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1975 (3) TMI 154
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review, emphasizing that a review of a judgment should only be considered for glaring errors, not for rehashing old arguments. The Court stressed the need for strict compliance with review criteria to conserve judicial time. The petition was dismissed with observations.
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1975 (3) TMI 153
Issues:
Liability of minors in a proceeding before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C.
Liability of the Union of India or respondents 1 to 3 for the accident.
Compensation payable to the appellants.
Analysis:
1. Liability of Minors:
The judgment addresses the issue of the liability of minors in a proceeding before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C. The court determines that the principles of natural justice and equity necessitate the application of Order 32, Rule 7 to protect the interests of minors, even though the specific rule is not mentioned in the Motor Vehicles Act or its rules. Citing precedents, the court emphasizes that any compromise or agreement made on behalf of minors without the express permission of the court is void as against the minors. The judgment concludes that the compromises made in this case without court permission are void as against the minors and cannot be adhered to. The court holds that the interests of minors were not adequately safeguarded in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, rendering the tribunal's decisions flawed.
2. Liability for the Accident:
The judgment also delves into the liability of the Union of India or respondents 1 to 3 for the accident. The court considers witness statements to determine the party at fault. The court notes that the tanker involved in the accident was on the wrong side of the road, indicating negligence on the part of the tanker driver. Witness statements reveal discrepancies regarding the condition of the tanker's brakes, with one witness supporting the driver. Ultimately, the court finds that the fault lies with the tanker driver, making respondents 1 to 3 liable for the compensation. The Union of India is absolved of liability in this context. The judgment upholds the finding of the Claims Tribunal regarding the liability of respondents 1 to 3 and sets aside any liability on the Union of India.
3. Compensation Payable:
Regarding the compensation payable to the appellants, the judgment highlights that the Claims Tribunal did not determine this aspect due to relying on void compromises. The court directs that the case be remanded to the Claims Tribunal for reassessment of the compensation payable to the appellants. While the compensation amount needs to be determined afresh, the liability for payment is affirmed to rest solely with respondents 1 to 3. The court allows the appeals, sets aside the decision of the Claims Tribunal, and instructs the Tribunal to ascertain the compensation amount payable by respondents 1 to 3 to the appellants.
In conclusion, the judgment addresses the issues of liability of minors, liability for the accident, and compensation payable in a thorough and detailed manner, emphasizing the importance of procedural safeguards and equitable considerations in legal proceedings before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
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1975 (3) TMI 152
Issues Involved:
1. Legislative Competence of the Parliament
2. Constitutionality of Sections 3, 4, and 8 of the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950
3. Alleged Violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution
4. Validity of the Notification under Section 8 of the Act
5. Validity of the Notice by the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legislative Competence of the Parliament:
The petitioners challenged the validity of the Act, arguing that it fell within the domain of "trade and commerce" under Entry 26 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, thus outside the Parliament's legislative competence. The Court, however, concluded that the Act's pith and substance were about preserving the sanctity of names and emblems of national and international significance, not trade and commerce. Therefore, Entry 49 of List I concerning "Patents, inventions, designs, copyright, trade marks and merchandise marks" was applicable. Alternatively, the Court held that the residuary Entry 97 of List I could cover the Act's subject matter, thus affirming the Parliament's legislative competence.
2. Constitutionality of Sections 3, 4, and 8 of the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950:
The petitioners argued that Sections 3, 4, and 8 conferred arbitrary powers on the Central Government, leading to potential discrimination and unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights. The Court found that the Act's preamble, objects, and reasons provided sufficient guidance for the exercise of these powers. The prohibition of improper use of names and emblems was deemed necessary to prevent misuse and maintain national sanctity. The Court also noted that Section 8's delegation of power to the Central Government to amend the Schedule was appropriate and did not constitute excessive delegation.
3. Alleged Violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution:
The petitioners contended that the Act violated their rights to equality and to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. The Court held that the Act did not interfere with the petitioners' right to trade in bidis but merely regulated the use of specific names and emblems. Section 3 allowed the Central Government to grant time for affected persons to adjust their business, thus mitigating any hardship. The restrictions imposed by the Act were deemed reasonable and regulatory, not violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g).
4. Validity of the Notification under Section 8 of the Act:
The petitioners argued that the Notification under Section 8 was not published in the President's name and was issued by an unauthorized Under Secretary. The Court clarified that the Notification was a piece of subordinate legislation, not an executive order, and was duly published in the Gazette of India over the Under Secretary's signature, who was authorized for the purpose. Therefore, there was no violation of Article 77.
5. Validity of the Notice by the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks:
The petitioners challenged the Notice by the Joint Registrar of Trade Marks, which proposed to rectify the Register by expunging the trade marks containing the name or emblem of Chhatrapati Shivaji. Since the Act and the impugned provisions were held constitutionally valid, the objection to the Registrar's Notice was dismissed.
Conclusion:
The petitions were dismissed, and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950, and the related Notification and Notice. The Court found no merit in the arguments concerning legislative competence, violation of fundamental rights, excessive delegation of power, or procedural irregularities. There was no order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 151
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the defendant is a benamidar for the plaintiff of the suit properties.
2. Whether the agreement with Mohamed Mustaffa pleaded in paragraph 3 is true.
3. Whether Mustaffa agreed to reduce the sale price to Rs. 50,000 at the request of the plaintiff.
4. Whether the consideration for the sale was paid by the plaintiff.
5. Whether the sale deeds were executed by the defendant at the behest of the plaintiff.
6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from denying the title of the defendant.
7. Whether the improvements in the suit property were effected by the plaintiff or the defendant.
8. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled.
9. What is the order as to costs.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the defendant is a benamidar for the plaintiff of the suit properties:
The court evaluated the nature of the transaction under Exhibit B-1, considering the principles laid down in various precedents, including Minakumari Bibi v. Bejoy Singh Dudhuria and Surasaibalini v. Phanindra Mohan. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies heavily on the plaintiff to show that the ostensible vendee (defendant) was a mere name-lender. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide satisfactory evidence to prove the benami nature of the transaction, noting that the intention of the parties is crucial in determining whether a transaction is benami.
2. Whether the agreement with Mohamed Mustaffa pleaded in paragraph 3 is true:
The court examined the testimony of P.W.1 (Mohamed Mustaffa), who initially supported the plaintiff's claims but later contradicted himself. The court found inconsistencies in P.W.1's statements and noted that he admitted receiving the sale consideration from the defendant, not the plaintiff. This undermined the plaintiff's claim regarding the agreement with Mustaffa.
3. Whether Mustaffa agreed to reduce the sale price to Rs. 50,000 at the request of the plaintiff:
The court found no credible evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that Mustaffa agreed to reduce the sale price. P.W.1's testimony did not corroborate this claim, and the court concluded that the alleged reduction in the sale price was not proven.
4. Whether the consideration for the sale was paid by the plaintiff:
The court scrutinized the evidence related to the source of the purchase money. It found that the defendant provided receipts (Exhibits B-4 to B-7) for the amounts paid to Mustaffa, and P.W.1 confirmed receiving the sale consideration from the defendant. The plaintiff's claims about his financial capacity and sources of funds were deemed unconvincing and unsupported by evidence.
5. Whether the sale deeds were executed by the defendant at the behest of the plaintiff:
The court noted that the plaintiff failed to provide any agreement or receipt from the defendant to support his claim that the defendant executed the sale deeds at his behest. The court found that the defendant executed the sale deeds out of his own volition and received payments for them.
6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from denying the title of the defendant:
The court found that the plaintiff had not objected to the defendant's actions, including the sale of portions of the property to third parties, for nearly a decade. This conduct estopped the plaintiff from denying the defendant's title to the property.
7. Whether the improvements in the suit property were effected by the plaintiff or the defendant:
The court found that the defendant had made significant improvements to the property, including planting rubber and other trees and constructing buildings. The plaintiff's claims about spending money on improvements were not substantiated by evidence.
8. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled:
Given the findings on the above issues, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. The plaintiff's claims were not supported by credible evidence, and the court dismissed the suit.
9. What is the order as to costs:
The court dismissed the appeal with costs, confirming the findings of the lower court.
Conclusion:
The court, after a thorough examination of the evidence and the principles governing benami transactions, concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was a benamidar and that the sale consideration was paid by the plaintiff. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the lower court's judgment.
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1975 (3) TMI 150
Issues:
Conviction under Section 135(b) Clause II of the Customs Act and enhancement of sentence.
Analysis:
The accused was convicted under Section 135(b) Clause II of the Customs Act and fined by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Poonamallee. The Assistant Collector of Customs filed a revision petition seeking enhancement of the sentence. The appellant arrived at the airport and declared possession of diamond jewelry without the required license or permit. The Customs Officer detained the items and initiated confiscation proceedings, leading to a penalty. The appellant claimed innocence, stating he thought the jewels could be cleared on payment of duty. The prosecution's case relied solely on the Customs Officer's testimony. The Magistrate convicted the appellant despite no evidence of smuggling intent or suspicious behavior. The Assistant Collector's attempt to argue immediate smuggling upon arrival was dismissed by the judge, emphasizing the importance of passenger declarations at Customs counters. The judge cited a previous Division Bench decision to support the interpretation of "import" in the Customs Act, highlighting the need for clarity in determining the point of importation for goods. Based on this interpretation, the judge acquitted the appellant, setting aside the conviction and sentence. The appeal by the appellant was allowed, and the revision petition by the Assistant Collector was dismissed.
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1975 (3) TMI 149
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Vishwa Nath sublet, assigned, or parted with possession of the premises to the company Interads Advertising (P.) Limited.
2. Whether the amendment to the written statement should have been allowed.
3. Whether Vishwa Nath was entitled to the use of the bathroom under Section 45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Subletting, Assignment, or Parting with Possession:
The primary issue was whether Vishwa Nath sublet, assigned, or otherwise parted with possession of the premises to Interads Advertising (P.) Limited without the landlord's written consent, as prohibited under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The facts established that Vishwa Nath took the premises on rent in his own name in 1962 and later formed a company in 1964, which started paying the rent. The landlords alleged that this constituted subletting. However, the court found that Vishwa Nath retained legal possession and control over the premises, as he was the managing director and had a controlling interest in the company. The court held that mere user by the company did not amount to parting with possession since Vishwa Nath did not divest himself of the right to possession. The court cited precedents like Chaplin v. Smith (1926) 1 Kb 198, which established that allowing a company to use the premises while retaining legal possession does not constitute parting with possession.
2. Amendment to the Written Statement:
The appellants sought to amend their written statement to reflect that Vishwa Nath was the tenant and not the company, which was consistent with the evidence presented. The tribunal dismissed the application for amendment, considering it mala fide and introducing a new case. However, the court found that the amendment was necessary to reflect the true state of affairs and prevent miscarriage of justice. The court emphasized that courts exist to do justice and should not punish litigants for procedural mistakes. The amendment was in line with the findings that Vishwa Nath was the tenant, and the tribunal should have allowed it.
3. Use of the Bathroom under Section 45:
The company filed an application under Section 45 of the Act, alleging deprivation of an essential amenity (use of the bathroom). The rent controller and the tribunal found that the bathroom was not included in the tenancy and that there was no deprivation of an essential amenity. The court confirmed this finding, noting it as a finding of fact that could not be disturbed in a second appeal.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the order of ejectment was set aside. The court concluded that Vishwa Nath was the tenant, retained possession, and did not sublet or part with possession to the company. The application under Section 45 was dismissed, confirming that the tenant was not entitled to the use of the bathroom. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout.
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1975 (3) TMI 148
Issues:
1. Termination of services of the appellant in the Civil Aviation Department of the Government of India.
2. Interpretation of the proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965.
3. Validity and retrospective effect of the rule amendment.
4. Argument regarding the need for a validating provision in the amended rule.
5. Dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court and the appellant's appeal.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant was appointed as an Airport Ticket Clerk in the Civil Aviation Department of the Government of India but had his services terminated on 15.6.1971. The termination was immediate, with a directive for payment in lieu of notice. The appellant's appeal and representations were unsuccessful, leading to a writ petition. The High Court of Delhi dismissed the petition, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court based on a certificate granted due to a relevant precedent.
2. The proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 was amended retrospectively from 1st May 1965. The amendment affected the entitlement of the appellant to claim pay and allowances upon immediate termination. The amendment clarified that the appellant was only entitled to claim specific sums, rendering a previous court decision inapplicable.
3. The validity and retrospective effect of the rule amendment were upheld, emphasizing that rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are legislative and can be given retrospective effect. Consequently, the decisions of the Delhi High Court were deemed correct, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
4. An argument was raised regarding the absence of a validating provision in the amended rule. The appellant contended that the Government's intention in making the amendment could not be valid without such a provision. However, the Court clarified that once a law is given retrospective effect, actions taken under it are deemed valid, obviating the need for a separate validating provision.
5. The appellant's counsel argued for a fresh consideration of the writ petition by the Delhi High Court, citing concerns beyond the immediate termination. However, the Court found no merit in the additional points raised, including allegations of mala fide termination and violation of Article 14. As the termination was not based on retrenchment, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
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1975 (3) TMI 147
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act to the first respondent.
2. Whether the first respondent waived rights under the Usurious Loans Act by signing confirmation letters.
3. Entitlement of the first respondent to relief under Act 31 of 1958.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act:
The first respondent contended that as an agriculturist, he was entitled to relief under the Usurious Loans Act, as amended by Madras Act 8 of 1937, and was not bound to pay compound interest or interest at the rate of 12%. The trial court held that the first respondent was an agriculturist under Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, which does not favor charging compound interest for loans to agriculturists. The court also found that the first respondent was engaged in agricultural operations, thus qualifying for relief under the Act. The stipulation in Ext. A-1 for payment of interest at 9% per annum with quarterly rests was deemed an agreement to pay compound interest. The court presumed the interest to be excessive under the Usurious Loans Act and found no circumstances to rebut this presumption. Consequently, the court adjusted the interest rate to 9% per annum till 1-10-1965 and 12% per annum thereafter.
2. Waiver of Rights Under the Usurious Loans Act:
The appellant argued that by signing Exts. A-13 and A-14, the first respondent confirmed the correctness of the amounts and waived any rights under the Usurious Loans Act. However, the court held that no such waiver could be inferred from merely signing the confirmation slips. Even if Exts. A-13 and A-14 amounted to a settlement of accounts, Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act empowered the court to reopen transactions and relieve the debtor of liability for excessive interest. Thus, the trial court's decision that the first respondent did not waive his rights was upheld.
3. Entitlement to Relief Under Act 31 of 1958:
The first respondent also sought relief under Act 31 of 1958, contending that he was an agriculturist entitled to such relief. The trial court did not grant relief under this Act, stating that the first respondent, possessing a large extent of agricultural property, should be deemed a person paying agricultural income tax. However, the appellate court found no evidence that the first respondent was paying agricultural income tax during the relevant period. The court noted that the first respondent's agricultural income did not exceed Rs. 5,000 per annum, and thus he was not liable to pay agricultural income tax. Consequently, the first respondent was entitled to relief under Act 31 of 1958 for the second transaction involving a loan amount of Rs. 1,000. The cross-appeal was allowed to this extent, and the parties were directed to bear their respective costs.
Conclusion:
The appeal by the plaintiff-bank was dismissed, and the cross-appeal by the first respondent was allowed to the extent of granting relief under Act 31 of 1958 for the second transaction. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to adjust the interest rates and found no waiver of rights under the Usurious Loans Act by the first respondent.
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1975 (3) TMI 146
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the no-confidence motion and subsequent vacancy of the President's office.
2. Compliance with statutory provisions for election notification.
3. Effect of non-compliance with statutory provisions on the election.
4. Discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the No-confidence Motion and Subsequent Vacancy of the President's Office:
The Petitioner was elected as President of the Municipal Board Soron in a bye-election held in 1971. On 1st February 1974, a no-confidence motion was passed against the Petitioner, resulting in the office of the President falling vacant. This vacancy was duly notified, and the District Magistrate issued notices for a bye-election to fill the position.
2. Compliance with Statutory Provisions for Election Notification:
The Petitioner challenged the election procedure, arguing that the Gazette notification dated 21-9-1974 was not printed until after 25th September 1974. This contravened paragraph 6 of the U.P. Municipalities (Conduct of Election of President and Election Petitions) Order 1964, which mandates that the date for filing nomination papers must be at least four days after the notification date. The Court verified that the Gazette was indeed issued on 24th September 1974, making the nomination date of 26th September 1974 non-compliant with the statutory requirement.
3. Effect of Non-compliance with Statutory Provisions on the Election:
The Court held that the provisions of paragraph 6(1) of the 1964 Order are mandatory. The dates for filing nomination papers and other election-related activities must be fixed through a notification published in the Official Gazette. Since the Gazette containing the notification was published on 24-9-1974, the date fixed for filing nominations (26th September) did not comply with the four-day requirement, rendering the election process invalid.
4. Discretionary Relief under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The Respondents argued that the election should not be interfered with under Article 226, as the Petitioner could seek remedy through an election petition under Section 43-B of the U.P. Municipalities Act. However, the Court noted that the Petitioner had promptly approached the Court before the election took place and had challenged the election programme's validity. The Court had earlier directed that the election results would be subject to the writ petition's outcome, implying that if the petition had merit, the election would be invalid. The Court decided to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, setting aside the election proceedings.
Conclusion:
The petition was allowed, and the election of the Respondent as President of the Municipal Board Soron held on 1st October 1974 was set aside due to non-compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions for election notification. The Court exercised its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, providing relief to the Petitioner.
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1975 (3) TMI 145
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commission to inquire into the succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's estate.
2. Validity and enforceability of the agreement dated 27-6-1952 between the plaintiff and Sajjid Yar Jung.
3. Abatement of the appeal due to non-service of notices to certain respondents.
4. Public policy considerations surrounding the agreement.
5. Plaintiff's entitlement to the return of advanced amounts.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commission to Inquire into the Succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's Estate:
The Nizam of Hyderabad appointed a Commission on 31-5-1949 to inquire into the succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's estate. The High Court of Hyderabad, in its judgment dated 23-9-1952, held that the Commission was not the proper forum to determine the question of succession. The High Court directed that the estate's management remain with the Salar Jung Estate Committee until the question of succession was settled by a Civil Court. The succession was eventually settled by a compromise embodied in the decree passed in O.S. 13/58.
2. Validity and Enforceability of the Agreement Dated 27-6-1952:
The plaintiff claimed that Sajjid Yar Jung approached him for financial help to establish his claim to the estate. An agreement was executed on 27-6-1952, where Sajjid Yar Jung promised to return the advanced amounts and give the plaintiff a one-anna share in the estate. The City Civil Court found the agreement true and admissible in evidence. However, it was held unenforceable as it was "opposed to public policy" and "unconscionable," with the agreement's object being to influence Central and State Ministers.
3. Abatement of the Appeal Due to Non-service of Notices to Certain Respondents:
During the appeal, Askar Nawaz Jung, the 1st defendant, died. Notices to some of his legal representatives were returned unserved. The court dismissed the appeal against the 1st respondent due to non-compliance with the order to file fresh batta with correct addresses. The court held that the appeal had abated against the 1st respondent and could not proceed against the other respondents either, as their interests were the same, and success against the remaining respondents would lead to contradictory decisions.
4. Public Policy Considerations Surrounding the Agreement:
The court emphasized that the agreement's object was to influence Ministers, which is against public policy. The court cited various precedents, including Montefoire v. Menday Motor Components Co. Ltd., to support the view that agreements tending to influence public servants are injurious to public interest and, therefore, void. The court stressed that public policy must evolve with changing social values and that agreements with a tendency to corrupt public service are contrary to public policy.
5. Plaintiff's Entitlement to the Return of Advanced Amounts:
The plaintiff argued for the return of the advanced amounts with interest, citing cases like Husain Bakhsh v. Rahmat Husain and Venkataswamy v. Nagi Reddy. However, the court held that the agreement was not merely champertous but aimed to influence Ministers, making the entire agreement void. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the advanced amounts.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the judgment and decree of the lower court, dismissing the appeal with costs. The agreement was found to be opposed to public policy and unenforceable, and the appeal was dismissed due to abatement against the 1st respondent. The plaintiff's claim for the return of advanced amounts was also denied.
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1975 (3) TMI 144
Issues Involved:
1. Joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
2. Scope of Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
3. Legality and validity of the trial and charge against the appellant firm and its partner.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Joint Trial of the Vendor, Distributor, and Manufacturer:
The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court addressed whether a joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer for offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is illegal. The High Court held that the general procedure for joint trials, as found in Sections 234 to 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, applies to prosecutions under the Act, which contains no special procedure for the joinder of charges or accused persons in the same trial. The joint trial of the vendor Laxmi Narain with the warrantor Jagdish Chander was permissible because the actions of both accused formed parts of the same transaction, as explained by the Supreme Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Rao and Anr. The High Court emphasized that mens rea is not an essential element for offences under the Act, and proof of a guilty mind is not necessary in statutes creating absolute liability for offences against public health and welfare. The High Court also noted that Section 19(3) of the Act confers a right upon the vendor, not the warrantor, and no interests of an accused person were prejudicially affected by a joint trial.
2. Scope of Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954:
The Full Bench held that Section 20A, which is an exception to Section 351(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, can be invoked after the trial of the vendor has commenced and before it has concluded, but not after that. Section 20A is a self-contained provision, and the "person concerned in the offence" mentioned therein is not to be equated with "a person who has committed the same offence" mentioned in Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court clarified that the addition of an accused under Section 20A constitutes an expressly laid down exception to the requirement of a sanction under Section 20(1) of the Act.
3. Legality and Validity of the Trial and Charge:
The Supreme Court considered whether the charge against the appellant firm should be quashed due to the joint trial with Laxmi Narain. The Court held that a distributor could be prosecuted for selling adulterated food under Section 7 of the Act, and the definition of "sale" includes every kind of seller. The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Act does not carve out an exemption for distributors or manufacturers who sell adulterated food. The Court also rejected the reasoning that a distributor or manufacturer could only be brought in subsequently after a warranty set up under Section 19(2) had been substantiated. The Court agreed with the Delhi High Court that the special provisions of Sections 19(2), 20, and 20A do not derogate from the effect of the ordinary provisions of the law, which enable separate and joint trials of accused persons.
The Supreme Court noted that the activities of the manufacturer, distributor, and retail seller are sufficiently connected by a unity of purpose and design to make their joint trial possible in suitable cases. However, where a joint trial is likely to jeopardize a fair trial, a separate trial should be ordered. The Court concluded that the joint trial of the appellant with Laxmi Narain was not illegal, but the continuation of the prosecution would impose undue hardship on the appellant due to the passage of time and the difficulty in defending against the stale charge. Consequently, the Court quashed the charge against the appellant and ordered his discharge.
Separate Judgment by A. Alagiriswami, J.:
Justice Alagiriswami agreed with the final conclusions and order proposed by his learned brothers but emphasized that for a joint trial of the vendor, distributor, and manufacturer to be valid, it must be alleged that the food was adulterated at every stage of manufacture, distribution, and sale. The absence of an allegation that the ghee distributed by the appellant to the vendor was adulterated means that both cannot be tried together. The validity of the charge depends on the facts put forward as the prosecution case, and without the necessary allegation, there cannot be a unity of purpose or common object to sell adulterated food.
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1975 (3) TMI 143
The Supreme Court allowed the petition of habeas corpus due to a significant delay of three months in passing the detention order under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. The court found that the delay broke the chain of connection between the dangerous activities and the detention order, leading to the petitioner being directed to be set at liberty.
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1975 (3) TMI 142
Issues involved:
Challenge to detention orders under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974; Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain writ petitions under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution.
Judgment details:
1. The petitions challenge the detention orders of two detenus under the impugned Act, who were initially detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The petitioners argue that the detenus have been deprived of their right to move freely and reside within the State of Gujarat, giving rise to a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution.
2. The detenus were served with fresh detention orders under the impugned Act after being released from detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. The respondents argue that no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Gujarat State, challenging the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the petitions.
3. The Court's hearing is limited to determining its jurisdiction under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution, with other challenges reserved for future arguments.
4. Article 226(1A) grants High Courts jurisdiction based on where the cause of action arises. The Court must establish if any part of the cause of action falls within its territorial jurisdiction.
5. Reference to previous cases indicates that Article 19 provisions are relevant in considering the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution.
6. The suspension of Article 19 due to the emergency proclamation does not preclude its reference for determining the Court's jurisdiction under Article 226(1A).
7. The detenus were not released upon the expiry of their previous detention orders but were served with fresh orders under the impugned Act, leading to a continuation of their detention. The initial arrest at Baroda forms part of the cause of action within the Court's jurisdiction.
8. The detenus' ordinary residence in the State, initial detention in the State, and subsequent transfer to Jaipur support the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. The detenus were not set at liberty upon the expiry of previous orders, indicating a continuation of their detention and a cause of action within the Court's territorial limits.
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1975 (3) TMI 141
Issues Involved:
1. Correct construction of Section 14A of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952.
2. Validity of condition No. (ii) in the certificate of registration granted under Section 14B of the Act.
3. Authority of the Forward Markets Commission to impose conditions on the certificate of registration.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Correct Construction of Section 14A of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952:
The controversy in this case centers around the interpretation of Section 14A of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. Section 14A(1) states that no association concerned with the regulation and control of business relating to forward contracts shall carry on such business except under, and in accordance with, the conditions of a certificate of registration granted by the Commission. The High Court interpreted this to mean that the conditions which the Commission could attach to the certificate of registration were those related to the manner and method of carrying on the business of forward contracts. However, the Supreme Court found this interpretation fallacious, stating that there is no limitation in the language of Section 14A regarding the nature of conditions that can be imposed. The Court emphasized that the power of the Commission is plenary as regards the nature of conditions it can attach for regulating and controlling the business of forward contracts.
2. Validity of Condition No. (ii) in the Certificate of Registration Granted Under Section 14B of the Act:
Condition No. (ii) specified in the certificate of registration granted to respondent No. 1 under Section 14B of the Act stated that the company shall not commence trading in non-transferable specific delivery contracts in any commodity without obtaining the prior approval of the Forward Markets Commission in writing. The High Court quashed this condition, reasoning that it did not relate to the manner or method of carrying on the business and that no power to impose such a condition could be implied as it would be repugnant to the powers of the Central Government under Sections 15 to 18 of the Act. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the specification of commodities in which business can be carried on is indeed a condition concerned with the regulation and control of the business relating to forward contracts. The Court concluded that Rule 7A, which authorizes the incorporation of such conditions in the certificate of registration, is intra vires the rule-making power.
3. Authority of the Forward Markets Commission to Impose Conditions on the Certificate of Registration:
The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Forward Markets Commission to impose conditions on the certificate of registration, emphasizing the Commission's role in supervising and regulating the business of forward contracts. The Court stated that the conditions imposed by the Commission, including the specification of commodities in which business can be carried on, are integral to the regulation and control of the business. The Court highlighted that Sections 15 to 18 of the Act, which authorize the Central Government to impose general restrictions on forward contracts, do not conflict with the Commission's power to impose specific conditions on particular associations. The Court applied the rule of harmonious construction to ensure the co-existence of these powers.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and allowed the appeal, holding that the impugned condition No. (ii) in the certificate of registration was valid and justified. The Court acknowledged the assistance rendered by Shri Bishamber Lal, Advocate, as amicus curiae, and allowed the appeal without any order as to costs.
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1975 (3) TMI 140
Issues Involved:
1. Immunity of a company from prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
2. Applicability of mandatory imprisonment and fine to a company.
3. Interpretation of Section 16 and Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
4. Legislative intent and historical context of the Act's amendments.
5. Judicial precedents and principles of statutory interpretation.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Immunity of a Company from Prosecution:
The court examined whether a company, as defined in Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, enjoys immunity from prosecution for offences under the Act. The court concluded that a company does not enjoy such immunity. It was determined that the term "person" in Section 16(1) includes a company, as per the definition provided in the General Clauses Act. The court held that a company can be prosecuted and punished under the Act, even if the mandatory punishment includes imprisonment, which cannot be imposed on a company.
2. Applicability of Mandatory Imprisonment and Fine:
The court addressed whether a company can be punished with both imprisonment and fine, as mandated by Section 16(1) of the Act. It was noted that the mandatory punishment prescribed includes imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand rupees. The court recognized that while imprisonment cannot be imposed on a company, the company can still be prosecuted and fined. The court rejected the argument that a company cannot be prosecuted if imprisonment is a mandatory part of the sentence.
3. Interpretation of Section 16 and Section 17:
The court provided a detailed interpretation of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Section 16(1) prescribes the punishment for offences, including imprisonment and fine. Section 17(1) states that when an offence is committed by a company, every person responsible for the conduct of the business, as well as the company itself, shall be deemed guilty and liable to be punished. The court emphasized that the legislative intent was to make the punishment more stringent and to include companies within the purview of the penal provisions.
4. Legislative Intent and Historical Context:
The court examined the legislative history and intent behind the amendments to Section 16. The amendments aimed to make the penal provisions more deterrent and to address the increasing tendencies of food adulteration. The court referred to the objects and reasons for the amendment, which highlighted the need for more stringent punishments. The court concluded that the legislative intent was not to exempt companies from prosecution but to ensure that they are held accountable for offences under the Act.
5. Judicial Precedents and Principles of Statutory Interpretation:
The court referred to several judicial precedents and principles of statutory interpretation. It cited Heydon's case, which established the rule of construction that statutes should be interpreted to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy intended by the legislature. The court also referred to the Supreme Court's decisions in various cases, emphasizing the need to give effect to the legislative intent and to ensure that all parts of the statute are effective and operative.
Conclusion:
The court held that a company does not enjoy immunity from prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. If a company is found guilty of an offence, it can be punished with a fine, even if imprisonment cannot be imposed. The court's interpretation aimed to advance the legislative intent and to ensure that companies are held accountable for food adulteration offences. The reference was answered accordingly, and the criminal appeal was to be posted before the Division Bench for disposal in light of the court's findings.
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1975 (3) TMI 139
Issues:
1. Disqualification of the respondent for holding an office of profit under the Government of Bihar.
2. Allegation of corrupt practice by the respondent in procuring the services of a police officer for election purposes.
Analysis:
1. The appellant challenged the respondent's election as a Legislative Assembly candidate from the Baghmara constituency, alleging that the respondent was disqualified for holding an office of profit under the Government of Bihar. The respondent was appointed as the Chairman of the Jharia Mines Board of Health by the Government. The Supreme Court examined whether the Board constituted a 'local authority' under the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court found that the Board had its own funds, levied taxes, and had powers not entirely controlled by the State Government. Citing legal precedents, the Court emphasized that the source of remuneration and control by the Government are crucial factors in determining if an individual holds an office of profit under the Government. As the respondent's payments were not from government revenues, and he did not perform functions for the Government, the Court concluded that the respondent did not hold an office of profit under the State Government.
2. The second issue involved the allegation of the respondent engaging in a corrupt practice by using the services of a police officer for an election meeting. The appellant claimed that the meeting was held within the police station premises, implicating a violation of the Representation of the People Act. However, the evidence provided by the appellant was hearsay and not corroborated by eyewitness testimony. The High Court, after evaluating the evidence, found the charge of corrupt practice unproven. The Supreme Court reiterated the requirement for such serious allegations to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As the evidence presented fell short of meeting this standard, the Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs, emphasizing the need for stringent proof in cases of alleged corrupt practices during elections.
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1975 (3) TMI 138
Issues Involved:
1. Annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud.
2. Divorce on the ground of unsoundness of mind.
3. Judicial separation on the ground of cruelty.
4. Condonation of cruelty and its implications.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Annulment of Marriage on the Ground of Fraud:
The appellant sought annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(c) of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground that his consent was obtained by fraud. He alleged that the respondent was treated in the Yeravada Mental Hospital for Schizophrenia, but her father fraudulently represented that she was treated for sunstroke and cerebral malaria. The trial court rejected this contention, and the High Court's decision on this issue was treated as final and not reopened.
2. Divorce on the Ground of Unsoundness of Mind:
The appellant also sought divorce under Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act, claiming that the respondent was incurably of unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The trial court rejected this contention as well, and the High Court's decision on this issue was also treated as final and not reopened.
3. Judicial Separation on the Ground of Cruelty:
The appellant sought judicial separation under Section 10(1)(b) of the Act, alleging that the respondent had treated him with cruelty. The trial court found the respondent guilty of cruelty and passed a decree for judicial separation. However, the District Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the respondent's appeal, resulting in the dismissal of the appellant's petition. The High Court also dismissed the appellant's second appeal, finding that the appellant had failed to establish cruelty.
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had erred in its approach by requiring the petitioner to prove cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt, which is not the standard in civil cases. The correct standard is the preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court also clarified that cruelty under Section 10(1)(b) does not need to be of such a character as to cause "danger" to life, limb, or health, but must cause a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.
The Supreme Court found that the respondent's conduct, including regular abuse, threats, and physical violence, amounted to cruelty. The Court noted that the respondent's behavior was not merely the wear and tear of married life but constituted a pattern of conduct that was harmful and injurious to the appellant.
4. Condonation of Cruelty and Its Implications:
The High Court had found that the appellant had condoned the respondent's cruelty because they continued to cohabit and a child was born to them after the alleged acts of cruelty. The Supreme Court agreed that condonation means forgiveness and restoration of the offending spouse to the same position as before the offense. The evidence showed that the spouses led a normal sexual life, indicating condonation.
However, condonation is conditional, subject to the implied condition that no further matrimonial offense will be committed. The appellant argued that the respondent's subsequent conduct, including false accusations and denial of access to children, revived the original cause of action. The Supreme Court found that the respondent's subsequent conduct did not amount to a revival of the original cruelty. The Court noted that the appellant's persistent accusations of the respondent's unsound mind provoked her conduct, and her allegations in the letter to the Government were a response to these accusations.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent was guilty of cruelty, but the appellant had condoned it, and the subsequent conduct of the respondent did not revive the original cause of action. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to pay the costs of the respondent.
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1975 (3) TMI 137
Issues:
The issues involved in this case are the determination of compensation for acquired land, the review of a judgment under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the appeal process against the revised compensation rate.
Compensation Determination:
The appellant, the owner of 3.30 acres of land, sought compensation at a higher rate than initially awarded under the Land Acquisition Act. The Additional District Judge initially awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 200/- per katha, which was later reduced to Rs. 75/- per katha after a review application by the State of Bihar. The High Court upheld the revised compensation rate of Rs. 75/- per katha. The Supreme Court found that the appeal could only be against the revised decree and not the original one, ultimately setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the decree passed by the Additional District Judge on 18-8-1961.
Review Process and Appeal:
The State of Bihar filed a review application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, citing new and important evidence regarding the market value of the land. The review led to the reduction of compensation from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 75/- per katha. The appellant filed a cross-appeal challenging the review process and the subsequent order. The High Court acknowledged the error in allowing the review but upheld the revised compensation rate. The Supreme Court emphasized that the appeal could only be against the revised decree, as the original decree had been superseded by the review judgment.
Separate Opinion by Justice Krishna Iyer:
Justice Krishna Iyer concurred with the decision but expressed regret at the procedural dominance over substantive rights. He highlighted the need for a balance between procedural rules and substantive justice, suggesting a provision for Judges to intervene in cases of procedural flaws leading to inequitable outcomes. While supporting the appeal outcome, he cautioned against sacrificing equity for procedural strictness and advocated for a system that upholds justice above all.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the decree passed by the Additional District Judge. Justice Krishna Iyer's separate opinion underscored the importance of balancing procedural rules with substantive justice to prevent the sacrifice of equity for procedural adherence.
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1975 (3) TMI 136
Issues involved: Review of judgment, criteria for entertaining review petition, compliance with rules of the game, judicial time conservation.
In the judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized the seriousness of a review proceeding, stating that it should only be entertained in cases where a glaring omission, patent mistake, or grave error has occurred due to judicial fallibility. The Court highlighted that a mere repetition of old arguments or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are insufficient grounds for a review. The importance of compliance with these factors was underscored, with the rationale behind the insistence on counsel's certificate being to prevent frivolous reviews that waste judicial time. The Court expressed concern over the tendency for repeat performances with the review label as a passport, emphasizing the need to conserve judicial time for maximum use. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petition, noting that the present stage was a review of an earlier order that had the normal feature of finality. The judgment concluded with the dismissal of the review petition.
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1975 (3) TMI 135
Issues involved: Consolidation of appeals, Judgment per incuriam, Binding precedent, Costs
Consolidation of appeals: The Supreme Court heard four appeals which were identical in nature, and the appellants requested that one appeal be disposed of first, followed by the others. The appellants argued that a previous judgment did not bind them, allowing them to argue on the merits. However, the Court considered the background facts and the jurisdiction of the civil court in land reform litigation, ultimately deciding that the appeals must fail.
Judgment per incuriam: The appellants had initially requested the consolidation of all four appeals, stating that the issues were common to all. The Court granted this request based on the representation that the points in all appeals were identical. The appellants later attempted to shift their stance by claiming that the earlier judgment was rendered per incuriam, but the Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the importance of consistency in legal rulings.
Binding precedent: The Court highlighted the principle that a decision once rendered must bind like cases, especially when the facts and law are indistinguishably identical. The appellants cited cases to support their argument that judgments per incuriam do not bind parties, but the Court emphasized that such exceptions are limited and must involve a glaring omission, which was not the case here.
Costs: The appellants requested that parties bear their costs in the Court, which was accepted by the Court, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed.
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