductible.
- J.N. Singh & Co. Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax: Legal expenses for defending an employee in a criminal case were allowed.
- Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax: Expenses incurred to defend the quality of goods in a criminal case were deductible.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the expenditure of Rs. 6,000.00 incurred in defending a partner in a criminal case for contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was not wholly and exclusively for the business's purpose. The primary objective was to save the partner from imprisonment, which did not qualify as a business expense under Section 10(2)(xv). The question was answered in the negative, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 172
Issues Involved
1. Whether a notice under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, even if combined with a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, has to be served on the tenant personally.
2. Whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him.
3. Whether in the circumstances of the present case the Courts below were right in raising the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favor of the landlord.
Detailed Analysis
Issue 1: Personal Service of Notice
The court examined whether a combined notice under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must be served personally on the tenant. The court concluded that a combined notice is permissible under law and a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act has to be made in respect of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the demand of rent under Section 3 of the U.P. Act III of 1947, if included in the same notice, must also be deemed to have been served on the tenant. The court thus answered in the negative, stating that even a notice of demand deemed or presumed to have been served on a tenant will be considered "service upon him of notice of demand."
Issue 2: Proof of Endorsement of Refusal
The court considered whether the plaintiff must produce the postman or other evidence to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post if the defendant denies service. The court referred to the relevant provisions of the Post Office Act and the rules framed thereunder, which indicate that endorsements made by postmen are official acts performed in the discharge of their duties. The court held that it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to produce the postman to prove the endorsement of refusal. The presumption of service can be made under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the court answered this issue in the negative.
Issue 3: Presumption of Service
The court examined whether the courts below were right in raising the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favor of the landlord. The court noted that when a registered article is handed over to a post office, it is the official duty of the postal authorities to make delivery to the addressee. The court stated that a presumption about due service of a notice can be made under illustrations (e) and (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. The court also acknowledged that this presumption is rebuttable. The court thus answered in the affirmative, stating that the presumption regarding the service of such notice has also to be made under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.
Conclusion
The court concluded by answering the three formulated questions as follows:
1. The requirement of personal service of notice under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is not mandatory if the notice is deemed or presumed to have been served.
2. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal by producing the postman or other evidence.
3. The courts below were correct in raising the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favor of the landlord, and this presumption should also be made under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.
The court directed that the papers of the appeal be laid before the learned single Judge for the decision of the appeal.
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1970 (3) TMI 171
Issues: Appeal against conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code; Right to prefer an appeal from a sentence of the Court of Sessions under Section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code; Principles governing the dismissal of appeals by the High Court; Illustration of arguable and substantial points in criminal appeals.
In this case, the appellant, accused No. 1, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of two individuals. The appeal was made against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Sholapur, which was dismissed by the High Court of Bombay and the leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also refused. The right to prefer an appeal from the Court of Sessions is provided under Section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code, allowing appeals on both matters of fact and law, except in cases of trial by jury where the appeal is limited to matters of law only.
The Supreme Court highlighted various principles regarding the dismissal of appeals by the High Court. It emphasized that the Appellate Court has the power of summary dismissal but should provide reasons if the appeal raises arguable and substantial points. The Court referred to previous decisions to illustrate what constitutes arguable and substantial points in criminal appeals. For instance, issues such as gross illegality in relying on co-accused evidence, denial of opportunity to be heard, and failure to consider the appellant's position were considered substantial grounds for appeal.
The appellant raised contentions in the appeal, arguing that his conviction under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34 was erroneous after the acquittal of accused No. 2. Additionally, he challenged the finding of intimacy based on third-party evidence without direct testimony from the individuals involved. These contentions were deemed arguable and substantial matters of law and fact. The High Court's dismissal of the appeal with a single word without providing reasons led the Supreme Court to allow the appeal, setting aside the dismissal order and remanding the case back to the High Court for fresh consideration after hearing the parties.
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1970 (3) TMI 170
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.
2. Definition of "wages" under the Payment of Wages Act.
3. Applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act to establishments managed by authorized controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.
4. Exemption under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority under the Payment of Wages Act
The primary question was whether the Payment of Wages Authority had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act. The court held that the Payment of Wages Authority is designed to handle simple, summary proceedings concerning deductions from wages or delays in payment. However, when complex legal issues arise, such as the interpretation of new legislation or statutory exemptions, the Payment of Wages Authority lacks jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the Payment of Wages Authority should not decide on complicated questions of law or fact, which are better suited for other forums like the Industrial Court, as stipulated under Section 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act.
2. Definition of "wages" under the Payment of Wages Act
The court examined whether the bonus payable under the Payment of Bonus Act could be considered "wages" under the Payment of Wages Act. The definition of "wages" includes all remuneration payable under the terms of employment, whether by way of salary, allowances, or otherwise. The court held that the bonus payable under the Payment of Bonus Act qualifies as "wages" because it is remuneration that the employer is statutorily obligated to pay, thus forming part of the terms of employment. The court rejected the argument that "wages" should be limited to contractual remuneration, noting that the definition had been amended to include statutory payments.
3. Applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act to establishments managed by authorized controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951
The court considered whether the establishments managed by authorized controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, were exempt from the Payment of Bonus Act. The court analyzed the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, particularly Sections 18-A, 18-B, and 18-E, which grant extensive control and management powers to the authorized controllers. The court concluded that these establishments are managed "under the authority of any department of the Central Government," thus falling within the exemption provided under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act.
4. Exemption under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act
The crucial issue was whether the establishments in question were exempt under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act, which exempts "employees employed by an establishment engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government." The court held that the extensive control and management exercised by the authorized controllers, who act under the directions of the Central Government, bring these establishments within the scope of the exemption. The court emphasized that the authorized controllers are not mere agents but are vested with the full powers of the directors, effectively placing the establishments under the direct control of the Central Government.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Payment of Wages Authority lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims for bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act due to the complexity of the legal issues involved. Furthermore, the court held that the establishments managed by authorized controllers under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, were exempt from the Payment of Bonus Act under Section 32(iv). Consequently, the orders of the Payment of Wages Authority were set aside, and the applications of the workmen were dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 169
The landlord filed for eviction under Madras Rent Control Act. Respondent sought to set aside ex parte order. Court ruled no power for restitution without statutory provision. Order for re-delivery set aside. Civil revision petition allowed.
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1970 (3) TMI 168
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE).
2. Jurisdiction of the DSPE to investigate cases in other states.
3. Validity of the consent given by the Government of Maharashtra.
4. Interpretation of Entry 80 of the Union List concerning the extension of police powers.
5. Adaptation and modification of laws under Article 372 and Article 372A of the Constitution.
6. Meaning and implication of the term "belonging to" in the context of police forces.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutionality of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE):
The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the DSPE, arguing that it was not a constitutional body. The court examined the history and legislative framework of the DSPE, tracing its origins to Ordinances enacted during British India and subsequent adaptations and amendments post-independence. The court concluded that the DSPE Act of 1946 and its amendments were validly enacted and adapted, thus upholding its constitutionality.
2. Jurisdiction of the DSPE to Investigate Cases in Other States:
The appellant contended that the DSPE had no jurisdiction to investigate cases outside Delhi. The court referred to Section 5(1) of the DSPE Act, which allows the Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction of DSPE members to any area, including railway areas, subject to the consent of the state government concerned as per Section 6. The court noted that the Government of Maharashtra had consented to the DSPE exercising its powers in Maharashtra, thus validating the DSPE's jurisdiction in the state.
3. Validity of the Consent Given by the Government of Maharashtra:
The appellant questioned the validity of the consent given by the Maharashtra Government. The court examined the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, which confirmed that the Chief Minister had duly considered and given consent. The court held that there was a presumption of regularity of official acts and found no reason to doubt the validity of the consent.
4. Interpretation of Entry 80 of the Union List Concerning the Extension of Police Powers:
The appellant argued that Entry 80 of the Union List, which allows the extension of police powers, did not apply to Union Territories. The court referred to the adapted definition of "State" in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act, which includes Union Territories. The court held that Entry 80 must be read to include Union Territories, thereby allowing the extension of DSPE's powers to states with the necessary consent.
5. Adaptation and Modification of Laws under Article 372 and Article 372A of the Constitution:
The appellant contended that the President's power to adapt laws under Article 372 had expired, making the adaptation of the General Clauses Act in 1956 invalid. The court clarified that Article 372A, introduced by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, provided a fresh power to the President to adapt and modify laws. The court held that the adaptation of the General Clauses Act was valid under Article 372A, thus supporting the inclusion of Union Territories in the definition of "State."
6. Meaning and Implication of the Term "Belonging to" in the Context of Police Forces:
The appellant argued that the term "belonging to" in Entry 80 implied a police force employed by a state, not merely located in it. The court interpreted the term to mean a police force constituted and functioning in an area, emphasizing the territorial nexus. The court held that the DSPE, originally constituted for Delhi and later adapted to function in Union Territories, met this criterion. The court rejected the appellant's argument and upheld the validity of the DSPE's operations.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the constitutionality and jurisdiction of the DSPE to investigate cases in other states with the necessary consent. The court upheld the validity of the consent given by the Government of Maharashtra and interpreted Entry 80 of the Union List to include Union Territories. The court also validated the adaptation of laws under Article 372A and clarified the meaning of the term "belonging to" in the context of police forces. The appeal was found devoid of force and was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 167
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the first power of attorney.
2. Validity of the second power of attorney.
3. Effectiveness of the second power of attorney in ratifying the first.
4. Entitlement of the appellants to a declaration.
5. Proper framing of the suit.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the First Power of Attorney:
The appellants challenged the first power of attorney executed by Vernon Seth Chotia on September 6, 1961, on the grounds that it was not properly authenticated under the law. The court agreed, noting that the document did not comply with Section 33 of the Indian Registration Act, which requires authentication by a Notary Public for an Indian residing abroad. The document only bore the signature of a witness without anything to show that he was a Notary Public, rendering it ineffective to clothe Mr. Chawla with the authority to execute the sale deed or to present it for registration.
2. Validity of the Second Power of Attorney:
A fresh power of attorney was executed by Vernon Seth Chotia on March 23, 1964, which was properly authenticated by a Notary Public in California. The court found this second power of attorney to be valid and effective under both Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 33 of the Indian Registration Act. The endorsement by the Notary Public, stating that the document was subscribed and sworn before him, was deemed sufficient to presume that the Notary Public had satisfied himself about the identity of the person executing the document.
3. Effectiveness of the Second Power of Attorney in Ratifying the First:
The court addressed whether the second power of attorney could validate the earlier transaction of sale and registration. It was held that the second power of attorney expressly ratified the first, stating that the first power of attorney was defective and was being ratified. The principle of ratification relates back to the original act, making the second power of attorney effective from the date of the first. This cured the illegality in the presentation for registration that had taken place under the first power of attorney. The court cited the legal maxim "Canis ratihabitio retrotrahitur at mandate priori sequiparatur," meaning ratification is thrown back to the date of the act done.
4. Entitlement of the Appellants to a Declaration:
The appellants sought a declaration that the respondents were neither the owners of the land nor had any right to redeem the land. The court noted that the appellants did not ask for the cancellation of the Collector's order or any injunction, which were necessary reliefs in addition to the declaration. The suit was therefore hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and the court was in a position to deny the declaration without these specific reliefs. The court also found the suit to be unmeritorious, as the appellants were mortgagees who were trying to retain the property by raising technical objections.
5. Proper Framing of the Suit:
The court observed that the appellants did not join Vernon Seth Chotia, the son of the original mortgagor, as a party to the suit. The suit could only be properly framed with all the parties before the court. Even if Vernon Seth Chotia was not a necessary party, he was at least a proper party. His presence would have clarified whether he had given the authority to execute the document and could have ratified the act of Mr. Chawla again. The suit was therefore not properly framed.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, as the court found no merits in the appellants' case. The court also noted that the learned Judge in the High Court should have awarded costs, as costs should normally follow the event in contentious matters.
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1970 (3) TMI 166
Issues:
Jurisdiction of Court of Small Causes in entertaining suit for possession of land used for agricultural purposes under Bombay Rents Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 57 of 1947.
Detailed Analysis:
The case involved a dispute between the owner of a plot and a tenant regarding possession of land used for agricultural purposes. The tenant alleged that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment against him, as the suit premises were not covered under the Bombay Rents Hotel & Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 57 of 1947. The tenant contended that the decree of the High Court confirming the ejectment was without jurisdiction. The Court executing the decree rejected this contention, leading to a series of legal proceedings.
The High Court of Gujarat, in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, reversed the order of the Court of Small Causes and dismissed the petition for execution. The key issue was whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the tenant for possession of land used for agricultural purposes. The Court emphasized that the term "premises" under the Act did not include land used for agricultural purposes, and the Act did not apply to open land. The Court also highlighted that objections to jurisdiction must be raised at the appropriate stages of legal proceedings.
The Supreme Court reiterated that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree and must take it according to its tenor. It was emphasized that a decree, even if erroneous, remains binding between the parties until set aside through the proper legal process. The Court discussed the circumstances under which objections to the validity of a decree can be raised during execution proceedings, particularly when the decree is a nullity or passed without jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that the questions regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit could not be raised in execution proceedings, especially when they required an investigation into facts not apparent on the face of the record. The Court clarified that lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing the decree does not automatically render the decree a nullity. In this case, the High Court's decision that the decree was without jurisdiction due to the agricultural use of the land at the time of the lease was overturned, and the order of the Court of Small Causes was restored.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the respondent to pay the costs of the appellant throughout. The judgment clarified the limitations on challenging the validity of a decree during execution proceedings and emphasized the importance of raising jurisdictional objections at the appropriate stages of legal proceedings.
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1970 (3) TMI 165
Issues Involved:
1. Reasonable opportunity to show cause.
2. Violation of principles of natural justice.
3. Authority of the dismissing officer.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Reasonable Opportunity to Show Cause:
The respondent contended that his request for copies of witness statements recorded during the inquiry was arbitrarily rejected, denying him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The High Court found that although the request for copies was denied, the respondent had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and present his defense. Hence, the High Court did not accept the respondent's claim that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to show cause.
2. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The respondent alleged that the Enquiry Officer was in frequent consultation with the Anti-Corruption Branch during the inquiry, and the materials gathered from these consultations were used against him without his knowledge. The High Court found that the Enquiry Officer had indeed consulted the Anti-Corruption Branch and utilized the materials gathered from these consultations, which were not disclosed to the respondent, thus violating the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of dismissal.
However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's conclusion. It emphasized that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by strict rules of evidence and can obtain information from all sources, provided the information used against a party is disclosed to them. The Supreme Court found no evidence that the Enquiry Officer used any undisclosed materials from the Anti-Corruption Branch in his findings. It concluded that the enquiry was based solely on the evidence recorded during the proceedings, and there was no violation of natural justice.
3. Authority of the Dismissing Officer:
The respondent argued that he was appointed by the Inspector General of Police, while the dismissal order was passed by a subordinate authority, the Superintendent of Police, making the dismissal illegal. The Supreme Court examined the records and found that the respondent was appointed as a permanent Sub-Inspector by the Superintendent of Police, not the Inspector General of Police. Therefore, the Superintendent of Police was the competent authority to dismiss the respondent, and the dismissal order was valid.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It held that the respondent had a fair opportunity to defend himself, there was no violation of natural justice, and the Superintendent of Police was the competent authority to dismiss the respondent. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the appellants.
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1970 (3) TMI 164
Issues Involved:
1. Violent departure from provisions of the Code in investigation and cognizance of offenses.
2. Mala fide investigation and prosecution.
3. Discriminatory treatment against the appellant.
4. Applicability and violation of sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
5. Propriety of taking self-incriminatory statements.
6. Interpretation of section 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Violent Departure from Provisions of the Code in Investigation and Cognizance of Offenses:
The appellant argued that there had been a significant deviation from the procedural requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) during the investigation and cognizance of offenses, amounting to a denial of justice. The High Court noted that the investigation should have commenced under Chapter XIV of the CrPC when the Deputy Superintendent of Police started the enquiry on April 15, 1964. The court observed that substantial information and evidence had been gathered before the formal registration of the first information report (FIR), indicating that the investigation had effectively begun earlier. The court concluded that the delay in registering the FIR was an irregularity, but the statements recorded during the investigation were still subject to the provisions of section 162 of the CrPC.
2. Mala Fide Investigation and Prosecution:
The appellant claimed that the investigation and prosecution were initiated with malicious intent by his immediate junior officer, who was related to the Chief Minister. The High Court dismissed this allegation, finding no substantial evidence to support the claim of mala fide intent. The relationship between the junior officer and the Chief Minister was deemed too distant to have influenced the investigation.
3. Discriminatory Treatment Against the Appellant:
The appellant contended that he was being discriminated against, as others equally guilty were not being prosecuted and were promised immunity for aiding the prosecution. The High Court was not convinced by the plea of hostile discrimination, noting that the prosecution's decision not to secure judicial pardon for accomplices but to retain them as witnesses was a policy choice. The court emphasized that the appellant's position of influence and power over his subordinates justified the decision to prosecute him alone.
4. Applicability and Violation of Sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
The appellant argued that the investigation violated sections 162 and 163 of the CrPC by taking signed statements from witnesses with assurances of immunity and then relying on their unsigned statements under section 161(3) for the purpose of section 173. The High Court found that there had been a deliberate violation of these provisions, as the investigating officers had taken signed statements and provided assurances of immunity to witnesses. The court directed the Special Judge to exclude from consideration all statements recorded under sections 161(3) and 164 that were found to be vitiated.
5. Propriety of Taking Self-Incriminatory Statements:
The High Court expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which self-incriminatory statements were obtained from witnesses, noting that such statements were taken under inducement, threat, or promise. The court emphasized that the means adopted in the investigation must be fair and reasonable, and the use of questionable methods to secure convictions was not acceptable. The court directed the exclusion of self-incriminatory and confessional statements from consideration.
6. Interpretation of Section 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act:
The appellant challenged the interpretation of section 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the High Court and the Special Judge. The Supreme Court clarified that the section applies to any person having a connection with the official functions of the public servant, including subordinates. The court held that the section aims to encompass not only outsiders but also subordinates or other persons connected with the official functions of the public servant.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed all the appeals, affirming the High Court's findings of serious irregularities in the investigation to the prejudice of the appellant. The court did not endorse the High Court's view on the commencement date of the investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC but upheld the directions given by the High Court to the Special Judge, with the modifications indicated by the Supreme Court. The appeals were dismissed, and the directions to the Special Judge were to be followed accordingly.
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