|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 147 Records
-
1979 (3) TMI 219
The Supreme Court of India, in a criminal appeal, altered the appellant's conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304(1) IPC. The appellant was initially acquitted by the Trial Court but convicted by the High Court. The Court found that the case did not warrant a Section 302 IPC conviction but rather fell under Section 304(1) IPC. Consequently, the appellant's sentence was reduced from life imprisonment to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.
-
1979 (3) TMI 218
Issues Involved:
1. Conviction and Acquittal of the Accused
2. Competence of Private Parties to Invoke Jurisdiction under Article 136
3. Evaluation of Evidence and Dying Declarations
4. High Court's Reasoning for Acquittal
5. Supreme Court's Jurisdiction and Grounds for Interference
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction and Acquittal of the Accused:
The first accused, Sadhanantham, was convicted under Sections 148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and two years for rioting. The other four accused were convicted under Sections 147, 323, and 149 read with 323, and sentenced to one year of imprisonment on each count. The High Court of Madras acquitted all the accused, leading to an appeal by the brother of the deceased after obtaining special leave from the Supreme Court.
2. Competence of Private Parties to Invoke Jurisdiction under Article 136:
The Supreme Court addressed the doubt regarding the competence of private parties to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution against a High Court's acquittal judgment. The Court clarified that its appellate power under Article 136 is plenary and exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law to meet the pressing demands of justice. The Court emphasized that it could entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal at the instance of private parties, as the exercise of this power is not circumscribed by any limitation regarding who may invoke it.
3. Evaluation of Evidence and Dying Declarations:
The prosecution relied on direct witnesses (PWs 1, 2, 3, and 5) and two dying declarations (Exhibits P-1 and P-6) made by the deceased. The High Court rejected this evidence, primarily due to the unexplained injury on one Ramalingam and perceived inconsistencies between the dying declarations. The Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence, noting that Ramalingam was introduced surreptitiously during cross-examination and had no established connection to either party. The Court found that the High Court erred in rejecting the dying declarations on the ground that Exhibit P-1 was recorded later than Exhibit P-6, emphasizing that Exhibit P-1 was recorded shortly after the occurrence, while Exhibit P-6 was recorded hours later when the deceased's condition had deteriorated.
4. High Court's Reasoning for Acquittal:
The High Court acquitted the accused, citing the failure of the prosecution to explain Ramalingam's injury and rejecting the testimony of direct witnesses as they were interested parties. The Supreme Court found this reasoning flawed, noting that the injury to Ramalingam was irrelevant to the case and that the direct witnesses' testimonies were unjustly dismissed. The Court highlighted that the High Court indulged in speculation and approached the evidence from the wrong perspective.
5. Supreme Court's Jurisdiction and Grounds for Interference:
The Supreme Court reiterated its jurisdiction under Article 136, stating that it would interfere with acquittals only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the High Court's decision is based on irrelevant grounds or results in a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the High Court's acquittal was based on irrelevant considerations and failed to properly evaluate the evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge against the first accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's acquittal and restoring the Sessions Judge's conviction and sentence against the first accused, Sadhanantham, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court emphasized the importance of evaluating evidence correctly and the competence of private parties to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 136.
-
1979 (3) TMI 217
Issues:
- Appeal against conviction for civil contempt and sentencing to imprisonment.
- Violation of undertaking given to the Court.
- Appropriate sentence for civil contempt.
Analysis:
The judgment concerns an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act against a High Court order convicting the appellants for civil contempt and sentencing them to one month's simple imprisonment. The case originated from a loan transaction where the appellants failed to repay the loan as per the agreed terms, leading to a complaint under Section 420 IPC. Subsequently, the parties reached a compromise, and the appellants undertook to repay the loan with interest by a specified date. However, the appellants violated this undertaking, prompting the respondent to move the High Court for contempt proceedings. The High Court found the appellants guilty of wilful disobedience of the court's order based on the violated undertaking, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The appellant's counsel argued two main points before the Supreme Court. Firstly, it was contended that while the appellants violated the undertaking, it was not a wilful disobedience of the court's order. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's finding that the appellants had indeed committed wilful disobedience by breaching the undertaking that formed the basis of their acquittal. Secondly, the appellant's counsel raised the issue of the appropriate sentence for civil contempt under Section 12(3) of the Act, arguing that imprisonment should only be imposed in exceptional circumstances where a fine would not suffice. The Supreme Court concurred with this argument, emphasizing that imprisonment should be an exception rather than the rule, and should be imposed only when necessary for the ends of justice.
Considering the specific circumstances of the case and the absence of the respondent to support the imprisonment sentence, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellants should not be sent to jail. Instead, the Court set aside the High Court's sentence of imprisonment and directed the appellants to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 each, with a provision of 15 days simple imprisonment in case of default. The appellants were granted four weeks to pay the fine, thereby modifying the sentence to align with the principles of justice and the statutory provisions governing civil contempt.
-
1979 (3) TMI 216
Issues Involved:
1. Vires of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956.
2. Discrimination and procedural aspects under Sections 12-A, 87, and 4(c) of the Act.
3. Conflict between Sections 15 and 16 of the Act.
4. Applicability of Section 4(c) to the instant suit.
5. Excessive delegation of power to the State Government.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Vires of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956:
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Act, particularly Sections 12-A, 87, and 4(c), arguing that the Act was discriminatory. They contended that the Act allowed untrained officials to determine questions of title, which should be within the purview of the Civil Courts. The court upheld the Act, stating that the mere creation of a special forum does not imply discrimination. It was noted that various laws create special forums to expedite processes and achieve legislative objectives. The court found that the classification under the Act was based on an intelligible differentia and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, thereby passing the tests of permissible classification.
2. Discrimination and Procedural Aspects under Sections 12-A, 87, and 4(c) of the Act:
The petitioners argued that the Act was discriminatory as it barred the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and vested the power to decide title disputes in administrative authorities. The court held that the creation of a special forum for consolidation purposes was not discriminatory. The court emphasized that the objective of the Act was to expedite consolidation proceedings and that involving Civil Courts would delay the process. The court referred to precedents where special forums were upheld and concluded that the Act did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Conflict between Sections 15 and 16 of the Act:
The petitioners contended that there was a conflict between Sections 15 and 16, where Section 15 made the certificate of transfer conclusive proof of title, while Section 16 treated the confirmed scheme as having only presumptive value. The court clarified that Section 15 related to proof of title and was conclusive, whereas Section 16 dealt with matters not covered by Section 15 and had presumptive value. The court held that there was no conflict and even if there was, Section 15 would prevail due to its clear and explicit language.
4. Applicability of Section 4(c) to the Instant Suit:
The petitioners argued that their suit under Section 72 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act was not covered by Section 4(c) of the Act. The court examined the nature of the suit and concluded that it involved a declaration of rights and interests in lands subject to consolidation proceedings. Therefore, the suit abated under Section 4(c). The court also addressed concerns about composite suits with multiple reliefs, stating that only the portion of the suit related to land rights would abate, while independent reliefs would proceed.
5. Excessive Delegation of Power to the State Government:
The petitioners argued that the Act conferred unguided and arbitrary power on the State Government to initiate consolidation proceedings in villages of its choice. The court rejected this argument, stating that the guidance for the exercise of power was available in the preamble and general scheme of the Act. The court noted that administrative and financial constraints necessitated piecemeal application of the law, which was not illegal or ultra vires.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ application, upholding the validity of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956. The court found that the Act did not suffer from the vice of discrimination, and the procedural changes were necessary to achieve the legislative objective of expedited consolidation of agricultural lands. The court also emphasized the need for a State Law Commission to address local legislative issues effectively.
-
1979 (3) TMI 215
Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Court Directions on Under-trial Prisoners
2. Periodic Production of Under-trial Prisoners Before Magistrates
3. Prolonged Detention Beyond Maximum Sentence
4. Legal Aid for Under-trial Prisoners
5. Speedy Trial and State's Constitutional Obligation
Summary:
1. Compliance with Court Directions on Under-trial Prisoners:
The Court noted that the State of Bihar had not yet complied with its direction to file a revised chart showing a year-wise break-up of under-trial prisoners categorized into minor and major offenses. The Court directed the State to file this revised chart within three weeks. The Court also noted that steps were being taken to transfer women under "protective custody" from jails to welfare institutions.
2. Periodic Production of Under-trial Prisoners Before Magistrates:
The Court found the affidavits filed by the State of Bihar unsatisfactory in confirming whether under-trial prisoners were periodically produced before Magistrates as required by the proviso to section 167(2) of the CrPC. The Court directed the State to provide specific dates of remand orders for certain under-trial prisoners to ensure compliance with the legal requirement.
3. Prolonged Detention Beyond Maximum Sentence:
The Court expressed concern over under-trial prisoners being detained for periods longer than the maximum sentence they could receive if convicted. The Court directed the immediate release of such prisoners, terming their continued detention as illegal and a violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
4. Legal Aid for Under-trial Prisoners:
The Court highlighted the need for a comprehensive legal service program to provide free legal aid to under-trial prisoners, especially those charged with bailable offenses but unable to secure bail due to poverty. The Court directed the State to provide lawyers at its own cost for such prisoners to make bail applications. The Court emphasized that free legal services are an essential element of "reasonable, fair, and just" procedure under Article 21.
5. Speedy Trial and State's Constitutional Obligation:
The Court reiterated that speedy trial is an essential ingredient of "reasonable, fair, and just" procedure guaranteed by Article 21. The Court directed the State to furnish details of pending cases and reasons for delays in trials and investigations. The Court emphasized that financial constraints cannot justify the denial of the right to a speedy trial and that the State must take necessary measures to ensure this constitutional right. The Court also called for a dynamic and comprehensive legal service program to ensure justice for the poor and marginalized.
The writ petition was scheduled for final disposal on 4th April 1979, with the Supreme Court Bar Association invited to assist the Court.
-
1979 (3) TMI 214
Issues Involved:
1. Authority and jurisdiction of the Land Reforms Tribunal to reopen a previously finalized order.
2. Allegation of fraud and misrepresentation by the petitioner in the declaration of family members.
3. Applicability of inherent powers of the Tribunal to review its own orders in cases of fraud.
4. Compliance with principles of natural justice in reopening the case.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority and Jurisdiction of the Land Reforms Tribunal:
The primary issue was whether the Land Reforms Tribunal had the authority or jurisdiction to reopen or review its own order. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal lacked such power as neither the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1975, nor the rules framed thereunder conferred any such power. The petitioner relied on previous judgments, including a decision by Ramchandra Raju, J., which held that the Land Reforms Commissioner had no power to direct the Tribunal to reopen a case once disposed of. The Supreme Court's ruling in Patel N. Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji was also cited, emphasizing that the power to review is not inherent and must be conferred by law.
2. Allegation of Fraud and Misrepresentation:
The Tribunal reopened the case based on allegations that the petitioner had falsely claimed to have five children instead of three, thereby misrepresenting his family unit to defraud the government. This allegation was supported by an inquiry conducted by the Tahsildar, which found the petitioner's declaration to be false. The petitioner challenged the reopening on the grounds of jurisdiction and lack of authority.
3. Inherent Powers to Review in Cases of Fraud:
The learned Government Pleader argued that courts and tribunals have inherent jurisdiction to revise their own orders in cases of fraud, even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions. Several cases were cited to support this proposition, including Baidyanath Dubey v. Deonandan Singh, which held that a court has inherent powers to recall orders obtained by practicing fraud. The judgment concluded that while a court or tribunal cannot review its own order unless provided by statute, it retains inherent powers to recall orders in cases of fraud or misrepresentation.
4. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice:
The petitioner contended that the Tribunal failed to provide notice before reopening the case, violating principles of natural justice. The court acknowledged this contention and directed the Tribunal to give notice to the petitioner before proceeding to reopen the case, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion:
The court held that the Tribunal has inherent powers to review its own orders in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. However, it directed the Tribunal to provide notice to the petitioner before reopening the case to ensure adherence to the principles of natural justice. The writ petition was dismissed, but the Tribunal was instructed to proceed according to law after giving the petitioner due notice.
-
1979 (3) TMI 213
Issues:
1. Levy of excise duty on bottling wastage.
2. Interpretation of Section 28 and Section 29 of the U.P. Excise Act.
3. Validity of duty notifications and departmental practices.
4. Imposition of excise duty through license clauses.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the issue of the levy of excise duty on bottling wastage by a Limited Company holding licenses for manufacturing Indian made foreign liquor and bottling Rum exclusively for Military Troops. The petitioner argued that the wastage occurs due to unavoidable causes like evaporation and spillage during the bottling process, while the State contended that wastage results from the negligence of the assessee. The court emphasized that the validity of the levy does not depend on the cause of wastage but on the application of excise duty laws. The court examined the provisions of the U.P. Excise Act and previous decisions to determine the point at which excise duty becomes payable.
2. The judgment delves into the interpretation of Section 28 and Section 29 of the U.P. Excise Act to ascertain the stage at which excise duty is chargeable. It references the case of Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. v. State of U.P. to establish that excise duty is essentially a single point duty and is imposed on the production or manufacture of an excisable article. The court concluded that duty is chargeable at the point of issue, not at the stage of manufacture, based on the Act's provisions, duty notifications, and departmental practices. The court rejected the argument that excise duty was leviable at the stage of manufacture, emphasizing the linkage of duty rates to the date of issue for sale.
3. The judgment scrutinizes the validity of duty notifications and departmental practices in determining the point of excise duty imposition. It highlights various notifications issued by the State Government, indicating that duty is chargeable only at the point of issue and varies based on the destination of the liquor. The court emphasized that duty rates are fixed concerning the place where the articles are sent, reinforcing the conclusion that duty is to be charged only at the point of issue, not at the stage of manufacture.
4. The judgment also evaluates the imposition of excise duty through license clauses, specifically addressing a clause in the bottling license regarding the recovery of spirit wastages at the full rate of duty. The court clarified that a tax can only be imposed by statute, not by a license clause, unless authorized by the statute. The court emphasized that duty is to be charged only at the point of issue as per Section 28 and Section 29 of the Act and duty notifications, rendering the license clause ineffective in imposing excise duty.
In conclusion, the judgment allows the petitions and special appeal, quashing the demand for excise duty on bottling wastage and restraining the respondents from realizing or adjusting the impugned demand. The court's decision is based on the interpretation of the U.P. Excise Act provisions, duty notifications, and departmental practices, affirming that excise duty is chargeable at the point of issue, not at the stage of manufacture.
-
1979 (3) TMI 212
Issues:
Jurisdiction of the court to try the suit based on the agreement between the parties.
Analysis:
The plaintiff, an Industrial Development Corporation, filed a suit against the defendant firm for the recovery of money owed due to the supply of goods and losses incurred. The defendant contested the jurisdiction of the court at Keonjhar, claiming that the agreement between the parties stipulated that disputes would be settled in Calcutta. The court examined the purchase order and subsequent communications between the parties to determine the jurisdictional issue.
The purchase order, Ext. C, contained a clause stating "All subject to Calcutta jurisdiction." However, the court held that this alone did not conclusively establish an agreement to confine dispute resolution to Calcutta. The court emphasized that ousting jurisdiction must be proven explicitly or by necessary implication. The defendant's reliance on Ext. C and B to support the agreement was deemed insufficient, as the plaintiff did not assent to the jurisdictional clause.
The plaintiff's terms of business, Ext. A, specified that disputes would be resolved in Keonjhar, contradicting the defendant's claim of a Calcutta jurisdiction agreement. The court highlighted that the defendant's communication asserting Calcutta jurisdiction, Ext. B, lacked sufficient evidence of receipt by the plaintiff. The court scrutinized the evidence presented, including the certificate of posting and witness testimony, but found it inconclusive to establish the posting and receipt of Ext. B by the plaintiff.
The court emphasized the importance of mentioning material facts in the written statement, which the defendant failed to do regarding the alleged letter. The absence of any mention of the letter or its effect in the written statement raised doubts about the credibility of the defendant's claim. Consequently, the court upheld the lower court's finding that there was no contract ousting the jurisdiction of the Keonjhar civil court, given the lack of conclusive evidence supporting the defendant's position.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the civil revision challenging the jurisdiction of the Keonjhar court, as the plaintiff's terms of business and the lack of concrete evidence regarding the alleged jurisdictional agreement did not support the defendant's claim. The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Keonjhar civil court to try the suit, emphasizing the importance of explicit contractual terms in determining jurisdictional issues.
-
1979 (3) TMI 211
Issues Involved:
1. Restoration of Claim Case No. 5704 of 1966.
2. Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation.
3. Determination of whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is a "Court" under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Restoration of Claim Case No. 5704 of 1966:
The workman filed an application for restoration of Claim Case No. 5704 of 1966, which was dismissed for default on August 17, 1972, due to his absence. The application for restoration was filed on May 12, 1975, citing sudden illness as the reason for non-attendance. The company contested the application. The Commissioner relied on the decision in Harbhajan Singh v. Bishu Roy, which held that there was no specific provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, for setting aside an ex parte order, and thus, Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, providing a three-year limitation, would apply. The Commissioner concluded that the application was not barred by limitation and restored the claim case.
2. Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation:
The primary point of controversy was whether the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The court referred to the Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma case, which held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil Court. The court examined whether the Commissioner is a civil Court, as the Limitation Act would apply only if the Commissioner was a civil Court.
3. Determination of whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is a "Court" under the Limitation Act, 1963:
The court reviewed multiple authorities and judicial decisions to determine the requisites that make a tribunal or authority a Court. It cited several cases, including Allen Bros. & Co. v. Bando & Co., Salamat v. Agent, East Indian Railway, and Mt. Dirji v. Smt. Goalin, among others, to establish the criteria for a judicial tribunal. The court noted that the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation has been conferred with powers of a civil Court, such as taking evidence on oath, enforcing attendance of witnesses, and compelling production of documents. The court concluded that the Commissioner is a Court because he exercises judicial power by virtue of a statute, follows established procedures, and his decisions are binding and enforceable.
Conclusion:
The court held that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is a Court under the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings before the Commissioner. The application for restoration of the claim case, filed long after two years, was prima facie barred by limitation. However, the court provided the workman an opportunity to explain the delay in making the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The impugned order was set aside, and the records were sent back to the learned Commissioner to allow the workman to explain the delay through a supplementary affidavit. If the workman fails to take steps within the granted time, his application for restoration will be dismissed.
-
1979 (3) TMI 210
Issues Involved:
1. Abatement of the Government Appeal
2. Nullity of the High Court's Decree
3. Finding of Fact on Compensation
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Abatement of the Government Appeal:
The primary contention was that the Government appeal abated due to the failure to bring the legal representatives of deceased respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on record within the prescribed period. The appellants argued that the appeal abated as a whole, relying on the precedent set in *State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram*. The Court noted that under Order XXII Rule 4(1) and (3) of the CPC, the appeal abated against the deceased respondent due to non-substitution of his legal representatives. However, it was emphasized that the abatement did not automatically dismiss the entire appeal. The Court highlighted that the legal representatives of the deceased respondent were aware of the proceedings and had the opportunity to raise the issue of abatement but chose not to, thereby wilfully abandoning the plea. The Court concluded that the failure to raise this contention at the appropriate time, especially when the legal representatives were already participating in related appeals, indicated a deliberate abandonment of the plea, and thus, the Government appeal did not abate as a whole.
2. Nullity of the High Court's Decree:
The appellants argued that the High Court's decree was a nullity because it was passed against a deceased person. The Court clarified that a decree against a dead person is not necessarily a nullity for all purposes. It is treated as a nullity only to the extent that it cannot be executed against the legal representatives who were not given an opportunity to be heard. The Court emphasized that the legal representatives had the discretion to either treat the decree as a nullity or abide by it. In this case, the legal representatives participated in the proceedings without raising the issue of abatement, indicating their decision to be bound by the decree. Therefore, the High Court's decree was not a nullity merely because it included a deceased respondent.
3. Finding of Fact on Compensation:
The appellants contested the High Court's finding that reduced the compensation from Rs. 12/- to Rs. 4/- per square yard. The Court reviewed the High Court's consideration of various factors, including the location of the land, its purchase price, and the lack of improvements made by the claimants. The High Court had examined the sale deeds and concluded that the land's market value was Rs. 4/- per square yard, doubling the rate at which the claimants had purchased the land eight months prior to the acquisition. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's assessment and held that the finding was not vitiated for any reason, thus requiring no interference.
Separate Judgment by D.A. Desai, J.:
Justice Desai concurred with the dismissal of the appeal but provided a separate opinion. He argued that the Government appeal had not abated at all. He emphasized the interdependence of cross-appeals and the principle that the substitution of legal representatives in one appeal should enure for the benefit of the other. He concluded that the legal representatives of the deceased respondent were effectively before the Court in the claimants' appeal and had the opportunity to contest the Government appeal. Therefore, the Government appeal had not abated, and the High Court's judgment on compensation was upheld.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment on the grounds that the Government appeal had not abated, the decree was not a nullity, and the compensation determined by the High Court was appropriate.
-
1979 (3) TMI 209
Issues Involved:
1. Heritability of tenant's right under Section 37 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, before the 1956 amendment.
2. Applicability of the 1956 amendment to the heirs of tenants who died before its commencement.
3. Interpretation of Section 40 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, before and after the 1956 amendment.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Heritability of tenant's right under Section 37 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, before the 1956 amendment:
The core issue was whether the right of a tenant to recover possession of land under Section 37, if the landlord ceased to cultivate it, was heritable. The Court noted that under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, Explanation II to Section 7 explicitly included the tenant's heirs. However, the 1948 Act, before the 1956 amendment, lacked a similar provision. The Court concluded that the right under Section 37 was not heritable before the 1956 amendment, emphasizing the significant omission of a provision corresponding to Explanation II to Section 7 of the 1939 Act in the 1948 Act.
2. Applicability of the 1956 amendment to the heirs of tenants who died before its commencement:
The Court examined whether the heirs of a tenant who died before the 1956 amendment could exercise the tenant's right to recover possession. The Court referred to the Full Bench decision in Vasant Hariba Londhe v. Jagannath Ramchandra Kulkarni, which held that Section 40, as amended in 1956, automatically continued the tenancy to the tenant's heirs. However, since the tenant in the present case died before the 1956 amendment, the Court found that the heirs could not exercise the right under Section 37, as the amended Section 40 did not apply retrospectively.
3. Interpretation of Section 40 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, before and after the 1956 amendment:
The Court compared Section 40 before and after the 1956 amendment. Before the amendment, Section 40 required the landlord to offer to continue the tenancy to the tenant's heirs, but it did not specify the consequences if the offer was not made. After the amendment, Section 40 deemed the tenancy to continue automatically to the tenant's heirs. The Court noted that the pre-amendment Section 40 did not create a heritable right to recover possession under Section 37. The Court emphasized that the 1948 Act, before the 1956 amendment, did not provide for automatic continuation of tenancy to the heirs, unlike the amended Section 40.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the right under Section 37 was not heritable before the 1956 amendment, and the heirs of a tenant who died before the amendment could not exercise this right. The Court's interpretation was based on the language of Section 40 before the 1956 amendment, and it did not extend the heritability of the right under Section 37 to the pre-amendment period. Consequently, the appeal was allowed without any order regarding costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 208
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation stand repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, by necessary implication.
2. Whether the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code are saved by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Summary:
Issue 1: Repeal by Necessary Implication
The erstwhile Portuguese Colonial Possessions of Goa, Daman, and Diu became part of India on 20th December 1961. The Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962, declared that all laws in force before this date would continue until amended or repealed. The Portuguese Civil Code, which included provisions on Limitation, was never expressly repealed by any legislative enactment or order by the Central Government. The Limitation Act, 1963, enacted by Parliament, extended to the whole of India except Jammu and Kashmir, and repealed the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The question arose whether the Portuguese Civil Code's Limitation provisions were repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, by necessary implication.
Issue 2: Savings by Section 29(2)
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, saves 'special and local laws' by stating that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed by the Schedule. The appellants argued that the Portuguese Civil Code, being a general law, was repugnant to the Limitation Act and thus void under Article 254(1) of the Constitution. However, the respondents contended that the Portuguese Civil Code was a local law applicable only to Goa, Daman, and Diu, and thus saved by Section 29(2).
Judgment:
The Court concluded that the Portuguese Civil Code is a local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation are to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963, as if the Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended mutatis mutandis. Therefore, no question of repugnancy arises. The provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation continue to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman, and Diu. Both appeals were dismissed with costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 207
Issues Involved:
1. Construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, specifically rules 3, 6, 8, and 10.
2. Application of the quota rule at the time of confirmation.
3. Seniority determination based on the date of confirmation.
4. Discrimination against promotees in terms of confirmation and seniority.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Construction of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959:
The primary issue in the appeals is the interpretation of the Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959, particularly rules 3, 6, 8, and 10. Rule 3 defines the composition of the service, Rule 6 outlines the recruitment method from two sources (80% by promotion and 20% by direct appointment), Rule 8 addresses probation, and Rule 10 deals with seniority based on the date of confirmation. The Service Rules provide for the constitution, recruitment, qualifications, probation, pay, seniority, and discipline of the members of the Service.
2. Application of the Quota Rule at the Time of Confirmation:
The respondents argued that the quota rule should apply not only at the time of initial recruitment but also at the time of confirmation. They contended that failure to apply the quota rule at the time of confirmation resulted in discrimination against promotees. The State of Punjab and the direct recruits argued that the quota rule applies only at the initial recruitment stage and not at the time of confirmation. The High Court concluded that the quota rule should operate both at the time of initial recruitment and at the time of confirmation to avoid unreasonableness and ensure fair treatment.
3. Seniority Determination Based on the Date of Confirmation:
Rule 10 specifies that seniority is determined by the date of confirmation in the Service. The promotees argued that if seniority is based on the date of confirmation, then confirmation should be made available to recruits from both sources. They pointed out that direct recruits were confirmed automatically after completing the probation period, while promotees were not confirmed for years, affecting their seniority and opportunities for promotion. The High Court held that to maintain fairness, the quota rule should be applied at the time of confirmation, ensuring that promotees are not disadvantaged.
4. Discrimination Against Promotees in Terms of Confirmation and Seniority:
The promotees contended that the existing system discriminated against them, as they were not confirmed for extended periods, unlike direct recruits who were confirmed automatically after probation. This delay in confirmation adversely affected their seniority and chances for promotion to higher posts. The High Court found that if the quota rule is not applied at the time of confirmation, it leads to an unreasonable and discriminatory outcome. Therefore, the Court concluded that the quota rule must be applied at both the recruitment and confirmation stages to ensure equality of opportunity and fairness in seniority determination.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that the quota rule should apply both at the time of initial recruitment and at the time of confirmation to avoid discrimination and ensure fairness in seniority determination. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 206
Issues Involved:
1. Conspiracy at Calicut
2. Conspiracy at Tutorial College, Tellicherry
3. Attack on Tellicherry Police Station
4. Attack on Pulpally Wireless Station
5. Dacoity in the house of P.W. 106
6. Dacoity in the shop of P.W. 116
7. Dacoity in the house of P.W. 117
Detailed Analysis:
Conspiracy at Calicut
The prosecution alleged that a conspiracy was hatched at the house of accused No. 1 at Calicut on 30-10-1968. However, the court found that the evidence provided by P.W. 21, who was declared hostile, did not satisfactorily prove the conspiracy. P.W. 21 admitted he overheard discussions from the ground floor and could not identify the participants. The court ruled out P.W. 21's evidence as speculative and insufficient to corroborate the accomplice witnesses' testimonies. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the conspiracy at Calicut.
Conspiracy at Tutorial College, Tellicherry
The prosecution claimed a conspiracy meeting was held at the Tutorial College owned by accused No. 2 on 17-11-1968. The court found P.W. 23's evidence unreliable as he allegedly overheard the meeting from beneath a staircase and could not see the participants. P.W. 23 also provided inconsistent statements. The court concluded that the prosecution did not provide cogent and reliable evidence to prove the conspiracy at Tellicherry.
Attack on Tellicherry Police Station
The prosecution alleged that the accused raided the Tellicherry Police Station on 22-11-1968. The court found that the F.I.R. (Ex. P-93) did not name any accused and noted discrepancies in the testimonies of P.W. 63 and P.W. 64. The court ruled that the identification of the accused in court without a prior T.I. parade was valueless. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove the participation of the accused in the attack on Tellicherry Police Station.
Attack on Pulpally Wireless Station
The prosecution successfully proved the attack on Pulpally Wireless Station on 24-11-1968. The F.I.R. and testimonies of P.W. 92, P.W. 94, and the statement of Sub-Inspector Sankunny Menon (Ex. P-107) provided substantial evidence. The court found that accused Nos. 5, 7, 16, 128, 135, 145, 146, and 147 participated in the attack. The court altered their convictions to Section 149/455 IPC and sentenced them to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment.
Dacoity in the house of P.W. 106
The prosecution alleged a dacoity in the house of P.W. 106 on 24-11-1968. The court found that P.W. 106's identification of A.5 was unreliable as it was made under stress and was not corroborated by other witnesses. The court ruled that there was no legal evidence against A.5, and the accomplice evidence could not be used.
Dacoity in the shop of P.W. 116
The prosecution alleged a dacoity in the shop of P.W. 116. The court found that the F.I.R. (Ex. P-134) did not identify any accused by name or face. P.W. 116's in-court identification of the accused was deemed unreliable without a prior T.I. parade. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove this incident.
Dacoity in the house of P.W. 117
The prosecution alleged a dacoity in the house of P.W. 117. The court found that the F.I.R. (Ex. P-133) did not identify any accused. P.W. 117's in-court identification of A.16 was not mentioned in the F.I.R. and thus was unreliable. The court ruled that there was no evidence to prove the dacoity in P.W. 117's house.
Conclusion:
The prosecution failed to prove the conspiracies at Calicut and Tellicherry, as well as the dacoities in the houses of P.W. 106 and P.W. 117, and the shop of P.W. 116. However, the prosecution successfully proved the attack on Pulpally Wireless Station, resulting in the conviction of accused Nos. 5, 7, 16, 128, 135, 145, 146, and 147 under Section 149/455 IPC with a sentence of 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. All other appellants were acquitted of the charges against them.
-
1979 (3) TMI 205
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Rule 16(2) of the Retirement Rules is applicable to retain the respondent in service beyond the normal retirement period for completing disciplinary proceedings.
2. If Rule 16(2) is not applicable, whether the retention of the respondent beyond the normal retirement period was valid and whether he could be removed from service after his actual and effective retirement.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Rule 16(2) of the Retirement Rules:
The respondent was suspended and charges were framed against him for alleged failures during disturbances in Nowgong District. The High Court examined whether these charges constituted "misconduct" under Rule 16(2) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, which states, "A member of the service under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire from the service but shall be retained in service until the inquiry into the charges against him is concluded and a final order is passed."
The High Court concluded that the charges, which included failures in leadership, lack of foresight, and negligence, did not amount to "misconduct." Misconduct, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, involves acts or omissions contrary to the prescribed code of conduct, often requiring a guilty mind or mens rea. The charges against the respondent indicated inefficiency and lack of certain personal qualities but did not amount to misconduct as defined by the Conduct Rules. Therefore, Rule 16(2) was not applicable.
2. Validity of Retention Beyond Normal Retirement Period:
The respondent's normal retirement date was 1st February 1962. The Assam Government extended his service initially for three months and subsequently through various orders until the inquiry was concluded. However, Rule 16(1) of the Retirement Rules allowed the State Government to extend the service only for an aggregate period of six months. The State Government's orders extending the respondent's service beyond this period were invalid as they were not made before the expiration of the six-month period and were not sanctioned by the Central Government.
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's finding that the retention of the respondent in service beyond 1st August 1962 was illegal. Since the retention was invalid, any disciplinary action taken after this period, including the removal order dated 11th October 1963, was without jurisdiction and void.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the charges did not constitute misconduct, and the retention of the respondent beyond his normal retirement period was invalid. Consequently, the disciplinary action taken against him after his effective retirement was illegal. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 204
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Resolution No. 1.1 in relation to Regulations 4 and 5 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955.
2. Non-inclusion of the appellant in the Select List due to the absence of an integrity certificate.
3. Consideration of adverse entries in the appellant's confidential record.
Summary:
1. Validity of Resolution No. 1.1:
The Supreme Court addressed whether Resolution No. 1.1 was ultra vires of Regulations 4 and 5 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955. The High Court had quashed Resolution No. 1.1, stating it was an executive instruction that imposed additional requirements not specified in the regulations, leading to potential arbitrariness. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Resolution No. 1.1 was valid and within the scope of the regulations. The Court emphasized that integrity is a crucial aspect of merit and suitability, and the government has the authority to prescribe criteria for assessing these qualities. The resolution did not confer unguided discretion on the Chief Secretary but required certification based on annual confidential reports.
2. Non-inclusion in the Select List:
The appellant's non-inclusion in the Select List was partly due to the absence of an integrity certificate. The High Court found that the Selection Committee had another reason for not including the appellant, stating he was "not found suitable otherwise." The Supreme Court noted that the non-issuance of the integrity certificate was linked to an adverse report from 1966-67, which had not been resolved. The Court held that the non-issuance of the integrity certificate was unjustified as the adverse report had not been properly considered.
3. Consideration of Adverse Entries:
The Supreme Court highlighted the principle that adverse entries in confidential records must be communicated and considered before denying promotional opportunities. The appellant's adverse report from 1966-67 had not been resolved due to procedural delays. The Court directed the State Government to dispose of the appellant's representations regarding the adverse report within two months and instructed the Selection Committee to reconsider the appellant's inclusion in the Select List based on the government's decision and the appellant's service record.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed with modifications. The State Government was directed to resolve the appellant's representations, and the Selection Committee was instructed to reconsider the appellant's inclusion in the Select List, recording reasons for any proposed supersession. The Union Public Service Commission was to be consulted thereafter. The Court emphasized that the appellant's writ petition and appeal were not infructuous despite the approval of the Select List by the Union Public Service Commission.
-
1979 (3) TMI 203
Interpretation of "shall be liable to confiscation" occurring in Section 63(1) read with sub- section (1) of Section 64, two alternatives, namely, to confiscate the car, or, in lieu of confiscation, to impose a fine at the option of its owner.
-
1979 (3) TMI 202
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the levy of cess on jute twine and jute yarn used for captive consumption.
2. Scope of the Central Government's power under Section 9(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.
3. Method of cess calculation (value vs. weight).
4. Discrimination in cess imposition based on weight.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Levy of Cess on Jute Twine and Jute Yarn Used for Captive Consumption:
The appellants contested the levy of cess on jute twine and jute yarn used within their factories for producing finished jute products. They argued that these intermediate products should not be subjected to cess as per Section 9(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, read with the Jute Manufactures Cess Rules, 1976. The learned Single Judge had previously upheld the validity of the cess, leading to the present appeals.
2. Scope of the Central Government's Power Under Section 9(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951:
The appellants argued that the Central Government could only levy cess on articles explicitly mentioned in the First Schedule of the Act. They contended that jute twine and jute yarn were not specified in Item 23(2) of the First Schedule, thus making the cess illegal. However, the court held that the First Schedule merely enumerates industries subject to control and does not limit the Central Government's power to levy cess on all goods manufactured or produced by a scheduled industry. The court emphasized that the term "all goods" in Section 9(1) includes both intermediate and final products.
3. Method of Cess Calculation (Value vs. Weight):
The appellants contended that cess should be calculated based on the value of the goods, as indicated by the proviso to Section 9(1), which limits the rate of cess to not exceed 12 n.p. percent of the value of the goods. They argued that the impugned levy based on weight was ultra vires. The court clarified that the proviso serves as a ceiling on the maximum cess and does not restrict the method of calculation to value alone. The court noted that the Central Government could levy cess based on weight, provided it did not exceed the maximum limit specified.
4. Discrimination in Cess Imposition Based on Weight:
The appellants argued that imposing cess based on weight was discriminatory, as coarser varieties of jute yarn and twine, which have greater weight but lesser value, would bear a disproportionate burden. The court rejected this argument, stating that the imposition of cess according to weight is a recognized principle of taxation and not per se arbitrary or discriminatory. The court also noted that the Central Government could adjust the rates to address any potential hardship.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the validity of the cess on jute twine and jute yarn used for captive consumption. The court affirmed that the Central Government's power under Section 9(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, is broad and includes the authority to levy cess on all goods manufactured or produced by a scheduled industry, whether intermediate or final products. The method of cess calculation based on weight was deemed valid, and the court found no discrimination in the imposition of cess based on weight. The appellants' request for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution for appealing to the Supreme Court was also rejected.
-
1979 (3) TMI 201
Whether the prosecution case proved against accused Nos. 1 to 13 who were convicted of various offences covered by different counts of the charge and were sentenced in consequence to imprisonment?
Held that:- In taking the view of the matter that it did, the High Court, for all practical purposes, presumed the accused to be guilty unless they succeeded in establishing their innocence, which was not a correct approach to the appreciation of evidence. It was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the contraband articles were in the conscious possession of accused Nos. 1 to 11 and that they had received the currency notes in question as claimed by the prosecution, neither of these matters was a matter of assumption, although of course the same could be inferred from circumstances which, in our opinion, have not been shown to exist. We do not regard the defence as a bundle of assertions which could not possibly be true within the domain of reason. There is nothing inherently improbable in the currency notes having been found in one or more of the packages which are said to have been lying unaccounted for in the Customs House, nor can we agree that the averment about residents of Varor having deposited the said packages in response to a warning issued to them earlier borders on the absurd even though it may not be very probable.
Thus as contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 leave the prosecution with no material such as may suffice, apart from documents exhibits 31 and 46 to be incriminatory of any of the accused. Accordingly we accept all the appeals, reverse the impugned judgment, set aside the conviction recorded against and the sentences imposed upon the appellants (being accused Nos. 1 to 11 and 13) and acquit them of the charge in its entirety.
-
1979 (3) TMI 200
The Appellate Collector set aside the duty demand by the Superintendent in three cases, ruling that the goods cleared were bars, not flats. The penalty in one case was upheld for late submission of returns, while penalties in the other two cases were overturned. (Citation: 1979 (3) TMI 200 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI)
........
|
9911796707
