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• 2008 (3) TMI 792
  
  ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:

  1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963.

  2. Determination of which party committed a breach of the contract for the sale of property.

  ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  1. Limitation Issue

  Relevant legal framework and precedents: The issue of limitation is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963. Specifically, Article 54 of the Limitation Act applies to suits for specific performance of a contract, while Article 62 pertains to enforcement of payment of money secured by a mortgage or charge upon immovable property. Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides a statutory charge in favor of the buyer for the purchase money paid, unless the buyer has improperly declined to accept delivery.

  Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the determination of whether the suit is barred by limitation is intricately linked to the question of which party breached the contract. The Court noted that the trial court had rightly concluded that the limitation issue could not be decided preliminarily without evidence, as it depended on whether the plaintiffs improperly declined to accept delivery of the property.

  Key evidence and findings: The trial court had not yet taken evidence to determine who defaulted in performing the contract. The Court emphasized that the question of limitation could only be resolved after evaluating the evidence regarding the alleged breach of contract.

  Application of law to facts: The Court applied Article 62 of the Limitation Act, providing a 12-year period for enforcing a statutory charge under Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act. It concluded that the limitation period for the buyer's charge was 12 years from when the money became due, rather than three years.

  Treatment of competing arguments: The defendants argued for a preliminary determination of the limitation issue, while the plaintiffs contended that such determination required evidence on the breach of contract. The Court sided with the plaintiffs, emphasizing the need for a full trial to resolve the intertwined issues.

  Conclusions: The Court decided to leave the limitation issue undecided at this stage, directing the trial court to resolve it along with other issues after taking evidence.

  2. Breach of Contract Issue

  Relevant legal framework and precedents: The breach of contract is assessed under the principles of contract law, with specific reference to the terms of the agreement and the conduct of the parties. Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act provides remedies for non-performance, including a charge for the buyer on the seller's interest.

  Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court recognized that determining which party breached the contract required a detailed inquiry into the evidence. It noted that the trial court had correctly identified this issue as complex and requiring proof through oral and documentary evidence.

  Key evidence and findings: The trial court had not yet taken evidence on the breach of contract. The Court highlighted that the determination of breach was essential for resolving the limitation issue and the plaintiffs' entitlement to remedies.

  Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principles of contract law and the statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to assess the parties' obligations and the consequences of non-performance.

  Treatment of competing arguments: The defendants claimed readiness to perform the contract, attributing the delay to the plaintiffs' failure to pay the balance consideration. In contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants deliberately delayed the transaction. The Court deferred judgment on these competing claims pending evidence.

  Conclusions: The Court deferred the resolution of the breach of contract issue, directing the trial court to decide it after a full trial.

  SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "The trial Court rightly concluded that the question of limitation largely depends on the question whether the plaintiffs have improperly declined to accept delivery of the property or not."

  Core principles established: The Court established that the limitation period for enforcing a statutory charge under Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act is 12 years, as per Article 62 of the Limitation Act. It also emphasized the need for evidence to resolve intertwined issues of limitation and breach of contract.

  Final determinations on each issue: The Court set aside the trial court's preliminary finding on limitation, directing a fresh determination along with other issues after evidence is taken. It ordered the trial court to prioritize the case and resolve it expeditiously within six months, imposing costs on the defendants for their conduct aimed at protracting proceedings.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 791
  

  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

  • Whether documents relied upon by the appellant in his defense can be considered at the stage of framing of charges.
  • The scope of the court's jurisdiction at the stage of framing charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Whether the High Court's direction to supply certain documents to the appellant impacts the framing of charges.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Consideration of Defense Documents at the Charge Framing Stage

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The legal framework involves the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the framing of charges and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998. Relevant precedents include the case of State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, which outlines the limited scope of judicial inquiry at the charge framing stage.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court emphasized that at the charge framing stage, the court's role is limited to assessing whether a prima facie case exists. The court does not weigh evidence or consider the defense's potential success at trial.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The appellant sought to rely on documents such as an income tax assessment order and asset declarations. However, these documents were not part of the prosecution's evidence.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the principle that the defense's documents cannot be considered at this stage unless they are part of the prosecution's evidence. The focus is solely on whether the prosecution has made a prima facie case.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that the documents should be considered based on the High Court's earlier direction. The prosecution contended that these documents were irrelevant at the charge framing stage.
  • Conclusions: The Court concluded that the appellant's documents could not be considered at the charge framing stage, as the focus is on the prosecution's evidence.

  Issue 2: Scope of Court's Jurisdiction at the Charge Framing Stage

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court referred to the established judicial view that the charge framing stage involves a prima facie assessment of the prosecution's case without delving into the merits or defense.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court reiterated that the jurisdiction is limited to determining whether there is sufficient ground to proceed with the trial based on the prosecution's evidence.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The Court noted that the prosecution presented 51 relevant documents, with 23 directly related to the appellant's assets.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the principle that the charge framing stage does not involve a detailed examination of evidence or defense arguments.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's argument for considering defense documents was rejected based on the limited scope of inquiry at this stage.
  • Conclusions: The Court concluded that the jurisdiction at the charge framing stage is limited to assessing the prosecution's prima facie case.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  • Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused."
  • Core principles established: The Court reaffirmed that the charge framing stage is limited to prima facie assessments of the prosecution's case without considering defense evidence.
  • Final determinations on each issue: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the appellant's documents could not be considered at the charge framing stage, and the prosecution's prima facie case was sufficient to proceed with the trial.

  The judgment underscores the limited scope of judicial inquiry at the charge framing stage, focusing solely on the prosecution's evidence without delving into the merits of the defense or weighing evidence. The Court's decision aligns with established precedents, emphasizing that the defense's potential success at trial is not a consideration at this stage.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 790
  
  Issues involved:
  1. Propriety of the order dated 14th November, 2006 passed by the Learned Small Causes Judge at Sealdah in T.S. No. 22 of 2006.
  2. Challenge to the rejection of the petitioner's objection regarding misjoinder of causes of action in the suit.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  Issue 1: The judgment concerns the challenge to the order dated 14th November, 2006, passed by the Learned Small Causes Judge at Sealdah in T.S. No. 22 of 2006. The Revisional Application questions the propriety of this order at the instance of the defendant/petitioner.
  
  Issue 2: The primary issue in this case revolves around the rejection of the petitioner's objection regarding the misjoinder of causes of action in the suit. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendant/petitioner seeking various reliefs related to two separate properties, "A" schedule property and "B" schedule property. The plaintiffs claimed absolute right, title, and interest in the "A" schedule property and sought recovery of possession from the petitioner. Additionally, they claimed a share in the "B" schedule property and requested partition of the same.
  
  The defendant/petitioner objected to the misjoinder of causes of action in the suit, arguing that different reliefs related to distinct properties were improperly joined in a single suit. The Trial Judge, however, upheld the joinder of causes of action, citing Order II Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Judge also considered the previous direction to accept the petitioner's written statement, which addressed all claims made by the plaintiffs.
  
  Both parties cited legal precedents to support their arguments. The petitioner relied on cases like Balasundara Mudaliar v. Muthuvenkatachala Mudaliar, emphasizing the impropriety of joining multifarious causes of action. Conversely, the plaintiffs' counsel cited cases like S.M. Gopalakrishna Chetty v. Ganeshan, asserting that the joinder of causes of action was permissible under relevant civil procedure rules.
  
  The Court analyzed the legal provisions, specifically Order II Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which restricts the joinder of causes of action without the Court's leave, especially when seeking relief for partition of distinct properties. The Court concluded that the relief for partition of the "B" schedule property could not be claimed against the petitioner in a suit primarily focused on recovering possession of the "A" schedule property.
  
  Ultimately, the Court held that separate trials for the distinct causes of action would be expedient in the interest of justice. The plaintiffs were granted leave to choose which cause of action to pursue, with directions for amending the plaint accordingly. If no action was taken by the plaintiffs, the Trial Judge was instructed to strike out the partition claim from the plaint, allowing the plaintiffs to file a separate suit for partition if desired.
  
  In conclusion, the Revisional Application was disposed of with the above observations, emphasizing the need for separate trials for distinct causes of action and ensuring the proper pursuit of legal remedies in accordance with the law.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 789
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Legality of invoking urgency provisions under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  2. Right to be heard under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
  3. Judicial review of government decisions regarding land acquisition.
  4. Allegations of arbitrariness and violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of Invoking Urgency Provisions under Section 17(1) and (4):
  
  The appeals challenge the invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring additional land for the Inpun rehabilitation site. The appellants argued that the State Government's decision to bypass the Section 5A inquiry was arbitrary and lacked application of mind. The court examined the Collector's proposal and the Commissioner's order, which highlighted the urgency due to the Onkareshwar Project's time-bound nature. The court noted that the project's public purpose justified the invocation of urgency provisions, as the rehabilitation of displaced villagers was imperative before submergence due to the dam. The court found clear application of mind by the authorities in invoking Section 17(1) and (4), thereby meeting the requirements set by the Supreme Court in related precedents.
  
  2. Right to be Heard under Section 5A:
  
  The appellants contended that the right to be heard under Section 5A is a valuable right akin to a fundamental right, and its dispensation should not occur without proper justification. They cited various Supreme Court judgments emphasizing this right. However, the court observed that the urgency of the project and the need to expedite land acquisition justified the dispensation of the Section 5A inquiry. The court found that objections from landowners could delay the urgent rehabilitation process, and thus, the decision to invoke Section 17(4) was not arbitrary or mechanical but based on a well-considered assessment of the situation.
  
  3. Judicial Review of Government Decisions:
  
  The appellants argued that the court should scrutinize the government's satisfaction regarding urgency and the decision to dispense with the Section 5A inquiry. The court, however, reiterated the Supreme Court's stance that the question of urgency is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the government. Judicial review is limited to examining whether the government applied its mind to relevant factors and whether the decision was made in good faith. The court found no evidence of non-application of mind or malafide intent in the government's decision, thus upholding the dismissal of the writ petitions by the learned Single Judge.
  
  4. Allegations of Arbitrariness and Violation of Fundamental Rights:
  
  The appellants claimed that the acquisition was unreasonable and arbitrary, violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21. They argued that government lands were available for rehabilitation, and the preference for Inpun by displaced villagers should not dictate land acquisition. The court held that these considerations are within the government's discretion, provided the acquisition serves a public purpose. The court emphasized that once the government applies its mind to the necessity of invoking urgency provisions and acts without malafide intent, the court should not interfere. Consequently, the court found no merit in the appeals, dismissed them, and vacated the interim orders of status quo.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 788
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Constitutional validity of the prerequisite period of separation for one year under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  2. Whether the one-year separation period is arbitrary and lacks nexus to the object of the provision.
  3. Interpretation of statutory provisions regarding mutual consent divorce and the mandatory nature of the one-year separation requirement.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Constitutional Validity of the One-Year Separation Requirement:
  
  The primary issue raised in the petition was the challenge to the constitutional validity of the one-year separation requirement under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petitioners argued that this requirement is unconstitutional and arbitrary. The court examined the legislative intent behind this provision, noting that it was introduced to liberalize divorce laws while ensuring that marriages are not dissolved impulsively. The court emphasized that the requirement serves as a "cooling-off" period, allowing parties to reconsider their decision and attempt reconciliation. The court held that this provision is not unconstitutional as it aligns with the legislative objective of providing a fair opportunity for the survival of marriage.
  
  2. Arbitrary Nature and Lack of Nexus to the Provision's Object:
  
  The petitioners contended that the one-year separation period is arbitrary and does not serve the intended purpose of the provision. The court rejected this argument, stating that the period is essential to prevent hasty decisions regarding divorce. The court highlighted that the provision is designed to ensure that parties have sufficient time to reflect on their decision and explore possibilities of reconciliation. The court found that the separation period is rational and directly linked to the objective of preserving the sanctity of marriage, thus not arbitrary.
  
  3. Interpretation of Statutory Provisions and Mandatory Nature:
  
  The court analyzed the statutory language of Section 13B and concluded that the one-year separation requirement is mandatory. It emphasized that the legislature intentionally did not provide any relaxation or discretion to the courts to waive this period. The court referred to the Supreme Court's interpretation in Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, which underscored the necessity of meeting the statutory conditions before granting a divorce by mutual consent. The court reiterated that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and it is not within the court's purview to alter or waive the mandatory requirements set by the legislature.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court dismissed the petition, affirming the constitutionality and necessity of the one-year separation requirement under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. It concluded that the provision is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional, as it serves the legislative intent of providing a reasonable period for parties to reconsider their decision to dissolve the marriage. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the statutory conditions to maintain the integrity and sanctity of the institution of marriage.

  ---

• 2008 (3) TMI 787
  
  Issues involved:
  Challenge to the order of dismissal passed by the Principal Sessions Judge under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Application under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  The accused filed an application under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon five documents from the respondent, claiming the necessity of these documents for trial.
  
  Issue 2: Contentions of Petitioners and Respondents
  The petitioners sought to summon various documents, alleging potential alteration and manipulation of records in police custody. The respondent police contended that the petition was filed belatedly to delay proceedings, and that some documents had already been provided earlier.
  
  Issue 3: Trial Court Decision
  The Trial Court dismissed the petition under Section 91, stating that the petitioners failed to provide justifiable reasons for summoning the documents.
  
  Issue 4: Arguments of Counsel
  Petitioners argued that the documents were crucial for their defense and to contradict prosecution witnesses. They claimed the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition.
  
  Issue 5: Legal Provisions
  Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for the issuance of summons for necessary documents, but the accused must demonstrate the relevance and necessity of the documents for a just decision.
  
  Issue 6: Case Diary and Other Documents
  Summoning of case diaries and certain documents was contested, with the court emphasizing the need for the accused to justify the necessity of such documents.
  
  Issue 7: Precedents and Legal Interpretations
  Various High Courts have highlighted the importance of demonstrating the relevance and necessity of documents for invoking Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  
  Issue 8: Conclusion
  The Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, stating that the petitioners failed to establish the necessity of summoning the documents for the trial. The petition was dismissed, affirming the Trial Court's order.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 786
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Obligations of the driver, owner, or person in charge of the vehicle regarding documents.
  2. Consequences of non-production/carrying of documents.
  3. Jurisdiction of officers to seize documents and motor vehicles.
  4. Jurisdiction of authorities to compound and/or impose fines or penalties.
  5. Compensation entitlement and liability.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Obligations of the Driver, Owner, or Person in Charge of the Vehicle Regarding Documents:
  The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, mandates the carrying of certain documents, such as the driving license, registration certificate, certificate of fitness (for transport vehicles), permit, and insurance certificate. However, Rule 139 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, provides a relaxation, allowing these documents to be produced within fifteen days if not immediately available. The court emphasized that it is not necessary to carry original documents at all times, and failure to produce them on demand should not lead to vehicle detention.
  
  2. Consequences of Non-production/Carrying of Documents:
  Non-carrying of documents is not penal if the documents can be produced later within the prescribed period. The court highlighted that the failure to carry documents should not result in vehicle detention, as long as the documents can be produced as per Rule 139. The court referenced a precedent from 1957, establishing that physical possession of documents at the time of demand is not a legal requirement.
  
  3. Jurisdiction of Officers to Seize Documents and Motor Vehicles:
  The power to seize documents and detain vehicles under Sections 206 and 207 of the Act is conditioned on "reason to believe" that there is an infraction of the law. This expression has been judicially interpreted to mean that the belief must be of an honest and reasonable person based on reasonable grounds, not mere suspicion. The court found that the respondent lacked the jurisdiction to detain the vehicle, as the seizure was based on vague suspicions and not on a reasonable belief of any contravention.
  
  4. Jurisdiction of Authorities to Compound and/or Impose Fines or Penalties:
  The power to impose penalties for contraventions under the Act lies exclusively with the Criminal Court, as per Sections 4(2) and 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court found that the respondent's imposition of a fine/penalty was unauthorized, as no application for compounding was made by the petitioner. Compounding requires a request from the alleged offender, which was absent in this case.
  
  5. Compensation Entitlement and Liability:
  The court held that the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the illegal detention of the vehicle. The State is liable to pay Rs. 50,000 as compensation, with the liberty to recover the amount from the responsible officer. The court emphasized the need for accountability of public officers and highlighted the severe financial loss caused to the petitioner due to the prolonged detention of the commercial vehicle.
  
  Conclusion:
  The writ application was allowed, and the court directed the release of the vehicle without the payment of the unauthorized fine. The State was ordered to pay compensation to the petitioner, with the option for the petitioner to seek additional compensation through appropriate legal channels. The judgment underscored the importance of adhering to legal provisions and the accountability of public officers in exercising their powers.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 785
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether such information can be provided to the appellant under the RTI Act when Section 138 of the Income Tax Act prohibits disclosure of such information?
  2. Whether in such a situation the overriding provision as contained in Section 22 of the RTI Act comes into play?
  3. Whether Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act is applicable to the case of the appellant?
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue I: Applicability of Section 138 of the Income Tax Act
  The respondents argued that Section 138(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which deals with the disclosure of information concerning an assessee, empowers the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to decide if it is in the public interest to provide such information. The decision of the Commissioner in this regard is final and cannot be questioned in any court of law. The respondents also noted that Section 138(2) provides an overriding effect, allowing the Central Government to restrict the disclosure of information by public servants.
  
  Issue II: Overriding Provision of Section 22 of the RTI Act
  The Commission referred to the principle that a special enactment or rule cannot be overridden by a later general enactment unless there is a clear inconsistency. The RTI Act, being a general law, does not override the specific provisions of Section 138 of the Income Tax Act, which is a special law concerning the disclosure of information about assesses.
  
  Issue III: Applicability of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
  The denial of information by the CPIO was based on Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which exempts the disclosure of personal information that has no relationship to any public activity or interest or would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The appellant argued that he had a personal interest in the information as an informer entitled to a reward. The respondents countered that the reward was already calculated and paid based on the information provided by the appellant, and the appellant had no stake in other income assessed.
  
  Decision and Reasons:
  The Commission held that while assessment details are personal information, the amount of tax determined by the Settlement Commission and the amount actually paid by the assessee company is related to public activity or interest. Therefore, the CPIO should disclose this specific information. The Commission directed the CPIO to provide the information within two weeks from the date of the order.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Commission decided that the specific information regarding the tax determined and paid should be disclosed, while other assessment details could be withheld. The decision was announced on March 5, 2008, and notice of the decision was to be given free of cost to the parties.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 784
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to order creating a new district Baghpat in Uttar Pradesh.
  
  Summary:
  1. The appeal challenged an order by the Allahabad High Court regarding the creation of Baghpat district in Uttar Pradesh.
  2. The High Court disposed of the writ petition based on a previous order in a different case.
  3. A notification was issued for creating Baghpat district under relevant sections of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and the General Clauses Act. Writ petitions were filed challenging the creation of Baghpat and another district, Sant Kabir Nagar. The High Court quashed the notification for Sant Kabir Nagar and directed reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition related to Sant Kabir Nagar.
  4. Another writ petition challenged the creation of Kausambi district, which was disposed of with reference to the Sant Kabir Nagar case.
  5. The State assured compliance with the High Court's orders regarding district creation and budget provisions.
  6. The Division Bench noted unnecessary observations made by the High Court regarding district officials' residence. The State Cabinet decided to continue the new districts created in 1997.
  7. A contempt petition related to the district creation was disposed of after the State Cabinet's decision to retain the new districts.
  8. The appellant argued against the High Court's interference in policy decisions like district creation. The respondents supported the High Court's consideration of various factors.
  9. The High Court's direction for reconsideration in a previous case was deemed unnecessary as the Cabinet had already made a decision.
  10. The Court emphasized limited interference in policy decisions by the judiciary, leaving such matters to the government's discretion.
  11. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 783
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Entitlement to family pension for a disabled son after the death of a retired railway employee.
  2. Compliance with procedural requirements for claiming family pension.
  3. Validity of reasons provided by the respondents for denying family pension.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Entitlement to Family Pension for a Disabled Son
  
  The petitioner claimed family pension u/s Rule 75 of the Family Pension Scheme for Railway Servants, 1964, asserting that he is 55% physically handicapped and unable to earn his livelihood. The petitioner argued that the family pension should continue in his name after the death of his father, a retired railway employee, as he is a disabled son with permanent disability. The court noted that Rule 75(6) allows family pension to a son suffering from a disability that renders him unable to earn a living even after attaining the age of 25 years. The court held that the petitioner is entitled to family pension during his lifetime due to his disability.
  
  Issue 2: Compliance with Procedural Requirements
  
  The petitioner submitted all required documents, including a disability certificate from AIIMS dated 28th April 1997. The respondents initially denied the family pension on the grounds that the father did not provide written information about the petitioner's disability at the time of retirement. However, the court found that the petitioner had complied with all procedural requirements and that the respondents' rejection based on procedural grounds was invalid.
  
  Issue 3: Validity of Reasons Provided by Respondents
  
  The respondents argued that the petitioner was not entitled to family pension because his disability was not mentioned by his father at the time of retirement and that the disability certificate did not explicitly state that the petitioner was unable to earn his livelihood. The court held that the respondents could not supplement their original reasons for denial with new grounds in their counter-affidavit. The court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, stating that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons mentioned at the time it was made and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons later. The court concluded that the respondents' reasons for denying the family pension were invalid and that the petitioner is entitled to family pension during his lifetime.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding that he is entitled to family pension during his lifetime due to his disability. The respondents were directed to pay the family pension to the petitioner from the date of his father's death on 25th December 2000 and to continue paying it during his lifetime. The parties were left to bear their own costs.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 782
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Parameters for appeal against acquittal.
  2. Examination of independent witnesses.
  3. Reliance on testimonies of PWs 5 to 7.
  4. Reliance on the statement of PW-1.
  5. FIR and its implications under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  6. Identification of accused and sufficiency of light.
  7. Conduct of the accused.
  8. Medical evidence and its correlation with ocular evidence.
  9. Recovery of weapons and other material objects.
  10. Role and behavior of PWs 3 and 4.
  11. Application of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
  12. Interference by appellate court in judgments of acquittal.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Parameters for appeal against acquittal:
  The appellants contended that the High Court misdirected itself by not considering that the parameters for entertaining an appeal against a judgment of acquittal differ from those arising from a conviction. They argued that since two views were reasonably possible, the impugned judgment was unsustainable in law. The Supreme Court acknowledged that ordinarily, an appellate court would not interfere with an acquittal if two views are possible. However, it noted that serious infirmities in the trial court's judgment could justify interference.
  
  2. Examination of independent witnesses:
  The appellants argued that the non-examination of independent witnesses cited in the chargesheet should have raised doubts about the prosecution's version. The Supreme Court did not find this argument compelling, emphasizing that the overall credibility of the evidence presented was more critical.
  
  3. Reliance on testimonies of PWs 5 to 7:
  The appellants contended that the High Court should not have relied on the statements of PWs 5 to 7, which were found doubtful by the trial judge. The Supreme Court, however, found that the trial judge had erred in disbelieving these witnesses based on minor inconsistencies and the lack of documentary proof of their presence.
  
  4. Reliance on the statement of PW-1:
  The appellants argued that reliance on the statement of PW-1 was misplaced. The Supreme Court held that PW-1, as an injured witness, was credible, and there was no reason to disbelieve his testimony. The Court emphasized that the testimony of an injured witness should be given due weight, especially when corroborated by other evidence.
  
  5. FIR and its implications under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
  The trial judge had held that the FIR was hit by Section 162 of the Code because the general diary entry was not produced. The Supreme Court clarified that an information received by an officer in charge of a police station does not need to be preceded by an FIR to be actionable. The Court found that the FIR recorded at 3 a.m. was valid and not vitiated by prior entries in the general diary.
  
  6. Identification of accused and sufficiency of light:
  The trial judge doubted the identification of the accused due to insufficient light. The Supreme Court found this reasoning flawed, noting that the accused and the witnesses were from the same village and known to each other. The light near the conductor's seat was on, making identification possible.
  
  7. Conduct of the accused:
  The Supreme Court highlighted the conduct of the accused, who were absconding for a long time, as indicative of their guilt. The Court referenced previous judgments to support the view that such behavior could be taken into account when assessing the credibility of the prosecution's case.
  
  8. Medical evidence and its correlation with ocular evidence:
  The trial judge found discrepancies between the medical and ocular evidence. The Supreme Court noted that minor inconsistencies should not lead to the rejection of credible eyewitness testimony. The Court found that the medical evidence corroborated the overall sequence of events described by the witnesses.
  
  9. Recovery of weapons and other material objects:
  The trial judge had disbelieved the recovery of weapons due to inconsistencies in their description. The Supreme Court found that the recovery of weapons and blood-stained clothes was credible and supported the prosecution's case.
  
  10. Role and behavior of PWs 3 and 4:
  The Supreme Court noted that PWs 3 and 4, the driver and conductor of the bus, had not provided complete details of the incident, likely to avoid trouble. The Court found that their partial testimony did not undermine the credibility of other witnesses.
  
  11. Application of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus:
  The Supreme Court reiterated that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) is not applicable in India. The Court held that even if some accused were acquitted, it did not mean that the main accused should also be given the benefit of doubt.
  
  12. Interference by appellate court in judgments of acquittal:
  The Supreme Court affirmed that appellate courts could interfere with acquittals if the trial court's judgment was perverse, highly unreasonable, or based on irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. The Court found that the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal due to serious errors in the appreciation of evidence and legal principles.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment convicting the appellants for the murder of the deceased and causing injuries to PW-1. The Court found no merit in the appellants' arguments and emphasized the importance of credible eyewitness testimony, proper appreciation of evidence, and the conduct of the accused in reaching its decision.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 781
  
  Issues involved: Appeal u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding trading addition and rejection of books of account.
  
  The respondent, a partnership firm involved in manufacturing and export, was assessed under Section 143(3) of the Act for the assessment year 2001-02. The assessing officer rejected the books of account due to a decline in Gross Profit Rate (GPR) and added Rs. 20,83,752 based on a GPR of 27%. The Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal, deleting the addition as no specific defect in the books of account was pointed out. The Commissioner held that the rejection was unjustified as the appellant was not obligated to maintain detailed records of raw materials due to the variety of products manufactured. The Tribunal upheld this decision, stating that without any defect in the books of account, the assessing officer's addition was unwarranted.
  
  The revenue appealed to challenge the deletion of the trading addition, arguing that the appellant failed to provide quantitative details of raw materials despite being given an opportunity. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision, emphasizing the lack of justification for the assessing officer's addition without specific defects in the books of account. The revenue contended that the books were rightly rejected under Section 145(3) of the Act due to inability to verify the declared GPR of 25.38%.
  
  The High Court dismissed the revenue's appeal, noting that no specific defect in the books of account was identified by the assessing officer. The court upheld the findings of the Commissioner and the Tribunal, stating that no substantial question of law arose for determination. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 780
  
  Issues involved: Modvat credit on parts/components of D.G. Set received by the assessee, who is not the manufacturer of the D.G. Set. Entitlement for credit on parts/components of D.G. Set when a complete D.G. Set was received from the supplier.
  
  Summary:
  The reference application was admitted by the High Court concerning the correctness of allowing modvat credit on parts/components of D.G. Set to the assessee, who did not manufacture the D.G. Set but received it from another person. The Revenue raised questions on the entitlement of the assessee for credit on parts/components of D.G. Set received from their supplier. The Commissioner had earlier disallowed modvat credit to the respondent, alleging irregular availing of the credit. The assessee had received parts/components of D.G. Sets and availed modvat credit without disclosing that the components belonged to another entity. The Tribunal found that the components received by the assessee were covered under the definition of capital goods, and they had paid duty on them. Citing precedents, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to claim modvat credit on the duty paid components. The High Court noted that the Tribunal's decision was consistent with previous judgments and no contrary view was presented. As there were no substantial questions of law arising, the application for reference was dismissed.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 779
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Effect of the amendment in Section 2(17) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 on the vested right to claim tax exemption.
  2. Whether blending of tea amounts to manufacture under the amended Act.
  3. Constitutionality of the amendment under Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
  4. Application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Effect of the Amendment in Section 2(17) on Vested Right to Claim Tax Exemption:
  The core issue revolves around whether the amendment to Section 2(17) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994, which omitted the phrase "and includes blending of tea," affected the vested right of the petitioner company to claim tax exemption under Section 39. The petitioner company argued that their right to tax exemption crystallized when they set up their industrial unit and made the first sale in 1999, based on the then-existing definition of "manufacture." The amendment, effective from August 1, 2001, was contended to be prospective and should not affect the already accrued rights. The court, however, held that the amendment was prospective and did not retrospectively take away any benefits already enjoyed by the petitioners. The court emphasized that the legislative power to amend statutes includes the power to withdraw concessions, and such amendments do not amount to an irrevocable vested right.
  
  2. Whether Blending of Tea Amounts to Manufacture:
  Initially, blending of tea was included in the definition of "manufacture" under Section 2(17) of the Act, qualifying the petitioner for tax exemptions. Post-amendment, blending of tea ceased to be considered a manufacturing process from August 1, 2001. The petitioner argued that the amendment should not affect their right to exemption for the prescribed period of seven years. The court concluded that the amendment was prospective and operational from the date of the amendment, thus altering the status of blending tea as a manufacturing process for future cases.
  
  3. Constitutionality of the Amendment under Article 14 and Article 19:
  The petitioner contended that if the amendment deprived them of the exemption, it would be violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The court, however, found no merit in this argument, stating that the amendment was a legislative action within the competence of the legislature. The court reiterated that legislative amendments could alter existing rights unless explicitly stated otherwise. The principle of legislative supremacy allows the legislature to amend laws, which may affect existing rights, provided it does not infringe upon constitutional rights.
  
  4. Application of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel:
  The petitioner did not base their claim on promissory estoppel but argued that their right to exemption was already crystallized. The court noted that promissory estoppel does not apply against legislative actions. The court cited several precedents, including the Supreme Court's rulings in "Kasinka Trading vs. Union of India" and "MRF Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax," which held that exemptions granted under statutory provisions could be withdrawn if public interest so demanded. The court concluded that the petitioner's right to exemption was not absolute and could be altered by subsequent legislative amendments.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court upheld the decision of the Learned Taxation Tribunal, stating that the amendment to Section 2(17) was prospective and did not retrospectively affect the petitioner's right to exemption. The court affirmed that legislative amendments could alter existing rights and that the principle of promissory estoppel does not apply against legislative actions. Consequently, the petitioner's application was dismissed, and similar writ petitions were disposed of in light of this judgment.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 778
  

  Investigation by the CBI without the prior consent of the State - letter in the nature of 'inter-Departmental communication' by the Deputy Secretary to the State of Madhya Pradesh to the Secretary to Central Government - could be treated as valid consent - alleged offences had committed at Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh and CBI had no power, authority or jurisdiction to institute criminal proceedings direction issued by the High Court was ex facie erroneous - HELD THAT:- A notification required to be issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Delhi Act specifying offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as also under several other Acts has been issued on September 7, 1989 and has been placed by the respondent on record along with the affidavit-in-reply filed by Superintendent of Police, CBI, Bhopal. The said notification covers inter alia, the offences punishable under Sections 417, 418, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 511, IPC.

  Likewise, the Central Government passed an order on February 18, 1963 as contemplated by Section 5 of the Delhi Act extending the powers and jurisdiction of the members of Special Police Establishment to various States including the State of Madhya Pradesh for the investigation of offences specified in the Schedule annexed to the said schedule. The Schedule specifies various offences under IPC including the offences referred to hereinabove, offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and various other enactments. Thus, Section 3 and 5 of the Delhi Act have been complied with.

  The counter argument on behalf of the respondent is that such consent has been given by the State Government which is reflected in the order dated February 5, 1957. The learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that all executive actions of the Government of a State must be taken in accordance with and as per the procedure laid down in Article 166 of the Constitution.

  Bare reading of Clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution makes it clear that all executive actions of the Government of a State should be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) provides for the authentication of the orders and other instructions made and executed in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the Government of the State and for the allocation of business among the Ministers, usually known as 'Rules of Business' or 'Business Rules'.

  The Court nonetheless held the consent valid as general consent was all that was required by law. Though it did not remark on the form in which such consent should be given, i.e. the letter, was correct or not, the fact that it could find nothing wrong with the consent raises a strong presumption in favour of the argument that a letter can be a means of granting consent by the State Government under Section 6.

  In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta [1969 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT], this Court observed that it had been repeatedly held that provisions of Article 166(1) and (2) were 'directory' and 'substantial' compliance with those provisions was sufficient. In that case, the order impugned was made in the name of the State Government but was signed by the Chief Secretary. The order was held valid.

  In the present case, the decision produced by the respondent along with the counter-affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Bhopal clearly sets out all the particulars required by Section 6 of the Delhi Act. It refers to the file/reference number, name of the department, the authority from whom it was issued and communicated to the concerned department of the Central Government. It, therefore, cannot be said that the State Government had not granted consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Act.

  Section 6 which speaks of consent of State Government for the exercise of powers and jurisdiction of the Special Establishment neither refers to 'notification' nor 'order'. It merely requires consent of the State Government for the application of the Delhi Act. Parliament, in our considered opinion, advisedly and deliberately did not specify the mode, method or manner for granting consent though in two preceding sections such mode was provided. If it intended that such consent should be in a particular form, it would certainly have provided the form as it was aware of different forms of exercise of power. It, therefore, depends on the facts of each case whether the consent required by Section 6 of the Delhi Act has or has not been given by the State Government and no rule of universal application can be laid down.

  Thus, there is no doubt that the State of Madhya Pradesh has given consent as envisaged by Section 6 of the Delhi Act and prosecution instituted by CBI against the appellant cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. The appeal, hence, deserves to be dismissed and we accordingly do so.

  Appeal is dismissed accordingly.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 777
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to the interference with Catering Policy of 2005 in respect of reservations by the Division Bench of Orissa High Court.
  
  Judgment Summary:
  
  Interference with Catering Policy of 2005: The Supreme Court held that the interference with the Catering Policy of 2005 by the Division Bench of Orissa High Court was not justified. It was emphasized that government policy decisions should not be interfered with unless they are contrary to statutory rules or the Constitution. Since no evidence was presented to show that the Policy violated any legal provisions, the Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeals.
  
  Dismissal of Appeal: The appeal was dismissed in light of the orders passed in C.A.NO.1336/2006 and C.A. NO.1362/2006. No costs were awarded in this matter.
  
  This summary captures the key issues and details of the judgment regarding the challenge to the interference with the Catering Policy of 2005 by the Division Bench of Orissa High Court.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 776
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the court can dismiss a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the wife.
  2. The interpretation and application of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding maintenance claims.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Dismissal of Maintenance Petition Due to Restitution of Conjugal Rights Decree
  The primary issue was whether a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be dismissed solely because a decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed against the wife. The Family Court had rejected the wife's claim for maintenance on this ground, asserting that the wife was living separately without a valid reason, as determined in the restitution of conjugal rights proceedings.
  
  The judgment clarified that Section 125 of the Code does not stipulate that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights can bar a wife from claiming maintenance. The court emphasized that the criteria for granting maintenance under Section 125 are distinct from those in restitution of conjugal rights proceedings. Specifically, Section 125(4) mentions that a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she "refuses" to live with her husband without sufficient reason, not merely if she "fails" to live with him. The court highlighted the difference between "refusal" and "failure," noting that refusal implies an offer from the husband that the wife rejects, whereas failure does not necessarily involve such an offer.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation and Application of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  The court extensively analyzed Section 125 of the Code, which provides for maintenance of wives, children, and parents. The essential requisites for granting maintenance are:
  1. The wife is unable to maintain herself.
  2. The husband has sufficient means.
  3. The husband neglects or refuses to maintain the wife.
  
  The court reiterated that these three factors are the only requirements for granting maintenance under Section 125(1). It cited precedents, including the Supreme Court judgments in Begum Subanu v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor and Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, to support this interpretation.
  
  The court noted that the Family Court had found the husband had sufficient means and that the wife was unable to maintain herself. However, the Family Court had erred in rejecting the maintenance claim based on the restitution of conjugal rights decree, as this did not constitute a valid ground under Section 125(4). The court explained that Section 125(4) bars maintenance only if the wife "refuses" to live with the husband without sufficient reason, not merely if she lives separately.
  
  The judgment also emphasized the need for a liberal interpretation of Section 125 to protect the rights of destitute women, children, and parents. It cited the Supreme Court's guidance in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat, which stressed the special object of Section 125 to provide a quick and summary remedy for those unable to maintain themselves.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that the Family Court had committed an illegality by rejecting the wife's maintenance claim without considering the distinct criteria under Section 125. The decree for restitution of conjugal rights did not automatically disentitle the wife from receiving maintenance. The court directed the husband to pay maintenance of Rs. 500/- per month to the wife from the date of the Family Court's order. It also clarified that the husband could still make an offer under Section 125(3) or apply for cancellation of the maintenance order under Section 125(5) if there were sufficient grounds. The revision petition was allowed.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 775
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment addresses the issue of whether an application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act can be entertained at a later stage, including during arguments after the entire trial.
  
  Issue 1: Application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act
  
  The revision petition under Article 227 was filed to revise an order regarding the application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act for sending signatures for comparison and expert opinion. The court considered inconsistent views taken by different judges on maintaining such applications at a belated stage. The court emphasized that revisional jurisdiction may not be necessary if the trial court's decision based on expert evidence can be corrected in appeal. The petitioner argued that filing such an application after closing evidence amounts to reopening the suit, while the respondent contended that once the trial court exercises discretion, evidence cannot be shut in. The court examined previous judgments where it was held that expert opinion is not conclusive but only a piece of evidence for the court to consider.
  
  Issue 2: Previous Cases Considered
  
  The court briefly discussed three cases: Kaveti Sarada, Pulaparti Sankuntala Bai, and Guru Govindu. In Kaveti Sarada, the court upheld the objection to a belated application for expert opinion on a pronote. In Pulaparti Sankuntala Bai, the court rejected an application for expert analysis of an agreement of sale after evidence was recorded. In Guru Govindu, the court allowed the filing of an application under Section 45 of the Evidence Act even at the stage of arguments, emphasizing that expert opinion is supporting material and not conclusive.
  
  Issue 3: Court's Interpretation and Conclusion
  
  The court referred to the Supreme Court's ruling on the effect of the deletion of a proviso to Order 18 Rule 2(4) CPC, emphasizing the court's inherent power to permit parties to produce evidence at a later stage. The court concluded that no fixed time could be set for filing applications under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, leaving it to the discretion of the court based on the exigencies of each case. Quoting Justice Vivian Bose, the court highlighted the procedural nature of the Code of Civil Procedure, designed to facilitate justice without being overly technical.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the court's discretion in entertaining applications under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for flexibility and justice in procedural matters.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 774
  
  The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal due to a delay of 665 days. The case was found to be covered by a previous judgment in Income-tax Appeal No.296 of 2001. The motion along with the appeal was dismissed.

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• 2008 (3) TMI 773
  

  Challenged the order passed by High court - Departmental proceeding - Guilty for Non compliance of the Railway Vigilance Manual (the Manual) - Booking Supervisor with the Central Railways - penalty of reduction to the lowest scale of pay - transaction between the decoy passengers and the respondents reported to have been witnessed by the RPF Constables - HELD THAT:- We have been taken through the evidence of Shri S.B. Singh by Dr. Padia. Significantly the examination-in-chief was conducted by the Enquiry Officer himself. As the proceeding was for imposition of a major penalty, why the Presenting Officer, who must have been engaged by the department, did not examine the witness is beyond any comprehension. Even the minimum safeguard in regard to the manner in which examination-in-chief was conducted has not been preserved. The questions posed to him were leading questions. It is interesting to note that in answer to a question as to whether he had asked the appellant to return Rs. 5/- , he not only answered in the negative but according to him the said statement was made by him as instructed by the Vigilance Inspector. He although proved Exhibits P/1 and P/2 which were written in English language but also stated that he did not know what had been written therein Strangely enough, the Enquiry Officer started reexamining him. Even in the re-examination he accepted that he could not read and write English.

  The High Court unfortunately even without any material on record held that some excess amount was found from the appellant which itself was sufficient to raise a presumption that it had been recovered from the decoy passenger. No such presumption could be raised. In any event there was no material brought on records by the department for drawing the said inference. The High Court itself was exercising the power of judicial review. It could not have drawn any presumption without there being any factual foundation therefor. It could not have taken judicial notice of a fact which did not come within the purview of Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act.

  The approach of the High Court, in our opinion, was not entirely correct. If the safeguards are provided to avoid false implication of a railway employee, the procedures laid down therein could not have been given a complete go bye.

  It is the High Court who posed unto itself a wrong question. The onus was not upon the appellant to prove any bias against the RPF, but it was for the department to establish that the charges levelled against the appellant. High Court also committed a serious error in opining that Sub-rule (21) of Rule 9 of the Rules was not imperative. The purpose for which the sub-rule has been framed is clear and unambiguous. The railway servant must get an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him. In this case he has been denied from the said opportunity.

  Thus, the manner in which the enquiry proceeding was conducted was required to be taken into consideration by the High Court. The trap was not conduced in terms of the Manual; the Enquiry Officer acted as a Prosecutor and not as an independent quasi judicial authority; he did not comply with Rule 9(21) of the Rules, evidently, therefore, it was not a case where the order of the Tribunal warranted interference at the hands of the High Court.

  The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and that of the Tribunal restored. The appeal is allowed with costs.

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